

D1.2 Analysis of the current
preventive activities

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of the report "*Analysis of current preventive activities of the EU*" is to complement the Deliverable 1.1 of the "*Improving Effectiveness of Capabilities of EU Conflict Prevention*" (IECEU) project and to present the current activities of the EU in conflict prevention - the preventive activities that the EU employs as part of its response to international conflicts and crises. In addition, in relation to improving the utilisation of EU conflict prevention capabilities and activities, the report will introduce the concept of pooling and sharing within the EU.

The report is based on the review of existing literature and research on the current conflict prevention activities by the EU, including pooling and sharing of capabilities within the EU. The analysis deriving from this desk study phase is complemented with the findings of two online surveys, in which EU officials, member state representatives and members of the academia/think tanks expressed their perceptions of the EU conflict prevention activities and the other on pooling and sharing within the EU.

The current preventive activities of the EU can be categorised as representing structural, long-term, conflict prevention and operational, short-term conflict prevention. The current preventive activities of the EU can be outlined as including, but not limiting to: Early warning and conflict assessments, diplomatic measures, mediation, demarches, statements, as well as activities conducted as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy such as the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations. Whilst CSDP actions are but one although visible part of the EU's conflict prevention activities, the conduct of CSDP missions, as well as role as a tool of EU conflict prevention, could be further developed for instance by providing them a clearer mandate and improving their coherence as part of overall EU contribution.

One possibility to improve the activities of the EU in conflict prevention is to foster the practice and concept of pooling and sharing which aims to improve the availability of EU capabilities. First and foremost, pooling and sharing applies to defence cooperation in which context considerations around national sovereignty - or the loss thereof - have been the key constraint for its proper application. Utilising the principle could be expanded also to the context of civilian crisis management and conflict prevention where, *inter alia*, training and recruitment of personnel and logistics have been identified as potential areas that could benefit from pooling and sharing of capabilities.



ACRONYMS

AAR	Air to air refuelling
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BENESAM	Belgian-Dutch Naval Cooperation
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DEVCO	Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development
DRC	The Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECHO	Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (formerly known as the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office)
EDA	European Defence Academy
EEAS	European External Action Service
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ESDC	European Security and Defence College
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESCPC	European Satellite Communications Procurement Cell
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
HTP	Helicopter Training Programme
HR/VP	High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission



IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IECEU	Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
MARSUR	Maritime Surveillance
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NORDEFECO	Nordic Defence Cooperation
OHQ	Operation Headquarters
OPCEN	Operations Centre
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P&S	Pooling and sharing
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PFCA	Political Framework for Crisis Approach
PSC	Political and Security Committee
R&D	Research and Development
RAF	Royal Air Force
RCA	Central African Republic (République centrafricaine)
SATCOM	Satellite Communications
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicle
UN	United Nations
VAT	Value-added tax
WP	Working Package



INTRODUCTION

1.1 PREVENTIVE ACTIVITIES AND CONFLICT PREVENTION

Conflict prevention is considered a key objective of the EU's external relations and foreign policy, as according to the Lisbon Treaty "*the EU shall...preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security*"¹. It can be said that the historical roots of the EU are linked to the horrors of the Second World War, and therefore the idea of preventing further breakout of conflicts is by default at the very heart of the Union and its actions. The EU prides itself as "a successful example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development"².

As an integral part of the external relations of the EU, conflict prevention has also been part of EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (since 2009 the Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP) has since the outset aimed at strengthening the capacity of the EU to take action through its capacities in conflict prevention and crisis management. In the EU context, the concept of crisis management has been primarily – but not exclusively – used in reference to military and civilian interventions within the framework of the CSDP, and the IECEU project follow this understanding. The EU interpretation is that crisis management in its broad interpretation also includes conflict prevention, and on the other hand, CSDP capabilities are by and large intended to contribute to conflict prevention.³ It must be emphasised, however, that CSDP missions and operations are only one limited instrument of the EU in regard to conflict prevention. Primarily linked with short-term activities, CSDP instruments contribute to the so called operational conflict prevention⁴.

The overall objective of the IECEU project is to enhance EU conflict prevention capabilities. As part of the project, the task at hand aims to address and present the current conflict prevention activities under the European External Action Service (EEAS), including short and long term conflict prevention instruments. Whilst the long-term conflict prevention instruments will be briefly

¹ Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty.

² Draft European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Council of the EU, 9537/1/01 REV 1, 7 June 2001.

³ Janina Johannsen, *The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. Premises, Ambitions, Limits* (A Publication of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg: Volume 204, 2011), 57.

⁴ The definitions have been presented in detail in the project deliverable 1.1.



presented, the focus of this study yet remains on the operational conflict prevention. This is also in line with the objectives of the IECEU project; one of which is to identify and collect positive examples of successful EU operations and mission in order to identify ways and methods that can be used to support and strengthen EU missions and operations in the future, with a view to better contributing to conflict prevention. This would include identifying good methods and practices by which the EU has already been contributed to conflict prevention through its CSDP missions and operations. Therefore, this aspect will be addressed in the study.

