PROJECT TITLE:

Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

1.3 Review: Civil- Military Synergies

Lead beneficiary: National Defence University/ Finnish Defence Forces International Centre

Delivery date: M6

Revision: 2.0

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dissemination Level</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PU: Public</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP: Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RE: Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contents

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................ iv
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... iv
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................ vi
ACRONYMS .............................................................................................................. viii

1 INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................... 9
  1.1 Purpose of the deliverable ............................................................................. 12
  1.2 Structure of the deliverable ........................................................................ 13

2 CIVIL- MILITARY RELATIONS IN EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT ...................... 15
  2.1 Development of the theoretical framework for EU crisis management structures ........................................ 16
  2.2 Scope of the interaction ............................................................................... 17
  2.3 Civil- Military Cooperation (CIMIC) ................................................................ 20
  2.4 Civil- Military Coordination (CMCO) .............................................................. 21
  2.5 Comprehensive Approach (CA) to crisis management .................................. 23
  2.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................. 28

3 EU’S COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CRISIS - INTERNAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION ........................................................................................................... 29
  3.1 CSDP - The framework of civil-military interactions within the EU .............. 29
    3.1.1 Key policies and documents relevant to CSDP ......................................... 29
    3.1.2 Institutions and Actors ............................................................................ 34
  3.2 Civilian and Military capabilities .................................................................. 35
  3.3 Lessons Learned Cycle .................................................................................. 39
  3.4 Planning and Conducting CSDP missions and operations ............................... 45
    3.4.1 Early warning and situational awareness ............................................... 45
    3.4.2 Planning and decision making ................................................................. 46
3.4.3 Command and Control (C2) ........................................................................................................ 52
3.4.4 Information sharing and reporting .......................................................................................... 55
3.4.5 Finance and Procurement ........................................................................................................ 56
3.4.5 Training ..................................................................................................................................... 58
3.4.6 Staffing ...................................................................................................................................... 63
3.5 Civil- military interaction in theatre .......................................................................................... 66
3.5.1 Overview of the CDSP mission and operation deployed parallel ........................................... 67
3.5.2 Interaction between CSDP missions and operations in theatre ............................................. 73
3.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 78
4 LESSONS FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CRISIS ......... 80
4.1 Lessons learned from comprehensive approach to CSDP ......................................................... 81
4.1.1 Annual reports ......................................................................................................................... 81
4.1.2 Lessons identified on CSDP civil- military interface ............................................................... 82
4.2 Limitations to developing the comprehensive approach to crisis management ...................... 92
4.3 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 96
5 INTER- ORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION .......................................................................... 97
5.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)- European Union (EU) ........................................ 98
5.2 United Nations (UN) – European Union (EU) ............................................................................ 108
5.3 Regional international organizations ......................................................................................... 116
5.3.1 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) - European Union (EU) .... 116
5.3.2 African Union (AU) – European Union (EU) ........................................................................ 121
5.4 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 125
6 TOWARDS ENHANCED COOPERATION AND COORDINATION .................................. 127
6.1 Implementation of comprehensive approach in CSDP .............................................................. 128
6.2 Civil- Military synergies ............................................................................................................. 132

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

European Union (EU) is a unique actor in conflict prevention and crisis management in comparison to its international counter partners. It has vast potentiality in combining civilian and military means to tackle a complex crisis. Combining the strengths of both military and civilian capabilities can enhance the visibility, impact and efficiency of EU’s interventions, thereby supporting the EU’s Foreign Security Policy objectives. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the EU to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and strengthening international security.

Purposeful coordination and cooperation between the different EU actors, namely between civilian and military ones, is perceived to be of utmost importance for the coherence and efficiency of the EU’s conflict management efforts. The aim of the civil- military cooperation/coordination imperative is not about creating new structures nor new mechanisms, nor about merging respective capability development processes. It is about acknowledging one another’s competences, identifying the combination of the full range of available capabilities and resources and use them in a coordinated and coherent manner, thereby reinforcing the desired progress and create synergies where appropriate. Promoting this culture of coordination requires the interagency members, to the greatest degree possible, to resist seeing their capabilities and resources as belonging to a single agency, but rather as tools of the EU’s power to achieve the desired outcome by sharing, leveraging, synchronizing, and applying them.

This deliverable “Review: civil- military synergies” is a first step in the implementation of the IECEU project, which aims to enhance the effectiveness of the European Union’s conflict prevention capabilities. This is done by identifying how to increase the interoperability of resources and capabilities and identify the potential for pooling and sharing. The aim of this deliverable is to outline the existing practices of civil- military cooperation and coordination within CSDP, thereby contributing to the identification of potential synergies between CSDP civilians and military instruments that are achieved through EU’s comprehensive approach. The prerequisite for this report is that efficient conflict prevention requires parallel deployment of military and civilian instruments that are operating, if not integrated, in a cooperative and coordinative manner.

To achieve the objectives set for this report an extensive desk research, key informant interviews and panel discussion were conducted thereby gaining a comprehensive understanding of the issue. As a result, we found out that cooperation and coordination between the EU’s civilian and military functions is a complex challenge with numerous structural, political, technical and ideological facets. A number or barriers to interoperability could be identified at political- strategic
level, such as, a lack of a united policy line among the member states when it comes to military interventions, a lack of coordination between EU institutions and with partners when planning, conducting and supporting a CSDP mission/operation and the issue of funding the missions and operations, and at operational level, such as, insufficient capabilities to reach the mission/operation objectives, absence of common training and recruitment standards and a lack of a sufficient communication system that would enable secure information sharing between the EU actors. In addition, a number of areas where added value could be achieved through enhanced cooperation and coordination between CSDP civilian and military functions were identified, including areas such as, Strategic Communication, Information sharing/dialogue, Shared accommodation, Warehouses, Transportation, Security arrangements, Common Medical facilities, Common pre-deployment and “on-theatre” training, Mutual/Integrated civil-military Lessons process and Security provision of the CSDP staff.

This deliverable is divided into 4 chapters (Chapters 2-5). Chapter 2 discusses the key concepts relevant to civil-military relations in CSDP. Chapter 3 examines the intra-institutional cooperation and coordination practises within EU’s crisis management structures, focusing on the interaction in short-term (operational) conflict prevention instruments, in particular, analysing the current practises from the conduct of CSDP missions and operations. This chapter includes analyses of the interaction between CSDP missions and operations which have been operating in the region parallel. Chapter 4 discussed CSDP’s lessons learned process and key lessons identified, related to cooperation and coordination between civilian and military crisis management capabilities and Chapter 5 reviews the intra-institutional cooperation and coordination between CSDP and the main international actors outlining the existing practises.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CilMA</td>
<td>Civilian Lessons Management Application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CivCom</td>
<td>Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CivOpsCdr</td>
<td>Civilian Operation Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crisis Management Concept</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civilian Strategic Options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO</td>
<td>Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (formerly known as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELMA</td>
<td>EUMS Lessons Management Application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDC</td>
<td>European Security and Defence College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU del</td>
<td>European Union Delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFM</td>
<td>Fact Finding Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSJ</td>
<td>Freedom, Security and Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>Headquarter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>Intelligence Steering Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>Lessons Identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LL</td>
<td>Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMG</td>
<td>Lessons Management Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSO</td>
<td>Military Strategic Options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Mission Implementation Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHQ</td>
<td>Operation Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OpCdr</td>
<td>Operation Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCEN</td>
<td>Operations Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operations Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFCA</td>
<td>Political Framework for Crisis Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOR</td>
<td>Provisional Statement Of Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIAC</td>
<td>Single Intelligence Analyses Capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASE</td>
<td>Safe and Secure Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SitCen</td>
<td>Situation Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium- sized Enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOR</td>
<td>Statement of Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371.
1 INTRODUCTION

International crisis management has undergone a major transition over the past two decades. Given the new threats emanating from fragile states, asymmetric conflicts, organised crime, and terrorism, traditional peacekeeping has frequently given way to complex peace building in protracted conflicts. As global challenges continue to rise in number and increase in complexity; the effects of climate change and degradation of natural resources, population pressures and migratory flows, illicit trafficking, energy security, natural disasters, cyber security, maritime security, regional conflicts, radicalisation and terrorism, et cetera, and as economic and financial resources remain under pressure, the case for a comprehensive approach making optimal use of all relevant civilian and military instruments - be they external or internal policy instruments - is now stronger than ever. As evolved crises have shown, security and development cannot be guaranteed by the effort of a single nation or actor alone. Instead, it can benefit from multilateralism and a networked approach, combining in the best possible way all available civil and military instruments to be applied in a coherent and coordinated manner.

The need for the increased interoperability of existing civilian and military capabilities in CSDP for the improved effectiveness, visibility and impact of the EU’s external actions has been widely recognised. Evolving crises are putting the EU’s capability to contribute to the stabilisation and resolution of the crises in its neighbourhood to a test, and the need for the EU to take a greater role in solving current issues in the global security arena by increasing the efficiency and visibility of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is now more current than ever. One of the objectives of the EU’s external action as outlined in Article 21, of the Treaty on European Union, is to ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security’. As the on-going crisis in Ukraine and struggles in fighting transnational terrorism and evolving asylum crisis have shown the preventative action may not always be possible or successful. Therefore, advancing a truly comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises is critical for an effective EU response in fragile and conflict-affected contexts. In order to address these challenges, the EU has a wide array of external policies, instruments and tools at its disposal, ranging from diplomacy and EU

---


2 The ongoing fight against Islamic State (ISIS) in the Middle-East has brought forces from several nations to the same ground. In addition, it is evident that Europe’s refugee crises demands, not only cooperation between countries, but also joint action from various internal and external security actors.

3 The CSDP was on the agenda of the meeting of Council of the European Union, December 2013, when the heads of states discussed how to enhance defence capabilities, strengthen the defence industry and improve the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP.

external cooperation instruments, to actions under the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), including regular political dialogues with third countries and international organisations, restrictive measures (sanctions), EU Special Representatives, disarmament and non-proliferation activities, and civilian and military crisis management missions under the CSDP.\(^5\)

The experience of war and re-emerged ethnic and political conflicts in the aftermath of the Cold War led the EU to develop its capabilities for crisis response within the framework of CSDP, and to adopt a political commitment to prevent violent conflicts. CSDP is not a stand-alone policy but rather a set of procedures and capabilities designed to improve and complete EU foreign policy. CSDP missions and operations are an important instrument in CFSP, enabling the Union to take a leading role in peacekeeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security. The logic and principle behind the CSDP is to expand the EU toolkit to a broad range of foreign policy instruments.\(^6\) CSDP is also an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets. Since 2003 the EU has launched some 32 peace missions and operations. From the start of its operational engagement, the EU has tried to present its ability to deploy both civilian and military instruments together as its particular strength, which is one of the main features of its comprehensive approach to crisis management.

The term ‘comprehensive approach’ was not coined in EU development policymaking circles but has emerged from discussions on the integration of civilian and military components in the CSDP. To date, there is no universal definition and the concept is interpreted depending on the context in different ways; varying from a simple understanding of a need to promote synergies between civil and military actors to a larger understanding of the need for coordination and joint efforts between all actors in crisis areas including the diplomatic representation, humanitarian and development agencies, as well as, trade and economic instruments. From the outset, a central characteristic of the EU’s comprehensive approach to crisis, particularly in the context of CSDP, has been the endeavour to achieve synergies between military and civilian parts of EU interventions\(^7\).

Despite the political will to strengthen synergies between civilian and military parts in CSDP, the current institutional reality, clear separation to civilian and military structures, have hinder the

---


\(^7\) It was stated by Council of the European Union in The European Union Exercise Concept, 9329/04 MV/RM 1, 7.5. 2004, that “as the Union is pursuing a comprehensive approach to crisis management, a strong synergy and coordination between military and civilian components will be required.”
implementation of comprehensive approach to crisis.\(^8\) Some efforts to bridge the civilian and military functions in CSDP have been made *inter alia* through the foundation of the Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD). Despite being an important step towards the integration of civil and military approaches, this new body has not been able to provide a solution for a lack of a comprehensive planning structure, which is perceived to be crucial for the implementation of a comprehensive approach to a crisis.\(^9\)

Being able to work together in coherence is however not only an institutional, but rather a cultural and political question. According to several studies and evaluation reports, cooperation and coordination between the civilian and military actors has been recognized to be important tools to increase the efficiency of international conflict prevention and crisis management efforts. Therefore, understanding the key elements enabling and on the other hand preventing interoperability of the EU’s civilian and military crisis management instruments is crucial. Identifying the strengths and weaknesses from a managing civil- military interface can significantly increase the efficiency of the EU’s interventions. The issue could not be more current, as the evolving security threats in the European soil, and the strained defence and security budgets of the Member states, force the community to look for new solutions to maintain security in a cost- efficient, preventive and sustainable manner.

To contribute to build up-to-date understanding on EU’s efforts to exploit its civil- military capabilities in CSDP, this report outlines current practises of civil- military cooperation and coordination within CSDP. To provide an overall understanding of the topic, this report discussed the emerging challenges surrounding the comprehensive approach to a crisis and how the EU tries to implement it through civil- military cooperation/coordination. The report addresses the topic of civil- military synergies, referring to it as cooperation and coordination, from a perspective of EU’s Comprehensive Approach to CSDP missions and operations, and, thus, in this report, Comprehensive Approach is understood from a “narrowed perspective”, which emphasises the need to enhance cooperation and coordination between civilian and military functions.\(^10\)

---

\(^8\) Panel of Experts (EEAS Officials), 16 June 2015; Interview with a EUTM Mali Officer, 23 September 2015.


\(^10\) Fernanda Faria discussed in her article “What EU Comprehensive Approach? Challenges for the EU action plan and beyond, ESDP”, *ECDMP Briefing Note*, No. 71. (2014), the issue of how Comprehensive Approach is interpreted in different context. The approach used in IECEU, is based on the Comprehensive Approach to Conflicts and Crisis (this is further discussed in this report chapter 2.5 Comprehensive Approach (CA) to crisis management.) According to which, it is argued that in the absence of a sense of urgency (e.g. crisis or conflict and a clear perception of threat to common EU interests) it is difficult for all relevant EU actors (institutions and member states) to agree on a joint strategy and, above all, commit to its rapid implementation. Even in crisis situations, as for instance in Syria, too many interests and a complex and fluid situation makes a shared understanding and policy approach difficult. In addition, a Comprehensive Approach requires significant amounts of human resources, time investment and expertise that the EU can hardly mobilize in every context. It entails a process of coordination and articulation that is even more complex and time-intensive.
The report aims at enhancing understanding on how the Comprehensive approach is practised in the planning of an operation and mission, as well as how synergies within CSDP have been searched in the areas where several missions and operations have been in the area parallel. Due to the importance of ‘using the full potential of the existing capabilities’ to respond to a crisis in a coherent and resource efficient manner, the study also identifies the main barriers to interoperability, explores key lessons of using civil- military assets in a comprehensive manner in a post- Lisbon Treaty setting.

In addition, this report provides an overview of the key concepts and procedures relevant for the civil- military cooperation and coordination from planning to implementation of the EU’s interventions to conflicts. Even though the Comprehensive Approach in practise also encompasses relations between CSDP missions/ operations and EU delegations, Commission Humanitarian (ECHO) and Development (DEVCO) and more and more internal security functions (FSJ), the scope of this report will be limited to the examination of civil-military synergies within CSDP. Therefore, this study reviews the areas of cooperation and coordination between the civilian and military functions in the EEAS structures (political- strategic level), Operation Centres and Headquarters (operational level), as well as, inter- institutional cooperation and coordination between mission/operation and other international actors.

1.1 Purpose of the deliverable

The IECEU –project supports EU by focusing on capturing and exploiting the best and most successful civilian- military synergies. The study ‘Civil- military synergies’ contributes to the overall objective of the IECEU- project by outlining the key issues related to solid civil- military cooperation and coordination within CSDP. Through extensive desk study, key informant interviews and panel discussions, we aim at ensuring the topicality, accuracy and relevance of the study, thereby creating a foundation for the latter case studies conducted.

---

11 In this report the following CSDP missions and operations are reviewed; EUFOR and EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina, EUTM Mali and EUCAP SAHEL Mali and EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP Nestor.

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
The deliverable is built on existing knowledge. Before the deliverable was written, a comprehensive review of on-going discussion in Media including social media, blogs and discussions platforms, state- of the art literature, as well as policy paper practise related to civil- military cooperation and coordination in crisis management missions and operations within the EU, was undertaken. A wide range of experts (military and civilian) were consulted through semi- structured interviews, as well as informal conversations in person, by phone and email.

Deliverable 1.3. builds on the above by introducing the blocks of civil- military cooperation and coordination within CSDP. The added value of this particular deliverable is that it provides an overview for those seeking deeper understanding of existing civil- military synergies in CSDP missions and operations. The deliverable outlines the existing and potential areas of cooperation between missions and operations and underlines the main institutional and organisational barriers, as well as enablers for the interoperability of civilian and military functions under the CSDP.

1.2 Structure of the deliverable

In chapter 2, an overview of the institutionalisation of CSDP structures is briefly discussed with an aim of outlining the implications of the ‘Huntington’ and ‘Janowitzian’ models to the understanding of civil- military interface within the EU. In addition, chapter 2 approaches the key concepts related to civil-military interaction and how the interface has emerged and is applied to the institutionalisation of CSDP.

Chapter 3 discusses the intra- institutional cooperation and coordination practises within CSDP. This chapter outlines the institutional and legal settings relevant for the coordination of civil- military functions in EU. This chapter focuses on the civil-military cooperation and coordination in short-term (operational) conflict prevention instruments, in particular, analysing the current practices from the conduct of CSDP mission and operations. By outlining some of the emerging lessons preventing and enabling the fostering of civil- military coordination within CSDP at a political-strategic and operational level, the chapter will contribute to the latter Working packages of the project building on the identification and analysis of the possibilities, opportunities and potential for the civil- military synergies in CSDP. The analysis are primarily conducted through interviews and

---

13 The interview template is Annex 1 - Thematic Interview.
14 Interviews and news from 2015.
expert panel discussions; utilizing the expertise of prominent civilian and military experts in peace support and crisis management. Chapter 4 complements chapter 3 by highlighting the key lessons learned from coordination/cooperation between EU's crisis management actors within CSDP. In chapter 5, the civil- military cooperation and coordination between the CSDP and its key partners, namely the UN, NATO, OSCE and AU, is discussed, as working with partners is recognised to be one of the priority areas for enhanced efficiency. Chapter 6 reviews the main findings to barriers to interoperability between civilian and military actors within CSDP, as well as areas where further synergies could be developed.
There are vast studies on civil-military interfaces. These studies have often focused on how the armed forces should be arranged and managed within a society. The traditional point of concern for the management of civil-military relations has been how to create effective military forces under proper civilian control. The understanding of the effective organization has been strongly influenced by two works: The Soldier and the State (1957) from Samuel Huntington and the Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (1960) written by Morris Janowitz. Their works are a sort of blueprint for the institutionalization of the EU’s crisis management structures. To get a better understanding on the development of the EU’s civil-military structures, this chapter starts with a brief discussion on the theoretical framework on civil-military interface followed by a discussion on the concepts related to civil-military relations within peacekeeping and crisis management.

There are several concepts or tools that are used by EU and other international organizations to describe the relations between the civilian and military sides. Two concepts are usually mentioned in efforts to interconnect civil and military approaches to crisis management: Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), and Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO). A clear distinction between these two concepts can be made: CIMIC is a military function, which is primarily a support function to the military mission related to cooperation between different actors in the field at operational-tactical level, whereas the CMCO refers to the internal coordination of EU actions at the political and strategic level, also covering the implementation of EU actions in crisis management.

Based on the available literature, this chapter aims at the explanation of the key concepts (i.e. CIMIC, CMCO, CA) used to describe the scope of the interaction between civilian and military actors in EU by outlining the main differences between the concepts, and explaining how and where they are usually applied within the EU. Because CSDP is an instrument under CFSP, this chapter also shortly outlines how the implementation of the comprehensive approach through civil-military cooperation/coordination practices support the EU’s long and short-term conflict prevention efforts.

---

2.1 Development of the theoretical framework for EU crisis management structures

The development of the EU’s crisis management structures have been impacted by the Huntington’s and Janowitzian works on civil- military relations.\(^{18}\) Especially, Huntington’s work has influenced how civil-military relations are approached and organized in most of democratic states, and has thus influenced on the development of the NATO and EU structures. In fact, NATO has played a central role in the institutionalization of the EU’s foreign security affairs during the early 21\(^{st}\) century. A pre-condition for developing the EU’s own military crisis management capabilities was that it would not weaken NATO. Additionally, the Berlin Plus agreement signed in 2001 decreased the need to continue the development of EU's independent military capabilities. Maintaining NATO as the major international military player was in the interest of EU member states, who are also a part of the allies, as well as of the United States, who wanted to ensure that it would have a strong voice on European Security issues. The development of the EU's civil-military relations have also been characterized by the absence of a clear civilian crisis management structure, which resulted in adding a well-organized military structure as a separate unit to the civilian dominant institution.\(^{19}\)

The 9/11 event impacted the development of the international community’s perception towards international security, shifting from robust peace-keeping towards the stabilization of fragile states.\(^{20}\) This new security context, together with lessons learned from CSDP missions deployed since 2003, changed the perception on the appropriateness of strictly separate civilian and military crisis management structures. Janowitz\(^{21}\) discussed the same issue already in 1960, arguing that

\(^{18}\) Huntington’s model for civil- military relations, which is still referred to as the “normal theory,” is based on an idea that in order to create effective armed forces it must be under proper civilian control and there must be “a strict ideological and physical separation of the military and civilian spheres.” In practical terms, this means that the civilian and military is arranged to separate units, with limited vertical interaction at other than management level. The “Janowitzian model” of civil-military relations already acknowledged the obstacles that a strict separation of planning and command structures cause for the military to carry out the tasks in changed security environment. Janowitz, argued already in 1960, that this change of role of armed forces, added a new set of requirements to the military profession. According to him ‘proper civilian control and effective use of the armed forces can only be achieved by political integration and education of the officer corps’. This cannot be achieved through separation, due to the inevitable political and social impact of the military establishment on civil society. According to ‘Janowitz model’ the ideal civil-military interface, would be to break down cultural barriers between the military profession and the rest of society.


\(^{21}\) Janowitz, A Social and Political Portrait.
fostering the effectiveness of the armed forces require that the interoperability between the civilian and military is enhanced by breaking down the cultural and structural barriers. This conception can also be traced in the European Security Strategy (ESS), in which it is stated that the EU’s competitive advantage is its ability to deploy a large number of different civilian capabilities that can be used parallel to military ones. These experiences have led to the need to develop a ‘culture of coordination’ within the EU foreign policy instruments, thereby questioning the efficiency of the “Hungintons” institutional settings to tackle a complex crisis.

This idea has become relevant in the context of peace building and stability operations and the need for comprehensive strategies, planning and command arrangements that incorporate all instruments of power. As Norheim- Martinsen (2010)\textsuperscript{22} concludes in his analysis, recent operational experience has shown that effective crisis management requires a quick response from flexible teams of people with various professional backgrounds who can address different types of challenges, i.e. filling immediate security gaps, while, at the same time, starting to build local capacity. Due to the complexity of the contemporary crisis, civilian instruments cannot simply be added to once peace is restored, but needs to be involved already during the early phases of planning for an operation. The gradual disintegration from NATO and EU’s strengthening capabilities to conduct out crisis management operations along the whole civilian- military spectrum on its own has had an impact on the EU’s policy making, which nowadays is showing attempts to implement the ‘Janowitzian approach’ to the civil- military interface, by developing the comprehensive approach.

\textbf{Managing the interface}

Since 1999, the EU has shown the ambition to strengthen its role as a unique strategic actor with an ability to mix civilian and military crisis management instruments as part of a comprehensive approach. Until today, the EU’s ambition has materialised as a number of institutional innovations attempting to enhance the EU’s ability to implement a truly comprehensive approach. However, the current institutional set-up for the civil- military interface resulted from struggles and compromises between the Member States and have reflected on considerations rather than developing effective civil- military structures.

\textbf{2.2 Scope of the interaction}

This increased engagement by the military in humanitarian crises has been controversial, particularly for humanitarians. The key, overarching and widely documented challenge facing civil–military interaction within peace building concerns the tension between the neutral and impartial

\textsuperscript{22} Norheim- Martinsen, “Managing the Civil-Military Interface in the EU"
provision of humanitarian assistance and the political and strategic objectives of military forces and the governments that direct them.  

A growing number of policymakers and scholars are recognizing the urgent need for standards, guidelines, and best practices for civil-military relations in peace building and stabilization activities.  

Civilian and military specialists share the goals of avoiding tensions and conflicting purposes and maximizing the potential for cooperation, in order to achieve more effective and timely peace building interventions. This is because; it is frequent that military and civilian actors work together on the same theatre of operations. For instance, a civilian organization might undertake humanitarian or monitoring activities during the first stage of post-conflict management. In addition, the activities of humanitarian and military operations may affect each other at the strategic, operational and tactical level, and even, on some occasions, have a negative impact on each other. For this reason, civil-military co-ordination has been recognized as a key issue in post-conflict management.

However, the scope of the interface is context specific and it can take place at different levels and in different forms. In times of large humanitarian disasters, such as an earthquake in Haiti or Ebola, it has shown that in times of ‘external’ crisis, the international community has the ability to employ the civilian and military assets across a spectrum in a coordinated or even integrated manner. International organisations have created various concepts to describe the scope and depth of the interaction between civilian and military functions. Discourse describing civil-military relations is enriched by different terms. When using terms, such as ‘interoperability’, ‘coordination’, and ‘ integration’, it is important to understand what is meant by these terms and what their implications to civil-military relations are. As the picture below displays, different levels of relationship can be connected to different activities, such as joint planning and resource sharing.


Figure 1. Improving the EU comprehensive approach

Relations between civilian and military functions can be referred as:27

Coexistence: existing in the same time and space.

Communication: sharing information.

Collaboration: working alongside one another, but not necessarily towards shared purposes. That can include joint planning, pooling resources and evaluating outcomes together.

Co-operation: different actors work together as enablers, but are not part of the same institutional structures and do not (necessarily) share overall objectives and strategies.

Coordination: synchronizing efforts for agreed upon shared purposes.

Integration: all relevant institutions are brought together to develop common objectives and strategies and then work jointly towards meeting them.

Interaction: any action between parties.28

The aim of the interaction between civilian and military functions is often referred to as interoperability and synergy, which can be described as:

Interoperability: the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

Synergy: the increased effectiveness that results when two or more functions work together.

It would be wrong to say that some of the interaction levels are more effective than the others. The level of interaction depends on what type of relations is possible or desirable for the specific situation. It cannot, for example, be assumed that coordination is always effective or worthwhile. As outlined above, in particular, civilian relations with military or political entities beyond the coexistence level might entail a compromise of the humanitarian principles. On the other hand, as the experiences from the Ebola crisis have shown, at times, the coordination and even integration of civilian and military actors can support both actors achieve their objectives.

### 2.3 Civil- Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

The definition of EU’s CIMIC was set in Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (2002) through EU Military Committee (EUMC) and was based on the definition written by NATO. It is a function and capability that aims to enhance the relationship between the force and civil society. In a way, CIMIC is about “winning the hearts and minds” of the population to contribute to force protection and peace and stability. Thereby, CIMIC derives from the military perspective that focuses primarily on force protection, and on the need to cooperate with local authorities and civilians to reach that aim, as a part of a complex military operation.

CIMIC aims to establish and maintain co-operation with the civilian authorities and populations within the area of operations, in order to create the best possible moral, material and tactical conditions for the achievement of the mission's purpose. It is an important feature of the EU-led crisis management operations aiming at enhancing the effectiveness of those operations.

---

29 Hanssen, Civil-Military Interaction in the European Union, 12
30 The development of the EU CIMIC has been marked by two conferences. The EU CIMIC Conference held in June 2002 was oriented towards political, strategic and conceptual levels, and strived to delimit the functions between civilian and military actors in crisis situations, including the formulation of the guiding principles. The second EU CIMIC conference in June 2003 was more orientated at the operational and tactical levels. To read more about the development of the concept view: Nik Hynek, “EU crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty: civil- military coordination and the future of the EU Operational Headquarters". European Security, Vol. 20 (2011): 81– 102. Accessed 5 August 2015. doi: 10.1080/09662839.2011.556622
31 In AJP-9, NATO Civil-military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, (NATO, 2003), the CIMIC is defined as "The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies". 
In practice, CIMIC interaction usually takes place in two cases: the crisis management operation is partially dependent on civilian institutions and the population for resources, information and even security or/and there is cooperation of the military force with other international or non-governmental organizations.\textsuperscript{33}

Depending on the specific context of each operation, CIMIC-oriented measures may assume various different functions. Core functions of the European CIMIC are similar to those defined by NATO and include Civil-Military Liaison, Support to the Civil Environment and Support to the Military Force.\textsuperscript{34}

EU concept for CIMIC for EU-led military operations was published in 2008\textsuperscript{35} by European Union Military Staff (EUMS), which is responsible for planning and implementing CIMIC at the political and strategic levels, and for the procedural roles for civilian and military capacities. This includes coordinating the planning, communication, information exchange, separation of mandates and long-term goals, and the transition of responsibilities between military and civilian actors in crisis situations. Although the CIMIC concept is primarily concerned with coordination in theatre, rather than an overall strategic concept of complete institutional cooperation, CIMIC nevertheless represents an important operational component of CMCO.\textsuperscript{36}

### 2.4 Civil- Military Coordination (CMCO)

CMCO ‘addresses the need for effective coordination of the action of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of the EU’s response to crisis rather than seeking to put too much emphasis on detailed structures or procedures’ (Council of the European Union, 7 November 2003).