This task will build on the review and analysis, conducted under Task 1.1 of the project, of current EU policy priorities, instruments and capabilities in conflict prevention and preventive activities and aims to identify areas of further strengthening and developing of EU capabilities in conflict prevention. In this regard, the potential of, and opportunities for current CSDP crisis management missions and operations to increasingly contribute to conflict prevention will also be identified and considered. As part of the projects' forward looking stance, the development of EU conflict prevention capabilities and CSDP instruments also needs to take account of possible future security threats and conflict scenarios. The results of the online expert survey conducted for this task in general suggest that future conflict scenarios concerning the EU will be more complex, more cyber and relate to migration. According to the survey respondents, future conflicts could also have religious or cultural origins and their geographical focus will be in Africa and Middle East.⁵

The survey respondents also foresaw that "non-state" threats such as terrorism continue to increase, and that crises and conflicts are becoming closer to the EU. One of the future scenarios regarding CSDP missions therefore is that new missions might have to be conducted within the borders of Europe. It was also noted that the Petersberg tasks were still valid but that the CSDP as an instrument might not be prepared to deal with non-state threats. With regard to some of the identified future threats, such as uncontrollable flow of refugees or large scale migration in general, it was observed that maritime security and/or border management would continue to be at the forefront of CSDP activities.⁶

Furthermore, the deliverable at hand will present the concept of pooling and sharing (PS) in the context of the EU. In addition to introducing the concept of pooling and sharing, the deliverable aims to identify the potential of increased application of pooling and sharing principle in the

⁵ IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments.

⁶ Ibid.



context of civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. The concept, which has been primarily linked with military crisis management at the national (Member States) level, could potentially be utilised outside of the "military sphere". Better utilisation of pooling and sharing would be in line with the prominent idea of a fully comprehensive EU approach to crisis management: instead of merely coordinating different CSDP instruments and activities, optimally pooling and sharing (of not just CSDP instruments but other capabilities of the EU as well) could better contribute to conflict prevention.

1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE DELIVERABLE

The deliverable will in its main chapters address two primary themes: the current preventive activities of the EU (Chapter 2) and pooling and sharing within the EU (Chapter 3). Chapter 2 provides an outline of the long-term (structural) conflict prevention instruments available for the EU, and focuses on the short-term (operational) conflict prevention instruments, in particular analysing lessons identified and key observations and challenges from the conduct of CSDP missions and operations and their contribution to conflict prevention. By presenting some of the emerging lessons from the missions and operations, this chapter will contribute to the latter Working Packages (WP) of the project (WP2, WP3 and WP4) that focus on assessing the effectiveness of selected CSDP missions and operations in the Balkans, Africa, Middle East and Asia. Building on the introduction, the identification and analysing of the possibilities, opportunities and potential for future development and actions, both in regard to conflict prevention and crisis management, will be primarily conducted through online surveys⁷ and an expert panel⁸; utilising the expertise of prominent experts in EU conflict prevention and crisis management. This part will serve the purpose of providing a snapshot of possible topics and themes that can be addressed when assessing the missions and operations.

Chapter 3 will introduce the concept of pooling and sharing, and its application within the EU, by defining the concept and presenting the current forms of cooperation, as well as the different

⁷ As part of the report, two online surveys - one concerning EU conflict prevention and the other on pooling and sharing within the EU - were conducted. The survey questions can be found as annexes to the report. The links to the surveys were sent via email to key EEAS officials and Member state representatives as well as representatives of the academia and European think-tanks who took part in the surveys anonymously. The surveys were launched during the last week of September, and reports from the surveys were compiled on 8 October 2015. The response rate to the surveys was rather low, between 20-25%, and the random sample of the surveys subsequently remained relatively modest: 10 respondents to the survey on EU conflict prevention, and 12 respondents to the survey on EU pooling and sharing. Responses and remarks in these surveys are integrated throughout the chapters.

⁸ A small scale expert panel or workshop, comprising 17 participants representing eight EU member states and three non-EU countries, was organized in Gotenica, Slovenia, on 21 October 2015.



discourses. Additionally, the chapter takes stock on the future possibilities of pooling and sharing, also beyond the "traditional" military/defence cooperation remit. The desk study will be complemented with the results of the online survey which shed light on two primary aspects: to what extent, and in which areas, the potential of pooling and sharing has been implemented so far and how pooling and sharing could be further utilised in the context of civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. The purpose of this chapter is also to provide a foundation on which the remaining Working Packages will build upon in relation to pooling and sharing. Assessment of selected CSDP missions and operations, within Working Packages 2, 3 and 4, will also take stock on how pooling and sharing has been, or could be increasingly, utilised in the conduct of current missions and operations.

The preparation of the deliverable was coordinated by Crisis Management Centre Finland that also drafted the following chapters: the Executive Summary, Introduction and Conclusions. The University of Ljubljana drafted Chapter 2 and AIES drafted Chapter 3. Enquirya participated in designing the content of the Online Surveys, launched the Surveys and compiled the findings of the Surveys. University of Maynooth, Ireland, analysed and reported the findings of the Surveys. Centre for European Perspective planned and conducted the Expert panel/workshop and prepared the Bibliography.

Once approved and public, the deliverable will be downloaded onto the project website. WP1.2 partners will be encouraged to share the information about the publication through their networks, including utilising social media platforms.



2 EU PREVENTIVE ACTIVITIES AND CHALLENGES AHEAD

Based on literature review, this chapter aims at outlining the past and the current relevant conflict prevention activities of the EU. The main focus of this chapter will be the CSDP missions and operations. Thus, the outline will not discuss the EU's conflict prevention instruments and policies in details, into which also other activities of the EU can be categorized (such as the development aid of the EU, the EU Neighbourhood Policy instruments etc.). Such an analysis would, first, fairly exceed the scope of the IECEU project, and second, detailed studies on that have already been conducted. The institutions of the EU tasked with conflict prevention will be mentioned merely through their preventive activities, as the role of the EU's conflict prevention institutions has been extensively analysed in the Deliverable 1.1 of this project.