\textsuperscript{33} Marjan Malešič, Crisis Management in the EU: International Coordination and Civil-Military Cooperation, (Ljubljana: University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences) http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_26078.pdf (Accessed 25 August 2015)


\textsuperscript{35} To learn more about the concept, visit: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260410euconceptcimic_/sede260410euconceptcimic_en.pdf

\textsuperscript{36} Hynek, “EU crisis management after the Lisbon Treaty”
Since adoption of the EU CIMIC Concept, EU has declared its ambition to develop both civilian and military crisis management capabilities, and in this respect, there was a need to develop a concept that would address the need for effective coordination of actions of all relevant EU actors under the Council. In 2003 the EU formulated its concept for Crisis Management Coordination (CMCO), which refers both to internal EU processes with respect to civil-military coordination within ESDP/ CSDP, as well as to civil-civil coordination between the CFSP and Commission competences.

CMCO aims to coordinate the military, political and policy instruments of a CSDP, as well as the links between the community tools for crisis management and the security-political relations of the EU with external actors. CMCO is the conceptual cornerstone of EU efforts towards implementing a comprehensive approach.

Whereas CIMIC is mainly located at the operational and tactical level of the crisis management operations, CMCO is located at the political-strategic level, reflected in a crisis management concept (CMC) integrated at the level of the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The objective is to integrate civilians and the military into the various stages of crisis management, from strategic planning to crisis management, including training and exercises.

Until the establishment of CMPD and the formulation of the Lisbon Treaty, the CMCO concept provided the most significant conceptual coordination reference to the EU Comprehensive Approach to a crisis. During the period from the initial discussions of the concept and until

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CMCO is referred as;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• a culture of coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the procedure to translate the Comprehensive Approach into practise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• the prerequisite for building an effective EU response to a crisis and concerns the planning as well as implementation phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• ensuring within the EU an effective co-ordination of the whole range of the EU's instruments, with the challenge that the instruments may be subject to different institutional and thus decision-making processes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• also concerning cooperation with external actors</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Janina Johansen 2011, 57 -65.)

---

38 Civil-civil refers to cooperation and coordination between different civilian actors; i.e. police and human rights officers.
about 2005 when it was adopted, some attempts at making the CMCO concept more specific was made. These attempts led to the identification of five important parts that needed to be included in CMCO.\footnote{Johannsen, The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management, 57 – 65.}

1) **Comprehensive Analysis:** All actors involved must have a coherent understanding of the crisis at hand and how to solve it.

(2) **Comprehensive Planning:** Aims at collecting all different actors in a common planning effort.

(3) **Management of Operations:** Aims at finding concepts for effective civil-military interaction in-theatre.

(4) **Methodology for Measuring Progress:** Commonly conducted evaluation on a continual basis.

(5) **Management of Capabilities:** Use available (and make available) relevant instruments and make them inter-operational.

These parts set the roadmap for the effectiveness of the CMCO and the implementation of a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management interventions. Unfortunately, to date, not all the concepts have been fully developed, and the implementation of the approach has been rather weak. There is still no single body within EU structures that would be responsible for ensuring the implementation of Comprehensive Approach to CSDP. Nevertheless, the conceptual conditions for implementing a Comprehensive Approach are more underdeveloped than the institutional ones.

### 2.5 Comprehensive Approach (CA) to crisis management

Nowadays, most national governments and international organisations dealing with security challenges have at least a reference to ‘comprehensiveness’ in their crisis management operations in their policy documents. The rationale of including this reference relates to developing synergy, especially between military and civil interventions, acting upon root causes of conflict, coordinating efforts of various actors involved and increasing cost-effectiveness in crisis management.\footnote{Christel Vincentz Rasmussen, Linking instruments in development and foreign policy- Comprehensive Approaches in the EU, (Copenhagen: Dils Report, 2013); Margriet Drent, The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Security: A Culture of Co-ordination?”, (Studia Diplomatica, 2011),4 http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20111000_sd_drent_approach.pdf (Accessed 19 September 2015)}

Various definitions and practices have evolved in the UN system, NATO, the EU institutions and EU member states. Therefore, it is more useful to speak of ‘comprehensive approaches’, rather than one universal comprehensive approach. In general, comprehensiveness in security refers to
an understanding that peace and development are fundamentally intertwined and that a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments are required to address the complex security environment in which crisis management operations are conducted.\textsuperscript{43} According to Wendling (2011), a common denominator for comprehensive approaches is that they refer to a mindset recognizing a holistic approach.\textsuperscript{44} Some of the approaches entail the establishment of structures and processes for coordination, including pooled funding arrangements and all the approaches involve cross-sector work.

The development of the concept has been promoted by the UN family in search for better linking security and development concerns; by NATO in search for better interaction between its military efforts and endeavours in civil reconstruction; and by the EU need to enhance internal coherence within the different instruments and actors. Table 2.\textsuperscript{45} presents the key concepts and documents used by the UN, EU and NATO referring to the comprehensiveness in relation to peacekeeping missions.

**Table 2. Comprehensive Approach- relevant documents and concepts**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Comprehensive Approach (CA) - relevant documents and concepts</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{44} Cécile Wendling, *The comprehensive approach to civil–military crisis management, a critical analysis and perspectives*, (France: IRSEM, 2011), 13.

\textsuperscript{45} Adopted from Mölling, “Comprehensive Approaches to International Crisis Management”, 3.

\textsuperscript{45} This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
In their policy documents and guidelines, both the EU and NATO refer to the approach as ‘Comprehensive Approach’, and the civil- military cooperation and coordination is highlighted to be one of its core functions. The UN uses a concept of ‘Integrated Approach’, which goes beyond the civil- military coordination to a system- wide coordination across the political, security, development, rule of law, human rights and humanitarian dimensions.\(^{46}\) The concept, introduced in the notion of “Integrated Missions” in 2006, underlines the need to involve all the relevant UN agencies in the reconstruction process, and thereby the approach is mainly about shared understandings and common strategic plans among the various UN agencies, in particular a strategic partnership between the UN peacekeeping operation and the UN country teams.\(^{47}\)

Although, both NATO and the EU use the term Comprehensive Approach, the concepts are implemented in different ways. NATO acknowledges in its reference documents that the effective implementation of a comprehensive approach requires all relevant actors - internal and external - to contribute in a concerted effort, based on a shared sense of responsibility, openness and determination, taking into account their respective strengths, mandates and roles, as well as their decision-making autonomy. Thereby, the understanding of the concept goes beyond the existing NATO doctrine on enhanced civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). However, in practice, NATO’s capability to implement the approach is limited and it requires external cooperation with civilian actors and other international organizations.\(^{48}\) This is due to the fact that as by definition NATO is a military organization, it does not have relevant civilian capabilities, and therefore it is rather a contributor for the Comprehensive Approach.\(^{49}\) There are various examples in which NATO has supported a civilian mission with its military capabilities.\(^{50}\)

The term ‘comprehensive approach’ is widely used in the EU system, and there seem to be a lack of consensus on when and for what the approach is needed. Although, the CMCO concept provides conceptual coordination reference to the EU Comprehensive Approach to crisis, it does not provide univocal definition. To take a step forwards clarifying the EU actors’ understanding of the approach, the EU High Representative and the Commission formulated Joint Communication


\(^{48}\) The implementation of NATO’s contribution to a comprehensive approach is a permanent feature of the Alliance’s work. NATO is working to make improvements in several key areas of work including the planning and conduct of operations; lessons learned, training, education and exercises; cooperation with external actors; and public messaging. For more information, see “A ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to crisis”, NATO Website, accessed 18 August 2015, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_51633.htm).

\(^{49}\) NATO formally put the Comprehensive Approach on the agenda at the Riga summit in 2006. NATO’s commitment to a Comprehensive Approach was reaffirmed and further developed at the Lisbon Summit in 2010.

\(^{50}\) E.g. by supporting EU Mission EULEX convoys and cooperation with EUPOL Afghanistan.
In this document, the European Council and HR/EEAS committed to a Comprehensive Approach that “covers all stages of the cycle of conflict or other external crisis; through early warning and preparedness, conflict prevention, crisis response and management to early recovery, stabilisation and peace building, in order to help countries getting back on track towards sustainable and long term development”.52

Despite the given definition, is there still variance in understanding on the scope of the approach, as it is often interpreted as a Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management (narrow) or Comprehensive Approach to EU external action (broad).53

The narrow understanding to Comprehensive Approach defines it as a civil-military integration limiting the approach to crisis management. It is similar in some respects to the definitions of a Comprehensive Approach to crisis management used by NATO, with the difference that whereas NATO focuses on the cooperation with external civilian actors, the EU Comprehensive Approach to crisis management is firstly internal – concerned with bringing together military and civilian actors in CSDP. 54

The broader understanding of the Comprehensive Approach for the EU is an integrated EU approach towards a third country or towards another region or group of countries.55 This Comprehensive Approach to EU external action, referred also as a ‘Whole-of-EU approach’, is a joined effort by EU institutions and member states that seeks to enhance the wide range of EU policies, instruments and actions for a more coherent and effective action upstream and beyond crises. The integration is not limited to CSDP, humanitarian or development instruments, but it seeks to create favourable conditions for transitions and consolidate progress by looking for synergies across inter-connected policy areas.56 The Figure 2. 57 below displays the range of instruments, which can be included in the broad understanding of the Comprehensive Approach.

---


52 Ibid. 2.

53 Faria outlines in her article “What EU Comprehensive Approach?”, the two main interpretations used to define EU’s Comprehensive Approach. In addition, in a study by Volker Hauck and Camilla Rocca, Gaps between Comprehensive Approaches of the EU and EU member states,( Maastricht: ECDPM, 2014) they introduced three scopes of comprehensive approach according to which “narrow” involves only civil-military, coordination, “medium” entailing, e.g., diplomacy, security/crisis management, humanitarian action and development, or “system-wide” that includes diplomacy, security/crisis management, humanitarian action, development, rule-of-law support, employment/business cooperation and trade.

54 Woollard, The EU and the Comprehensive Approach.

55 Rasmussen, Linking instruments in development, 29.


Both understandings have their merits and limits. Arguments in favour of a narrower Comprehensive Approach - focusing on crisis management - are mainly based on political and capacity issues, as it is difficult for all relevant EU actors, including institutions and member states, to agree upon a joint strategy and, above all, commit to its rapid implementation in times of crisis. There are however lots of critics towards a narrowed interpretation as it will not tackle the problems of duplication, fragmentation and competition that exist within the EU. In addition, those supporting the broad understanding of the approach argue that it better enables the EU to meet the objectives of its external action, including the prevention of conflict.  

However, as concluded by the European Council in 2014, the Comprehensive Approach is a general working method, as well as results or effectiveness, to promote coherence among the EU institutions, instruments and policies to better achieve the objectives of the EU’s external actions. The approach implies bringing together all relevant parts of the EU to work together with a common strategy towards an external object. Whether the narrow or broad interpretation is applied, civil-military cooperation is one of the key components of the EU’s Approach.

Acknowledging the limitations to the narrower understanding of the comprehensive approach, this report will nevertheless use that definition as a point of reference in talking about civil-military cooperation/coordination. This is due to the objective of the report, which is to illustrate the existing civil- military synergies within CSDP missions and operations.

---

59 The objectives of the EU External actions set out in the Lisbon Treaty and include the following: ‘promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples’ (Art. 3.1) and ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security’ (Art. 21.2(c)).
60 Woolard, The EU and the Comprehensive Approach
2.6 Conclusions

As discussed in this chapter, the institutionalization of the EU’s crisis management structures has been impacted by the traditional view on how to effectively manage a civil-military interface. In addition, the dominant role of NATO over the European security issues, and overlaps in memberships has caused a reluctance to develop the EU’s military capabilities, thereby hampering the development of an integrated civil-military organization in support of CSDP. However, due to the threats emanating from weak states and asymmetric conflicts, the accuracy to respond to crisis effectively by using the traditional model have been challenged. Civilian-military relations in CSDP are no longer only about enhancing the relationship between the force and civil society, but rather about integration civilians and the military into the various stages of crisis management, from the strategic planning to crisis management to act upon root causes of conflict, coordinating the efforts of various actors involved and increasing cost-effectiveness in crisis management.\(^{61}\) CSDP missions and operations are a tangible example of the EU’s efforts to manage a crisis in a comprehensive manner, drawing civilian and military capabilities. To strengthen the visibility and impact of these efforts on the ground, the EU has tried to find ways to increase the interoperability of the relevant civilian and military means through the development of various concepts, such as CMCO and CA, and reforming its structures. These developments have been welcome, thus with limited resources, the EU must ‘do more with less’. This fosters the need to make better use of the existing coordination and cooperation instruments, and look for further synergies between the civil and the military capability development and implementation processes wherever they can bring added value and reduce costs, both in short and long term stabilisation efforts. These efforts should not be limited due to structural and cultural reasons.

3 EU'S COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CRISIS - INTERNAL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

The EU prides itself in bringing a comprehensive approach to its crisis management. As outlined in chapter 2, the civil-military interaction has an important role to play in CSDP and the EU's ability to prevent and solve complex and multidimensional crises. For the EU- as much as for most other crisis management actors- coordination/cooperation imperative has translated into two parallel lines of effort: one internal and one external. Internally, the necessity to act in a more strategic manner has led to the development of the comprehensive approach. Externally, its increasing crisis management role has led the EU to work and develop partnerships with a range of other crisis management institutions.

In this chapter, the EU's efforts to implement a comprehensive approach in CSDP missions and operations are reviewed. To provide an overall understanding of the interaction between the EU’s civilian and military capabilities in CSDP, this review comprises the procedures and practices focusing on the efforts to facilitate internal coordination and cooperation between CSDP's civilian and military functions, thereby creating conditions for the implementation of a comprehensive approach to crises.

As outlined in chapter 2, a comprehensive approach should be employed from the planning and preparation phase of the EU missions, to the support functions of civilian and military operations in theatre. To gain a deeper understanding on the implementation efforts, this chapter maps out the different phases of CSDP’s operational cycle, assessing the existing procedures in regards to the civil-military interaction, utilizing experiences from the EUs engagement in Bosnia Herzegovina, Mali and Horn of Africa. This is because these missions and operations are deployed parallel to the same region, thereby creating a fruitful base for a case analysis on their implementation of the EU’s comprehensive approach. The assessment is based on literature review, interviews of EEAS officials, CSDP mission and operation staff and other officials, as well as a panel of experts' discussions.

3.1 CSDP - The framework of civil-military interactions within the EU

3.1.1 Key policies and documents relevant to CSDP

The official EU policies and documentation lays the foundation to the EU's comprehensive crises management. There are an extensive list of policies and documents related to civil and military
functions within CSDP\textsuperscript{62}. To get a brief overview of the framework for the civil-military interaction in CSDP, we have listed some of the key documents here.

**The European Security Strategy (ESS)**

The ESS originally builds the framework for the EU's role as a global actor. The strategy has been developed within the context of globalisation, end of the Cold War and enlargement of the EU. The strategy was adopted in 2003\textsuperscript{63}, ten years after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty\textsuperscript{64}. The strategy outlines three main principles on which all EU external action is based. Those are prevention, holistic approach and multilateralism. \textsuperscript{65} In addition, the strategy acknowledged that security is a precondition for development. Security problems often reflect the wider structural changes in a society and can no longer be seen in isolation from its political, economic and social context. \textsuperscript{66} With this acknowledgement, the ESS set the security framework in which the EU acts in a crisis management area.

The institutional complexity of the EU often makes a challenge to understanding the context and significance of its external policies. Since its establishment, the EU external policies have been formulated and managed under one of two separate institutional processes: 1) The Common Foreign and Security Policy, which includes CSDP\textsuperscript{67} and 2) External policies in areas such as foreign aid, trade and EU enlargement, which are shaped and executed under 'a community decision'- making process. \textsuperscript{68}


\textsuperscript{63} EEAS has announced the need to renew the EES and High Representative Mogherini is currently drafting the new security strategy titled “EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy” and it will be published in June 2016. The new threats are dynamic and ‘spread if they are neglected; therefore conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early’. ‘None of the new threats is purely military, nor can any be tackled by purely military means’, therefore prevention will require the application of ‘a mixture of instruments’. ‘The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations’.

\textsuperscript{64} The Maastricht Treaty created a Union with three pillars of policy cooperation – the European Community, Justice and Home Affairs and Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).


\textsuperscript{66} This sets the conceptual framework for EU Security Sector Reform (SSR). Traditionally, the security sector is viewed as comprising four different groups: Core security actors, such as Armed forces, police service, customs and border protection, 2) Management and oversight bodies, such as the executive and legislative, relevant ministries, planning and financial institutions, 3) Justice and the rule of law: and Non-statutory security forces, such as Liberation armies, private security companies, guerrillas, (Michaela Friberg-Storey, ”Security Sector Reform,” in Handbook for decision makers - The common security and defence policy of the European Union, ed. Jochen Rehrl, (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014), 169-170.

\textsuperscript{67} CFSP is intergovernmental in nature: the 28 member state governments, acting on the basis of unanimous agreement in the European Council and the Council of Ministers are the key actors.

\textsuperscript{68} This process involves all three of the main EU institutions: the European Commission, the European Council together with the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament are involved in the decision-making; Derek E.Mix, The European Union: Foreign and Security Policy, (Congressional Research Service, 2013), 2. Note: The institutions and actors of CFSP and Community are further discussed in IECEU WP 1.1. Review: from short-term stabilization to long-term peacebuilding.

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

Since the establishment of the EU, the Union has expressed its desire to act as a coherent actor on the world stage and has raised its foreign and security ambitions with the framing of CFSP.69

The objectives of the CFSP, as defined by the Treaty, include the safeguarding of the Union’s common values, its interest and integrity, the strengthening of peace and security, both within the Union and on the international stage, and the promotion of international co-operation, democracy, the rule of law and human rights (TEU, title V). To achieve the set objectives, the ESDP, CSDP in the Lisbon Treaty, was established, enabling the EU to directly contribute on the peacekeeping and crisis management by deploying its civilian and military instruments.70

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

The CSDP is the operations arm of CFSP. CSDP missions and operations are the most visible activity of the EU in the international security domain, being the most tangible examples of the CSDP ‘in action’, as well as of EU as a security actor. CSDP operations and missions are conducted in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter 11 and they take place in a broad security environment trying to achieve systematic change as a way to promote peace through multiple ways aiming at long-term

---


and sustainable peace. The EU crisis management could be characterised by its security focus, its multidimensionality and its complexity.

In 1999, the EU member states formally agreed to begin work on an integrated EU security and defence policy. Despite the military and defence elements, the activities under CSDP are not exclusively military in nature. In fact, in practise, most of them consisted of civilian activities, such as rule of law or police training and security sector reform. Nowadays, CSDP has become largely oriented towards such activities, as well as peacekeeping, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict stabilization and humanitarian missions, rather than military combat operations.71

Since 2003, the EU has launched 32 missions and operation. The most recent support the reform of police services in Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine, 2014) and Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali, 2014) in order to strengthen the rule of law. Eleven of these operations have been launched since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, which brings the number of ongoing missions to 17 as of September 2015, for a total strength of over 6,000 personnel deployed.72

The Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon (TEU) renewed the European crisis management structures. The Treaty can be referred to as a fundamental document for the CSDP actions, as it contained a number of important new provisions related to the CSDP, including a mutual assistance and solidarity clause, the creation of a framework for Permanent Structured Cooperation, the expansion of the Petersberg tasks, and the creation of the EEAS, under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 73

Crisis Management Concept (CMC)

CMPD is a central institution for forming CSDP CMC for CSDP operations and missions. CMC forms the basis of the operational planning and the conduct of a mission. CMC is relevant for civil-military cooperation/coordination, as the strategic planning over a mission/operation is conducted in a so-called integrated way, involving both civilian and military planners and in consultation with other services within and outside the EEAS.

Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) & Political Framework for Comprehensive Approach (PFCA)

71 See the list of completed and ongoing missions at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/
The most relevant guidelines, common to each “side”, are the Crisis Management Procedures (CMP), which deal with the way how to handle a crisis and how to elaborate the strategic planning. They are the “overarching” framework guidelines, where the crisis management process is explained, and where templates of the crisis management framework planning documents are given. A revised CMP was delivered in 2013. This document describes thoroughly the civilian and military CSDP processes. The revised paper also introduces a new tool called Political Framework for Comprehensive Approach (PFCA). The significance of this tool is that it not only brings together the CSDP experts from the EEAS, but also respected Commission organisations to discuss and advise on comprehensive EU actions on crises at hand. The first implications of the PFCA have been quite promising.

**Standard Operation Procedures (SOP), Manuals, Guidance, Rules and Directions**

EU has Standard Operation Procedures (SOP) for Military CSDP operations and Missions and Crises Management Manual those including some guiding policies for civilian-military cooperation. In spring 2015, the rules for Human Rights and Gender issued by EEAS were prepared, those to be applied by civilian and military sides. In addition, both civilian and military entities have developed manuals and guidebooks for their own use and the civil-military cooperation is often promoted.

The guidance/direction for civil-military cooperation and coordination is included in most of the military operation/mission mandates and operation plans. As civil-military cooperation is a tool to facilitate the reach of the objectives, but not an objective in itself, it is not necessarily included in the missions’ key documents. However, after the launch of EU OPCEN, the aspects of civil-military cooperation and coordination has at least been endorsed also in the mission/operations plans, where applicable. However, guidance/direction are not binding and they merely represent “nice-to-know” information regarding the need to cooperate more across the institutional borders. It is to be notified that the existing guidelines and regulations do not prevent interoperability between the civilian and military sides. However, they are not precise enough to create a real interoperability within CSDP.

**A Joint Communication on EU’s Comprehensive Approach**

---

74 Interview with a EEAS Official, 13 August 2015.
76 Interview with a former EEAS Official, 23 September 2015.
77 Ibid. and Panel of Experts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EEAS Official and former OPCEN official), 27 August 2015.
78 Interview with a former EEAS Official, 8 September 2015.
By far, one of the most significant documents regarding the objectives and implementation of comprehensive approach is 'A Joint Communication on EU's Comprehensive Approach', which was distributed in December 2013, and supported by an Action Plan which was published in May 2015. The documents outline and deepen understanding of the EU's broad and special capabilities to handle complicated crises by exploiting the wide array of tools that the EU has at its disposal.79

3.1.2 Institutions and Actors

The key actors and institutions involved in CSDP are80:

Decision- making and strategic guidance:

- The European Council and the Council of Ministers are the highest decision making body for the CSDP. They provide strategic guidance of CSDP.
- The High Representative is charged with coordinating and carrying out the EU's foreign and security policy.81

Political control:

- The PSC plays a major role in exercising political control and the strategic direction of CSDP operations.
- The EUMC, composed of the Member States Chiefs of Defence, provides input to the PSC on military matters.

Operational planning and implementation:

- A Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD): that integrates civilian and military strategic planning
- A Civilian Planning Conduct Capability (CPCC) office that runs civilian missions
- A Joint Situation Centre (SitCen) for intelligence analysis and threat assessment
- An EU Military Staff (EUMS) tasked by the EUMC to provide military expertise and advice to the High Representative.

---

79 European Commission, “The EU's comprehensive approach”
80 The functions of the institutions and actors are explained more in depth in IECEU WP 1.1. Review: from short-term stabilization to long-term peacebuilding.
In addition, there are a number of other institutions, such as European Defence Agency (EDA) and committees (CIVCOM) that are relevant for the CSDP. These and the actors listed above are further explained in IECEU WP 1.1. Review: from short-term stabilization to long-term peacebuilding.

### 3.2 Civilian and Military capabilities

In this report, capability is understood as the ability to fulfill a specified task or to achieve specified effects. It consists of a complex combination of manpower, deployability, equipment, training, performance, interoperability, sustainability, readiness and concepts. The issue of capability is also discussed in IECEU project deliverable WP 1.5. Conceptual Framework.

The efforts made over the last decade by all crisis management actors to conceptualise and give substance to the notions of ‘integration’, ‘comprehensive approach’ or ‘security-development nexus’, all reflect the broad consensus that crisis response can only have a lasting impact if it is coordinated. For the EU, the coordination of the military and civilian components of their operation is key to their overall impact. The complexity of the EU engagement in CSDP missions and operations requires the capacity to continuously assess the effectiveness of the EU activities against the resources available.

European Union military capabilities began to develop after the Helsinki 1999 European Council meeting. Named as the Helsinki Head Line Goal, a list of headquarters and troops of up to 60 000 soldiers was formally agreed in 2004. The same year, the EU established the European Defence Agency (EDA) to develop the EU’s military capabilities. A new Head Line Goal 2010 was set in May 2004. Civilian-military aspects are heavily emphasized in the documents.

Based on assessed risks and threats in the ESS, the first step in the military capability development is to describe so called scenarios e.g. describing the situations where the EU could activate the civilian and military capabilities. So far, the EUMS has established the scenarios

---


without cooperation with civilian side. This means that the entire capability development process following the scenario phase is more or less divided.  

Civilian Head Line Goals 2010 were developed more or less with the same phase, with an aim at improving the EU’s civilian capability to respond effectively to crisis management tasks. In 2011, the Council Conclusions on civilian capabilities Comprehensive Approach were emphasized and, for instance, support to the EU’s disaster relief is mentioned. A work plan for civil-military synergies has been considered to be important. In conclusion, adequate and skilled personnel are highlighted as the top priority.

When a civilian mission requires some specific capabilities, quite often these gap areas can be potentially fulfilled by military support through the whole operational cycle. Some typical examples are training, transport and logistics as such and personal security equipment.

A vital part of a civilian mission’s logistics capability is the so called Warehouse system. The idea is to cost effectively store and deliver important equipment, such as vehicles, used by missions. According to the Annual Lessons Identified and Lessons Learned report, the system should be developed to serve better the initial phase of the missions. There the development of now very limited cooperation with military logistic system could be a key to success.

CMPD is paying special attention to find synergies between civilian and military means and strengthen ties between CSDP and the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Human rights and other horizontal aspects of EU crisis management.

---

85 Interview with a former EEAS official, 10 Sep 2015.
88 Interview with a former EUFOR Chad RCA Official, 20 Aug 2015.

---

Table 4. Civilian capabilities critical for CSDP operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adequate amount of skilled personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vast variety of MS, Council and Commission level tools (political, budgetary, HA, CSDP, DDR, SSR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
On one hand, security and defence require specific capabilities. On the other hand, more and more commercially designed products find their way into the security and defence domain. Because of the nature of the actions, the civilian realm doesn't have the same need for specialized equipment as the military. Instead, civilian CSDP missions cope well with Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) material and equipment. Instead, the critical capability for civilian missions is the amount and quality of the personnel.

EDA supports the Council of the European Union and the Member States in their efforts to improve the European Union’s defence capabilities through cooperative projects and programs. EDA’s tasking also includes the so called dual-use capability development, which leads to products that can have either a military or a civil application following, thus, the Comprehensive Approach concept. For example, the areas of electronics, components, nanotechnologies, radars and sensors, telecom and ICT represent capabilities for both entities.91

According to the EU treaties, defence-industrial matters are treated as MS responsibility. On the other hand, the EU’s internal market falls within the Commission’s realm (346 TFEU). The commission governs the Directives on intra-EU transfers and defence procurement. However, the dual-use capability development also seeks funding from the European Commission’s programmes. EDA has, for instance, been able to support seven projects to be partly funded by the Commission’s European Structural Funds. There is high potential in the future to deepen the civilian military cooperation.92

Even if the Commission’s structural budget cannot be used to fund purely defence initiatives and projects, the growing importance of these instruments – and the support they can lead to developing dual-use technologies – makes the Commission, along with the EDA, an even more crucial interlocutor for industry. The Commission possesses an important role of market regulator,


This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
as dual-use technologies are blurring the line between the commercial and defence sectors. In this respect, the importance of the Commission is greater than ever for defence companies.93

The European Commission and the EDA are looking for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to utilize the EU structural funds for dual-use R&D worth €325 billion between 2014 - 2020. This formidable sum clearly indicates the importance of the process.

Eurostat calculates that the EU28 allocated only 5.11% of their total research and development (R&D) budgets to defence in 2012. Additionally, ASD Europe estimates that out of the total €128 billion worth of sales in the aeronautics sector, only €46 billion was generated by military-related projects. Commercial R&D and sales are therefore essential for the Defence Industry. One example is the (civilian) European Earth Observation program, Copernicus, which supports the efforts of Frontex, the European Maritime Safety Agency and the EU Satellite Centre on space-based surveillance of the EU’s surrounding waters.94

Member states role is crucial as the success of CSDP missions depends to a large extent on the Member States’ willingness to support the mission by co-operating and sharing information, sending qualified staff, and monitoring and learning from their work. Ensuring that sufficient civilian and military capabilities are available is a crucial issue for the success of the CSDP operations. Thereby, developing dual-use capabilities has increased attention among the EU Member States and institutions. December 2013 EU Council stated that the only way to ensure the viability of Europe’s defence sector is through reinforced interaction between the civilian and defense sectors. This is a clear example of comprehensive approach in practice.