The main aim of this chapter is twofold: first, to analyse the preventive activities of the EU through the lens of conflict prevention instruments available to the EU in the realm of CSDP missions and operations, and second, deriving from this framework, to scrutinize the positive and negative sides of the CSDP missions and operations (as an important part of the EU's preventive activities), with presenting a cross-sectoral comparative analysis of the lessons learned in various CSDP missions and operations. The study, based on the review of the existing literature (state of the art) and the normative documents adopted by the EU, is by no means the first such study.⁹

This chapter would serve as a pool of the ideas for the questions of both the Online Survey and the Expert Panel, which will be conducted within the Deliverable 1.2. CSDP missions and operations, as one part of the EU's preventive engagement in the world, were never at ease, when the tasks were to be implemented.¹⁰ However, the complexity of the mandates has grown immensely in more than a decade, when the EU back in 2003 declared its instruments for civilian and military crisis management were ready to be deployed.¹¹ Understanding the lessons from the conduct of missions and operations will serve as a starting point for the field work, which will be

⁹ As noted by Asseburg and Kempin, the first comprehensive assessment of best practices and lessons learned in civilian ESDP/CSDP missions was prepared for the meeting of GAERC in December 2009; Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, "ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011), 178-199. For another example of lessons learned in CSDP missions and operations, see: Elisa Dari, Megan Price, Jense Van der Wal, Marlene Gottwald, Nicole Koenig, *CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons Learned Process* (Brussels: Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union – Directorate B, Policy Department, 2012).

¹⁰ New types of CSDP missions and operations are emerging, and the EU nowadays has to deal with the implementation of ceasefire agreements, strengthening of aviation security, capacity building, the prevention of acts of piracy etc. See: Marhic, Gilles, 'Recent Developments in European Union crisis management operations', *ILSA Journal of Comparative and International Law* 2 (2014): 283.

¹¹ Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, "ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 178-199.



conducted within the selected case-studies of the IECEU project (WP2, WP3, and WP4). Based upon the completion of these tasks, which will draw mostly from the lessons learned in the CSDP missions and operations in the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East and Asia, the potentials and opportunities for the current and future CSDP missions and operations embodying conflict prevention potentials will be identified.

The chapter consists of two parts. In the first part, the current preventive activities of the EU are analysed through the prism of conflict prevention instruments the EU has at its disposal. The second part dwells on the CSDP missions and operations through the scope of lessons learned, presenting the key observations from the implementation of past and current missions.

2.1 CURRENT PREVENTIVE INSTRUMENTS AND ACTIVITIES

With regard to the current preventive activities of the EU, diplomatic activities and CSDP missions and operations are the most visible. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized again, as it has been done in other deliverables of the IECEU project that the EU engages preventively also by applying other conflict prevention instruments, which will be briefly described in this subchapter.

Among *long-term (or structural) conflict prevention instruments* of the EU the following are among the most visible and used: prospects and promises to neighbouring countries to accede to the Union, treaties between the EU and third countries on various issues (economic cooperation, developmental and humanitarian aid etc.), initiatives for regional cooperation, supportive measures for the organizations working on nuclear non-proliferation, financial assistance for the products from non-EU countries to access the EU market, programmes for a reform of security sector, support for human rights protection etc. These instruments are primarily meant for addressing the root causes of potential conflicts, and thus contributing to the stability in conflict-prone regions.¹²

¹²Javier Niño Pérez, "EU instruments for conflict prevention", in Vincent Kronenberger and Jan Wouters (eds.), *The European Union and Conflict Prevention: policy and legal aspects*, 93–117 (Haag: TMS Asser Press, 2004); Rok Zupančič, "Modern "don-quixotism" or an emerging norm of international relations? Prevention of Armed Conflicts in the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe," *Romanian Journal of Political Science* 1 (2010): 71–94. The respondents to the online survey on EU conflict prevention instruments considered long-term development cooperation as well as economic cooperation as important elements of EU conflict prevention, also emphasising the importance of timely engagement through the different activities of conflict prevention.



On the other hand, the EU has a variety of other, more concrete instruments that can be applied on a short-time basis, when the outburst of conflict is imminent. In other words, they can be applied in the cases where long-term preventive measures have either failed or where they have not been applied in the first place. Among the so called *operational (or short-term) conflict prevention instruments* the following are most often used by the EU: political dialogue, diplomatic measures, issuing demarches or declarations calling for a peaceful resolution of conflict, sending diplomatic envoys to a crisis area, mediation in peace talks, mechanisms of early-warning, fact-finding missions, observer or monitoring missions, economic or political sanctions, deployment of armed forces, threat with the use of armed force or, at last and rarely used, the actual use of armed force.¹³

The importance of these operational conflict prevention measures was also acknowledged by the expert respondents to the online survey, who considered early warning and conflict assessment, diplomatic measures and mediation and CSDP all as either important or very important EU conflict prevention instruments.¹⁴

The official line of the EU, building on the *EU Concept on Mediation and Dialogue Capacities* from 2009, argues that the use of mediation as a tool of primary response to emerging or on-going crisis shall be promoted in the first place.¹⁵ This is also supported by the expert survey where the respondents regarded diplomatic measures and mediation as the most important instrument of EU conflict prevention.¹⁶ The current preventive activities also involve various measures to strengthen mediation capabilities of the EU.¹⁷

The principal financial EU instrument directly addressing conflict prevention and peace-building issues is *Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)*, which implements both short-term crisis response operations and long-term stabilization measures.¹⁸ The instrument has been

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments, responses to question number 2.