However, at times there have been some real difficulties with CSDP operations, ranging from resource shortages, intermittent political support from Member States, and a lack of coordination between EU actors. 95 However, at times, there have been some real difficulties with CSDP operations, ranging from resource shortages, intermittent political support from Member States, and a lack of coordination between EU actors.96 Adequate capabilities, whether human resources, equipment or C2 structures, is the key to a mission/operation’s ability to fulfil the mandate. With limited resources, the EU must be able to ‘do more with less’, and coordinating and developing civil-military capabilities has an important role to play to ‘bridge’ the heavy capability gaps in CSDP missions. In the EEAS document “Promoting synergies between the EU civil and military capability

93“Crisis Management and Planning Directorate”
94Flott, “The three effects of dual-use”
95Scherer, “Cooperation and Coordination,” 43 – 49.
96Ibid.
development" (February 2011) the Council identified a series of domains where synergies in the development and use of civilian and military capabilities can add value and should therefore be pursued. The document states that synergies could be fostered, in particular, in the development of concrete dual use capabilities including through joint research and technology efforts, and finding ways to facilitate their potential availability for CSDP civilian missions and military operations, while taking full account of civilian and military specificities.

3.3 Lessons Learned Cycle

‘The Council also recognises the need to continuously improve the performance of CSDP missions and operations, including through evaluation of outcomes, benchmarking, impact assessment, identifying and implementing lessons learned and developing best practices for effective and efficient CSDP action.’

As displayed above by Council, the EU recognizes the need to learn from its own experience in crisis management to improve capacities and efficacy. The methods and tools used for learning lessons and identifying best practices have been evolving together since the first ESDC/ CSDP mission was launched.

Lessons learned processes attempt to assess most aspects of CSDP missions and operations. This process is an important instrument to improve the planning and conduct of CSDP missions/operation. As described by the EUMC, "the lessons are created to reduce the waste of resources by eliminating duplication of effort; to benefit from collective wisdom and to create new knowledge as a benefit of the sharing process,' thereby contributing to the development of a comprehensive approach to CSDP. The development of lessons from CSDP engagement is an essential part of improving and extending the EU capability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management. There is an increasing interest from Member States in the efficiency and

---


98 Strategic and tactical transportation, logistic support, communication and information systems (CIS), medical support, security and force protection, use of space capabilities, unmanned vehicles, warehousing and centralised support systems, sharing information and intelligence, training, exercises, interconnecting the civilian and military capability development processes, and lessons learned.


100 European Union External Action defines lessons as “any occurrence or finding that has an impact on operational output, which requires further development or monitoring.”

relevancy of CSDP missions, especially concerning how money is being used and what is achieved with it.

Identifying lessons from operations is politically sensitive. Since 2003, the identification of CSDP lessons has been conducted on ad hoc basis with little transparence and with infrequent input from outside experts and Non- Governmental Organisations (NGO). While CSDP field operations have modestly increased their consultations with NGO and civil society, the planning process in Brussels is less inviting to outside feedback. Regular consultations with NGO’s, independent experts, the private sector, and civil society- which the UN and OSCE have a tradition of doing with positive effect- would address some of the criticism about the democratic deficit of CSPD, as would an increased parliamentary role for the annual review of CSDP missions.102

**Process**

Various actors are involved in the CSDP learning processes, EUMS, CPCC and CMPD being the headliners. The tools and procedures have been established separately for the civilian and military side, which is reflected in the different approaches followed by the three main actors. Here, a brief overview of the different processes is provided.

---

European Union Military Staff (EUMS)

EUMS collects the lessons from CSDP military operation. EUMS has collected and registered Lessons Identified (LI) and Lessons Learned (LL) in practise from its birth.\(^{103}\) Since then this process, software database tool (EUMS Lessons Management Application – ELMA), has captured lessons from a variety of CSDP Military Operations and Exercises.\(^{104}\)

LI/LLs are normally collected from the EUMS, Member States, Operations, Missions and from other institutions engaged with the EUMS during operations and exercises. Lessons have been grouped thematically: Early Warning and Advance Planning; Situation Assessment; Strategic Planning. Despite the standardized process of collecting and distributing the lessons, the current challenge to the EUMS is to ensure that the lessons identified are learned at appropriate levels. The implementation of the lessons at the planning of a new CSDP operation has been inadequate, as often there is no time to conduct lessons cycles or consult lessons learned documents. Therefore, the mechanism to ensure that Lessons are incorporated into CSDP Planning and Conduct of Activities should be strengthened.\(^{105}\)

Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)

The lessons process for the civilian missions is managed by CPCC. CPCC concentrates on operational aspects of missions, strategic reviews, and supporting missions’ lessons learning process, such as the six-monthly lessons reports. The CPCC lessons process includes collection and verification/lessons observations, analysis/lessons identified, development/lessons learnt and best practices/outputs. It also includes the appointment of a dedicated lessons focal point. To support the efforts to standardize the lessons, a process database modelled on ELMA has been developed for civilian missions (CiLMA), which incorporates all the information relating to the collection, analysis and development of individual lessons.\(^{106}\)

Lessons are collected through formal and informal channels. Formally, lessons from civilian missions are collected after the planning phase, as well as after the end of a mission. The Head of Operation holds monthly meetings with each mission. During these meetings, issues arising from the conduct of the mission, best practices and lessons are discussed. Also 6-month reports from

\(^{103}\) Current EUMS Lessons Process (ELPRO) was agreed by the EUMC on 26 November 2007.

\(^{104}\) The Military Lessons Process including the milestones and key actors is described in Council of the European Union, “EU Military Lessons Learnt at the Political Strategic Level Concept.”; Directorate-General, Consolidating the EU’s Crisis Management Structures, 111, 29.

\(^{105}\) Ibid. 31 - 32.

\(^{106}\) Ibid. 29 – 31; Panel of Experts (EEAS Officials) 16 June 2015.
the Heads of Mission include a section on lessons learned. The pre-selected lessons identified are then passed to CIVCOM for discussion and approval and finally sent to PSC. However, the reports alone do not compel people to consult the documents in their work. Therefore, informal mechanisms have an important role to complement the sharing of lessons and best practices. This personal knowledge is often shared with other members of CPCC in informal ways, through dialogue, meetings, and the exchange of experiences among officials. This informal system allows the discussion of sensitive issues that otherwise may be censored out of official lessons learned documents. In addition, visits to the missions, contact between the Head of operations, the Civilian Operational Commander, his Deputy and the Head of Missions and internal reviews are some of the additional mechanisms to identify the areas that most need intervention and improvement.

A current challenge with the CPCC lessons process is the utilization of the lessons identified. The lessons reports are often censored and far removed from reality to be able to play a role in improving missions. This seems to be particularly the case for political lessons, which carry a higher level of sensitivity for Member States. Additionally, an obstacle to a more systematic process of learning lessons is the limit on the resources available to CPCC for the task.

**Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD)**

CMPD is the author of the main lessons learned reports at the political and strategic level, such as the Annual Reports and thematic reports. CMPD aims at enhancing civil- military cooperation and support political-strategic planning for CSDP. Ideally, CMPD would receive the 6-month reports from the Heads of Mission or from CPCC, and lessons learned documents from military operations, mission HQ, as well as from international actors. For the Annual Report, CPCC provides CMPD with pre-selected information about lessons identified and learned in the past year. The reports are then distributed to CivCom, PSC and Council. The main channels to ensure the dissemination of the lessons identified are through the reports, from 2007/2008 onwards, CMPD check lists have been used by CMPD to ensure in the planning phases of a new mission that the planners take into consideration the key lessons. Furthermore, CMPD is involved in the training of new and current mission staff, representing an opportunity for the implementation of lessons identified in previous missions and develop suggestions to training requirements accordingly.

---

107 Some of these lessons identified are then shared with CMPD. The decision about which lessons are deemed for internal use only is based on perceived relevance to CMPD, or if it is exclusively an internal technical issue learned. Hence, what CMPD ultimately receives seem to be heavily edited and, at times, censored.


110 Directorate-General, *Consolidating the EU’s Crisis Management Structures*, 31- 33.
Civilian-military lessons synergies
CMPD, CPCC and EUMS identifies lessons from their respective areas and the CSDP Lessons Working Groups endorses the five CSDP key lessons, which are an important, cross-cutting and overarching lesson that needs to be addressed in connection with the practical functioning of the CSDP.

Both the military and the civilian side have developed more standardized and coherent mechanisms over the past few years. Table 6. outlines the current process of identifying the CSDP key lessons. In general, there is a tendency to standardize and formalize the process as much as possible at all levels. To foster the comprehensiveness of collecting lessons identified and lessons learned (LI/LL), the EEAS runs a CSDP Lessons Management Group (LMG). LGM is chaired on a relatively high, Deputy Secretary General level, presently by Mr Maciej Popowski. The comprehensive results are put together in an Annual CSDP Lessons Report.

Despite the importance of defining the key lessons, efforts to ensure the implementation of those lessons has drawn more attention and there is a common recognition that the implementation of lessons needs more effort. Unless the lessons identified are translated into changes in practice and policies, they cannot be considered learned. In particular, lessons need to be integrated in the revision of the concepts underpinning CSDP.111 Introduction of a shared civilian-military database to manage, develop and implement lessons, has increased the awareness and understanding of lessons within each area and assist in common trend analysis. Additionally, combining the lessons reporting processes has helped to support combined and integrated planning for CSDP missions

Table 6. Who identifies the CSDP key lessons?

- CPCC identifies lessons based on mission reports and Brussels HQ experience
- CMPD identifies lessons based on planning and strategic reviews
- EUMS identifies lessons based on mission and operation reports and Brussels HQ experience
- CSDP Lessons Working Groups (composed of EEAS, Commission stakeholders) discusses the lessons and agrees up to five key lessons every year.
- CSDP Lessons Management Group chaired by DSG Popowski endorses the key lessons.
- MS (PSC) endorse the key lessons

and operations and contributes to learning lessons, both common and individual, from CSDP activities, which can be distributed widely to all relevant EU stakeholders.112

Challenges

Several challenges can be identified that could hamper the capacity for institutional learning within CSDP;113

- While lessons are identified and learned in various (thematic) areas, the political and strategic level that involves decision-making processes, concept development, and the writing of mission mandates is still under-represented in explicit lesson learned documentation.

- Lack of coordination has an impact on the collection, sharing and dissemination of the lessons. Despite attempts to homogenise the methodologies and tools used, the various actors conducting lessons learned processes apply different methods, definitions and standards.

- Horizontal learning across missions and institutions remains a challenge, as a result of both institutional culture and a lack of resources. Among all the dedicated institutions, there is insufficient dedicated staff to the lessons process.

- Lessons documents tend to be filtered and diluted as they move ‘up’ from the missions through the EEAS structures in Brussels depending on their sensitivity.

- Most of the EU internal documents and reports are confidential and classified, and access to relevant documents remains limited to the few actors involved in CSDP and this constrains the sharing of information and also transparency.

The bridges between the operational/mission level and the strategic/mandate-writing level should be further strengthened to help ensure that mandated tasks reflect realistic capabilities on the ground.

---

112 Ibid.
3.4 Planning and Conducting CSDP missions and operations

3.4.1 Early warning and situational awareness

The optimal way to prevent crises is to turn them down before they escalate to open hostilities. The EU’s CFSP emphasizes the importance of preventive activities.\textsuperscript{114} In relation to CSDP, situational awareness is of utmost importance, as it helps to plan the EU’s intervention before a potential conflict emerges.

The EU follows the security related situation globally through Early Warning System\textsuperscript{115} that analyses and connects relevant actors within the EU in order to be able to respond to conflicts in a proactive and preventive manner. Due to the limited resources and priority areas in terms of the EU’s security, some situations are prioritized for more detailed assessment. In the EEAS, the Conflict Prevention Group assesses the situation and development of policy option papers utilizing the EEAS Intelligence Steering Board (ISB).

The actual analysis is mostly done by two EEAS organisation, namely the EU Intelligence and Analyses Centre and Intelligence Directorate of the EUMS. Since the EU lacks its own intelligence resources, the method for both organisations is to request information from the Member States’ intelligence organisations. Organisations independently deliver their reports to the ‘customers’ but the most important and valuable products, so called Single Intelligence Analyses Capacity reports (SIAC), are joint civil-military ‘products’.

Based on this situational awareness, the EU and MS representatives make the decision on which EU’s instruments should be used, inter alia, launching a CSDP operation or mission.

\textsuperscript{114} The conflict cycle and conflict prevention are discussed in IECEU WP 1.2.

\textsuperscript{115} The instrument is further discussed in IECEU WP 1.1. Review: from short-term stabilization to long-term peacebuilding.
3.4.2 Planning and decision making

![Decision Making Procedure Diagram](image)

**Figure 3. CMPD decision making procedure**

The Figure 3. outlines the decision-making procedure launching a CSDP mission or operation. The Crisis Management Procedures describe the process of EU CSDP engagement in a crisis, and form the framework for planning CSDP missions and operations between the Member States, the Commission and the EEAS. The Procedures outline key phases for planning, deployment and conduct of a CSDP mission/operation.  

1) Identification of a crisis and development of an overall EU approach

In a case of a crisis emerging, the EU will consider its options to engage in the crisis. CSDP advance planning is paramount for EU to be able to act proactively. Planning may include several participating organisations from the EEAS and also from the Commission.  

---


118 Ibid.

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
The PSC, with the support of the respective working groups (CIVCOM and EUMC) considers whether a CSDP operation is appropriate. A PFCA, which sets the political context for the crisis, will be prepared once the security situation is assessed. This assessment include identifying a broad range of options available to the EU, including what EU instruments could be available, and best suited in regard to the crisis at hand, to act. The adoption of a PFCA entails combining political and operational elements – but also civilian and military expertise and input – to define common objectives.

Once the PSC has decided that action is appropriate the EEAS is tasked to frame the CMC. This starts the planning process.

2) Development of the Crisis Management Concept and establishment of the mission operation

Once the PSC considers the appropriateness of potential CSDP action, CMPD draws a CMC describing the EU’s political interests, viable options (civilian and/or military) and objectives of a possible mission or operation. At this phase, CMPD consults with all the relevant EEAS services, in particular the CPCC, EUMS and other relevant directorates, EU delegations and Commission services. For the military operations the ATHENA mechanism will be activated.

At the CMC formulation phase, normally, CMPD will send a Fact Finding Mission (FFM) to the country concerned to assess the situation on the ground, make initial contacts with the host government and the EU Delegation, and provide recommendations on options for EU engagement. In addition, Status of Forces Agreement (in the case of a military operation) and Status of Mission Agreement (in the case of a civilian mission) are negotiated with the host country (where applicable), verifying the will of the local authorities.

In addition, at this stage, initial force sensing is launched as early as possible leading to the actual Force Generation at later stage. Force sensing often results the lead nation and selection of the OHQ. The designated OHQ prepares the Provisional Statement Of Requirements (PSOR) as basis to the upcoming Force Generation and other capability requirements.

---

119 Revised CMP: “CSDP advance planning by CMPD, supported by CPCC and EUMS, will engage with other Services, such as Geographic, Conflict Prevention/Peace-building/Mediation, MD CROC, EEAS Security, Human Rights and Democracy, EU Delegations, the Commission (FP1, ECHO, DEVCO, HOME, ELARG), EU Agencies (EUROPOL, FRONTEX, EUROJUST), Member States embassies, and NGOs as required. Where appropriate the EEAS will consult with international organisations (UN, AU, NATO etc), and third states that may have a role/interest in the resolution of the crisis.”

120 De Kermabon, Crisis Management Procedures, 43 - 47.

121 Silva Lauffer and Johannes Hamacher ed., In Control – A practical guide for civilian experts working in crisis management missions, (Berlin: ENTRI, 2014), 75 – 76
The CMC is presented by the EEAS to the PSC. The PSC asks CIVCOM and the EUMS for advice on the CMC dependent on the nature of the proposed operation. The CMC is finalized and sent to the Council for approval. CMC is approved by the PSC giving basis for the EUMS and/or the CPCC to continue with the further operational planning.\footnote{Council of the European Union, “Suggestions for crisis management procedures”}

3) Operation planning of the CSDP mission or operation and decision to launch

Depending on the complexity of the crisis the EUMS or the CMPD may be asked to develop Military or Civilian Strategic Options (MSO/ CSO). The EUMC and CIVCOM will assess respectively the MSOs and CMOs and advice PSC accordingly.\footnote{Lauffer and Hamacher, In Control, 74-75.}

The PSC tasks the director of CPCC and Civilian Operations Commander to initiate operational planning and recruitment of the Head of Mission and his/her core team and to consider possible augmenters to CPCC for the conduct of the new mission. If the mission is military, the PSC identifies the future military Operational Headquarters and future Operation Commander, on the recommendation of EUMC.

The Council then adopts a Decision establishing the mission/operation. At this point the mission/operation objectives and mandate are set out, Operation Commander (OpCdr) becomes active and an Operation Headquarter (OHQ) for the military operation is designated. Both the OpCdr and Civilian Operation Commander (CivOpsCdr) start the Force Generation process involving Member States and invite third states when applicable.\footnote{Ibid. 75-76.}

Then, for the military operation the EUMS develops on Initiating Military Directive (MID) to ensure that the CMC is well translated into military guidance and direction. Based on CMC and PSC tasking, the Civilian or Military Operations Commander prepares a draft Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and presented to the PSC who receive advice from EUMC and CIVCOM, and subsequently for the Council, for approval.\footnote{Ibid. 77.} Then they prepare their respective the OPLAN, a brief statement of how the Operation Commander plans to fulfill his/her mission.

3) Fast track process\footnote{De Kermabon, “Crisis Management Procedures”, 47.}

In order to maintain a level of flexibility and to enable a rapid deployment of a mission or operation, the above described process can be circumvented. The minimum decision-making process for the establishment of a mission or operation includes the approval of the CMC, developing the IMD (for

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Council of the European Union, “Suggestions for crisis management procedures”}
\item \footnote{Lauffer and Hamacher, In Control, 74-75.}
\item \footnote{Ibid. 75-76.}
\item \footnote{Ibid. 77.}
\item \footnote{De Kermabon, “Crisis Management Procedures”, 47.}
\end{itemize}
a military operation), the adoption of the Council decision that establishes the mission/operation, and the approval of the OPLAN.

4) Deployment of the CSDP mission or operation

Under the responsibility of the Council and of the HR the PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of the CSDP mission/operation. The Commission keeps the PSC informed about the measures it has taken or envisages. The CivOpsCdr and the military OpCdr exercise command and control of the civilian mission and of the military operation respectively. The Head of Mission and the Force Commander exercise command and control of the mission and of the operation in the theatre in accordance with established command and control principles. The Command and Control (C2) is discussed further in this chapter.

5) Strategic review of the CSDP mission or operation – refocusing and/or termination operations

When a given CSDP action needs to be refocused, a strategic review can be triggered. This is conducted when the strategic context of the mission/operation changes, half way through the mandate, or when the mandate is nearing the end. In the light of the findings of the strategic review the HR proposes to the PSC a set of measures aimed at refocusing or finishing the EU action. The PSC agrees and forwards the measures to the Council. The Council decides, as appropriate, to refocus the EU action, including possible termination, or decides to launch any further action needed at this stage.

6) Transition and exit strategy

Transition of a CSDP mission/operation can be understood in several ways: as an end of the EU’s engagement in a country, ending a single EU mission or the phase between the end of a mission and at the beginning of the activation phase of other instruments.

There is no universal transition strategy that could be applied to all CSDP missions/operations. However, according to Gross (2014), transition strategy should be provided already when planning a mission, included into CMC. This could enhance the efficiency of the mission/operation, as defining the transition requires the setting of achievable objectives formulating realistic mandates

---

127 Ibid. and Lauffer and Hamacher, In Control, 75 – 76.
128 Ibid.
130 Council of the European Union, “Suggestions for crisis management procedures”
and ensuring a degree of flexibility when it comes to planning timelines so that other actors can take over. In addition, defining the transition or exit strategy could also help to enhance synergies between civilian and military functions, as transitioning from military to civilian CSDP operations would also be possible, if appropriate.  

Defining the transition strategy at the planning phase remains a challenge for CSDP, particularly for two reasons: 1) the timeline of a mission, in terms of its expected mandate and any need to adjust to changes in its operational environment, and 2) the range of EU actors that should be involved in the planning process. There can be number of long-term EU actors already on the ground, e.g. Commission instruments and EU delegation, with whom a CSDP mission/operation will cooperate and the question is to what extent they should be employed during the planning of a mission.  

Thereby, a transition benefits from enhanced cooperation between civilian-military actors. The need to cooperate partly derives from the EU’s CFSP to strengthen sustainable peace through security development nexus, thereby understanding the interlink between the EU’s security and development instruments. The cooperation and coordination between the CSDP, other EEAS or Commission instruments and international organisations, is, however, often difficult to plan in advance and, therefore, the civil- military cooperation/coordination takes place on an ad hoc basis and can’t be generalized or formulized.  

Another challenge related to the appropriate transition or exit of a mission is that often the mission/operation does not have an end state defined. For instance, the mandate of the operation ATALANTA has been prolonged several times, but the exit strategy has, nevertheless, been tentatively prepared. This is mainly because crises tend to be increasingly complex by nature and it takes a great deal of time for the missions and operations to fulfil their mandate, for instance to create a safe and secure environment (SASE). It is difficult to assess when the situation allows the withdrawal and handover of the SASE to other organizations or the local authorities. The most difficult situations are when the operation cannot be seized because of, for example, security or political reasons. This is especially the case when the operation or mission is interlinked with Security Sector Reform (SSR) type of activities, such as operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Also, in the 2012 closure of EUPM Bosnia, the EU’s longest running police

---

131 Interview with a EDA Official 14 August 2015; Interview with a EEAS Official 2 October 2015.
mission, after nearly a decade of operation, illustrated the intricacies of ending missions and handing over tasks to other actors.\textsuperscript{134}

A third element to transition/exit CSDP missions is handing it over to partner organisations. A lack of resources and economic pressure encourages the EU to cooperate closely with other international actors, utilizing one another’s competences, such as the case in Central African Republic.\textsuperscript{135} Handing over often means that the CSDP contribution acts in a ‘bridging’ capacity with partners then eventually taking over or absorbing CSDP activities. To date, this has happened with military operations, including Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo, which contributed to peace-keeping operations carried out by the UN. In addition, handovers have also worked the other way round: the EU missions in BiH were taken over from the UN in the first instance, followed by NATO.\textsuperscript{136} Other potential handover partners include the African Union (AU), or even member states, who have strong presence in the host country of a mission/operation.

**Conclusion**

Although, both civilian and military functions of EEAS are involved in the strategic planning of a mission/operation, the examples have shown that in reality, civ-mil cooperation exists merely at early stages of a prevention phase up to the point when the CMPD is preparing the CMC. After this, the next phases are conducted in separate civil and military stovepipes and civ-mil cooperation is conducted on an ad hoc basis.\textsuperscript{137}

As outlined above, despite the bureaucracy, in principle, CSDP decision-making is a straightforward process. Often, the delays in decision-making are based on political constrains between the Member States. But due to the large number of actors involved, every step along the way can become the focal point of negotiations. In particular, the decision over whether civilian or military intervention is used to respond to a conflict is highly political and is not always based on adequate situational awareness or conflict analysis.\textsuperscript{138} This is a clear lack, as conflict analysis often plays a critical role in the success of a mission. As Gross argues, the success and sustainability of mission objectives also depend on the overall political framework and the ‘absorption capacity’ on the part of a host state. For example, the EUBAM mission in Libya exemplified that the security and political conditions were not adequate for civilian capacity-building mission. A rapidly changed security situation and the battle between the two Libyan

\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. 3-4.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid 2.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid. 1.

\textsuperscript{137} Interview with a OPCEN Official, 10 September 2015.

\textsuperscript{138} Interview with a EEAS Official 2 October 2015.
governments quickly showed that the conflict analyses were not carried out properly.\textsuperscript{139}

Planning of a CSDP mission/operation is also a crucial element for the efficiency of the activities on the ground. The planning should exploit all the expertise the EU has at its disposal, including those military and civilian, Commission instruments, Special Representatives and the EU delegates on the ground. Joint planning can help ensure consistency with overall EU objectives and coordination with all relevant EU and non-EU actors from the start. The issue of coordination is further discussed in chapter 5.

### 3.4.3 Command and Control (C2)

As outlined above in this chapter, Member States in the PSC exercise the political control and strategic direction of both civilian and military crisis management missions and operations under the responsibility of the Council and of the High Representative. They are on top of the chain of command.

Several military operations have a mandate to a safe and secure environment, through merely being present and having a deterrent function. Some police and rule-of-law missions focus on the proactive training of local officers through monitoring, mentoring and advising. Some civilian missions perform executive tasks including riot control capabilities. As a result of these differences, the implementation of missions and operations vary greatly, and the operation does not naturally have the same C2 structure. This is the case, despite the establishment of CMPD, as until today, there is no clear and functioning C2 structure\textsuperscript{140} between civilian missions and military operations on the field.

\textsuperscript{139} Interview of a Former EUBAM Libya Official 11 September 2015.

\textsuperscript{140} Gaila Glume, “Chain of command – command and control for CSDP engagement,” in Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations, eds. Jochen Rehrl and Gaila Glume, (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2015), 32. The \textit{chain of command} is the structure through which command instructions flow down from the political to the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and through which control is exercised by specified procedures and feedback. In particular, \textit{command and control (C2)} structures define the authority, responsibilities and activities of Heads of Mission/Military Commanders in the direction and coordination of personnel/forces and in the execution of their respective mandates.
The Figure 4.\textsuperscript{141} exemplifies the Civilian and military Command and Control Options applied in CSDP missions and operations.\textsuperscript{142}

![Figure 4. Civilian and Military Command and Control options](image)

Permanent Operations Headquarters (OHQ) is playing a crucial role for CSDP missions operational planning and initial operational capability. CPCC has a key role in running OHQ and it ensures the mission reporting to Member States (and third contributing States) and coordination with the EEAS management (and other stakeholders as appropriate) for the purposes of CSDP civilian missions, and supervises the implementation of political and operational guidance. The Civilian Operation Commander in CPCC works closely with the Head of Mission on the ground.\textsuperscript{143}

Force Commander is the key actor for the military operation on the ground. He/she is in charge of the OHQ and has the main responsibility for the day-to-day running of the operation. This includes commanding power over a number of tactical decisions such as increasing number of patrols in area due to changes security situations. Those decisions that cannot wait approval from OHQ or Brussels, or they are so insignificant that they do not require to get OHQ and Brussels involved. Force Commander and Head of Mission usually get considerable autonomy on the ground. However, this autonomy also depends on a case-by-case basis.\textsuperscript{144}

Military operations do not have a permanent C2 function, and, therefore, there are four options that can be used to command and control CSDP operation (as outlined in the picture above). The

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{142} More information about the different C2 options can be read at Glume, "Chain of command," 32 - 34.


\textsuperscript{144} Hanssen, "Civil-Military Interaction in the European Union", 33- 36.

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
military OHQ is chosen by PSC decision. A lack of a permanent military C2 function has been identified to limit military operations’ efficiency. Additionally, it is a clear barrier to civil- military cooperation/coordination, as the absence of a military counterpart for a civilian OHQ, exacerbates inter alia joint planning and information sharing across the civilian and military functions.

As explained above, the EU has developed several options for the command and control of CSDP missions and operations, each has a single and identifiable chain of command. Another important institutional aspect is the coordination with EU international actors. CSDP missions and operations are generally not only one foreign policy instrument on the ground. There may be other several operations, the presence of EUSR and a Union Delegation. Thus, C2 has been identified to be a crucial element for civil- military cooperation and coordination for CSDP. This means that even when CSDP operations would be present in the same region, they may occur simultaneously under parallel command. If there is a functional overlap between missions, the coordination is of utmost importance. This is the case in Bosnia for example, two CSDP operations are deployed alongside one another – police and military – both having the fight against organised crime in their mandates. These separate structures often result in a lack of coordination of CSDP activities in the region, and overlapping in activities such as information gathering, logistical and medical supports is hard to avoid.

The level of cooperation between the CSDP missions/operations is often dependable on personal relationships and on the Head of Mission/ Force Commander’s willingness to communicate. There have been several examples, where there has been reluctance from Head of Civilian mission/ Force Commander to cooperate and coordinate with his/her Civilian/Military counterpart. EUSR, in this respect, act as an important coordination agent.

---

146 Interview with a EUMC Official 4 September 2015 and Interview with a EEAS official 13 August 2015.
149 Interview with a EEAS Official, 2 October 2015.
150 Interview with a former EEAS Official, 8 September 2015; Interview with a former EUMC official 4 September 2015.

*This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371*
To increase the interoperability and efficiency of CSDP missions and operations, several EEAS officers and former staff members of CSDP operations and missions have welcomed the idea of integrated command structures for the missions and operations occurring in the same region. The examples from the UN Integrated missions have shown that integrated command structures do not only increase the efficiency, but also help to form the clarity among the host nation and civilian population on why the EU is present in the region. Integrated C2 structures can help to avoid duplications of actions and the sending of mixed-messages to the local population and other international actors.\textsuperscript{151} However, especially due to the political and financial constraints, the unifying of civilian and military C2 structures in CSDP is hardly taking place in the new future.