¹⁵ Council of the European Union, *Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capabilities*, adopted by the Council of the European Union on 10th November 2009. Accessed on 2nd September 2015, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/conflict_prevention/docs/concept_strengthening_eu_med_en.pdf.

¹⁶ IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments, responses to question number 2.

¹⁷ Andrew Byrne, *The European Union and Conflict Prevention* (Brussels: Division for Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments; Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention – EEAS, 2015). Accessed on 3rd September 2015, <http://eukonvent.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/8.-The-European-Union-and-Conflict-Prevention.pdf>.

¹⁸ Andrew Byrne, *The European Union and Conflict Prevention* (Brussels: Division for Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments; Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention – EEAS, 2015). Accessed on 3rd September 2015, <http://eukonvent.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/8.-The-European-Union-and-Conflict-Prevention.pdf>.



discussed more extensively within the Deliverable 1.1.¹⁹ Hence, at this point it is sufficient to say that the IcSP is by far the most comprehensive and financially strong instrument of the EU for conflict prevention projects so far, with the budget €2.3 billion for 2014–2020.

The EU also aims for closer co-operation between different conflict prevention and peace-building instruments. The main institution for preventive engagement is EEAS, which aims 'to facilitate more coherent, multi-dimensional and effective EU external action'.²⁰ Overall, the EU has a range of conflict prevention instruments (the EU officials rather call them 'tools') which can be utilized for more coherent and comprehensive conflict prevention:

- (i) Early warning and conflict assessment (EU Delegation reports, EU Situation room, Crisis Response Platform (informal));
- (ii) Diplomatic measures, including (formal) policy dialogue with third countries, demarches, statements, mediation/facilitation of dialogue, etc.;
- (iii) New multi-annual Financial Framework 2014-2020;
- (iv) Combining external assistance instruments and actions to link relief, rehabilitation and long term development measures; humanitarian aid instrument; geographical development instruments; thematic instruments, and last, but not least, *Common Foreign and Security Policy, including CSDP missions*.²¹

An interesting observation, gained through the online survey, is that the current EU conflict prevention activities described above were assessed as only having a limited contribution to the overall EU aim of "preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security". The most recurring challenge for the EU was described as the lack of coordination and coherence - a comprehensive approach - between the different instruments and activities. This is a problematic feature of EU capabilities as the online survey also revealed a need for better strategic coherence between EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding thinking. The survey indicated a lack of understanding of conflict prevention and peacebuilding throughout the EU and the need for clearer linkages between EU political goals and operational missions. As one respondent noted: "*In particular CSDP instruments have to be carefully linked to long term*

¹⁹ Regulation (EU) No 230/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing an instrument contributing to stability and peace. Accessed on 29th August, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/fpi/documents/140311_icsp_reg_230_2014_en.pdf.

²⁰ Andrew Byrne, *The European Union and Conflict Prevention* (Brussels: Division for Conflict Prevention, Peace-building and Mediation Instruments; Directorate for Security Policy and Conflict Prevention – EEAS, 2015). Accessed on 3rd September 2015, <http://eukonvent.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/8.-The-European-Union-and-Conflict-Prevention.pdf>.

²¹ Ibid.



development strategies in a more systematic way so as to make EU interventions sustainable and locally owned."²²

As mentioned earlier in the introductory part of this chapter, the main focus of the IECEU project are CSDP missions and operations, which are, as we have seen in this subchapter, perceived both in academic circles and the EU institutions as *only one* of the aspects of the EU's preventive activities. They shall also be understood that way – as *one, but very important* type of instruments of the overall conflict prevention policy of the EU, which shall be put in the framework of a wider strategic conflict prevention framework of the EU towards a country or a region. The expert survey findings are twofold in this regard. On one hand, and as noted earlier in this chapter, the respondents considered CSDP as an important instrument of the EU in conflict prevention. On the other hand, however, the respondents estimated that the current CSDP missions and operations, both civilian and military, only had demonstrated a limited role as part of overall EU conflict prevention activities.²³

This observation emphasises the importance of the IECEU project, one of the objectives of which is by learning from the ongoing CSDP missions and operations propose new solutions to enhancing the EU's contribution to long-term stability - also through the use of CSDP instruments - in the regions and countries it engages in.

Currently there are 7 ongoing CSDP military operations and 10 ongoing civilian crisis management missions.²⁴ The current preventive CSDP activities of the EU, which fall into a wider conceptualization of conflict prevention – as established within Deliverable 1.1 of the IECEU project, and shortly explained also within this deliverable – can be seen by having a closer look to the missions and operations' mandates.

"The main obstacles [to the functioning of the EU conflict prevention mechanisms] can be summarized as follows: lack of a common understanding of conflict prevention and peacebuilding throughout the EU; insufficient links between conflict prevention policies and actions and development and humanitarian ones; not sufficient links between short and longer term measures."

(Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments)

²² IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments, responses to question number 2 and 3; IECEU Workshop on the current preventive activities of the EU, Gotenica, Slovenia, 21 October 2015.