### 3.4.4 Information sharing and reporting

Information sharing and reporting are tools to enhance EU CSDP civil-military cooperation and coordination. The coordinative activities are usually reported bi-annually in EU CSDP Lessons (Learned) seminars. Moreover, Force Commanders and Head of Missions are reporting civil-military cooperation and coordination in their respective weekly, monthly and six monthly reports. The reporting seems to have, in many cases, also vested national or other interests for the benefit of the respective functionalities need to be endorsed by EUMS. However, the reporting is predominantly excellent, also giving a relative objective situation awareness of the EU’s comprehensive approach on CSDP civil-military functionalities.\textsuperscript{152}

An exchange of information is the main strand of the civil-military synergies. This should take place at all levels. There are plenty of different workshops, seminars, events, platforms at the strategic (between Brussels services) and operational (among operations/missions) level, which facilitate the exchange of information on the need bases between the stakeholders and interlocutors. However, currently at the strategic level, there are increasingly such arrangements where EEAS and Commission stakeholders, as well as those of ECHO and CSDP meet with the heads of civilian missions, operation/mission commanders and head of delegations through VTC, in order to also increase civil-military synergies.\textsuperscript{153}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{151}Interview with a Former UN Official, 13 August 2015.
\textsuperscript{152}Interview of a Former EEAS Official, 8 September 2015.
\textsuperscript{153}Email interview of a Former EEAS Official, 8 September 2015.
\end{footnotesize}
3.4.5 FINANCE AND PROCUREMENT

Figure 5. Displays how CSDP civilian and military operations are financed. Vertical fragmentation implies that EU Member States are not obliged to participate in CSDP operations. Historically, not all 28 Member States have participated in one common CSDP mission. Horizontal fragmentation means that there are several mechanisms in place in order to finance an operation, based on its nature and objectives.  

Civilian missions are generally funded by the EU CFSP budget, with the exception of the salaries of personnel seconded by member states. Being already included into the Union’s budget, a civilian mission is not submitted to the Member States’ willingness to contribute. Usually, the financial references are included in the Council decision establishing the mission and are revised following recommendations on expanding the mission.  

CSDP missions are only one instrument under CFSP. In the Commission’s Multiannual Financial Framework 2014 -20 -“Heading 4: Global Europe” foresees €2.0 billion for the CFSP, which amounts approximately 0.2 per cent of the total EU

“Stronger cooperation can be achieved through a better alignment and coherence between military and civilian missions’ financial regulations. As long as financial regulations will not allow greater flexibility between CFSP and military missions no relevant pooling and sharing synergies be found. “

(Interview of EEAS Official 2 October 2015)


budget. In 2012, €290 million were allocated to finance the civilian CSDP missions. Thus, the financial basis of the civilian missions is limited.157

The fundamental reluctance of the member states to become involved in CSDP military operations is probably partly due to the funding method. Military operations and defence implications cannot be financed from Union budget. Defence contributions are paid by Member States, with the main burden falling to those countries participating in the operation in question. The participating member states pay the costs of their own operational contribution to a CSDP operation. Limited number of common costs (10 - 15% of the total cost of the operation), such as transport, infrastructure, medical services, HQ expenses, can be financed via the so called ‘ATHENA’ mechanism. This mechanism is separate from the EU budget and is under the authority of PSC.158

Until now, the Athena mechanism has only been used for five European Union military operations: EUFOR Althea, EUFOR DRC, EUFOR Tchad/RCA & EUTM Somalia/Mali.159

**Procurement**

After a mission has been launched, a great challenge is to establish a mission on the ground. This requires a great deal of procurement procedures. For a number of CSDP missions, an unstable security situation in the host country, combined with a lack of adequate equipment of the international personnel, has been a continuous hindrance to effective implementation. Unlike military staff which normally come with their own equipment, civilian staff must be equipped on a case-by-case basis by the responsible EEAS bodies and the Member States. For all the material, buildings and equipment, mission staff and the officials in the CPCC have to go to the Commission and ask for money in the context of a previously agreed upon budget. Overall finances remain a problem and in many missions in theatre, it is difficult to acquire resources following European procurement standards. The building of adequate facilities on the ground require the hiring of private companies and local staff and lots of time and money is wasted due to the slow and complicated procurement process.160 For example, in Libya, there were no properly secured office/compound for the mission staff when the mission began. The building of adequate facilities with limited resources and a challenging security situation prevented the mission staff in fulfilling the mission mandate during the first months.

---

158 Ibid.
160 Interview with a Former EUBAM Libya Official 11 September 2015.

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
Procurements, logistics and equipping are areas where further synergies between civilian and military functions in theatre could be enhanced. A divided funding mechanism between civilian and military missions/operations is a major barrier to further integration of these functions. However, a shortage of resources raises a need to hence efforts towards creating further coordination between civilian and military capabilities, thus enhancing the impact on the ground. Consequently, a greater proportion of jointly funded expenditure for CSDP military operations would be to the benefit of all those member states that are in favour of deployment, but cannot become involved themselves for political or other reasons. They would also ease pooling equipment, namely accommodation and vehicles, between civilian and military missions.\footnote{161}

### 3.4.5 Training

Training and recruitment are perceived to be crucial elements for the effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations.\footnote{162} Due to the tasks of the CSDP civilian missions, the human resources are the single most important, mission-critical capability and civilian crisis management training has become a key enabler in delivering effective and efficient civilian missions. Despite the recognized importance, there is still no general framework regulating recruitment or training of CSDP civilian personnel. The Figure 6.\footnote{163} displays the phases for training and recruitment for CSDP missions and operations.

![Figure 6. Phases for Training and Recruitment of CSDP Missions and Operations](image)

\footnote{161} Ibid.\footnote{162} For example Panel of Experts (Official from Ministry of Defence, Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Official from Ministry of Interior) 28 August 2015, Interview with a Former UN Official 13 August 2015.\footnote{163} Jochen Rehrl, “Training and Recruitment” in Handbook for decision makers - The common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, ed. Jochen Rehrl, (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014), 72. This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371.
Given the vital role of civilian staff in the CSDP mission, specialized training is integral to the success of CSDP operations. The primary responsibility for training personnel seconded to civilian CSDP missions is held by the Member States, and there is incoherence among the scope and quality of the trainings. Some of the member states do not provide any training for their seconded personnel, and some of the member states have established national institutions dedicated to training national and international personnel. The EU highlights the importance of adequate training and its efforts to tackle the challenge through policy formulation and a networked approach.\textsuperscript{164}

The most extensive CSDP related training guidance is constituted in EU Training Policy and EU Training concept in CSDP accepted in 2003/2004.\textsuperscript{165} Even though the documents set the operation framework, training objectives and requirements for ESDC/CSDP training, with an aim to complement Member states’ training activities and create coherence and synergies among different training providers. However, until today, not all the objectives set out in these documents are met, and to enhance CSDP related training, the EU is currently developing CSDP training policy.\textsuperscript{166}

Currently, civilian crisis management training is organized by individual Member states and in a consortium of different training providers. One of the most recognized training programs are those organized by Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRI). In addition, European Security and Defence College (ESDC) established in 2005, operating as part of EEAS, is increasingly important, especially in providing strategic- level training and education on CSDP related matters to Member States.\textsuperscript{167} The EU has developed online- portals to strengthen the availability of relevant training courses, such as SchoolMaster\textsuperscript{168}.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{EU level training providers}
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
The EU training policy in CSDP is implemented by Member States' training providers on a national basis or through EU-level training providers/projects: \\
ESDC (European Security and Defence College) \\
CEPOL (European Police College) \\
ENTRI (Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management) \\
EUPST (European Union Police Services Training) \\
EDA supported training activities \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid. 72 - 80.
\textsuperscript{166} Rehrl, "Training and Recruitment," 80.
\textsuperscript{168} Schoolmaster is an on-line database containing information on all courses delivered throughout the EU that are relevant to the European Union's Common Security and Defence Policy. Whether delivered by Member States' training institutions or by the EU itself, all courses in Schoolmaster are in principle open to participants from all Member States. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/trainings/index_en.htm.

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371.
The staff of Civilian CSDP missions represents a wide range of experts with differing background. Alongside task specific qualities, should the experts have sufficient understanding of comprehensive crisis management in the EU foreign policy, cross-cutting knowledge of gender, human rights, SSR and assistance strategies, knowledge about how to appropriately interface with different civilian and military actors on the ground (EU and non-EU). While each CSDP mission/operation sponsors induction training for new personnel, these trainings only provide an introduction to the host country and general CSDP matters. Although member states participate in training programs on a voluntary basis, they are the ones that recruit, train and deploy both civilian and military personnel. The quality of mission induction training varies as widely as do the member state commitments to pre-deployment training. A common foundation of pre-deployment training can enhance mission effectiveness and coherence by ensuring that mission personnel have a solid understanding of the operational environment.169

For CSDP military operations, ensuring that personnel have received adequate training is less complicated than for civilian missions. The personnel deployed to operations are usually professional from national defence forces. The officers participate in international exercises and trainings that are part of an officer’s normal career. Protocol, procedures and terminology across the Member states are more or less the same.170 Nevertheless, pre-deployment training is also important for the military to ensure the coherence of multinational staff to be able to rapidly accomplish crisis management operational needs. Knowledge of other civilian and military actors, cross-cutting issues and EU structures is also important for those serving in CSDP operations. In addition, training is also a key effort to enhance cooperation and coordination between civilian and military missions, both at policy-strategic and operational levels.171

Training is also a tool to increase the cooperation and coordination between civilian and military actors. However, based on interviews of CSDP mission/operation personnel, there are no

169 Interview with a EEAS Official 2 October 2015, Interview with a former UN Official 13 August 2015 and Interview with a EUAM Official 26 August 2015.
170 Panel of Experts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EEAS Official and a former OPCEN Official) 27 August 2015.
mandatory training on civil-military cooperation and coordination. Cooperation and coordination with other CSDP missions and operations deployed in the same region does not seem to be insignificant as the issue is not usually included in pre-deployment or in-mission trainings. This is a considerable lack, especially for the civilian missions, as many civilian and humanitarian actors have not received any training on liaising with military. Military on the other hand, usually receives training in that field throughout their military career.\textsuperscript{172} A lack of coherence among pre-deployment and in-mission trainings also undermines the opportunity to systematically enhance the understanding of the other EU and international actors on the ground.\textsuperscript{173}

Training and exercises are perceived to be areas where synergies between the civilian and military functions could be searched. Joint trainings and exercises prior and in-mission do not only increase resources efficiency, but they also facilitate mutual learning, enhance understanding and lower prejudices between the civilian and military actors, thereby creating conditions for stronger internal cooperation and coordination within CSDP.\textsuperscript{174} This is of utmost important, because there seem to be lots of misperceptions and prejudices among the actors. The need for mutual learning is not only about 'who does what', but also 'who can do what and in what way'. For civilian planners, military operations are often seen as a security provider and a support tool for the benefit of the civilian mission. As the quote by a former CSDP staff member below describes, some military capabilities can be shared, but in order to avoid wrong expectations, a deeper knowledge or 'cultural awareness' needs to be raised among the civilian planners.

One of the good current practice to enhance civil-military coordination at the mission level are MultiLayer -exercises which are held every two years from political level (High Representative) to operational level (Operation Headquarters).\textsuperscript{175} In addition, there are a number of good examples among Member states, where different civilian and military experts are trained together.\textsuperscript{176} These sorts of initiatives are important, as if the EU is to achieve synergy in civil-military coordination and implement a genuinely comprehensive approach to crisis management, the joint trainings should be bolstered and even required.

\textsuperscript{172} Interview with a EDA Officer 14 August 2015.
\textsuperscript{173} Interview with a EEAS Official 13 August 2015.
\textsuperscript{174} Interview with a EUMC Official 4 September 2015; An example of these joint exercises is VIKING15 Training in Sweden.
\textsuperscript{175} Interview with a EEAS Official, 13 August 2015 and Interview with a former EUMC official 4 September 2015.
\textsuperscript{176} In Germany, there is a structure called The Comprehensive National Training Partner Platform to facilitate cooperation between military, police and civilian training institutions. In Finland the Finnish International Forces Training Centre (FINCENT) and Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland form together the Finnish Centre of Expertise in Comprehensive Crisis Management which core tasks are the development of civil-military relations and coordination in crisis management both for national crisis management capacity building and international crisis management missions. For more information, visit: http://www.fincent.fi/html/en/1206433068715507526.html
Training and exercises are also where Pooling and Sharing already takes place. For example, Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) aims to coordinate and harmonize military training activities among the NORDEFCO nations. By dividing the responsibility for the different types of courses, the participating nations have been able to reach an international top-level in a cost-efficient and coherent manner. This would not have been possible if the nations would have attempted to set-up the courses individually.\footnote{Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) is an example of Pooling and Sharing of capabilities. For more information, visit: http://www.nordefco.org/The-basics-about-NORDEFCO}

Although the EU training concept for CSDP only briefly mentions CMCO, there seems to be a wide overall agreement that joint trainings are one of the most important means to develop a common understanding for civil- military operations and may be a prime means to establish the aspired culture of coordination. Yet the responsibility for the training of staff still rests with the Member States, and in practice, there is no obligation for the Member States to conduct joint trainings for civilian and military staff. Even though significant progress has been made in the area, there is a need for enhanced Member States and EU commitment to expand the capacity of and improve cooperation among ESDC. Consolidating a comprehensive approach to EU security is dependent on ensuring sufficient, regular and systematic training.
3.4.6 Staffing

Force generation for civilian and military CSDP initiatives is an ongoing challenge. Ideally, the force generation process is conducted well in advance before the operation/mission is launched. The EU does not have its own standing force to be deployed to CSDP missions/operations and needs to rely essentially on seconded personnel from Member States. The process of filling the posts in the headquarters is called “force manning”. On the civilian side, the force generation is conducted via “calls for contributions”.178

Shortfalls in personnel have had a direct impact on the Missions’ ability to deliver their mandate, especially if shortfalls are in key positions. In fact, the success of a mission often depends on the number of personnel that can be deployed within the first three to six months after the launch. These force generation difficulties have impacted on the EU’s rapid response capabilities.179 EU Battlegroups, the main rapid response capability, have so far not been tested in an operational context, due to the lack of political consensus.180

Recruitment for the civilian missions is done by the CPCC and the civilian mission on the ground. In the field, the success of missions is impacted by the quality of their personnel, especially the senior leadership. A mission led by ineffectual personnel can decrease the ability of the mission to implement its mandate. The Head of Mission/Force Commander of missions interact with its own personnel, and with host governments, other stakeholders and decision-makers in Brussels. In particular, the relationships between Head of Mission and Brussels play an important role for the mission.181

The Head of Mission has a central role in the recruitment process, and his most important task during the operational planning is to recruit his/her staff members, including the contracted international senior officials and local staff.182 They are all recruited on an individual basis. Vacancies for individual posts are circulated to the member states (Call for Contribution), which can put forward their candidates on a seconded basis. Seconded staff in the missions remain

---

179 Slight improvement is on the sight, as the EU adopted the new ‘Rapid Response Concept’ in 2015.
180 Interview with a EUAM Official 26 August 2015 and Panel of Experts (Official from Ministry of Defence, Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Official from Ministry of Interior) 28 August 2015.
under the command of the national authorities\textsuperscript{183} of the seconding Member State in accordance with national rules, or the EU institution concerned or the EEAS. Those authorities transfer Operational Control (OPCON) of their personnel, teams and units to the Head of Mission. Crisis Response Teams (CRTs) also help to deploy staff to missions in the early stages, or when certain staff are required at short notice.\textsuperscript{184}

Skilled personnel are needed in CSDP field operations and CSDP officials who work in Brussels. On a daily basis, a mission interacts with CPCC. There is a “desk” for each mission, containing EEAS staff, permanent and seconded. The desk can have a significant role for the missions’ technical issues, as he/she is the connection between the mission and EEAS. If the desk is knowledgeable and driven can he/she make major contributions on the mission’s daily life. \textsuperscript{185}

An ongoing challenge for civilian missions is the difficulty in recruiting qualified experts. There are several reasons for this difficulty. The civilian personnel need to apply for positions as individuals through their national authorities and the process is often complicated. Only a few member states have established an institution that manages the recruitment process for all the CSDP missions. Additionally, unlike military personnel, who can be deployed abroad with short notice, civilian personnel are employed in full-time positions at home, and they cannot be ordered to participate in an international mission. Therefore, reasons such as security concerns, family or career considerations might play a role in deciding upon joining a mission or not.

Another contributor on the human resources is gender balance. The EU has committed to mainstream UNSCR 1325 to CSDP missions and operations. One aspect of mainstreaming is to ensure gender balance among mission personnel. Today, approximately 21\% of seconded personnel are female and 25\% of local staff.\textsuperscript{186} This imbalance between male and female staff in CSDP missions is partly based on the civilian crisis management focus areas that are also nationally segregated, such as the police and border guard. In military operations, the imbalance between female and male officers is even greater.

For the CSDP Military Operations, recruitment is not as complicated, and the challenges in Force generation are different from the civilian ones. In recent years, Member States have provided fewer personnel for military operations because they were overstretched in Iraq, Afghanistan. Kosovo has been a third theatre of European military deployment, where EU countries account for 80 percent of NATO forces. Additionally, capability gaps in Member States’ national defence forces

\textsuperscript{183} This means that the Member States has the right to demand their seconded staff to repatriate early.

\textsuperscript{184} Civilian Response Team (CRT) of multinational personnel able to be deployed with five days- notice. CRT has been used in several cases, the latest example from Ukraine.

\textsuperscript{185} Interview with a Former EUBAM Libya Official 11 September 2015.

\textsuperscript{186} Interview with a EEAS Official, 13 August 2015.
impact on their willingness to contribute to the CSDP operations. However, recruitment is relatively simple, since the operations are initiated and subsequently planned on the assumption that EU Member States will contribute resources (including human resources) to meet the requirements formally expressed in a document called the Statement of Requirements (SOR), or in more colloquial terms the ‘shopping list’ for that specific operation.  

Two distinct but inseparable elements are taken into consideration when discussing human resources for CSDP military operations:

Military troops or forces: to implement the military objectives detailed in the operation plans and Headquarters (C2 elements)

Command and control elements: planning, issuing directives, monitoring, evaluating and ensuring that the necessary corrective measures are implemented in line with political and military objectives.

Similar to civilian missions, in military operations, Member States transfer operational control (Transfer of Authority) in accordance with national restrictions and caveats, of their personnel, teams and units to the Force Commander.

Although the concept paper on CMCO emphasizes the culture of coordination among the EU officials and missions, implementation of a comprehensive approach varies both at a strategic and operational level. In Brussels, a lack of comprehensive planning is partly a human resource issue. For example, in CPCC, there are approximately 75 person working there and only one person is CMPD responsible for developing Civilian crisis management capabilities. In EUMS, the human resource situation is a bit better, but the lack of civilian human resources impacts on the cooperation between the civilian and military functions in CSDP.

In interviews and panel discussions, the importance of personal relationships emphasizes a major impact on civil- military cooperation and coordination, both in Brussels and on the ground. Even when a mission/operation’s political guidance (CMC) included a notion regarding coordination with other stakeholders in theatre and it would be further translated into OPLAN in a general manner, the depth of interaction is still person related. Almost no practical guidelines are available and the

---

188 ibid.
effectiveness of the cooperation relies on the personal qualities of (mainly) the leadership in different CSDP missions/operations. CMCO is not an objective of a mission or operation as such, and the reporting of interaction activities on the ground is not usually required by Brussels. Thus, the level of interaction between the EU missions and operations and other stakeholders often depend on the Head of Mission/Force Commander willingness to cooperate/coordinate.

3.5 Civil- military interaction in theatre

When assessing the implementation of a comprehensive approach through civil- military cooperation and coordination at the operational level, as well as searching for civil-military synergies from EU missions and operations, CSDP’s relatively short history should not be forgotten. The first CSDP mission was launched in 2003 and since then, concepts and instruments framing the CSDP activities have evolved. Among others, the need to look for synergies between civilian and military functions in CSDP have become increasingly important. As described in the previous section, there are several issues at the political- strategic level where cooperation and coordination between civilian and military sides could be strengthened.

In this section, an overview of the civil- military cooperation and coordination efforts and main barriers to interoperability at the operational level is provided. The review is mainly based on the assessment from past and ongoing CSDP missions and operations, where CSDP missions and operations exist simultaneously.

These operations/missions are:

- EUFOR and EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina
- EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali
- EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUTM Somalia and EUCAP NESTOR Horn of Africa

The most recent EU’s CSDP military operation – the European Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED, launched 22 June) is not covered in this

---

191 Interview with a Former EEAS official, 4 September 2015.
192 Interview with a Former EDA official 14 August 2015, Panel of Experts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EEAS Official and a Former OPCEN Official), Interview with a EUAM Official, 26 August 2015.
193 The Lisbon Treaty came into force in December 2009 and was a cornerstone in the development of the CSDP. Since the launch of the European Union Police (EUPM) in January 2003 the EU has over 30 operations as part of CSDP. Eleven of these operations have been launched since the entry into force of the Lisbon.
report due to the lack of proper “lessons learned” material and related documents. However, it seems that EUNAVFOR MED is fundamentally better prepared in regards to the EU’s comprehensive approach\textsuperscript{196} as it is planned together with FRONTEX and EUCAP Sahel Niger. Also, the Lessons and Best practices from previous CSDP missions/operations have been taken into account during the planning process.

3.5.1 Overview of the CDSP mission and operation deployed parallel
EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA)\textsuperscript{197}

The military operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was launched on 2 December 2004 and has contributed to the maintenance of the safe and secure environment in BiH ever since. The launch of Operation ALTHEA followed the decision by NATO to conclude its SFOR-operation and the adoption by the UN Security Council of resolution 1575, authorising the deployment of an EU force (EUFOR) in BiH.

In the framework of Operation ALTHEA, the EU initially deployed 7000 troops, to ensure continued compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in BiH and to contribute to a safe and secure environment. Operation ALTHEA is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements. Mandate and objectives in light of the improving security situation, Operation ALTHEA has been reconfigured four times, most recently in September 2012, but continues to act in accordance with its peace enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as specified in the latest UN Security Council Resolution 2183 (2014).

The main objectives of Operation ALTHEA are:

- To provide capacity-building and training to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
- To support BiH efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment in BiH
- To provided support to the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH

European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)\textsuperscript{198}


Since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (1995), the EU has had a key supporting role in the stabilisation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina is part of a broader effort undertaken by the EU and other players to strengthen the rule of law in the country. EUPM, the first mission under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), was launched on 1 January 2003 for an initial period of three years. Upon the invitation by the BiH authorities, the EUPM continued its mission with modified mandates and size until 30 June 2012.

In nearly a decade of its involvement in the strengthening of the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUPM worked diligently to create, under BiH ownership, a modern, sustainable, professional multi-ethnic police force, trained, equipped and able to assume full responsibility and to independently uphold law enforcement at the level of international standards. Focusing on police reform, and keeping a finger on police accountability, EUPM’s primary centre of attention has been the fight against organised crime and corruption. This effort has included, in particular, extensive work on achieving coordination, communication and cooperation among BiH’s 15 police agencies, as well as between law enforcement and judiciary, and has succeeded in creating a joint strategic and operational capacity.

**The EU Police Mission’s key tasks were:**

- To strengthen the operational capacity and joint capability of the law enforcement agencies engaged in the fight against organised crime and corruption;
- To assist and support in the planning and conduct of investigations in the fight against organised crime and corruption in a systematic approach;
- To assist and promote development of criminal investigative capacities of BiH; To enhance police-prosecution cooperation;
- To strengthen police-penitentiary system cooperation;
- To contribute to ensuring a suitable level of accountability.

**EU Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali)**

The restoration of security and lasting peace in Mali is a major issue for the stability of the Sahel region and, in the wider sense, for Africa and Europe. On 18 February 2013, at the request of the

---


---

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371.

68
Malian authorities, and in accordance with international decisions on the subject, in particular, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012), the European Union launched a training mission for Malian armed forces, EUTM Mali

The European Union's objective in Mali is to support Malian efforts to:

- Fully restore constitutional and democratic order through the implementation of the roadmap adopted on 29 January by the National Assembly;
- Help the Malian authorities to fully exercise their sovereignty over the whole of the country;
- Neutralize organized crime and terrorist threats.

The EUCAP Sahel Mali civilian mission

The EUCAP Sahel Mali civilian mission launched on 15 January 2015 at the invitation of the Malian government is an important element of the regional approach taken in the European Union strategy for security and development in the Sahel. The Sahel Strategy was the first to be developed jointly by several EU Institutions under the new framework established after the Lisbon Treaty, highlighting the importance that the EU attaches to its relationship with the region and its willingness to support development and security in the Sahel. The Strategy was based on the principles that development and security are interconnected and that the complex situation in the Sahel Region needs a comprehensive and regional approach, based on African ownership.

In addition to the action already taken in Mali by the EUTM mission, providing support to the Malian armed forces and by the European Union Delegation, and in connection with the EUCAP Sahel Niger and EUBAM Libya missions, the EUCAP Sahel Mali mission is helping the Malian government with the reform of its internal security forces (ISF) to enable them to provide more security and justice for Malians. EUCAP Sahel Mali is dedicated to supporting the Malian authorities' commitment to restructuring their defence and security forces in 2015.

In support of Mali's active efforts to restore State authority, and in close coordination with other international partners, particularly MINUSMA, EUCAP Sahel Mali is providing assistance and advice to the national police, the national gendarmerie and the national guard in the implementation of the security reform set out by the new government, with a view to:

---


- Improving their operational efficiency
- Re-estabishing their respective hierarchical chains
- Reinforcing the role of judicial and administrative authorities with regard to the management and supervision of their missions
- Facilitating their redeployment to the north of the country

**European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia – Operation Atalanta**

As part of the Comprehensive Approach to Somalia, in December 2008, the EU launched the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia – Operation Atalanta within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and in accordance with relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) and International Law in response to the rising levels of piracy and armed robbery off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean, Operation Atalanta is the European Union’s counter-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia.

EU NAVFOR is one part of the EU’s “Comprehensive Approach”, tackling both current symptoms and root causes of the problem. Together, EU NAVFOR, EUCAP Nestor and the EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia) form a coherent, integrated CSDP package supporting the EU’s “Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa”, which guides the EU’s multi-faceted engagement in the Horn of Africa. EU NAVFOR is also an actor in the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) initiative.

**Under the EU Council Joint Action, which is based on UN resolutions, EU NAVFOR’s mandate is to:**

- To protect World Food Programme (WFP) vessels delivering aid to displaced persons in Somalia, and the African Union Mission on Somalia (AMISOM) shipping;
- To deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali coast;
- To protect vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis.

---


203 The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) initiative began in 2008 as a mechanism of meetings aimed at coordinating and de-conflicting activities between the countries and coalitions involved in military counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean. The meetings are held in Bahrain at regular intervals and are co-chaired on a rotational basis by the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), NATO, and EUNAVFOR. OCEANS, “Beyond Piracy- a project of the One Earth Future Foundation, Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE)”, [http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/shared-awareness-and-deconfliction-shade](http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/shared-awareness-and-deconfliction-shade) (Accessed 17 August 2015).

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
In addition, the EU NAVFOR also contributes to the monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. On 21 November 2014, the Council of the EU extended the Mandate of Operation Atalanta until December 2016.

**Regional Maritime Security Capacity Building Mission in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (EUCAP Nestor)**

In July 2012, the European Union launched EUCAP Nestor, a civilian mission which assists host countries develop a self-sustaining capacity for a continued enhancement of maritime security, including counter-piracy and maritime governance. Its Headquarters is in Djibouti, the Head of Mission is Etienne de Poncins from France. The Mission is mandated to work across the Horn of Africa (HoA) and Western Indian Ocean (WIO) regions, with around 80 international and 20 local staff members carrying out activities and training across the region with a particular focus on Somalia. In addition to Djibouti, the Mission has personnel strategically positioned in Nairobi, Mogadishu, Bosaso, Hargeisa, the Seychelles and Tanzania.

Mandate and activities EUCAP Nestor aims to support the development of ‘maritime security’ systems in HoA/WIO states, thus enabling them to fight piracy and other maritime crime more effectively and to reduce the freedom of action for those involved in piracy in the region. The objective is to offer a solution that covers the whole process “from crime to court”, starting with the aerostation and detention of suspects up to the investigation and prosecution of maritime crime.

EUCAP Nestor carries out its activities within the context of the EU’s comprehensive approach to the HoA, comprising a broad set of actions (political, diplomatic, development, security and humanitarian). This is outlined in the "Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa", which the EU Member States adopted in November 2011 in order to guide the EU’s engagement in the region.

In the fight against piracy, the Mission complements a number of other EU actions, including the two CSDP missions in the region, the European Union Naval Force Somalia – Operation Atalanta at sea and the EU Military Training Mission (EUTM) for Somalia on land, as well as a number of EU programmes funded under the Instrument for Stability (Critical Maritime Routes Programme – MARSIC) and the European Development Fund (Regional Maritime Security Programme – MASE). The Mission also works closely with key international and regional organizations, such as the United Nations, in particular UNODC and UNDP, the African Union, IGAD and IMO.