²³ IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments, responses to questions number 2, 4 and 5.

²⁴ European Union – EEAS. Ongoing missions and operations. Available at: <http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/> (Accessed 23 October 2015).



Figure 1: Excerpts of the civilian CSDP missions' mandates

Civilian CSDP missions	Mandate (excerpts)
<i>EUAM Ukraine</i>	Assisting Ukraine in security sector reform (including police and the rule of law); providing strategic advice for the development of effective, sustainable and accountable security services
<i>EUMM Georgia</i>	Stabilisation, normalisation and confidence-building measures; working with all parties to prevent any return to armed conflict, as well as to help make the areas adjacent to the Administrative Boundary Lines of the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia safe and secure for the local population
<i>EUPOL Afghanistan</i>	Assisting in institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior; professionalization of the Afghan National Police, including the development of local training capacity and institutions; supporting improved interaction among Afghan law enforcement and criminal justice actors such as cooperation between police officers and prosecutors in criminal investigations
<i>EUBAM Rafah</i>	Monitoring, verifying and evaluating the performance of the Palestinian Authority with regard to the implementation of the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing Point; contributing to Palestinian capacity building in all aspects of border control; helping to build confidence and mediating between the conflicting parties; enhancing the PA capabilities for a quick redeployment to the Rafah Crossing Point and PA's potential for future operating there (workshops, training sessions and study trips)
<i>EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories</i>	Assisting the Palestinian Authority in building the institutions of a future State of Palestine in the areas of policing and criminal justice under Palestinian ownership and in accordance with the best international standards; supporting the reform and development of the police and judicial institutions
<i>EULEX Kosovo</i>	Assisting and supporting the Kosovo authorities in the rule of law area, specifically in the police, judiciary and customs areas
<i>EUBAM Libya</i>	Supporting the Libyan authorities in developing border management and security at the country's land, sea and air borders; capacity-building mandate at strategic and operational level through advising, training and mentoring Libyan counterparts
<i>EUCAP Sahel Mali</i>	Improving operational efficiency of internal security forces and the officials at the ministries of defence and security; re-establishing their respective hierarchical chains; reinforcing the role of judicial and administrative authorities with regard to the management and supervision of their missions; facilitating their redeployment to the north of the country
<i>EUCAP Sahel Niger</i>	Helping Niger's security forces in achieving interoperability and developing their operating strategies; Strengthening the Nigerien security sector's expertise in combating terrorism and organised crime; Improving the human resources, training and logistics management policies; Supporting the development of regional and international coordination in the fight against terrorism and organised crime
<i>EUCAP NESTOR</i>	Enhancing maritime capacities of five countries in the Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean (Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Seychelles and Tanzania), including counter-piracy and maritime governance; working with the main actors responsible for maritime security in each host country (coast guard, navy, civilian coastal police, prosecutors, judges and other actors; mission experts mainly provide advice, mentoring, and training)



Figure 2: Excerpts of the military CSDP operations' mandates

Military operations	Mandate
<i>EUFOR ALTHEA BiH</i>	Capacity-building and training to the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina; supporting BiH efforts to maintain the safe and secure environment; supporting the overall EU comprehensive strategy for BiH
<i>EUNAVFOR Medditeranean Sea</i>	Disrupting the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks in the Mediterranean; contribute to reducing the further loss of lives at sea
<i>EUMAM Central African Republic</i>	Supporting the Central African authorities in preparing a reform of the security sector with respect to the armed forces of the Central African Republic
<i>EUTM Somalia</i>	Training activities of national armed forces (focus on advisory and mentoring component on building long term capability and capacity within the Somali Ministry of Defence and General Staff with regard to the areas of operations, plans, logistics, administration, and legal affairs).
<i>EU NAVFOR Atalanta (Somalia)</i>	Protecting World Food Programme vessels delivering aid to displaced persons in Somalia, and African Union Mission on Somalia shipping; deterring, preventing and repressing acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somali coast; protecting vulnerable shipping off the Somali coast on a case by case basis; monitoring of fishing activities off the coast of Somalia
<i>EUTM Mali</i>	Restoring constitutional and democratic order through the implementation of the road-map adopted by the National Assembly; helping the Malian authorities to exercise their sovereignty over the whole of the country; neutralizing organized crime and terrorist threats
<i>EUSEC DR Congo</i>	Supporting the Congolese authorities in rebuilding armed forces and in creating conditions conducive to a return to economic and social development; assisting authorities in tailoring the security sector reform to foster democratic standards, human rights, international humanitarian law and good governance

As already explained, the IECEU project takes a wider approach to conflict prevention. Hence, the preventive activities, as pursued within CSDP missions and operations, are by no means the only preventive activities of the EU. On the contrary, certain instruments of the EU, led by other institutions and agencies of the EU, also have an impact on the reduction of risks factors and, overall, can have stabilization effects in volatile regions, as many of them try to deal with the root-causes of conflicts (economic assistance, development aid, humanitarian assistance etc.). As seen from both figures, some preventive activities of the CSDP missions and operations fall in the category of *direct* preventive activities (preventing piracy and armed robbery at sea; saving refugees in the Mediterranean Sea etc.), while the majority of preventive activities, as pursued within the current CSDP missions and operations, have an *indirect* impact, and as such fall into structural conflict prevention (training armed forces that will be professional, and as such able to protect all the people of the country; training judges, police etc.).