---

EU Training Mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia)\textsuperscript{205}

On 10 April 2010, the European Union launched a military training mission in Somalia (EUTM Somalia) in order to contribute to strengthening the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the institutions of Somalia. This support is part of the EU's comprehensive engagement in Somalia, which aims to support stabilising the country and to respond to the needs of the Somali people.

Since 2010, EUTM Somalia has contributed to the training of over 4,000 Somali soldiers from the Somali National Army (SNA) with a focus on the training of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), Junior Officers, specialists and trainers. Initially training took place in Uganda, due to the political and security situation in Somalia, and in close collaboration with the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF). The training focused on the commander up to company level, in addition to specialist training in the areas of military police, civilian-military cooperation, intelligence, company commander and combat engineering.

On 22 January 2013, the Council of the European Union extended the mandate of EUTM Somalia to March 2015. This third mandate contained a significant change in the Mission focus, with the addition of strategic advisory and mentoring activities to complement the training role. EUTM Somalia operates in close cooperation and coordination with other international actors; in particular, the United Nations, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the United States of America.

EUFOR RD Congo\textsuperscript{206}


The mission was tasked with:


• To support and provide security to MONUC installations and personnel;
• To contribute to airport protection in Kinshasa;
• To contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence;
• Execute evacuation operations in case of an emergency.

The mission came to an end on 30 November 2006.

**EU Police Mission for the DRC (EUPOL RD Congo)**

The EUPOL RD Congo mission followed on from EUPOL Kinshasa, the EU's first civilian mission in Africa. Launched in July 2007, EUPOL RD Congo supports the efforts of national Congolese authorities to reform the national police. Since October 2013, the mission focuses on the mentoring, monitoring and advising of the trainers and PNC police officers. The mission has provided technical assistance to three European projects (EU Delegation in DRC, France and the United Kingdom) designed to support the security of the 2011 elections in DRC. Its mandate has been recently extended until September 2014.

The mission cooperates closely with the EUSEC RD Congo, the European Union delegation in DRC and the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in its efforts to help ensure that all SSR efforts deployed are consistent.

The EU’s engagement in the DR Congo has been studied thoroughly in several publications.

### 3.5.2 Interaction between CSDP missions and operations in theatre

**Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)** has sometimes been referred to as a “testing ground” for the ESDP, from the point of view of planning and coordinating the different EU crisis management instruments. Cooperation and coordination between the CSDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina was - EUFOR Althea (2004 -) and EUPM/BiH (2004 - 2012) processed of “learning by doing”. In the first phase, the differences between the missions were mainly related to differing interpretations of the mission mandates, both within EUPM and EUFOR.

---


208 Johanssen, The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management, 238-338; Davis, “The EU and peacebuilding”; Lurweg & Söderbaum, ‘Building peace from the outside.’

209 Mustonen, “Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels”.

---

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371.
There were some rather general directions concerning how to coordinate the CSDP activities, but in practice, there were neither clear structures nor guidelines for coordination and liaison, nor a clear delineation of tasks between the missions. It very soon became evident that when left solely up to the will of the actors to liaise and coordinate their activities, the cooperation and coordination were inadequate and highly dependent on personalities and personal contacts.

One factor that was identified as having hindered cooperation was a poor knowledge of the other actors and their mission, especially at the field level interface. Even though the missions operated under the same EU flag and policy, nevertheless certain handicaps, such as national agendas, conflicting personalities, language problems, different nationalities and cultural background, are factors that have to be taken into consideration in the cooperation, as with any other international organisation or mission.210

As the difficulties in the cooperation and delineation of tasks with regard to fighting organised crime became ever more apparent, and appropriate mechanisms from the Brussels end were still lacking, the actors themselves took the initiative to improve the situation. In September 2005, EUPM, EUFOR and EUSR agreed on the documents “Seven Principles” and “Guidelines for Increasing Co-operation between EUPM-EUFOR and EUSR”211.

Currently the benefits between EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali rely mainly on mutual support. For example, the EUCAP mission benefits from EUTM Mali medical facilities for EU personal. Information and intelligence sharing is also of paramount importance for both of these missions.212

The cooperation (and coordination) between EUTM Mali and EUCAP is carried out mainly with liaison officers and occasionally with HQ staff officers. Otherwise the cooperation at the mission level mainly rests on an “on-demand” and “ad-hoc” basis and depends on willingness and personal relations between individual mission members. This means that “fruitful” results can be ensured by mutual understanding and all is about good will and common understanding. Also, there seems to be the lack of communication between these two operations. The civilian actors should be made more aware of what the military mission does on the field level and vice versa. There are a number of “stereotypic expectations”, both in the military and civilian thinking that a mission should get rid

210 Ibid. The mandates were broad and overlapping, giving both organisations a role in fighting the organised crime that emerged as the critical issue between EUPM and EUFOR. In addition, some conflicting personalities within the missions created a situation in which there was very little or no coordination of operations. See also: EUISSU, “Ten years after.


212 Interview with a EEAS Official, 13 August 2015.

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
of. The main tool in this is communication and education before and during deployment, both off and on theatre.  

Quite often, the main problem at least for effective information sharing is the lack of reliable classified communication systems that would facilitate the cooperation. In some missions/operations, some third of countries participating in the operation make the releasability of documents too difficult.

Despite the communication difficulties, the cooperation between EUTM & EU CAP seems to be working well. The added value of each Mission benefits from the other. The expertise of the respective Mission's advisers is exploited to engage the Malian authorities with the same messaging. EU CAP advisers dealing with Gendarmerie and the National Guard are embedded within EUTM advisory teams when it comes to engaging the Ministry of Defence. In Niger, military expertise in the Mission is useful to deal with the internal security forces with a military status.

In addition, one good practice is that in EUTM Mali, a gender and human rights advisor is included in the mission personnel and is in touch with various civilian actors- but mostly from a training perspective. The EUTM mission HQ has a liaison cell, which has regular contact with civilian actors- mostly humanitarian organisations.

A very good “global size” example of the good practices is the counter piracy operation on the Western Indian Ocean, where there are plenty of best practices at the operational level among the civilian and military stakeholders. Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) and the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) mechanism brings together industries, International Maritime Organization (IMO), United Kingdom Marine Trade Operations (UKMTO), UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), EU, NATO, Coalition of Maritime Forces (CMF), individual states, such as India, China, Russia etc. Moreover, the Contact Group of Counter Piracy off the coast of Somalia is a unique multilateral forum, which also endorses the best practices between civ – mil synergies e.g. capacity building in Somalia.

---

213 Interview with a former EUTM Mali Officer 13 August 2015.
214 Interview with a former EUFOR Chad RCA Officer 20 August 2015.
215 Interview with a former EU CAP Sahel Officer 2 September 2015.
216 Kacper Rękawek & Marcin Terlikowski, "EU CSDP in the Light of the Crisis in Mali," Bulletin, No. 20/ 475, (2013); Interview with a former EUTM Mali Officer, 13 August 2015.
217 Interview with a former EEAS Official, 8 August 2015; In addition, in July 2015 European External Action Service (EEAS) MD Africa Geographical sector launched an inter-service study on existing best practices between civilian and military CSDP missions/operations. EU CSDP Lessons report from CSDP actions 2014 and 2015 actuated the work. In the kick of meeting mid-July 2015 it was emphasized that there exist lots of best practices in use among and between civilian and military missions/operations. However, rules/directions how to apply best practices into CSDP mission/operation CONOPS, plans and eventually in practice is not officially documented. During the kick off meeting it was made rather clear that writing rules and directions into official documents such as Council decisions,
"EU NAVFOR is one part of the EU’s “Comprehensive Approach”, tackling both current symptoms and root causes of the problem. Together, EU NAVFOR, EUCAP Nestor and the EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia) form a coherent, integrated CSDP package supporting the EU’s “Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa”\textsuperscript{218}, which guides the EU’s multi-faceted engagement in the Horn of Africa."\textsuperscript{219}

Perhaps the “best policies and concept etc.” currently existing in the EU regarding the cooperation and coordination within the CSDP missions/operations is the mandate of EU Operations Centre (EU OPCEN)\textsuperscript{220} from summer 2012, prolonged spring 2015 until the end of 2016. Within this mandate, EU MSs are currently requesting EUOPCEN to facilitate the coordination between all EU stakeholders and interlocutors of EU CSDP Operations/Missions in the Horn of Africa (EUCAP Nestor, EUTM Somalia, EU NAVFOR Atalanta) and Sahel area (EUCAP Sahel and Niger, as well as EUTM Mali). Although EU OPCEN was initially created to facilitate coordination at the operational level, but in an updated mandate, the facilitating takes place both at the strategic (in Brussels- between CSDP stakeholders) and operational level (between missions/operations). We could say that it is currently the best instrument to facilitate the coordination within its comprehensive “incomprehension” to fulfil its mandate. However, we should understand that the “incomprehension” is the will of the Member States.\textsuperscript{221}

Examples of successful civil-military cooperation in EU NAVFOR Atalanta were the “joint” activity in the World Food Programme (WFP), the cooperation with the SHADE\textsuperscript{222} (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction). Also, EU NAVFOR and EUCAP Nestor had synergies in logistics. For example, EU NAVFOR transported EUCAP Nestor vehicles to Djibouti\textsuperscript{223}.

221 Interview with a former EEAS Official, 8 September 2015 and Interview of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official, 11 September 2015.
222 The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) initiative began in 2008 as a mechanism of meetings aimed at coordinating and de-conflicting activities between the countries and coalitions involved in military counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean. The meetings are held in Bahrain at regular intervals and are co-chaired on a rotational basis by the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), NATO, and EUNAVFOR. More information: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/shared-awareness-and-deconfliction-shade
223 Interview with a former EU NAVFOR Atalanta Officer, 31 July 2015.
In EUTM Somalia, a gender (GA) and human rights advisor was included in the mission personnel and is in touch with various civilian actors, but mostly from a training perspective. GA was given the opportunity to participate in seminars and meetings, as well as to meet delegations. However, knowledge, skill or potential synergies derived from meetings and seminars were not used at the operational level.224

As an example of implications of civil- military cooperation in CSDP, one could mention the EU integrated compound in Mogadishu, currently under construction. This is a good example of where civilian mission and military CSDP missions are located at the same airport (Mogadishu International Airport), very close to each other. However, both missions will utilize almost 100% of their own capabilities. Also, only limited medical support is provided from military missions to civilian missions. The main challenges are possible force protection and C2. However, the cooperation and coordination of efforts with different kind of meetings and platforms is increasingly improving civil-military synergies.225

An upcoming joint strategic review of the CSDP action in the Horn of Africa, instead of separate reviews of the missions and operations, is a good and concrete step forward. Another practical example of the comprehensiveness of the final output is a common base, which will be completed at the airport.226

From time to time, there has been the impression that certain nationalities only pursued their own national interests 227 rather than the interests of the mission (this is a general view and understanding through all the missions/operations 228). They travelled to the mission area, and in Europe, where they had their own national interests. This led to the fact that travel funds ran out mid-year. Most of the top level of cooperation was solely by the operation commander. The Staff was not informed on what had been agreed at the commander of journeys meetings.229

Sometimes civilian missions are afraid to be “branded” as part of the military entity which drives them to keep an adequate distance to military missions. Most of the EU civilian missions are dealing with Rule of Law, which emphasizes the distance to the military. Military CSDP operations/missions are to be transferred many cases to a civilian long term Rule of Law etc. missions which also have a political agenda. Civilian missions are usually happy to receive limited

---

224 Interview with a former EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFOR Atalanta Officer 26 July 2015.
225 Interview with a former EEAS Official, 8 September 2015.
226 Panel of Experts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EEAS Official and former OPCEN Official), 27 August 2015.
227 Interview with a former EEAS Official, 4 September 2015.
228 Interview with a former EUTM Mali Officer, 13 August 2015 and Interview with a former EUTM Mali Officer, 21 July 2015.
229 Interview with a former EU NAVFOR Atalanta Officer, 31 July 2015; Interview with a former EUTM Somalia Officer, 10 August 2015; Interview with a former EUTM Somalia Officer, 13 September 2015.
Logistical (medical and air transport) training support on ad hoc bases. Even security and force protection are usually contracted from private enterprises, which means that there are no issues on Command and Control.230

One of the challenges in the EU NAVFOR Atalanta was to get the “best practices” from the field level to the OHQ level to support decision making. Sometimes the system was too “formal and bureaucratic”. However, the cooperation between EUCAP NESTOR and EU NAVFOR Atalanta was functional in the “frame of the mandate”.231

### 3.6 Conclusion

As outlined in this chapter, an implementation of the comprehensive approach to CSDP is not easy in practice. The number of political, legal, structural and ‘cultural’ practises have an impact on the scope of the interaction between the civilian and military functions. Although the importance of developing instruments and procedures for effective civil-military coordination in the CSDP context has been emphasized throughout the history of ESDP/CSDP since 1999232, the potential synergies, for example, in the planning, training and conduct of a mission/operation have still not been fully exploited.

The number of documents, interviews and reviews show that the importance of closer cooperation and coordination between civilian and military functions is a must for the coherence, visibility and efficiency of the EU engagement in solving and managing crisis. As the examples of the existing practises in implementation of comprehensive approach through civil-military cooperation and coordination on the ground show, there are a number of good practises on how the interoperability of the civilian and military instruments have been enhanced. There are also examples of where the closed cooperation would bring added value to the EU’s civilian and military actors. These experiences from the past and ongoing missions/operations provide valuable lessons for the future CSDP engagement. Delivering activity across the board to reach the common objective is the only way that the desired end state can be achieved, either at all or without a significant delay or waste of resources.233

---

230 Interview of a former EEAS Official, 8 September 2015.
231 Interview with a former EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFOR Atalanta Officer, 26 July 2015.
Additionally, the experiences have shown that coordination and cooperation within CSDP needs to be extended to the other relevant EU instruments. In particular, the EU’s political and diplomatic capacity needs to come into play during the planning and conduct of missions and operations – especially when it comes to the conceptualization of the desired end-state and transition from CSDP to other EU instruments. This would improve not just mission design and effectiveness, but also ensure an adequate continuum of the stabilization efforts executed by the EU or another actor, thereby ensuring the sustainability and long-term effect on the ground.
4 LESSONS FROM IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CRISIS

“More civilian-military synergy is also an essential element in the EU's comprehensive approach: we definitely need more joint working methods, permanent boards and mechanisms that allow day-to-day coordination as well as more flexible funding mechanisms.” (EUMS conference, Brussels 19 June 2014)

As elaborated above in Chapters 2 and 3, the EU has been engaged with implementing civilian and military crisis management operations since 2003. Most of the time, these missions and operations are deployed to different countries or regions. However, there are few examples of countries and regions where the EU has deployed a civilian and military operation in theatre parallel. These examples offer a good opportunity to identify lessons and best practices - if possible, even synergies - as well as shortcomings in regards to civil-military interaction within CSDP. Even if the missions and operations are expected to contribute to an overall EU comprehensive approach, still in many cases, the operational level observations are geared towards civil-military interactions or synergies. Whilst the mentioned changes and developments following the Lisbon Treaty have been naturally reflected at the level of missions and operations, the number of parallel-deployed EU missions and operations remains limited, and the EU still has not deployed a joint CSDP mission.

As discussed in the previous chapters, the EU considers a comprehensive approach as one of its strengths. However, as discussed in the previous chapters, implementing the approach to conflict prevention and crisis management is challenging due to a number of structural, political and technical reasons. The EU has come a long way from addressing the need for increasing cooperation and coordination within CSDP actors merely as an issue between civilian and military crisis management. At the outset, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent creation of a "double-hatted" High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP) who is supported by the EEAS, and the reorganisation of relevant CSDP structures (CPCC, CMPD) under the EEAS, were automatically considered as furthering the comprehensive approach of the EU to crisis management, and increasing civil-military synergies and coordination, at least, at the level of Brussels.


235 EEAS, “Factsheet on “Promoting synergies”
Although, civil-military coordination only constitutes a limited - albeit significant - part of the EU's comprehensive approach to crisis management, when executed properly, it can significantly impact the effectiveness of the EU’s conflict prevention and resolution efforts. Therefore, this chapter discusses lessons identified on civil- military interactions within CSDP, basing the analysis on literature review, key informant interviews and a panel of expert discussions, focusing on outlining the barriers and best practises to effective civil- military cooperation and coordination.

As discussed in chapter three, many of the barriers to create synergies within CSDP lies in the political- structural level comprising i.e. the question of funding, resources, reluctance of establishing permanent military crisis management structures or a joint planning unit, as well as insufficient command structures. Personal relationships, adequate training and recruitment also play an unarguably significant role for the effective coordination and coordination. However, many of the key lessons regarding the implementation of comprehensive approach are connected with the crisis management structures, and therefore this section focuses on the lessons identified from a political- strategic level. Discussions on how efforts to exploit existing civil- military capabilities could be further enhanced. Owing to the significant structural changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty, in regard to crisis management and, in particular, civil-military interaction, this review of lessons identified will only focus on observations on post-Lisbon policies, structures and modalities.

Lessons identified and lessons learned processes are an integral part of the CSDP operation cycle, and many of the key lessons and best practises highlighted in the chapter have also been identified by several scholars, independent researches, as well as by the EU. Although identified, the lessons are often not exploited when planning a new CSDP mission/operation.

### 4.1 Lessons learned from comprehensive approach to CSDP

In the next chapter some of the key lessons and best practices related to EU’s efforts to implement the comprehensive approach through civil- military cooperation/coordination to CSDP are reviewed.

#### 4.1.1 Annual reports

EEAS release every year an Annual CSDP Lessons Report with recommendations. On 3 March 2015, the EEAS presented the second report on the key lessons identified during the previous year
in the field of CSDP. The report also described the implementation of the key lessons identified already in 2013 and listed in the Annual 2013 CSDP lessons report.\textsuperscript{236} The report included 15 key recommendations that refer to the five key lessons and describe (concrete) steps to be taken to implement each of them. The key recommendations relate mainly to the processes, but there are also some recommendations to enhance civilian-military coordination and synergies in CSDP missions and operations in the field. Those lessons are outlined in \textbf{Annex 2. Lessons identified.} \textsuperscript{237} Those lessons would most probably enhance civil- military synergies in the field of CSDP. However, the recommendations are quite general in nature and not that concrete. Also it is good to note that until the recommendations are agreed and put into practice to enhance CSDP civilian-military coordination and synergies in the field, it may take quite a long time due to the long process.\textsuperscript{238}

\subsection*{4.1.2 Lessons identified on CSDP civil- military interface}

It is said that improving coherence and effectiveness were amongst the guiding principles for reform in the Lisbon Treaty.\textsuperscript{239} Through the institutional changes following the Treaty, it was automatically considered as furthering the comprehensive approach of the EU to crisis management. To an extent, this has been achieved through the \textit{institutionalisation of the coordination mechanisms} among the main institutions and there is now an increased level of consultation among the crisis management actors, more consultative planning processes (also through revised Crisis Management Procedures) and improvements have been made in regard to shared situational awareness or analysis to which both civilian and military counterparts contribute, but for the most part, the outcome of this development following the Treaty remains limited.\textsuperscript{240}

Even if the idea of a comprehensive approach is not new, there has not been a common understanding of the concept within the EU. The EEAS and the European Commission published,

\textsuperscript{236} The 2014 report states that the implementation of the key lessons identified in 2013 made good progress, although further work is needed in particular on certain aspects of the Comprehensive Approach and on pre-deployment training. A summary of the Annual 2013 CSDP lessons report: \url{http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/annual_2013_csdp_lessons_report_en.pdf}.


\textsuperscript{238} The representatives of EU Member States in the EU Political and Security Committee discussed the report and on 12 May 2015 they endorsed its key lessons and recommendations in line with the advice of the EU Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, Political-Military Group and Military Committee. The CSDP Lessons Management Group composed of both EEAS and European Commission departments dealing with CSDP will monitor the implementation of the key lessons of both 2013 and 2014 and report back to Member States in the next Annual CSDP Lessons Report.

\textsuperscript{239} Drent, The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Security,"12.

\textsuperscript{240} Nicoletta Pirozzi 2013, 11.
in December 2013, a Communication on "The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis" which, whilst not really defining the concept of a comprehensive approach, sets out a joint understanding among the High Representative/EEAS and the Commission on how the EU could work more comprehensively.241

Table 8. The Key Lessons from 2014

1. The Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) showed its potential but could be further improved.

2. The revised Crisis Management Procedures (CMP) proved their worth but need further analysis to avoid delays in mission launch.

3. Staff in Brussels and in EU Delegations would benefit from more systematic CSDP training.

4. There is insufficient secure communication capability.

5. Coordination and cooperation between EU Delegations and CSDP missions can be enhanced.

(Council of the European Union, 3 March 2015)

241 Volker Hauck and Andrew Sherriff, Important progress, but real EU comprehensiveness is still ahead of us, ECDPM Talking Points blog, 20 December (2013).
The Communication outlined eight measures to "enhance the coherence and effectiveness of the external policy and action in conflict and crisis situations"\textsuperscript{242}:

1. Develop a shared analysis;
2. Define a common strategic vision;
3. Focus on prevention;
4. Mobilise the different strengths and capacities of the EU;
5. Commit to the long term;
6. Linking policies and internal and external action;
7. Make better use of EU Delegations;
8. Work in partnership.

Whilst the Communication emphasises conflict prevention and long-term commitment (to peace building), in essence, the Communication is largely focused on crisis management.\textsuperscript{243} As the Communication, welcomed and supported by the Council of the EU in its Conclusions\textsuperscript{244}, sets out the measures or priority areas for furthering the comprehensive approach, the opportunities and challenges for further developing the EU comprehensive approach will be organised (where applicable) according to those measures. Undoubtedly, other areas of importance may surface and they will be covered accordingly.

**Shared analysis**

Developing a shared analysis has been highlighted as one of the crucial areas for furthering the comprehensive approach to crisis management. Shared analysis and understanding of the outlying causes behind a (potential) conflict or crisis, identification of relevant people and groups involved and assessing the different options for action, by all relevant actors, is key for the formulation of a sound and coherent political strategy for conflict prevention and response. This should also include laying out the EU interests and objectives, as well as resources, in the country or region - something which is of utmost importance when trying to assess the impact or effectiveness of the

\textsuperscript{242} European Commission, "The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises"

\textsuperscript{243} Faria, What EU Comprehensive Approach?, 8-9.

\textsuperscript{244} Council of the European Union, "Council conclusions on the EU's comprehensive approach," FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels, 12 May 2014.
EU action.\textsuperscript{245} The development of a common or shared analysis of the situation at hand should also include a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the root causes of the conflict; without a sound understanding of the conflict context - and also the appropriate measures that should be applied - any response, or indeed the comprehensive approach, will fail.\textsuperscript{246} It has been noted that the lack of common understanding among the European Commission, the EEAS and the Council of the EU has hampered the creation of coherent strategies for the EU to effectively respond to crises and conflicts.\textsuperscript{247} In regard to the shared analysis, the most noteworthy step towards this direction has been the creation of the PFCA approach. Once a crisis occurs, or when a CSDP action is foreseen, a PFCA that outlines not just the situation or the conflict, but also the range of options for the EU to respond, will be prepared by the EEAS geographical desk with the support of relevant services, including civilian and military representatives, and the respective EU delegation. \textsuperscript{248} These options do not include only CSDP missions and operations but instruments such as diplomacy and economic sanctions. The PCFA was prepared for the first time in 2014 to address the Ukrainian crisis, where it has been reported to have helped in forming a common EU strategic vision; showcasing the potential of the document.

Regarding improving shared analysis by the EEAS and the European Commission, there are recent examples of good practices in this regard, namely through the Early Warning System, conducting conflict analysis workshops and better coordinating fact-finding and technical assistance missions. All of these allow blending in necessary civilian and military expertise and perspectives.\textsuperscript{249}

Whilst there have been notable developments in the area of shared analysis, mainly owing to the PFCA which "the EEAS will strive to make it even timelier, to perfect it and to make its use more systematic\textsuperscript{250}, naturally it could be further utilised and the analysis could be improved. To promote the new tool, PFCA should be included into the training programs, available for all the relevant EU actors. It has been observed that further efforts, and willingness, is required by the different actors to increase information sharing and improve situational awareness that are prerequisites for


\textsuperscript{248} European Commission, "The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises"; De Kermaon, “Decision making/shaping”, 47; Interview with a EU NAVFOR Officer, 20 August 2015.


\textsuperscript{250} Council of the European Union, "Annual 2014 CSDP lessons report"
formulating a shared understanding of the conflict setting and the appropriate measures to be taken by the EU.\textsuperscript{251}

**Common strategic vision**

As outlined above, shared analysis is a precondition for the development of a common EU strategic vision which, in turn, enables a more coherent planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations. In regard to crisis management, it has been noted that the effectiveness, or impact, of CSDP missions and operations is enhanced when they are conducted as part of a broader EU strategy.\textsuperscript{252} Therefore, the development of joint policy documents that state the shared political priorities and strategies of the EU to address security and development challenges at regional or national levels has been perceived as a valuable effort in increasing the EU comprehensive approach, also to crisis management. Wherever possible, the EU strategic vision should be set out in a **Strategy document**.\textsuperscript{253}

Having a "global, coherent and resilient" strategy for a country or a region has been identified as a challenge for the EU.\textsuperscript{254} Despite the importance of including CSDP actions in a common strategy framework, the recent regional or national strategies by the EU (such as on the Horn of Africa, Sahel, Great Lakes) have met criticism as regards their comprehensiveness and coordination. Whilst outlining a framework for regional action, the strategies stop short of detailing how the EU should act regionally. A stronger guiding implementation framework would facilitate coordination and cooperation on the ground, and the comprehensiveness of EU action could be improved through better identification of the most appropriate instruments for the various activities to be conducted at the field level, as well as better sequencing of short term crisis management mechanisms and longer term support activities; including elaborating on CSDP exit strategies and the effective handover to other EU instruments.\textsuperscript{255}

\textsuperscript{251} Interview of a EUMS Official, 8 September 2015; Panel of experts discussion (Official from Ministry of Defence, Official from Ministry for Foreign Affairs and , Official from Ministry of the Interior) 28 August 2015; Panel of experts’ discussion (EEAS Officials), 27 August 2015; Interview of a EU NAVFOR Officer, 20 August 2015.


\textsuperscript{253} Faria, What EU Comprehensive Approach?, 6;European Commission, “The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises”

\textsuperscript{254} Interview with a EU NAVFOR Officer 20 August 2015.

\textsuperscript{255} European Commission, “The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises”; De Kermabon, “Decision making/shaping,” 47; Interview with a EU NAVFOR Officer, 20 August 2015.  


 Interview with a EUMS Official, 8 September 2015; Panel of experts discussion (Official from Ministry of Defence, Official from Ministry for Foreign Affairs and , Official from Ministry of the Interior) 28 August 2015; Panel of experts’ discussion (EEAS Officials), 27 August 2015; Interview with a EU NAVFOR Officer, 20 August 2015.

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
The need to define a **common strategic vision** has been, as one might expect, also identified by the EU as one of the priorities. The development of guidelines for Joint Framework Documents (JFD) has been emphasised as an instrument to strengthen joint analysis and improving common EU strategic visions and establishing the Union's objectives and priorities for a region or country. The guiding principles for setting out these guidelines, to develop the JFD, highlight wide cooperation between the EU and its Member States, as well as assigning delegations and embassies on the ground a key role. It is also emphasised that the Guidelines for JFD need to take into account other strategic documents (regional strategies, the PFCA, EU development instruments).256 A lesson, in regard to shaping a common EU strategic vision, has been - in particular where CSDP missions are deployed - that the Member States need to be committed to the common vision to strengthen the "whole-of-EU" comprehensiveness.257

Following the definition of a common EU strategic vision towards a conflict or crisis, and in the case CSDP was chosen as the best instrument to be used in the situation at hand, the EEAS would prepare its options (either civilian or military) in accordance with the revised Crisis Management Procedures (CMP). One of the objectives of the revision, in 2013, of the CMP was to **align civilian and military planning processes and harmonise civilian and military procedures as much as possible.** As explained in chapter 3, currently, the development of the CMC, by the CMPD, includes both civilian and military inputs (CPCC and EUMS, respectively).258 A recent lesson, however, indicates that whilst the revised CMP has proved functional, it has not contributed to a faster launching of missions and more efforts are needed in this regard.259

There is some criticism, despite the aspiration of acting in line with one common strategic vision and according to the revised CMP, towards the actual implementation of a comprehensive planning process when designing the CSDP interventions. The critique points out that despite the principle of selecting the most suitable CSDP instrument according to the shared analysis and common strategic vision, many times the decision about which instrument (civilian or military) to utilise has been made, at the political level, before finalisation of the analysis and the formulation of the best suited options.260

There are a number of examples of such efforts. The EEAS, for instance, now takes part in the multi-annual financial planning of Commission external relations funds, and Commission services

---

in turn are actively contributing to CSDP mission/operation planning. In the field, this is matched by regular contacts, information exchanges and close coordination. Tangible results of this can already be observed in many theatres. Synergies could be fostered in particular in developing concrete dual use capabilities, including through joint research and technology efforts, and finding ways to facilitate their potential availability for CSDP civilian missions and military operations while taking full account of civilian and military specificities. The creation of a pool of European experts in a security sector reform is an example of such civil-military synergies.

Coordination

As noted above, the structural changes within EEAS following the Lisbon Treaty brought about an aspiration of improved institutional cooperation and coordination. As already mentioned, the institutional "architecture" has been strengthened, frameworks have been created and working methods have been improved; enhancing the comprehensiveness of EU external action. Currently, there are multiple actors and various coordination mechanisms that engage in crisis response: the EU Crisis Response System consisting of the EU Crisis Platform (chaired by the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Executive Secretary General or the Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Planning), the EU Situation Room and the Crisis Management Board. The purpose of the EU Crisis Response System is, by regular meetings, to ensure the coordination of EU actors and instruments across the EU system.²⁶¹

Figure 7. The EU Crisis Platform

As illustrated\(^2\), the Crisis Platform consists of the relevant EEAS, Commission and Council General Secretariat services, including the relevant CSDP actors. Its meetings are conducted on an ad hoc basis, and it has been activated, for instance, in the event of the crisis in Libya.\(^3\)

**Crisis platform** is a good coordination mechanism to enhance cooperation and information sharing between the military and civilian functions. However, it has not been able to bridge long-standing structural barriers within and across institutions, those including the intersection between shorter-term security policy and longer-term development cooperation, as well as between civilian and military structures. According to an official from the EU Military Staff, the Crisis Platform improved coordination at the top of the hierarchy, but not at the working level where duplication continues. In addition, the ad hoc use of the Crisis Platform did not ensure “intelligent sequencing”, namely smooth transitions between the activities in the realm of the CSDP and longer-term Commission measures.\(^4\)

**Operation Centre (OPCEN)**

\(^2\) “Crisis Platform,” Europen External Action Service, accessed 15 September 2015,
\(^4\) Interview with a Former EUBAM Libya Official, 11 September 2015.

Another good example of a structure that has contributed to the EU comprehensive approach (at least on a limited geographical area), as outlined by many interlocutors, has been the EU Operations Centre (OpCen) which was activated in March 2012 to coordinate and strengthen civil-military synergies between the three CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa. According to its initial mandate, the purpose of the OpCen was, inter alia, to support the Civilian Operations Commander in the operational planning and conduct of the then future civilian CSDP mission and support CMPD, at its request, in strategic planning for the CSDP mission and operation in the Horn of Africa. In addition, OpCen was to facilitate coordination and synergies between the CSDP mission and operations in the Horn of Africa, as well as between the mission and operations and Brussels structures. 265 At the end of 2014, the mandate of the OPCEN was extended until the end of 2016, and its geographical and functional scope was expanded to cover the Sahel region. 266

The creation of the OPCEN was based on a so called Weimar initiative that aimed at improving the planning and conduct of EU operations and establishment of a permanent operations HQ. Owing to the opposition by some member states, the founding of a permanent HQ was not possible, and therefore the creation of a temporary OPCEN was a compromise. Structurally, the OPCEN, as part of the EEAS, has no command responsibility, and remains separate of the EUMS.267

Overall, the creation and functioning of the OPCEN as a link between Brussels and the missions and operations has been regarded as positively contributing to improved coordination. Despite some observations regarding the unclear role of OPCEN, and the challenges to implement its mandate owing to the differing views of the member states, the OPCEN has been considered by some as the "best instrument to facilitate coordination" between the different EU stakeholders in the Horn of Africa and Sahel 268. In regard to the command and control of missions and operations, OPCEN is regarded as a good practice and many member states have expressed willingness to elevate the role of OPCEN into the chain of command of the missions and operations.


268 Interview of a former EUCAP Sahel Officer 2 September 2015
Nevertheless, it looks likely that the mandate of OPCEN, in its current form, will not be expanded nor extended beyond 2016 because of the opposition by some member states.269

In many instances, it has therefore been stated that the necessary coordination mechanism should be in place to ensure efficient coordination, including between the existing civilian and military capabilities at the strategic-political level. This understanding has, on the other hand, been challenged by noting that the multiplicity of actors, dealing at times with multiple crises, makes the coordination at the same time very difficult.270 One shortcoming, as observed by Hauck and Rocca is, however, that despite the various institutional settings, "there is no structure that could provide the strategic oversight and authority to take decisions across these different departments and institutions".271

With regard to the inter-institutional relations or coordination, some outstanding issues still remain between the CSDP institutions. Further work is needed to address the "silo type approach" between the Brussels institutions that has in many instances still led to separate civilian and military planning processes.272 In terms of planning of CSDP missions and operations, coordination has been an ongoing challenge between CPCC and CMPD who both have a role in particular in the planning of civilian missions.273 The Lisbon Treaty did not provide specific provisions concerning the respective mandates of CPCC and CMPD and did not thus clarify the sometimes contested division or labour or coordination; sometimes leading to "personal territorial claims and intra-institutional competition".274 In addition to the split responsibility for civilian planning, despite the developments, long-term (strategic) military planning are still separated among CMPD and EUMS. For the above mentioned reasons, there is an ongoing need to intensify the cooperation and coordination between CPCC, CMDP and EUMS in order to improve the coordination of planning processes.275

---

269 Panel of experts (EEAS Officials), 27 August 2015.
270 Interview with a former EUFOR Chad RCA 20 August 2015.
273 Interview of an official from the Ministry of the Interior of Finland, 27 July 2015.
274 Interview of a EU NAVFOR Officer, 20 August 2015; Pirozzi, The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management, 3, 11.
Further, as regards coordination between the CSDP instruments, and in particular between the civilian and military actors or civil-military coordination, the Communication on "The EU's comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis" provided limited attention to this aspect. The Communication did not address the longstanding issue of the civilian and military actors engaging more effectively through joint action; something which has provoked criticism particularly from non-state actors owing to the fear that military and political considerations would overrun the humanitarian and development components of their work. Another contributing factor to this has been the different approaches by the Member States to civil-military operations. Due to the desire to keep civilian and military crisis management separated, it has been observed that the Brussels structures are still not ideally suited for close cooperation.

It has been pointed out that aside from further clarifying the relationship between the institutions; a "change of mind-set" is needed to facilitate a comprehensive approach, and the implementation of coordination, in the spirit of the Communication, among the CSDP actors. Further, achieving greater dialogue between the various actors requires support at higher political levels in the institutions. The increasingly complex challenges that the EU is called to face through its CSDP interventions will require an enhanced integration between military and civilian components. Everyone dealing with CSDP missions, either at the strategic, operational or tactical level is voting for more cooperation and coordination.

4.2 Limitations to developing the comprehensive approach to crisis management

Whilst many areas of development and improvements have been identified in furthering the EU comprehensive approach to crisis management, there still seem to exist some areas, which limit the comprehensiveness of CSDP.

As discussed in chapter 3, the major obstacles for the implementation of effective civilian-military integration and synergies in the field lie in the decision-making process, financial and command aspects of CSDP missions.

---

276 Hauch and Rocca, “Gaps between Comprehensive Approaches”, 29.
277 Interview of a former EUMC Official, 4 September 2015.
278 Interview of a OPCEN Officer 10 September 2015.
281 Article 41 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). Civilian missions are directly financed through the collective CFSP budget, while military missions abide to the principle of “costs lie where they fall,” with only a small proportion (about 10 % of common expenditures) funded through the ATHENA mechanism. In the light of the different sources of funds, a reform of the existing cost distribution mechanism for operations is a pressing issue, particularly for the...
The limited cooperation and coordination across CSDP’s civilian and military functions is often based on lack of shared vision, time pressure, limited resources (both human and financial), structural and political constrains. Also the planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operations and the planning procedure itself is still an area where progress is needed. In addition, different reporting standards, lessons learned processes and limited access to those documents limit the horizontal institutional learning. Overall, lack of unity of efforts among the EU institution, prevent also the interoperability between civilian and military components.

Also EU’s strategic planning, various planning pipes and a lack of mechanisms for the design of the pipe exported, where necessary in the EEAS in Brussels, each operation is designed for their own purposes and in different tubes. Although the Treaty on European Union does not preclude the deployment of operations that could combine military and civilian elements, the EU planning and conduct structures, together with the relevant financial regulations, have so far prevented the creation of Joint military-civilian operations.

In fact the different financing mechanisms of civilian missions and military operations have been commonly recognised as one of the main limitations to the implementation of a comprehensive approach to crisis management. This has resulted in lack of resources that are available for CSDP missions and operations, and hindered operational effectiveness. This has been observed in particular in those cases that would require a combined civilian-military response, where the financing would come both through the Athena mechanism and the member deployment of larger civilian and military contingents. Discussions on new sources or mechanisms of funding for both military and civilian operations have been ongoing over the last two years, notably on the occasion of the review of the Athena decision, but also in the context of the 'Train and Equip' programme.


It remains to be seen how the EEAS review, which was completed this summer, is improving interoperability between civilian and military capabilities. Creation of a Crisis response unit under the Deputy Secretary of CSDP and Crisis respond in EEAS, which include all major CSDP civilian and military mission/operations’ stakeholders and interlocutors at the strategic level (except EUMS and EU OPCEN), should be a major improvement on civil-military interoperability within the CSDP.


“Unity of effort” is the state of harmonizing efforts among multiple organizations working towards a similar objective. This prevents organizations from working at cross purposes and it reduces duplication of effort. Multiple organizations can achieve unity of effort through shared common objectives. In military operations, unity of effort is similar to unity of command except it usually relates to coordinating organizations not in the same command, such as in interagency operations. In this case, unity of effort is often achieved through campaign plans or coordinating committees instead of through a unified commander (Wikipedia).

People with different professional backgrounds are used to different organisational structures (hierarchy vs. network), different ways of solving problems (intuitive vs. analytical), different views on good leadership (authoritarian vs. inclusive), and different ways of communicating (accepting orders vs. encouraging discussion).

Tardy, “CSDP in Action”
states.\textsuperscript{289} Financing has been a limitation to, for example, better utilisation of shared logistics, premises and medical services which could otherwise be areas that would contribute to a better use of existing resources in the spirit of comprehensiveness. Whilst the need to reform CSDP financing mechanisms has been widely acknowledged, and recently discussed at various levels, it has been concluded by some interlocutors that a reform will not take place any time soon owing to the different positions by the member states.\textsuperscript{290}

**Absence of Joint command and Control structures** between the CSDP activities existing parallel has also been identified to be an important barrier to implementation of the comprehensive approach in the field. With separate command structures, duplications, gaps and incoherence of activities on the ground are difficult to avoid. This unfortunately results as waste of resources, and the worst case, loss of creditability among the host nation, if the activities are carried out in sending mixed messages. The people of the host nation do not necessarily see the difference between the EU actors, but perceive carrying an EU flag as the same.\textsuperscript{291}

The creation of a truly **integrated chain of command** encounters a number of obstacles: while the Constitutions of some Member States\textsuperscript{292} do not allow the deployment of civilian personnel in operations led by a military commander, most of the military constituencies in Member States are reluctant to be deployed under a civilian head. Moreover, while national military authorities are closely involved in the planning phase of EU missions, the situation is much less linear in the civilian field, where the delegates from national Ministries of Foreign Affairs are often unable to satisfy the different interests of the national authorities concerned, including Ministries of Interior, Ministries of Justice, etc. Looking for a way out of this stalemate, the CMPD is trying to promote the engagement of, and strengthen ties between, the national ministries involved in the EU civilian crisis management.\textsuperscript{293}

At the mission/field level, the scope of civil- military interaction is (too often) dependable on the actors’ willingness to liaise and coordinate their activities. According to the interviews and panel discussions, the absence of sufficient resources, tools and mandate based directions to cooperate/coordinate between CSDP civilian mission and military missions/operations in theatre,


\textsuperscript{290} Panel of experts (Finnish Ministry for the Interior, Ministry of Defence and Ministry for Foreign Affairs representatives, 28 August 2015; Panel of Experts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EEAS Official and former OPCEN Official), 27 August 2015.

\textsuperscript{291} Interview with a former MINUSMA Officer 17 August 2015; Interview with a Former EEAS Official 23 September 2015.

\textsuperscript{292} Pirozzi, *The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management*

\textsuperscript{293} Tardy, “CSDP in Action”; Pirozzi, *The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management*

hinder the ‘need’ to do so. Thus the scope of the interaction is heavily based on individuals, both in EEAS and the mission staff, as well as the willingness and capacity to see where added value can be achieved. This is unfortunate, as especially the Head of Mission/Force Commander, together with EUSR and the EU delegation, can have a significant impact on the implementation of a comprehensive approach on the ground. 294

In addition, the national agendas, personal relationships, language barriers, different national and cultural backgrounds are the factors which hamper the fruitful civil-military cooperation.295 In addition, the capacity to understand one another’s competences also seems to hinder the search of synergies. Adequate training for all the relevant EU actors involved in conflict prevention and management including (EU delegations, EUSR, EEAS, ECHO and DEVCO) could contribute to overcome the prejudices and develop comprehensive capabilities.

Table 9. Main barriers to interoperability

- Political constrains
- Funding
- EEAS institutional settings
  - Lack of secure communication and information systems
  - Lack of joint Command and control structures
  - Inadequate training
- Civil- military cooperation/coordination is not integral part of the mandate
  - Cooperation is often dependable on personal connections
  - Rules of Reporting
  - Use of equipment vary widely

(Interviews 2015)

294 Interview with a former OPCEN Officer 15 September 2015.
295 Interview with a Former EDA Officer 14 August 2015, Interview with a EUMC Official 4 September 2015.
4.3 Conclusions

This chapter discusses lessons identified related to existing practises and barriers to efficient cooperation/coordination between civilian and military actors. Although, the EU has in recent years taken important steps towards more coherent external actions, there are still a number of contemporary issues preventing the EU in fully exploiting the civilian and military capabilities at its disposal. It has been notified by the EU, that all the tools that the EU has at its disposal are best applied if coordinated such that potential synergies and mutual support can be generated. Another aspect in support of looking for synergy are the limited financial resources. In a time of financial constraints, Europe also needs to do better with less.

Further efforts to support the implementation of the approach at an institutional level have been made through a number of Policy papers i.e. ESS, Lisbon Treaty, Joint Communication and the most recent, Joint Communication Action Plan. However, it was the Lisbon Treaty that truly opened new opportunities in this regard that both the European Commission and the EEAS are actively pursuing.

The joint Communication by the EU High Representative and the Commission was a significant step towards clarifying EU actors understanding of the comprehensive approach. The communication does not separately call for closer cooperation between EU’s civilian and military functions, but rather a coherence and cooperation between its CSDP missions and operations, its development cooperation and assistance, and other relevant domains of EU action, in particular in countries of conflict situations where the EU deploys multiple actors, instruments and interventions. The Council stresses that the strategically coherent use of the EU’s instruments and policies- simultaneously or in sequence- is necessary to effectively address the root causes of a conflict or crisis. In the context of crisis management, the Council reiterates the important role of CSDP, including through its civilian and military expertise and civilian- military synergies, as an essential element in the EU’.

Despite the strong ideological support for a comprehensive approach to crisis, operationalisation of the strategy has not been a success story. As the lessons identified showed in this chapter, the EU now needs to make further improvements and, more consistently, apply the comprehensive approach as a guiding principle to the EU external policy and action at all levels. The comprehensive approach is a joint undertaking and its success is a shared responsibility for the EU institutions, as well as for Member States, whose policies, actions and support significantly contribute to more coherent and more effective EU responses.
5 INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COOPERATION

As presented in this reports’ introductory chapter, while a comprehensive approach to a crisis is primarily about EU internal coordination and cooperation, it also contains an external dimension, i.e. the necessity for the EU to reach out to other crisis management actors, as well as to local parties. Effective multilateralism is one of the principles of the EU’s foreign policy and the Council of the European Union has emphasized the importance of working with its partners, in particular the UN, NATO, OSCE, AU and ASEAN, as well as strategic partners and partner countries\textsuperscript{296}, with due respect to the institutional framework and decision- making autonomy of the EU, and the principle of inclusiveness. Currently, the EU’s impact on the other security providers could be divided into five categories:\textsuperscript{297}

- EU member states who deploy personnel, capabilities and assets and finance them- without whom there would be no CSDP;
- International security organisations (UN NATO) with whom the EU cooperate/ coordinates to help to prevent and end conflict and engage in post- conflict stabilization;
- Other international organisations (such as UNCHR, UNOHA) with whom the EU cooperates and coordinates to enhance human security and welfare;
- Regional international organisations (ASEAN, OSCE, AU) with whom the EU cooperates and coordinates to enhance security in specific region;
- Non-member states who participate in CSDP operations (i.e. Canada, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey,) or whose national security interests are affected by such operations (Kenya by the EU counter-piracy operation, Russia by EU monitors in Georgia and Serbia by the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo.).

As the list above presents, there are several non- EU actors that have implications to CSDP. Since the deployment of the first CSDP mission in 2003, the Member States have desired to enhance overall coordination among the many actors involved in peace- and crisis management operations. This is not least for the reason that most of the EU member states are also donors for the peacekeeping operations conducted by NATO, UN and OSCE. Efficient coordination and cooperation could help to avoid unnecessary overlaps, inter- institutional competition and help to build synergies between the organisations.\textsuperscript{298} In addition, whatever the resources made available,

\textsuperscript{296} E.g. Norway, China, U.S, Canada, Turkey and New Zeland.
\textsuperscript{297} Ginsberg and Penska, The European Union in global security - the politics of impact, 140.
however, in most theatres, CSDP can only succeed if it works in close partnership with other major crisis management actors. Aside from clear benefits at the political, operational and tactical level, good cooperation and coordination with these actors is also a key dimension of the EU support to effective multilateralism.

In this chapter, the cooperation and coordination efforts between CSDP and EU’s main strategic partners, namely NATO, UN, OSCE and AU, in the field of crisis management are discussed. The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of the legal framework, as well as the main challenges and opportunities for the cooperation between the organisations. Due to the strategic importance and impact of the NATO and UN on the EU’s foreign issues, the cooperation with these organisations is discussed more in detail.

5.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)- European Union (EU)

"The EU and NATO are unique and essential partners who share common values and strategic interests. We work side by side in crisis management operations, capability development and political consultations to support international peace and security."299

"Berlin Plus" arrangements

The "European Union-NATO Declaration on the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)" and the "Berlin Plus" arrangements are the basic documents for the EU-NATO strategic partnership.300

These arrangements were first implemented in spring 2003 when the EU-led Operation CONCORDIA301 took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission Operation Allied Harmony

301 "CONCORDIA/FYROM", European External Action Service, accessed 6 September 2015, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/concordia/index_en.htm (In line with the "Berlin-Plus" arrangements, NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) was appointed as Operation Commander of this first ever EU-led military peacekeeping mission. NATO supported the EU on strategic, operational and tactical planning. An EU-Operation Headquarters (OHQ) was set-up at NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, to assist the Operation Commander. In addition, an ‘EU Command Element’ (EUCE) was established at AFSOUTH in Naples, Italy (which is the NATO Joint Force command for Balkan operations).
in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and in December 2004 for the current operation EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Berlin Plus agreement refers to a comprehensive package of arrangements finalized in early 2003 between the EU and the NATO that allows the EU to make use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led crisis management operations.

The formal elements of the Berlin Plus agreement (details of which are classified) include:

- A NATO-EU Security Agreement that covers the exchange of classified information under reciprocal security protection rules;
- Assured access to NATO planning capabilities for EU-led operations;
- Availability of NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led civil-military operations;
- Procedures for the release, monitoring, return and recall of NATO assets and capabilities;
- Terms of reference for using NATO’s DSACEUR (Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe) for commanding EU-led operations;
- EU-NATO consultation arrangements in the context of an EU-led operations making use of NATO assets and capabilities;
- Arrangements for coherent and mutually reinforcing capability requirements, in particular the incorporation within NATO’s defence planning of the military needs and capabilities that may be required for EU-led military operations.

The EU Council highlighted in December 2013 the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in the conclusion on CSDP stating inter alia: “The EU and its Member States must exercise greater responsibility …if they want to contribute to maintaining peace and security through CSDP together with key partners such as the UN and NATO…CSDP will continue to develop in full complementarity with NATO, in the agreed framework of the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy and procedures of each.”

---

302 Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.
305 “About CSDP- The Berlin Plus Agreement”
Areas of EU-NATO cooperation

Meetings

NATO and the EU meet on a regular basis to discuss issues of common interest. Meetings take place at different levels, including at the level of foreign ministers, ambassadors, military representatives and defence advisors. There are regular staff-to-staff talks at all levels between NATO's International Staff and International Military Staff, and their respective EU interlocutors (the European External Action Service, the European Defence Agency, the Commission and the European Parliament).

The highest point of institutional contact is currently in the meetings between the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC). This formation meets with varying frequency (roughly every six weeks) at ambassador level.

NATO's highest military body, the Military Committee and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) have strong personal links, since the Chiefs of Defence and their Military Representatives of EU Member States sit on both. Furthermore, the EUMC Chair attends joint NAC-PSC meetings, as well as EU Council and NATO Military Committee meetings.

Between EUMS and NATO SHAPE or IMS, there are weekly unofficial meetings and workshops which mainly deals with information sharing and Situational Awareness (SA). DGEUMS and NATO DGIMS have regular annual meetings 3-4 times per annum, producing common objectives to improve cooperation between respective organizations. EUMS Directors and their respective branches meet at least monthly, either on VTC or workshops with common objectives and topics in the agenda. The relationship between the aforementioned organizations is “not formal” and is “unofficial”. The level of information exchange varies from time to time and is also very dependent on “personal relationships” and “organizational ambitions”. No official agendas are produced.

Liaison

---

308 “NATO- EU: a strategic partnership” (E.g EU HR - NATO SG, monthly; EUMC - NATO MC every 2 months; EUMS - NATO IMS Director Generals’ Conference, twice a year; EUMS INT DIR - SHAPE J2 regular meetings; EUMS - SHAPE VTCs, monthly with a special focus on operations; EUMS - SHAPE Induction Training)
309 Since 2003, because of the “participation problem” (so-called “Turkish-Cypriot dispute”), there have been no formal meetings between the two organisations at ministerial level. To overcome this deadlock high-level informal meetings, so called Transatlantic events are held biannually in New York or in European capitals.
310 Interview with a former EUMS Official, 8 September 2015.
The Figure 8.\(^{311}\) below displays “Permanent military liaison arrangements,” which have been established to facilitate cooperation at the operational level. A NATO Permanent Liaison Team has been operating at the EU Military Staff since November 2005 and an EU Cell was set up at SHAPE (NATO’s strategic command for operations in Mons, Belgium) in March 2006.\(^{312}\)

![Figure 8. EU-NATO permanent liaison arrangements](image)

**Cooperation in the field\(^{313}\)**

For military operations, in the absence of a permanent Operations HQ (OHQ, at strategic level), one option is to use NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin-Plus arrangements. In this case, the preferred option is to establish an EU Operations Headquarter in the NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) at SHAPE (Mons, Belgium). This is, for instance, the case of EUFOR Althea (see below).\(^{314}\)

**Balkans**

On 31 March 2003, the EU-led Operation Concordia\(^{315}\) took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

---


\(^{312}\) “NATO- EU: a strategic partnership”

\(^{313}\) “NATO- EU: a strategic partnership”

\(^{314}\) Glume, “Chain of command”

\(^{315}\) “CONCORDIA/FYROM”
This mission, which ended in December 2003, was the first “Berlin Plus” operation in which NATO assets were made available to the European Union.

In July 2003, the EU and NATO published a “Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans”\(^{316}\). Jointly drafted, it outlined core areas of cooperation and emphasises the common vision and determination both organizations share to bring stability to the region.

Building on the results of Concordia and following the conclusion of the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union deployed a new mission called Operation EUFOR Althea on 2 December 2004.

The Operation EUFOR Althea operates under the “Berlin-Plus” arrangements, drawing on NATO planning expertise and on other Alliance assets and capabilities. The NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe is the Commander of Operation Althea. There is also an EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) located at SHAPE. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) as a whole provides the Operation Headquarters (OHQ), and the EU Staff Group (EUSG) is the core, liaising with all SHAPE's Directorate's Branches, particularly through the Strategic Operations Centre, allowing a total interface in all areas.\(^{317}\) A close relationship with EEAS and EUMS is maintained by the EUSG, with recourse to all SHAPE’s assets as OHQ when needed, in accordance with CSDP.\(^{318}\)

NATO has been leading a peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR\(^{319}\)) since 1999. The EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), which deployed in December 2008, is the largest civilian mission ever launched under the CSDP. In Kosovo, NATO and EU operate in parallel without a formal framework. The EU's exclusively civilian mission is reliant on NATO's military component for the protection of its civilian personnel. In Kosovo, four technical agreements\(^{320}\) were signed on the ground in order to facilitate cooperation.

---


317 Interview with a former SHAPE Officer, 7 September 2015.

318 “Operation ALTHEA,” NATO, accessed 6 September 2015, [http://www.aco.nato.int/page39511625.aspx](http://www.aco.nato.int/page39511625.aspx). European Union Command Element (EUCE), which is located at NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) at Naples, provides the necessary coordination for ensuring a Balkans regional approach and regarding the use of reserve, which are not covered under the “Berlin Plus” arrangements. The EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises the political control and strategic direction of the operation, under the responsibility of the Council of the EU.

319 “Operation ALTHEA”

320 Interview with a Ministry of Interior Official, 26 July 2015.

Agreements are:

Joint Operating Procedures (JOA) for Cooperation between the ESDP Mission and KFOR in Military Support to Police Operations, JOA for Cooperation between the ESDP Mission and KFOR in Border Management, JOA for Cooperation between the ESDP Mission and KFOR to Response in Case of Civil Disturbance Situations, JOA for Cooperation between ESDP Mission and KFOR in Information Exchange, Including The Field Of Intelligence
Other regions

The NATO-led Resolute Support (RS) mission (former ISAF 2002-2014) in Afghanistan provides training, advice and assistance for the Afghan security forces and institutions. EU launched in Afghanistan CSDP Rule of Law Mission (EUPOL) in June 2007.

The Figure 9. on the next page shows the areas where NATO and EU coexist. As in Kosovo and Afghanistan, NATO and the EU operate in parallel without a formal framework. EUPOL is still partly reliant on NATO’s military component for the protection of its civilian personnel. The EU had to negotiate 14 separate agreements with different EU and individual nations to ensure the protection and transport of its personnel. The search for case-by-case solutions on the ground is frustrating to both civilian and military personnel, being time-consuming and inefficient.

In Darfur both NATO and the EU supported the African Union’s mission (AMIS) in Darfur, Sudan, in particular with regard to airlift rotations.

Since September 2008, NATO Operation Ocean Shield and EU NAVFOR Atalanta are deployed with other actors, off the coast of Somalia for anti-piracy missions. These operations, which have the same mission (fight against piracy) and operate in the same region (Gulf of Aden), are supervised from Northwood, England, via EU and NATO command centres operating side by side. In theatre, commanders coordinate their actions on a daily basis via electronic communications and regular cross-deck meetings.

Particularly concerning naval operations in this region (Gulf of Aden) there are several well-functioning cooperation and coordination mechanisms to improve the Situational awareness and de-confliction. SHADE is maybe one of the “most advanced” mechanisms at the operational and tactical level, not only between the EU and NATO, but also other maritime and naval organizations and individual nations. It remains to be seen whether the same kind of arrangements will also be

---

324 S. J. Smith, The EU NATO cooperation the case for institutional fatigue?, (July 2011).
328 Interview with a former EUMS Official, 8 September 2015.
329 The Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) initiative began in 2008 as a mechanism of meetings aimed at coordinating and de-conflicting activities between the countries and coalitions involved in military counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean. The meetings are held in Bahrain at regular intervals and are co-chaired on a rotational basis by the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), NATO, and EUNAVFOR.
established in the Mediterranean Sea between the EU (EUNAVFOR Med\(^{330}\) and FRONTEX\(^{331}\) Op) and NATO (Operation Active Endeavor\(^{332}\)).

Figure 9. EU – Current NATO/EU Common Areas of Deployment

**Political consultation**

The range of subjects discussed between NATO and the EU has expanded considerably over the past two years, particularly on security issues within the European space or its immediate vicinity. Since the crisis in Ukraine, both organisations have regularly exchanged views on their respective decisions, especially with regard to Russia, to ensure that their messages and actions complement each other. Consultations have also covered developments in the Western Balkans, Libya and the Middle East.\(^{333}\)

**Capabilities**

\(^{330}\) EU NAVFOR Somalia


Together with operations, capability development is an area where cooperation is essential and where there is potential for further growth. The NATO-EU Capability Group was established in May 2003 to ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and EU capability development efforts. Following the creation, in July 2004, of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to coordinate work within the European Union on the development of defence capabilities, armaments cooperation, acquisition and research, EDA experts contribute to the work of the Capability Group.

Among other issues, the Capability Group has addressed common capability shortfalls in areas such as countering improvised explosive devices and medical support. The Group is also playing an important role in ensuring transparency and complementarity between NATO’s work on “Smart Defence”334 and the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing”335 initiative.