2.2 CHALLENGES IN CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS: KEY OBSERVATIONS

2.2.1 PLANNING AND SETTING UP A MISSION OR OPERATION

Despite the absence of clear criteria for deciding what constitutes the preconditions for the deployment of a CSDP mission or operation (e. g. number of deaths, degree of violence, region ...), the CSDP deployments have been in place for more than a decade. Due to the conundrum of conflict prevention (and crisis management) actors in conflict- and post-conflict zones and the inherent complexity of such environments, the planning and coordinating CSDP missions and operations require effective cooperation among various actors already at the planning phase. The UN, NATO and the OSCE are often found among the 'usual suspects' the EU shall coordinate its activities with from the very beginning, as also they try to address most or all of the phases of a conflict cycle.

An important lesson learned regarding the planning is that there is almost never enough of a fact-finding exercise prior to the launch of the mission, concerning the aims and objectives of the proposed effort, an evaluation of appropriate instruments to conduct the mission, and a decision concerning the appropriate time frame in which the intervention is to be implemented. One of the reasons for that is that the EU still fundamentally lacks independent (common) intelligence capabilities.²⁵

However, the recent missions and operations have been, comparing to those launched at the beginning of CSDP military and civilian engagement, better equipped with the information about the local environment, where the mission was to be deployed. In this regard, another important lesson the EU has learned is that it is wise to investigate thoroughly the willingness of the EU member states not only to approve the mission, but also to contribute human, financial or material resources.²⁶

Another lesson learned, which is not surprising, is that the process of setting up small deployments usually proceeds more smoothly and quickly, comparing to the large deployments,

²⁵ Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, "ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 197.

²⁶ Emil Kirchner, "Common Security and Defence Policy peace operations in the Western Balkans: impact and lessons learned", *European Security* 1 (2013): 36-54.



regardless of whether the civilian missions or military operations are in question. Nevertheless, Asseburg and Kempin mention significant differences between the two:

»on the one hand, recruiting personnel for military operations is easier in principle as member states have direct access to these personnel resources (at least when the political will is given), while civilian personnel cannot just be drafted and deployed (with additional difficulties in federal systems such as Germany). On the other hand, recruiting and sending civilian staff is generally easier to justify to the member states' populations.«²⁷

Another lesson learned with regard to the planning and implementation of CSDP missions and operations, which is based on the difficulties the first CSDP missions and operations have experienced in the field, is that a joint operational centre needs to be established for the sake of efficient planning and implementation of the CSDP missions' and operations' mandate. The Council has taken this decision already in December 2004, when the EU Military Staff was asked to set up an Operations Centre that would be able to plan and run CSDP operations, in particular in those cases where a joint civil and military response was required. Despite the numerous declarations of the member states that the CSDP shall be strengthened, those same member states were, as argued by Schnell and Terpan, rather hesitant with regards to the use of the Operations Centre.²⁸ It took almost 8 years to activate the Operations Centre, which was used for the first time in March 2012 in order to coordinate activities and increase synergies between the three CSDP missions and operations in the Horn of Africa from the planning phase until the implementation. The experiences, on which the lessons can be learned, have shown that despite some difficulties, the activities and the coordination of missions and operations conducted by the Operations Centre were an important step towards greater synergy of various EU activities at the Horn of Africa.

"Having one centre for coordination of the all EU activities on one country would make more benefit in coordinating the tasks of each EU institution."

(Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments)

²⁷ Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, "ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 191-192.

²⁸ Fiona Schnell and Fabien Terpan, "Member States Resistance to the EU Operations Centre", *European Foreign Affairs Review* 20 (2015) - Special Issue: 63-82.



The online survey revealed that planning phase is often superficial and needs more thought in order to link EU actions with other actors. Respondents also stated the importance of improved coordination among EU offices in the mission area.²⁹ In addition to this, the study of Asseburg and Kempin, referring to the analysis of the EU, emphasizes that one lesson learned should be in particular taken into consideration, when the planning of a CSDP mission or operation is going on. Namely, it has to be repeated to the wider audience many times, and especially to the member states, that CSDP missions and operations cannot serve as a surrogate for the EU's general policy and approach (political, economic, security etc.) towards the region/country, where the mission or operation is to be deployed.³⁰ This linkage between the different preventive activities of the EU was also echoed by one of the respondents in the online survey: "*More efforts should be put into planning capacities as well as into thinking how CSDP activities at best can contribute to the wider national and international efforts of peace-building and state-building. Better linkages with national actors, UN actors, regional actors, development banks, donors, civil society...*"³¹

This is inherently linked with the underpinning logic of the IECEU project, which presupposes that a CSDP mission or operation is only *one* of the conflict prevention instruments available to the EU. If the EU wishes to make a difference on the ground, the CSDP mission or operation alone is not sufficient to address the root causes of the conflicts in an appropriate way. During the planning phase of the mission, it is recommended that the CSDP missions and operations are supported by a wide spectrum of complementary EU peacebuilding activities, not only by employing a few of the instruments available. This has, for example, happened in the Western Balkans, which is, compared to the other regions where the EU is involved with its conflict prevention engagement, more stable place than it used to be in the 1990s.³²

2.2.2 MANDATES

If the EU wishes to pursue a sustainable conflict prevention mission or operation with a long term impact, it must ensure that the mandate, resources (both financial and human) and

²⁹ IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments.

³⁰ Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, "ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 190.

³¹ Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments.