**Terrorism and WMD proliferation**

Both NATO and the European Union are committed to combating terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They have exchanged information on their activities in the field of protection of civilian populations against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks. The two organisations also cooperate in the field of civil emergency planning by exchanging inventories of measures taken in this area.

**New areas of cooperation**

Since the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept336 at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, which identifies the need for the Alliance to address emerging security challenges, several new areas of cooperation with the EU are taking place- in particular energy security issues and cyber defence. In this context, NATO and EU staffs have been holding consultations in order to identify the specific areas in which the two organisations could enhance their cooperation in these fields.

The practical cooperation between the EU and NATO has expanded over the past few years, within the agreed framework of their strategic partnership and respecting the decision-making autonomy of each organisation. Apart from the already on-going operational cooperation and coordination (e.g. in Kosovo, Horn of Africa, Afghanistan), there is potential for strengthened interaction of maritime security, defence and security capacity building and cyber security. The “intertwining summits” – from December 2013 (European Council discussion on CSDP), through

---

the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, the June 2015 European Council up to the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw – bring additional dynamics, fostering further complementary and mutually reinforcing actions, for example, on military capability development. Both the EU and NATO share the assessment that the crisis in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods significantly altered the security reality for Europe and the broader transatlantic community. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, the good cooperation and coordination with NATO and the OSCE has proved invaluable.337

Challenges

In assessing EU-NATO cooperation, the same commentators use negative terms, such as "mutual suspicion", "institutional fatigue" and lack of "meaningful substance". From the other side, diplomatic language stresses the progress already made, while acknowledging that the EU-NATO relationship has yet to fulfil its potential. Calls for better cooperation between the two organisations - whose memberships largely overlap - have become more insistent in times of austerity and economic crisis.338

The "Berlin Plus" framework that defines the nature and conditions of NATO support to EU-led military operations and overall coordination has not been updated since it was finalised in early 2003. In principle, formal communication339 between EU and NATO is not possible outside of the Berlin Plus framework. This factor sometimes hampers the dialogue, cooperation and the decision making process in EUMS. In practice though, inter-institutional relations have developed informally to the extent possible340

The real "field level" cooperation between the EU and NATO has been relatively small-scale. The three theatres where EU-NATO cooperation has been tested in the last five years are Kosovo, Afghanistan, and the Gulf of Aden.341 Currently, out of 17 EU missions/operations, only EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina benefits from the "Berlin-plus" arrangements. Furthermore, NATO has been absent from Africa where currently the bulk of CSDP activities takes place. However, in the NATO and EU (NAVFOR Atalanta)342 anti-piracy mission there exist several

339 Also commentators note that since the 2004 EU enlargement, informal contacts between staff of both organisations have increased to compensate to some extent for the political blockage. Focusing the political "red lines" at the highest levels of cooperation leaves more flexibility at lower levels. See: Paul Sturm, "NATO and EU: Cooperation?", European Security Review, no. 48, (2010).
340 Panel of Experts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EEAS Official and former OPCEN Official)
341 Tardy, “CSDP in Action”
342 "EU NAVFOR Somalia"
cooperation and coordination mechanisms to improve the Situational awareness and de-confliction in that region\textsuperscript{343}.

The Turkish-Cypriot dispute\textsuperscript{344} is frequently presented as a major stumbling block in the development of EU-NATO cooperation. Since Cyprus joined the EU in May 2004, Turkey has consistently opposed Cypriot participation in formal EU-NATO meetings under the pretext that non-NATO members must first conclude security agreements with NATO. The EU refuses to participate in formal cooperation with NATO at ministerial level if all its Member States are not present.

Cyprus, from its side, has blocked administrative arrangements between the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Turkey, as well as the signature of a security agreement with Turkey necessary for EU secret documents to be transmitted to NATO. This issue, known as the "participation problem", has drastically reduced the scope of effective cooperation between the EU and NATO.\textsuperscript{345}

\textsuperscript{343} Interview with a former EUMS Official, 8 September 2015.
\textsuperscript{345} Matteo Ricci, \textit{The CSDP and NATO: friends, competitors or both?}, (2014); Panel of Experts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EEAS Official and former OPCEN Official).
5.2 United Nations (UN) – European Union (EU)

Background and framework for the UN-EU cooperation

According to the ESS, effective multilateralism is one of the strategic objectives of the EU. The ESS also outlines that "the United Nations (UN) Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" and that the strengthening of the United Nations is a European priority.346

The cooperation between the EU and the UN in the field of crisis management began to develop following the creation of ESDP. The primary reason for increasing EU-UN cooperation primarily in military crisis management was based on mutual interest: the UN, faced by increasingly challenging peacekeeping operations, needed the support of regional organisations such as the EU. In turn, the EU that was in the course of developing its crisis management capabilities could now offer not just financial support to UN peacekeeping operations but also military capabilities that the UN lacked. The UN also provided legality and legitimacy for EU crisis management activities.347

The European Council in Nice in 2000, in addition to further developing ESDP, set the institutional basis for cooperation between the EU and the UN, stating inter alia that "the development of European crisis-management capabilities increases the range of instruments for responding to crises available to the international community" which "will enable Europeans in particular to respond more effectively and more coherently to requests from leading organisations such as the UN...". The Presidency Conclusions of Nice Council Meeting also called for identifying areas as well as modalities for potential cooperation in crisis management between the European Union and the United Nations.348 Building on this spirit, dialogue between the organisations was initiated and certain principles for the relationship were established.349

Despite the institutional developments which primarily facilitated the exchange of information, the EU-UN cooperation gained more substance once the EU gained operational responsibility in crisis


349 Tardy, "UN-EU relations in military crisis management: institutionalization and key constraints", 46.
management. In January 2003, the EU launched its first civilian crisis management mission, the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, taking over from the UN-led International Police Task Force. In summer 2003, following a request by the UN Secretary-General for a rapid deployment of a well-equipped multinational force to support the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) in the Ituri region in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the first autonomous EU military operation, Artemis, was deployed in the DRC.

Following the first EU deployments, in 2003, the EU and UN signed the Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management, in which the EU reiterated its support to the objectives of the United Nations in crisis management. Through the Joint Declaration, the United Nations and the European Union also agreed to establish "a joint consultative mechanism" (also called the joint steering committee) at the working level to enhance mutual co-ordination and compatibility in the areas of planning, training, communication and best practices. In implementation of the commitments set through the Joint Declaration, in terms of military crisis management, the EU identified two main options:

1. Provision by member states of national capabilities, in which regard it remains a national decision to provide military capabilities to a UN operation, and

2. An EU operation in support of the UN; where the EU can conduct operations, under the political control and strategic guidance of the EU, either as a stand-alone operation or taking responsibility for a specific component within the UN operation.

Whilst identifying options for strengthening cooperation with the UN, at the same time the EU also reiterated the following basic principles for EU-UN cooperation:

- The EU will retain the political control and strategic direction of any of its operations through the Political and Security Committee (PSC);
- There would be no automatic involvement but cooperation will take place on a case-by-case basis;

---

350 See, for instance; Flessenkemper and Helly, "Ten years after".

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
The EU does not constitute a pool of forces but can only intervene by conducting specific missions or operations, and there would be no earmarked forces to any stand-by arrangements.\textsuperscript{354}

The 2007 Joint statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management reaffirmed the determination of the two organisations to continue cooperation and reiterated the various levels of exchanges of views and coordination between the organisations, whilst calling for increasing cooperation and coordination in specific areas such as senior level political dialogue and systematic lessons learned.\textsuperscript{355}

Again, the developing of cooperation at the strategic or policy level was inherently linked to interactions or cooperation at the operational level. In 2006, following an invitation by the UN, the EU deployed a military operation EUFOR RD Congo to support the UN peacekeeping mission MONUC during the election process in the DRC.\textsuperscript{356} Two years later, in early 2008, the EU deployed a "military bridging" operation EUFOR Tchad/RCA in support of the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). EUFOR Tchad/RCA was mandated to contribute to the protection of civilian and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid until the deployment of a military component of MINURCAT in March 2009.\textsuperscript{357} In December 2008, the EU launched the European Union Naval Force ATALANTA (EU NAVFOR) which, whilst having a regional approach, was deployed parallel with UN Political Office for Somalia.

In addition to cooperation in the military field, EU civilian crisis management missions in the DRC - EUPOL Kinshasa RD Congo, EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo - (have) coexisted with MONUC (since 2010 onwards MONUSCO).\textsuperscript{358} Further, the deployment of the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan in 2007 which led into coexistence with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and the EU taking over from the UN in Kosovo, through EULEX Kosovo mission in 2008 intensified the UN-EU cooperation also outside military crisis management.

Whilst the above mentioned agreements, as well as practical cooperation on the ground facilitated the development of close interaction between the EU and the UN in peacekeeping efforts, only few of the proposed coordination mechanisms - primarily formal contacts and the bi-annual meetings of the Steering Committee - were actually implemented or are still being applied. From the point of


\textsuperscript{355} Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management, Brussels, 7 June 2007; Major, EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, 11.


\textsuperscript{358} Johannsen, The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management,
view of the EU, the process around the Lisbon Treaty and the related restructuring of European foreign and security policy institutions resulted in the EU not launching a single mission or operation for three years, until 2012. The approach of the EU to focus on strengthening its own crisis management capabilities, coupled with the absence of new missions and subsequently the need to facilitate practical cooperation in the field, shifted the attention away from further developing the cooperation with the UN. As an example, the Steering Committee did not convene for its scheduled meetings during 2010/2011.359

Following this period of limited progress, and after the creation of EEAS and CSDP, cooperation between the organisations has intensified considerably. In November 2011 the European Council adopted “Actions to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping”, and the “Plan of Action to Enhance EU CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping”, published in June 2012, laid down implementing modalities of the said actions.360 The Plan of Action, in which the EU emphasises partnership with the UN as a central task for the CSDP and outlines six fields of various models for EU-UN cooperation with implementation timeline from 6 to 24 months, provided the EU with a clear framework for shaping the future cooperation with the UN. In particular the first two models of the Plan of Action are worth mentioning. Under the Clearing House model (Field A), the EU would function as an intermediary for bilateral Member State contributions (civilian, police and military) to the UN; something which was foreseen to be implemented by the end of 2013. Until now, the EU Member States have chosen to directly interact with the UN instead of referring to the EU as an intermediary.361 The so called Modular Approach (Field B) envisioned the integration of an EU component as part of the command structures of an UN operation - something which has been considered legally unviable and yet remains to be applied.362

360 Council of the European Union, “Plan of Action to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping”, 11216/12, 14 June 2012; Pietz, The European Union and UN Peacekeeping: Half-time for the EU’s Action Plan, 3.
Table 10. Institutional arrangements for EU-UN cooperation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Modality</th>
<th>Content / practical effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Joint declaration on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management</td>
<td>The EU reiterates its support to the objectives of the UN in crisis management. Establishes joint consultative mechanisms at the working level to enhance coordination in the areas of planning, training, communication and best practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>EU-UN cooperation in Military Crisis Management Operations. Elements of Implementation of the EU-UN Joint Declaration</td>
<td>EU Member States provide national capabilities for UN operations EU operation in support of UN operation either as a stand-alone operation or within the UN operation EU retains political control and strategic direction over its operations EU involvement to be decided case by case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Joint statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management</td>
<td>Reaffirmed determination to cooperate in crisis management Calls for increasing cooperation and coordination in specific areas such as senior level political dialogue and systematic lessons learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>EU Plan of Action to Enhance CSDP Support to UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>EU provides a Clearing House for Member States contributions. EU can provide a EU component to a UN operation (Modular approach) EU autonomous civilian deployment in support of UN EU autonomous military deployment in support of UN Strengthen assistance to AU and other regional and sub-regional organisations Cross-cutting areas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
Finally, in terms of principles and framework for cooperation, the adoption of "UN guidelines on Coordination between the UN and the EU during the planning of UN missions and EU civilian missions and military operations" in April 2014 and the agreement on modalities for "Coordination between the UN and the EU during the planning of UN missions and EU civilian missions and military operations" in June 2014 complemented the framework, setting an ambitious plan for joint assessment, planning and after action review. Again, the development of principles and modalities for cooperation has been linked to practical experiences from parallel missions and operations in the field - through the deployment of civilian CSDP missions EUBAM Libya, EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUAVSEC in South Sudan and EUCAP Sahel Mali, as well as military operation EUTM Mali. The abovementioned modalities were put into test in the Central African Republic in the transition from an EU military operation (EUFOR RCA) to a UN mission at the end of 2014\textsuperscript{364}, and most recently, in the building up of an EU Military Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUMAM RCA).\textsuperscript{365}

Table 11. EU and UN missions and operations deployed parallel (in August 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>EUPOL Afghanistan</th>
<th>UNAMA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>EUMAM RCA</td>
<td>MINUSCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>EUSEC RD Congo</td>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel/Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>UNSCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>UNTSO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>UNMIK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td>UNSMIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>MINUSMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Mali</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>EUNAVSEC Somalia</td>
<td>UNSOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

State of play of UN-EU cooperation: lessons identified and way forward

After more than ten years of cooperation, with many experiences through the deployment of parallel missions and operations in the field, and with established principles and mechanisms for cooperation, the two organisations have demonstrated their aspirations for further increasing and developing their partnership. The years of cooperation, notwithstanding the gradual developments,

\textsuperscript{364} Madsen, Pietz, EU-UN Cooperation, 3.
have revealed that there still are constraints or challenges remaining. The "EU-UN Partnerships Initiative", implemented by Germany and Italy in 2014, identified four primary areas for EU-UN cooperation on peace operations: coherence in mandates and planning, training, military capabilities and justice and security sector reform.\(^{366}\)

**Mandates and planning processes**

The differing political agendas and objectives of the organisations, or their member states, were discovered already at the early stages to hinder the EU-UN relationship.\(^{367}\) As these political aspirations translate into mandates, the EU and UN missions often differ from each other; something that can undermine the coherence of their cooperation. It has been acknowledged that the UN mandates are more general, leading to a greater autonomy for the missions whereas the EU mandates tend to focus on specific tasks and are less flexible. In some instances, UN and EU missions are deployed to same countries with similar tasks in their mandates (of which the Central African Republic and Mali are the most recent examples), leading to a necessity to cooperate. Despite the improved coordination and institutional arrangement (in line with the EU Plan of Action and UN Guidelines), it has been noted that the cooperation is largely depended on the staff of the missions.\(^{368}\) In general, it can be said that coordinated planning is still underpinned by the organisations' different cultures, planning rules and structures.\(^ {369}\)

**Training**

Both organisations share the same challenge in their missions and operations: being able to provide qualified personnel for the missions. For this purpose, training is crucial. Cooperation between the two organisations on training, for instance in the cases that both of the organisations are deploying to the same operation area, has so far been rather unstructured and limited. Along with the modalities established by the EU Plan of Action, training cooperation between the two organisation ranges from the integration and use of UN training standards in the development of certain EU courses, curricula and guidelines (such as Security Sector Reform) to sharing standards developed by the EU based in UN experiences and practices (for example, training modules on gender and human rights). Courses within the EU framework have been opened for


\(^{367}\) Major, EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, 7.

\(^{368}\) Hummel and Pietz, Partnering for Peace, 2.

\(^{369}\) Pietz and Tardy, The EU and the UN, 1.
UN staff participation and the online-database *Goalkeeper* (or, rather its *Schoolmaster* application) has been made available for the UN as regards the available courses.\(^{370}\)

In order to respond to common challenges related to training (for example, management of trained personnel and bridging the gap between preliminary training and actual deployment of personnel), cooperation between the organisations should be widened. This would be facilitated, for example, by the development of common or harmonised training standards among the organisations as well as by the establishment of training recognition system and standards.\(^{371}\) Within the EU framework, *Europe's New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management* (ENTRI) has addressed these challenges and also made EU pre-deployment and certification courses available to UN (civilian) field personnel. The fact that both the EU and UN are reviewing and reforming their training architectures has created a unique possibility for the organisations to intensify and synchronise their cooperation on training. Until now, however, there appear to be only limited consultation processes or mutual efforts for seizing this opportunity.\(^{372}\)

**Military capabilities**

EU, or rather European, support to UN peacekeeping efforts has been in the core of EU-UN cooperation since the beginning. Whilst the EU member states have provided significant funding to UN peacekeeping operations, the amount of European troops at UN operations has remained relatively low for the past decades. Also, an example of EU component within UN operation, as envisioned in the EU Plan of Action, yet remains to be seen as the EU has opted to support the UN has been through its own missions and operations. In regard to the EU military capabilities, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has submitted the EU a "capabilities list" in which the preferred EU support is outlined as provision of "strategic enablers" such as the EU Battlegroups, logistical assets or high-tech equipment. The EU member states have until now, however, preferred to maintain bilateral cooperation with the UN in this regard.\(^{373}\)

**Justice and security sector reform**

Activities related and assistance to justice and security sector reform (SSR), as well as support to the restoration of rule of law, have been at the core of both EU and UN missions for more than a decade. The organisations are currently deploying parallel missions that have tasks in justice or security sector reform in almost ten countries or regions. Yet the organisations have different

\(^{370}\) Annalisa Creta, “Training architecture(s) under review: An avenue for bolstering EU-UN Partnership on training for peace operations?” *ZIF Policy Briefing*, (October 2014), 3-4.

\(^{371}\) Hummel and Piletz, *Partnering for Peace*, 4; Creta, *Training architecture(s) under review*, 4.

\(^{372}\) Hummel and Piletz, *Partnering for Peace*, 2; Creta, *Training architecture(s) under review*, 2.

\(^{373}\) Hummel and Piletz, *Partnering for Peace*, 3; Pietz and Tardy, *The EU and the UN*, 2.
interpretation of what the rule of law and SSR mean, which also challenges the coherent implementation of such activities in the field. In particular, the EU internal coherence between short-term CSDP engagement and long-term development support remains a challenge.

With the EU Plan of Action, modalities for developing EU-UN cooperation in this field already exist. In particular, the "Modular approach", in line of which the EU would provide, in this case, a rule of law or justice component to a UN operation would be a good pilot in the case of a rule of law and SSR capabilities. Awaiting the materialisation of such an approach, the example of the quite recently deployed EUCAP Sahel Mali mission offers some good practices in regard to the cooperation and division of labour between the EU and UN; including the close interaction with UN DPKO in the planning of the EU mission to complement the UN activities in Mali, as well as fixed coordination structures and the exchange of liaison officers between the missions.374

5.3 Regional international organizations

Conflict prevention and crisis management emerged as a shared priority among security organizations, particularly after the failure to prevent war in the Balkans. Since then, security cooperation between organizations has developed incrementally, and as a case-by-case basis, depending on the scope and nature of the crisis. Alongside NATO and UN, various CSDP operations are open to contributions from third countries and regional organisations such as OSCE and AU. Cooperation in conflict prevention within the EU and AU and OSCE have strengthened the EUs creditability as a security provider, as well as improved the prospects for international cooperation on pressing security challenges.375

5.3.1 Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) - European Union (EU)

The OSCE is an intergovernmental organization with a consensus-based, non-legally binding decision-making procedure, aiming primarily to prevent disputes between and within its participating states. It differs from the EU in that it practices its foreign and security policy not within

374 Madsen, Pietz, EU-UN Cooperation, 1-4; Hummel and Pietz, Partnering for Peace, 3.
375 Emma J. Stewart, European Union conflict prevention and the European security architecture", in EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management- Roles, institutions and policies, ed. Eva Gross and Ana E. Juncros, (London: Routledge, 2011), 32-33.; Alongside AU and OSCE has EU longstanding relationship with ASEAN. Also the nonmember states such as Turkey, China, Canada and Norway have important contribution to CSDP operations and cooperation and coordination with them has an impact on the efficiency of the EU's interventions. More information regarding the impact of the EU in regards to the third states can be read at: Ibid. 221-229.
but beyond its borders. OSCE has conducted 17 operations in total.  The main structures of OSCE field operations are the conflict prevention centre (CPC) located in Vienna and Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR).

The EU states have played a key role in the origins of OSCE (formerly known as Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)). It was one of the first platforms for coordinating European foreign policy. Since its origins, OSCE has dealt with conflict prevention activities i.e. border monitor, police missions and promotion of human rights. Over their common history, the EU has gone from contributing to OSCE mission discussions to operating under OSCE mandates and operating independently as a competing actor in the pan-European area. This has taken place as a result of the development of EU civilian competences and because of a decline in political cooperation within OSCE.

Framework for cooperation

The activities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) are based on the concept of comprehensive security, which, in addition to politico-military security, emphasises the significance of democracy and human rights, as well as economic and environmental issues regarding the overall picture of security. Its goal is to improve cooperation between the participating states. There are 57 participating states in the OSCE, which also include countries from outside Europe, such as the United States and Canada.

The cooperation between EU member states and OSCE has been developed since 1970s. The EU and OSCE cooperate on a range of issues, and the scope of their co-operation has both broadened and deepened, following development of the CFSP, and the launch of the first EU crisis management operations under CSDP. In particular, interaction between the OSCE and EU in crisis management has been developed through the experiences from the Balkan region in the early 21st. Efficient cooperation among the international institutions in a responding crisis in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, included constant information sharing, regular meetings and joint establishment of a joint operation rooms. These experiences, together with an increased engagement of the EU in OSCE participating States, resulted in signing a framework for

---


378 Ibid. 42.

379 Ibid. 60.

380 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, CSCE, and NATO were important contributors for the European Community’s integration by creating stability to the area. The CSCE also gave a more specific boost to the EC’s gradual emergence as a security actor, because the negotiations leading up to the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the post-Helsinki process created the first serious opening for EC members to apply their diplomatic co-ordination efforts. See more: Alyson J.K. Bailes, Jean-Yves Haine & Zdzislaw Lachowski, “Reflections on the OSCE-EU Relationship”, OSCE Yearbook 2008, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, Verlag, 2008), 65.
partnership between EU and OSCE in 2003.\textsuperscript{381} Today crisis management has evolved into a key area for the OSCE- EU cooperation. And of 32 CSDP missions and operations, many of these have been established in the OSCE area. All of them have developed a degree of cooperation and information sharing with the OSCE on the ground.

Today, EU- OSCE cooperation comprises;

- Judicial and police reform, public administration, anti-corruption measures;
- Democratization, institution-building and human rights;
- Media development;
- Small and medium-sized enterprise development;
- Border management and combating human trafficking;
- Elections.

Modalities of cooperation

The EUs development of civilian crisis management capabilities has led to increased cooperation with the EU in election monitoring, border management and police missions. EU has worked closely with OSCE previously in Macedonia and Kosovo and currently in Ukraine. The cooperation has involved regular consultations and information sharing between the institutions, as well as, practical cooperation, such as in Macedonia where EU troops provided protection to OSCE monitors.\textsuperscript{382} The international attention to these countries has encouraged the enhanced cooperation between the organisations.\textsuperscript{383}

A mechanism to facilitate the cooperation and coordination between the EU and OSCE at a political and field level have been developed. Currently, the relationships are maintained through;\textsuperscript{384}

- Consultations between the OSCE Troika, including the OSCE Secretary General, and the EU at both the ministerial and ambassadorial/Political Security Committee levels;
- Cross representation at relevant meetings;
- Contacts between the Secretary General and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and other high-level EU officials. Annual staff-level talks on topical issues that are on each organization's agenda;

\textsuperscript{381} Council of the European Union, “Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on EU- OSCE Co-operation in Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Post- Conflict Rehabilisation”

\textsuperscript{382} Ginsberg and Penska, The European Union in global security - the politics of impact, 194.

\textsuperscript{383} Stewart, “EU conflict prevention and the European security architecture,” 44.


This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
• Staff to staff contacts between the General secretariat of Council of the EU, EU commission, and the OSCE secretariat and institutions.

These modalities of cooperation are concentrated on the political level prioritizing of dialogue at the headquarters level between senior officials in Brussels and Vienna. However, ensuring that field coordination should also receive attention, as the nature of OSCE activities are largely field-oriented.

In theatre, cooperation and dialogues between OSCE mission offices and EU delegations takes place in states where parallel presence exist. Often, the Heads of OSCE field operations liaise and co-ordinate with relevant EU representatives in the host country and EU representatives on the ground are frequently invited to address the OSCE Permanent Council. However, the cooperation often takes place in ad-hoc, depending often on the individual diplomats, officials and EU representatives on the ground. According to an EU official, a pragmatic culture of cooperation should be fostered on the ground, so that dialogue between the organisations became common practice and not person dependable.

**Challenges**

Due to the long history, as well as the fact that all EU member states are at the same time participating in the States of the OSCE, it would be easy to assume that the cooperation between the organisations is solid. There are several political and structural aspects, which have hindered the cooperation. One challenge for enhanced cooperation is that since the development of the EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities, both institutions are undertaking similar missions with overlapping mandates and in the same regions. The EU, who is a newer player in the field, has perceived to rival the OSCE stealing the tasks from OSCE and exploits it to go on doing less visible or risky assignments. Another considerable dominator for the development of cooperation has been the reluctance of some OSCE member states. As mentioned above, OSCE cannot undertake new missions without a consensus decision, including Russia, whose clear preference in recent years has been to minimize such missions. Until the most recent operation in Ukraine, the cooperation has been limited. EU- NATO cooperation has also impacted on the Russian interest in enhancing cooperation in the security framework and withdrawal of Russian Federation and its allies has contributed to preventing the development of EU- OSCE partnership.

---

385 OSCE & EU
386 Interview of a EUAM Official, 26 August 2015.
388 Ibid.
Opportunities

Although EU and OSCE can be perceived as competitors in the area of crisis management, the EU still needs the OSCE. It is a strategic partner that has developed its security and governance tools long before the first CSDP operation was launched and, thus, the EU can benefit from the skilled and experienced staff. Additionally, the OSCE has expertise in the fields i.e. arms control and non-proliferation, as the EU has not much expertise on that area, while both institutions support a range of approaches for better control of WMD-related capacities, small arms, landmines, excess ammunition stocks, and so on. The EU may be able to formulate tighter regulatory regimes for its own members, but the OSCE can develop codes of conduct, best practice exchanges, and coordination of outreach to cover twice as many countries. Similarly, when tackling the menace of terrorism, or drugs or human trafficking, the EU has better chances than the OSCE of achieving a harmonization of internal laws and practises, but the strategic vulnerability of the EU territory could be substantially reduced by even looser forms of co-operation with the other OSCE States occupying Europe’s eastern and south-eastern approaches.389

Finally, an important point of cooperation is that OSCE organs and representatives are accepted in some more remote and sensitive parts of the non-integrated territories, where the EU is perceived to be too partial. The OSCE may offer a more politically acceptable (“neutral”) intervention than the EU for comprehensive and formal solutions to the various frozen conflicts. Like the Ukrainian crisis has shown, the EU is not viewed as a neutral third party in peace talks and, therefore, an organization like OSCE, which is not either pro- European or pro- Russian is better suited to such a role.390 Although Russia has violated the OSCE’s central principles in the crisis, the OSCE has proved its worth in the Ukraine crisis; through its international presence in Ukraine, the organisation has carried out special monitoring and election monitoring, among other things. The organisation has also played an important part in the efforts to find a political solution to the crisis.391

Finally, OSCE is an important partner for the EU, sharing the same values, goals, and interest in strengthening the security in Europe and its neighbourhood. At its best, the OSCE can be a flexible and resourceful actor in civilian crisis management, conflict prevention, early-warning and mediation.

389 Ibid.
5.3.2 African Union (AU) – European Union (EU)

African Union (AU) is an organization consisting of 54 African states with secretariat based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. AU is an important regional partner for the EU. The EU has been a strong partner of the region for many years. It is committed to support the implementation of the framework agreement with all countries concerned and to foster regional cooperation. AU- EU cooperation has become an important element in EU foreign policy and CSDP action. The EU strategy for Africa is to bring together its significant diplomatic, commercial and development efforts with CSDP actions, in order to be a more strategic actor in the region and to help the AU develop its own capacity for peacekeeping. Due to the strategic importance of Africa to EU foreign policy, the EU is the world largest contributor of humanitarian and development aid in Africa. In addition, the EU is the largest contributor to building AU capacities in crisis management. 392

Framework for cooperation

Cotonou Agreement, adopted in 2000 to replace the 1975 Lomé Convention for African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries is the most comprehensive partnership agreement between developing countries and the EU, covering the EU’s relations with 79 countries. This agreement first set the framework of Africa- EU relations. However, the most relevant framework is the Joint Africa-EU Strategy adopted in 2005, which provides the overarching long-term framework for Africa-EU relations. The strategy set the objectives and mechanism for the two to pursue common interests on strategic subjects, including conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and building AU peacekeeping capacities, while linking all EU operations and programs into a more coherent whole. 393

The joint strategy is implemented through jointly identified priorities, which are identified in the Summit. The last Summit was held in 2014, adopting a roadmap to frame EU- African relations for 2014 – 2017. Five areas for joint action are; 394

- Peace and security;
- Democracy, good governance and human rights;
- Human development;

• Sustainable and inclusive development and growth and continental integration;
• Global and emerging issues.

In EU, one key policy of the Strategy for Africa is to provide Union support for African Union’s capacity building for conflict prevention, management and resolution. The African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) defines the instruments and activities for AU’s peacekeeping efforts. The actions to implement the strategy include areas such as the development of an African Standby Force (ASF), a Continental Early Warning System, support for Security Sector Reform, as well as support to build on the CSDP Action Plan for Africa including military and civilian elements. The overall goal of is to make the AU able to plan and conduct peace support operations autonomously. The EU continues is one of the main strategic partners of the AU on a range of issues, providing support through several instruments, notably, the Africa Peace Facility (APF), through which the EU is supporting the operationalization and implementation of various components of APSA.\(^{395}\)

**Areas of cooperation**

Currently, the EU’s cooperation with AU in crisis management is materialized through financial aid or capacity building initiatives. The EU support African-led Peace Support Operations, such as AMISOM\(^{396}\), mainly through substantial EU funding. Within the European Development Fund (EDF), the APF provides support to the African Union and regional economic communities to prevent and, if necessary, manage crises. Most of the funding covers allowances for troops and officers, while military equipment, weapons or ammunitions are excluded. In addition, the EU is a major donator for the implementation of APSA. The EU financial support to the APSA seeks to strengthen the capacity and effective functioning of APSA and to improve cooperation to prevent and, if necessary, manage and resolve conflicts in Africa. Furthermore, other elements to support the AU include development and humanitarian aid and the EU is currently the biggest donor for Africa through these instruments.\(^{397}\)

Under the CSDP, the EU provides capacity-building support for the AU in Addis. EU military advisors are based in the EU delegation to Ethiopia and under the remit of the EU delegation to


AU. In addition, in 2009 an early-warning initiative was launched to AU, designed to advise the Peace and Security Council on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa.\textsuperscript{398}

In addition, the EU has had a significant impact on AU, given its contributions to CSDP operations requested by AU. As outlined in the Table 13.\textsuperscript{399} below, 17 of CSDP operations since 2003 have been in response to African security and humanitarian issues.

Table 12. Completed and ongoing CSDP operations in Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS IN AFRICA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MILITARY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-2015: EUFOR RCA, CAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CIVILIAN</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-2010: EU SSR, Guinea- Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 - 2014: EUAVSEC, South Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The impact on the AU is closely linked on the UN, since AU is a regional security arrangement associated with the UN Chapter VII of the UN Charter. For this reason, the UN has requested the EU and other security providers to render security assistance in Africa, where the AU is either involved and needs assistance or is otherwise affected. Therefore, when the UN asks the EU for reinforcement to aid a humanitarian crisis in Chad or Sudan, the impact is felt on both the UN and AU. As the current asylum crisis have clearly proved, the consequences of instability, terror and humanitarian crisis has a direct impact on the EU member states. With the path dependency of crisis in Africa and their impact on the EU’s security environment, the EU has a priority to strengthen its efforts to build long-term stability to the region.\textsuperscript{400}

Challenges

The EU and the AU have complementary objectives in the region manifested in both separate and coordinated operations. However, despite the promise of EU- AU security cooperation, and the scope of European Aid, the AU is an awkward partner for CSDP operations. Since the AU, as an


\textsuperscript{399} “Ongoing missions and operations.”

\textsuperscript{400} Ginsberg & Penska, “The European Union in global security - the politics of impact”, 212 – 215.
international security provider, is not as integrated as the EU and is much larger and diverse, there are limits to the scope for the EU impact on the AU.401

Another challenge is that currently, the AU lacks the capacity and resources to exploit its full operational capacity. Therefore, it is dependable on the EU’s and UN’s support for years to come. That dependency hinders building an equal partnership between the organisations. In addition, the internal political challenges and scope of the violent conflicts are current trends in the African region, which impact on the AU’s ability to develop its own ability to manage a crisis.402

There is still a lack of cooperation and coordination among the EU instruments in Africa. To increase the efficiency, the EU needs to develop a strategic rationale for its African operations that forms part of a comprehensive approach drawing on the long-term objectives and financial commitment to conflict prevention and resolution and economic development. This lack of cooperation hinders the EU to have an expected impact on the ground. The challenges related to insufficient equipment, lack of resources and security threats are difficult to overcome without enhanced intra–institutional and inter-organizational cooperation.

Difficulties in attempting to form a coherent and consistent EU policy, is affected by political rivalry. Some powerful EU members seem to pursue their own African foreign policies despite the EU-wide character of the APF. Thus, as a result, the competing agendas of EU member states might, to an extent, undercut the good intentions of the EU. In some instances, EU assistance helps strengthen a repressive regime rather than enhance democratization. Another challenge to implementing the APF is that other major world players such as China also have a major interest be more involved in the region and they might be less willing to cooperate in CSDP.403

Opportunities

Building up AU peacekeeping capacities is an EU priority. The scope for the EU impact on the AU, continues to be function of how AU itself evolves as a regional security actor in a continent rife with instate conflict and humanitarian disasters. The efforts to support the AU to build its own peacekeeping capacity so that it would take the leading role in conflict management would serve many purposes from a European Perspective. Europe can combine a strong influence over goals and objectives, while at the same time, developing the implementation of operational crisis management to African lower-level units of government, i.e. the armed forces. But, of course, this

401 Ibid.
402 Ibid.
also has many potential consequences, such as strong African dependence on EU resources and assistance.

Another important area of cooperation is the situation centre. CSDP has participated in the implementation of the road maps for strengthening the AU situation room and joint operation centres. For each African sub regional organization, the objective is one permanent brigade headquarters and one standby force. It is seen as institutionally better equipped to push the necessary transformation of national security and defence thinking needed for the paradigmatic challenges. At the same time, the EU receives valuable up-to-date information on the evolving African security environment, thereby supporting the forming of its own situational awareness and preparedness capabilities.

### 5.4 Conclusions

As discussed in this chapter, international organisations involved in crisis management vary significantly in nature, structure and organisational culture. They are all living organisations, which have evolved within the time. Today, the EU is seen as a credible security actor and a relevant partner in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management. Multilateralism has been one of the EU’s principles since its creation and working with partners in coherence is a precondition for the efficiency of the EU’s crisis management efforts. In the current security environment, the EU faces long standing and emerging security challenges, within a rapidly changing and complex geostrategic environment, while the financial crisis is posing challenges to the security and defence capabilities of the European countries. The military capabilities of the NATO and the UN, combined with number of diplomatic, civilian and humanitarian assets, have been necessary to deal with the ongoing crisis in European neighbourhood. The scope and complexity of the ongoing crisis in Africa and Syria, combined with the asylum crisis and the situation in Ukraine, require resources and cooperation from the whole international community. Building the capacity of the other security actors is also an important form of cooperation. In the end, the security of the EU Member States is best achieved through ensuring the stability of its neighbour. Thus improving its partner’s ability to ensure stability and the protection of citizens is an important tool to strengthen the EU’s own security and capacity to manage a crisis outside its borders.

Cooperation with other security providers is an important element for many CSDP missions/operations. This is due to the fact that half of the operations have been requested by host nations or other international organisations. Several CSDP operations were deployed to replace troops of police from- or to fill in temporarily for. NATO (Macedonia and BiH) and the UN (i.e. DRC,
BiH) In several operations, the EU cooperates or coordinates with other international institutions, primarily NATO (BiH and Kosovo) and UN (DRC, Chad, Somalia), the AU (Sudan), ASEAN (Indonesia) and OSCE (Kosovo, Georgia and Ukraine).\textsuperscript{404} In addition, context matters, especially to where CSDP operations deploy. Thus, there is a strong necessity for policy coherence among EU actors and between EU and other security providers with vested interests in the outcome of the crisis. I.e. in the case of Georgia, an EU mission would not have been agreed upon if Russia had not supported the continuation of the OSCE missions.\textsuperscript{405} On multiple occasions, the EU had missed the opportunity for conflict prevention between Russia and Georgia.\textsuperscript{406}

Despite the good experiences from working with partners, there is still room for improvement. There is still a number of political, structural and cultural issues hindering the cooperation and coordination between the EU and its strategic partners, both at a strategic and operational level. The existing concepts could be exploited further to deepen the cooperation in relevant areas, thereby avoiding the unnecessary overlaps, competition and conflicting activities in the areas where the objectives and values are the same. This can be partially achieved through enhanced and extensive information sharing, regular consultations and efficient coordination mechanisms.

\textsuperscript{404} Ginsberg and Penska, \textit{The European Union in global security - the politics of impact}, 31.; Julian Brett, \textit{Recent experience with comprehensive civil and military approaches in international operations}, DIIS Report (2009),17.

\textsuperscript{405} Ibid, 65.

\textsuperscript{406} Tardy, “CSDP in action,” 29 -31.
6 TOWARDS ENHANCED COOPERATION AND COORDINATION

As discussed in this report, the EU has to tackle crisis in a comprehensive manner. It has a potential to access capabilities of all its 28 member states and support its main international partners and third actors. CSDP, which is the focus of IECEU project and thus this report, is only one instrument among the EU’s other conflict prevention and crisis management instruments. Despite its scope in terms of resources, CSDP missions and operations are important, tangible and visible efforts on how the EU is participating in the burden sharing of global disasters and conflicts. Due to its flexibility, the CSDP has proven to be a useful instrument that can be used to support stabilisation in diverse theatres. The CSDP allows EU Member States to pool their resources and to build stronger capabilities to act rapidly and effectively in times of crisis.

The issue of using the capabilities in a comprehensive and efficient manner is arguably current. Evolved migration crises are an example on how external crises can impact on a Community’s internal security. Failing to tackle the crises in Libya, Syria and Iraq have been drivers for migration to Europe. Consequences of unsolved conflicts in a neighbourhood have become very concrete on European soil, as thousands of migrants have left their homes applying for asylum from the EU countries. In addition, over 2,000 migrants have drowned in the Mediterranean this year, aiming at reaching Italy. The tragedy required a rapid response, and in June 2015, the Council launches an EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR Med). This military operation is claimed to be one element of the broader EU comprehensive approach to migration, which aims to respond to the immediate need to save lives and address emergency situations, tackle the root causes of irregular migration and fight traffickers. 407

The idea of comprehensiveness, despite so far lacking an overarching interpretation, has been one of the guiding principles of the development of EU’s crisis management, both in regard to civilian and military capabilities. It is however important to notify that CSDP missions and operations are by definition relatively short-term interventions: crisis management instruments are only supposed to provide a short-term solution to a conflict or crisis and as their mandates are agreed for a maximum of two years at a time, very often their objectives are in a quite short time frame, compared to the needs of conflict prevention or conflict transformation. This is still the case, even though practice has proved that often the missions and operations remain in the region a lot longer. This is also the case in some of the case study areas of the IECEU project. Missions such


This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
as EUFOR Althea, EUBAM Rafah and EUSEC RD Congo have been ongoing for over 10 years, and a clear exist strategy is still not in sight.

The visibility and impact of the CSDP engagement has also implications on public opinion. The more CSDP generate public support, the more member states will incline to contribute personnel and resources to CSDP operations and missions. Thus, managing the expectations towards the mission achievements is also crucial. CSDP missions and operations are visible, but budgetary matters are a very small part of the EU’s External actions. Mission mandates should reflect EU operational aims and capacities, but also an understanding of what is possible in a given context. This very nature of the missions and operations is essential to acknowledge, as therefore they can be only one part of a wider conflict prevention and reconstruction process, applied with the support of other instruments.

6.1 Implementation of comprehensive approach in CSDP

As discussed in this report, to fully exploit the potential of CSDP, the military and civilian capabilities should be developed and used in a coordinated and coherent manner. Ideally, all the EU interventions would be planned and applied in a comprehensive manner with an aim of achieving a common objective towards an external country, region or actor. Thus, the competences and capabilities of the EU’s institutions, Member States and partners, would be combined, so that there would be no shortfalls in civilian or military capabilities or overlapping in the actions, thereby increasing the efficiency of the activities. When implemented adequately, a comprehensive approach to crisis through CSDP can have an important contribution on solving the crises.

In reality, implementing the comprehensive approach in crisis management has proven to be difficult. One polarized issue related to CSDP has related to availability of the military capabilities. Defence is still at the heart of national sovereignty and decisions on military capabilities remain with Member States. Cuts in member states national defence budgets and the shortfalls in Member States’ capabilities became apparent during the CSDP operations in Libya and Mali and that the economic crisis has exacerbated existing structural problems. Alongside, the military capabilities, there is also need to strengthen and generating civilian capabilities for CSDP. The majority of CSDP missions are of a civilian nature. Generating civilian capabilities remains a priority, as well as a challenge, due notably to the shortages of personnel in specialised profiles. Thereby, lack of

sufficient military and civilian capabilities has complicated the implementation of the comprehensive approach in CSDP.

As outlined in this reports, another important element regarding the effectiveness of CSDP relates to appropriate structures and processes. In order to have the capability to prevent and solve crises in efficient and timely manner, the EU has gradually stressed the importance of mainstreaming civil-military cooperation and coordination into their core documents and policies. In addition, since the adaptation of ESS important steps have been taken towards institutionalisation of civil-military cooperation within EU. Establishment of EEAS and merging EU’s military and civilian crisis management functions to a form of the CMPD have been important milestones for facilitation of Comprehensive Approach to crisis. Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, CMPD has been at the core of the CSDP\textsuperscript{409} and is in charge of the integrated civilian-military planning for EU crisis management and humanitarian operations and missions.

As discussed in chapters 3 and 5, although the foundation of CMPD was welcome as an important step towards the further integration of civilian and military approaches to crisis management, the civilian and military functions planning and conduct structures remain separate, preventing the cross-sectorial competences and capabilities from being fully exploited in planning and commanding the CSDP missions and operations. Alongside the shortfalls in sufficient capabilities and institutional architecture, there have been important points of criticism towards the efficiency\textsuperscript{410} of CSDP missions and operations and their ability to contribute to conflict prevention and conflict management.\textsuperscript{411}

**Commonly the following issues are raised\textsuperscript{412}**

**Political- strategic**

- CSDP has had difficulties to act rapidly. This is because decision-making on new operations or missions is often cumbersome and long, CSDP faces capability shortfalls,
either due to a lack of commitment or because the capabilities are not available, as well as various legal and financial constraints; 413

- The question of funding is crucial - civilian missions are directly funded by the EU’s CFSP budget, 414 whereas military operations are mainly funded on a ‘costs lie where they fall’ basis meaning that the Member states are responsible for their own personnel and item expenditures; 415

- A lack of a united policy line among the member states when it comes to military interventions;

- A lack of coordination between EU institutions and with partners when planning, conducting and supporting a CSDP mission/ operation;

- No clear end- state scenario or exit strategy when launching a CSDP mission or operation.

- CSDP missions and operations are often deployed in an ad-hoc manner. Decisions on a concrete operation, its objectives, the resources and equipment needed, are taken without sufficient resources to the expertise and knowledge prevailing among other EU institutions in the region or country of deployment;

- A lack of a shared strategic vision among EU actors and member states towards a country or region where a CSDP mission or operation has been deployed.

**Operational**

- A lack in the interoperability of civilian and military capabilities;

- Insufficient capabilities- both civilian and military- to reach the mission/ operation objectives;

- Slow response from member states to provide personnel and forces;

- No permanent command and control structures for the military operations;

- No common training and recruitment standards;

- A lack of coordination and cooperation between the other EU actors on the ground;

- A lack of a sufficient communication system that would enable secure information sharing between the EU actors;

- Complexity of the chain of command and its separation for the civilian and military side.

---

413 EUISSU. Yearbook of European Security YES 2014, Naturally, it is essentially a political choice whether or not to commit resources to CSDP, at least to up to a certain level of capabilities whereon the lack of those resources would place Member States’ national security at risk.

414 The common costs of civilian missions are funded by CSDP budget, but the seconded personnel costs are at sending Member state’s responsibility.

415 ‘Operating expenditure to which the implementation of this Chapter [Chapter 2, Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy] gives rise shall also be charged to the Union budget, except for such expenditure arising from opera- tions having military or defence implications and cases where the Council acting unanimously decides otherwise’. Article 41, Paragraph 2 TEU.

416 This is the summary of the desk study, key informant interviews and panel of experts discussions.
All in all, cooperation and coordination between the EU’s civilian and military functions is a complex challenge with numerous structural, political, technical and ideological facets. As a result, the EU’s interventions seem to be planned in an ad hoc manner, overruled by the rival between civilian and military functions. The segregation between military and civilian intervention indubitably impact on the EU’s ability to tackle the crisis effectively. Recent examples have shown that the cooperation is also planned and implemented in a somewhat ad hoc manner, and there are still a lack of permanent structures and concepts that would ensure coherence between the activities. For example, an example from Libya has shown that the EU’s Military capabilities are not activated to support a civilian mission, even if the security situation would require so.\textsuperscript{417} The capabilities are not used in comprehensive manner.

A lack of coherence among the institutions and member states is unfortunate, since they limit the exploitation of the potential of EU's conflict prevention and crisis management instruments. Overcoming the institutional and cultural barriers to interoperability would help the EU's military and civilian actors to better work towards achieving a common objective. Despite the criticism, CSDP missions and operations have proved to be a useful instrument in the EEAS toolbox, and its potential could be exploited further through stronger integration into the Union’s wider security strategy.

\textsuperscript{417} In addition, Battlegroups have not been deployed, and the permanent headquarters for EU operations has yet to be instituted.
6.2 Civil- Military synergies

Table 13. Civil- military synergies that could be further enhanced within CSDP

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Strategic Communication (STRATCOM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Information sharing/dialogue bad “common” situational awareness (EEAS-EU Delegations-CSDP Missions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Secure communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Shared accommodation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Military airlift capability to deploy civilian missions equipment (needs additional funding/refunding due different budgeting between civilian and military)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Cyber defense capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Counter IED capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Medical facilities (Field hospitals, Air MEDEVAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Logistic support (Airport of disembarkation, Seaport of disembarkation, warehouses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Real Life support (Use of contractors, Camps, Warehouses, Transportation, Security arrangements etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Mutual/Integrated civil-military Lessons process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Common pre-deployment and “on-theatre” training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Security provision of the CSDP staff</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The need for a development of both civilian and military capabilities and enhancing cooperation with partners in the area of CSDP seem to be the key issues for the future. Hence, burning questions to be decided in the near future seem to be capability planning, pooling and sharing,\textsuperscript{418} CSDP funding, cooperation with other actors and the EU Battlegroups (BG). On capabilities, there are already numbers of examples of success when it comes to EU cooperation\textsuperscript{419} The EU has a set of civilian tools that can be used to support military led challenges, often without considerable financial implications. On the other hand, the military capabilities can bring added value to civilian led missions, by providing support to security, logistics, transportation and intelligence. There, however, needs to be an understanding on how to better use these existing tools, how to improve

\textsuperscript{418} The issue of pooling and sharing is further discussed in IECEU WP 1.2. Report: Analysis of the current preventive activities of EU.

\textsuperscript{419} Such as Air-to-Air refueling, Satellite Communications, Cyber Defence, and Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems.

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
their interoperability, as well as, political will to implement the comprehensive approach into CSDP missions and operations.

To increase the efficiency with limited resources, there is a need for coherence in the planning, engagement and transition of the activities between different actors- both EU and partners- for making an effective contribution to crisis response. Considering one another’s competences and needs when acquiring new civilian or military capabilities can help to bring added value. As the current asylum crisis has shown, improving border security, for example, may be one such area, which particularly benefits from enhancing effort in this way. 420 Current and future operations call for an effective and synchronized planning and deployment of military and civilian capabilities at the onset of operations (ideally in the planning phase). As the crises in Africa and Mediterranean have shown, the traditional sequence of military intervention in crisis management, followed by a civilian presence to reconstruction, is no longer valid. The availability of required capabilities and coordination of actions are the key words for success. Security, development, rule of law and good governance has to evolve in a coordinated manner to achieve success in crisis management operations. The Lisbon Treaty and the European External Action Service provide the EU with an excellent framework for comprehensive and effective crisis prevention and crisis management work. They just need to be utilized to the full.

6.3 Conclusions

As discussed in this report, considering the wide array of the different instruments that the EU has at its disposal, it is in a unique position to become an even stronger contributor to international peace and security. In addition to CSDP, the ‘EU toolbox’ can be considered to include assets such as development and humanitarian tools, diplomacy and economic means. This notion is also reflected in the understanding of the EU comprehensive approach that has been widening beyond civil-military cooperation and is now increasingly used in a broader understanding that includes not only CSDP-cooperation, but also the whole of the EU’s foreign policy tools. Against this background, developing the EU comprehensive approach that in its broad interpretation includes all relevant institutions has received increasing attention, and notwithstanding notable

420 Although border security is mainly considered a civilian related task, increasing military cooperation and coordination across agencies and institutions could bring significant achievements. With poor border management often acting as a catalyst for instability, this can be platform where enhanced cooperation between CSDP’s civilian and military instruments could play a greater role.

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
improvements, further developments are required for the EU to be able to deliver on its goal to ‘preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security’.

The EU's comprehensive approach to crises only constitutes a limited part of the overall EU comprehensive approach, in particular in relation to conflict prevention that often requires a long-term engagement, therefore in many instances reaching beyond CSDP. Nevertheless, the EU recognizes conflict prevention as being part of crisis management, and in turn, crisis management missions and operations do contribute to the overall EU conflict prevention. This recognition is one of the underlying assumptions within the IECEU project, that is, to gauge the potential of CSDP capabilities to better contribute to conflict prevention. Since CSDP has two key elements, civilian and military crisis management, the ‘traditional’ view to a comprehensive approach - civil-military coordination or synergies - deserves continuous attention in order to further develop CSDP. In the context of the IECEU project, potential civil-military synergies can also contribute to the operational effectiveness of CSDP interventions and, therefore, they need to be given sufficient attention (where applicable) when assessing the different missions and operations.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Creta Annalisa, “Training architecture(s) under review: An avenue for bolstering EU-UN Partnership on training for peace operations?” ZIF Policy Briefing, (October 2014).


This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371.


European Council, “Council launches EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers and traffickers in the Mediterranean”, Press Release, 22.06.2015,  


European External Action Service. “EU Operations Centre Horn of Africa & Sahel (EU OPCEN)”,  


Hauck Volker and Rocca Camilla. “Gaps between Comprehensive Approaches of the EU and EU member states”, *ECDPM Scoping Study*, (2014).

Hauck Volker and Sherriff Andrew, “Important progress, but real EU comprehensiveness is still ahead of us,” *ECDPM, Talking Points blog*, 20 December (2013).


This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371


Lurweg Meike and Söderbaum Fredrik. ‘Building peace from the outside’: The role of the EU in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gothenburg, 2011.


Pietz Tobias and Tardy Thierry, “The EU and the UN: together for peace,” EUISS Alert, (December 2014)


Ricci Matteo. The CSDP and NATO: friends, competitors or both?, 2014.


Smith S.J. The EU NATO cooperation the case for institutional fatigue? July 2011.


This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371.


WEB SOURCES


OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

Council of the European Union. EU Military Lessons Learnt at the Political Strategic Level Concept, EU Council documents 10692/15, 8 July 2015.


Council of the European Union. Plan of Action to enhance EU CSDP support to UN peacekeeping, EU Council document 11216/12, 14 June 2012.


This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371


This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
### KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former EUTM Mali Officer</td>
<td>21 July 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former EUTM Somalia and EUNAVFOR Atalanta Officer</td>
<td>26 July 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a Ministry of Interior Official</td>
<td>27 July 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former EUVAVFOR Atalanta</td>
<td>31 July 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former EUTM Somalia Officer</td>
<td>10 August 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a EEAS Official</td>
<td>13 August 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former UN Official</td>
<td>13 August 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former EDA Officer</td>
<td>14 August 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former MINUSMA officer</td>
<td>17 August 2015</td>
<td>email interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former EUFOR Chad RCA Officer</td>
<td>20 August 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a NAVFOR Atalanta Officer</td>
<td>20 August 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a EUAM Official</td>
<td>26 August 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former EEAS Official</td>
<td>8 September 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a EUTM Mali officer</td>
<td>1 September 2015</td>
<td>email interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former EUMC Official</td>
<td>4 September 2015</td>
<td>email interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a EUMC Official</td>
<td>4 September 2015</td>
<td>email interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a EUTM Somalia officer</td>
<td>10 September 2015</td>
<td>email interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of an OPCEN Officer</td>
<td>10 September 2015</td>
<td>email interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a NATO Shape officer</td>
<td>11 September 2015</td>
<td>email interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former EUBAM Libya Official</td>
<td>11 September 2015</td>
<td>email interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former OPCEN official</td>
<td>15 September 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a Former EEAS Official 23</td>
<td>23 September 2015</td>
<td>email interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a former EUCAP Sahel officer</td>
<td>2 September 2015</td>
<td>email interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview of a EEAS Official</td>
<td>2 October 2015</td>
<td>email interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel of Experts (EEAS Officials)</td>
<td>16 June 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel of Experts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EEAS Official and former OPCEN Official)</td>
<td>27 August 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel of Experts (Official from Ministry of Defence, Official from Ministry of Foreign Affairs &amp; Officials from)</td>
<td>28 August 2015</td>
<td>notes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371
ANNEX 1. THEMATIC INTERVIEW

**Theme 1: Guidelines, policies and concepts for interoperability of civil- military functions in CSDP**

1. What are the most relevant guidelines, policies and concepts to ensure interoperability of civilian and military capabilities within CSDP?
2. Do the existing guidelines, policies and concepts prevent the interoperability of the capabilities? If yes, in what way?
3. How well do the existing guidelines, policies and concepts facilitate the cooperation and coordination between civilian and military functions? Are they effective? If not, what elements are effective?
4. Are/ were the aspects of civil- military cooperation and coordination included into the mission/ operation mandate and/or in other official documents? What are the potential benefits? How effective they are/were?
5. How the cooperation between civilian and military capabilities is/was commanded/directed? Was it efficient?
6. How facilitation of cooperation between the civilian and military capabilities was resourced? In terms of personnel, funding, trainings to facilitate the cooperation. Was that sufficient?
7. Do/Did the personnel receive training on how to enhance the coordination/ cooperation between civilian and military functions? Is/Was the training efficient and sufficient?
8. How implementation of the level of interoperability, cooperation and coordination between civilian and military functions is/was reported and where? Is/Was that efficient and sufficient?

**Theme 2: Experiences, practices and barriers to implementation of civil-military cooperation in crisis management missions and operations**

1. Based on your own experience, what kind of civil- military synergies and practices of cooperation there are/ were in CSDP?
2. In your perspective, did those synergies increase/ decrease the (cost) efficiency of the activities?
3. How the cooperation and coordination between the civilian and military functions was/is realized in practice?
   - Political- Strategic level
   - Operational- Field level
   - Between EU and OSCE, UN, NATO, AU

4. What are the operational barriers to effective interoperability between civilian and military capabilities in CSDP?
5. Based on your experience, can you provide examples of best practices of operational civil- military cooperation/ coordination in CSDP missions and operations?
6. Can you provide practical examples from negative implications of civil- military cooperation in CSDP?

**Theme 3: How interoperability of civil- military capabilities could be improved?**

1. Should there be more cooperation between civilian and military functions? If yes, at which levels and between? Which actors? What could be examples of such cooperation?
2. How cooperation and coordination between EU’s civil- military functions could be improved?
   - Political- Strategic level
   - Operational- Field level
   - Between EU and OSCE, UN, NATO, AU

3. In what way the institutional cooperation within EU and between other actors could be improved to enhance the efficiency of the capabilities?
4. Are there potential negative implications of such enhancements with the third actors?
5. How the EU’s crisis management capabilities should be developed in the future?

**Theme 4: Pooling and sharing of civil- military capabilities**

1. Could you give some practical examples from pooling and sharing of civilian and/or military capabilities? How they could be utilized in CSDP missions and operations?
   - Political- Strategic level
   - Operational- Field level
   - Between EU and OSCE, UN, NATO, AU

**Additional questions:**

This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371.
1. Is there something else, what would be relevant when studying and analyzing Civil- Military synergies in CSDP missions and operation?
2. In what way the civil- military synergies in CSDP contribute to long- term CFSP objectives?
ANNEX 2. LESSONS IDENTIFIED

(2014.1.5) EEAS should ensure that PFCAs help avoid duplication and promote synergies between EU actions. PFCA analysis should inform mission planning.

(2014.2.2) Member States and EEAS should reach a shared understanding of the Crisis Management Procedures agreed in 2013, notably regarding the fast track process.

(2014.3.1) EEAS, CSDP missions, other EU services and Member States should better explore and make use of existing training opportunities on all relevant CSDP aspects, in particular those offered by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC). This also includes the courses developed jointly by ESDC-and Commission (DEVCO) on fragility, security and development.

(2014.3.2) For the military, the EEAS should offer training in core institutional and comprehensive working practice not only to EUMS staff but also those nominated on the EU OHQ augmentation lists. Specialised training should also be made more available to senior personnel who have the potential to be considered for Commander/Head of Mission roles.

(2014.3.5) The EEAS should include a standardised training module on EU Delegations and their activities in the pre-deployment training for CSDP mission staff and relevant Brussels staff.

(2014.4.1) The EEAS should determine what is required to improve secure communication and how it may be provided in the field, between Brussels and operations/missions and within Brussels.

(2014.5.1) The EEAS should consider ways to improve coordination and cooperation between EU Delegations and CSDP missions, inter alia in regard to mission relocation, SOMA and understanding of CSDP.