³² Annemarie Rodt and Stefan Wolff, "European Union Conflict Management in the Western Balkans", *Civil Wars* 3 (2012): 414-430.



implementation strategy of each mission and operation are matched to the specific circumstances as well as the needs on the ground.³³ In other words, the EU's envisaged activity should be sustainable and long enough. On the other hand, it is necessary for the CSDP mission or operation not to be overambitious, or lavish, in terms of human and material resources. Such lesson was learned in Kosovo, when it seems reasonable to ask whether so big efforts were needed – at the peak EULEX had 3000 personnel – and could such dynamics be sustained over the long periods.³⁴

One of the challenges with regard to the devising of the mandate has been documented well by Asseburg and Kempin.³⁵ They describe how the expertise of the EU institutions, which are most knowledgeable on the conflict zones, have often been overlooked by those Brussels-based institutions that have a primary say in the designation of the missions' and operations' mandates. The EU has a Special Representative in almost every conflict region where the CSDP missions and operations were or are deployed. Furthermore, the delegations of the EU, which are occasionally present in the volatile area even prior to the launching of the CSDP mission or operation, possess a lot of useful information and expertise, but the studies have shown that the value of this expertise has often not been taken into consideration to the extent it could have been. Such considerations were also noted in the online survey regarding the relationship between the Commission and the EEAS which were regarded as "*not working in line, [with] too much independency and not interconnectedness*."³⁶ Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that the goals of the mandates are often not set realistically, as they might be based on the false or distorted assumptions about the political, economic, cultural and social situation in the area. One of the key points identified in this regard is that despite the fact that the terrain-based institutions are subordinate even in the process of the mandate planning, it might be wise to make a better use of their expertise.³⁷

³³ Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, "The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations", *SWP Research Paper 2009/RP 14* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2009); IECEU workshop on the current preventive activities of the EU, Gotenica, Slovenia, 21 October 2015.

³⁴ Emil Kirchner, "Common Security and Defence Policy peace operations in the Western Balkans: impact and lessons learned", *European Security* 1 (2013): 36-54.

³⁵ Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, "ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 190.

³⁶ Respondent to the IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments.

³⁷ There are, of course, exceptions to the rule. Marc Otte, EU Special Representative for the Middle East peace process, has been very much involved in preparing the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access, which designated the EU as third party for the Rafah border crossing and ultimately formed the basis for the mandate of the EU support mission (Asseburg and Kempin, "ESDP in Practice", 190).



Another aspect regarding the mandates is that they have often been, especially as concerns earlier missions and operations, set vaguely (such as “to make a contribution to”), with rather unclear objectives and no specific benchmarks defined. This drawback was recognized by the EU experts³⁸. Consequently, the newer missions and operations do have the so called Mission Implementation Plans, which help measuring the change by comparing two states of situation over time.³⁹ The mandates of the newer missions and operations are not that rigidly set-in-stone as they used to be in the past, as easing the procedures to change the mandates has also been recognized as a necessity for responding the changed circumstances on the ground. Weak or not up-to-day mandate of the mission have been observed as having prevented experts working at their best, because certain activities could not have been undertaken due to the inflexible mandates.⁴⁰

Against this background, it is difficult to measure success. Furthermore, as also noted by Asseburg and Kempin referring to the mandates of the missions and operations, it is interesting to learn that lessons learned have not been really learned (or transferred to other experts) due to the fact that »systematic “lessons learned” processes and comparative situation analyses have been woefully absent.« Yet, comparative approaches – and the IECEU is one of that kind – would be an obvious tool to use.⁴¹

2.2.3 DEPLOYMENT

If the EU attempts to avert threats effectively and prevent conflict, it must be in a position to deploy its civilian experts or armed forces in the area of operation rapidly. The timely response has succeeded in some cases, at least partially. Asseburg and Kempin note that the monitoring missions in Aceh (Indonesia), Rafah (the Palestinian territories), and Georgia, as well as the

³⁸ IECEU workshop on the current preventive activities of the EU, Gotenica, Slovenia, 21 October 2015.

³⁹ Council of the European Union, "Revised Civilian CSDP Best Practice Compilation for Planners and Mission staffs", 5 March 2015, Accessed at: <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5705-2015-REV-1/en/pdf> (26th October 2015).

⁴⁰ Päivi Kuosmanen, "Feedback from Finnish Experts on EU CSDP Missions", *Peacebuilding and Civilian Crisis Management Studies* (Kuopio: CMC Finland, 2014), 10.

⁴¹ Asseburg and Kempin mention the case of training police personnel in conflict or post-conflict zones, which is often an important element of the EU's approach to long-term conflict prevention. For example, before EUPOL Afghanistan was deployed, positive and negative aspects of training police personnel outside Afghanistan could have been explored by comparing with the experience in training Iraqi police officers and judiciary staff in EU member states and in states in the region. See: Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, "ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 178–199; IECEU workshop on the current preventive activities of the EU, Gotenica, Slovenia, 21 October 2015.



operation Atalanta at the Horn of Africa and military operation Artemis in DR Congo (2003) were deployed in less than four weeks, measured from the date of the EU Council's decision.⁴² The rapid deployments occurred in those cases, where the start of the mission was defined externally – where the EU was designated as a third party for monitoring cease-fires or border regimes – or where member states had strong interests or already had forces in the area (the Gulf of Aden). However, the lesson learned from this is not that the rapid deployments should become the norm. Some mandates were prepared in such a rush that foreseeable points of dispute had to be resolved later on or have remained open (the case of Operation Atalanta, when the challenge of how to deal with captured pirates was resolved at a later point). Nevertheless, the rapid deployment is more an exception to the rule. The start of a mission or operation has often been delayed by the disagreement among member states regarding the mandate (the case with EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUFOR RD Congo), by the necessity to first clarify the legal framework (EULEX Kosovo) or by difficulties in recruiting the personnel.⁴³

After the planning phase and prior to the deployment phase, it is necessary to choose right candidates, especially when civilian missions are in question. Engagement of civilian experts, but also military staff in conflict and post-conflict zones is more likely to be successful, and would be considered as valuable also by the deployed person, if this is not a one-time deployment, but has some continuity (for example, that the person already has some experience from other similar missions). As it was proven many times, the first deployment of a person – be it in civilian mission or military operation – was usually limited to 'surviving' in a new environment (not in the sense of physical survival, but to adapt to a completely new environment). Only later, after second or third deployment, the deployed person was endowed with sufficient confidence that he or she can contribute to the success of the mission.⁴⁴

"Skills and capacity in analysis (conflict analysis, conflict sensitive approach) has to be improved as well as coordination and cooperation with other actors (including development). Activities also have to be more results orientated with clear objectives, goals and targets and ways to measure progress."

(Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments)

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Rok Zupančič, "Civil-Military Cooperation in Conflict and Post-Conflict Zones: Needed Marriage Also for Small States? The Case Study of Slovenian Armed Forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 3 (2015).



Another important lesson concerning the deployment arises from the fact that the experts deployed to civilian missions, coming from many countries, receive different training prior to the mission and have different background (education, skills, job etc.). The latter is not necessarily negative, but can cause difficulties, if certain experts have significantly lower knowledge of the situation in the field and are less skilled to deal with the challenges they are tasked with.⁴⁵

2.2.4 COOPERATION OF CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS WITH OTHER ACTORS INVOLVED IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

In most conflict or post-conflict zones, CSDP missions and operations work in close partnership with other major conflict prevention and crisis management actors. Partnership with the United Nations, NATO, and the OSCE are the most common examples, but with the CSDP missions and operations deployed to some other regions, new partnerships are emerging (e. g. the African Union).⁴⁶ The experience of CSDP partnerships with other international organizations in the field has been mixed, which does not come as a surprise due to the complexity of conflict- or post-conflict area and the diversity of various international organizations, which do not have very different agendas on what shall be done to stabilize the volatile zone, and the consequence of that are rather similar programmes (security sector reform, demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration, reconciliation etc.), which leads to the overlapping of activities. One of the respondents to the online survey noted that CSDP interventions could be improved by *"linking their intervention to development ones better, so as to increase sustainability of approaches; by better linking and strengthening their operations and roles with other international organisations present in the same country/region, by encouraging coordination and positive overlaps."*⁴⁷

In Africa, for example, CSDP operation Artemis was used to support UN mission MONUC in 2003, followed by EUFOR DRC in 2006. EUFOR Tchad/RCA was designed as a bridging operation paving the ground for UN deployment. However, as argued by Keohane, the EU hasn't clarified the nature and scope of its long-term involvement in UN peacekeeping, as the decision not to intervene in Eastern Congo in 2008, following a request of the UN, indicates. In some other

⁴⁵ The need for a common pre-deployment training has been emphasised, for instance, in the EU CSDP Lessons Learned report from 2013. Annual 2013 CSDP lessons report - summary for publication.

http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/annual_2013_csdp_lessons_report_en.pdf (accessed 27 October 2015).

⁴⁶ Daniel Keohane, "Lessons from EU Peace Operations", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 200-217.

⁴⁷ Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments.



cases, EU-UN cooperation has been weakened by political constraints affecting the room for manoeuvre of either institution.⁴⁸

The analyses have shown that in the next years, the EU will need to reinforce its partnership not only with the UN and other key multilateral bodies, but also with two other groups: third countries which contribute large numbers of personnel to CSDP (e. g. Turkey, Norway, Canada); and major powers involved in conflict prevention and crisis management (not only the US, but also the Russian Federation, India, China, Brazil ...).⁴⁹ In many cases, such partnership proved to be fruitful and more efficient, for example the participation of US and Russian personnel in Kosovo and Chad alongside the EU staff, or cooperation of the navies of 20 countries in the Atalanta mission.⁵⁰

Nevertheless, most of experts are of the opinion that the cooperation of the EU with other international actors has reached much higher level, comparing to the first CSDP deployments, although the difficulties regarding cooperation, arising from different mandates, constituencies (to whom are the experts of different international actors responsible) and strategic cultures are still omnipresent.⁵¹

2.2.5 ONE NATION'S OR THE EU'S MISSION OR OPERATION?

The view of the CSDP »being prey to the member states' wants«⁵² on one side, and attempts of the EU structures to consolidate the security and defence policy and so 'speak with one voice', has been debated since the inception of CSDP at the end of the 1990s. The recent example of this gap, which may be interpreted by this understanding of CSDP, is the lack of response of the EU to the crisis in Mali. Okemuo emphasises that the EU's policy on Mali looked promising at the first stages. Namely, the EU initially made a prompt decision to deploy a Training Mission to Mali, but then it did not activate the peacekeeping dimension of the CSDP as required at an advanced

⁴⁸ Daniel Keohane, "Lessons from EU Peace Operations", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 210.

⁴⁹ Daniel Keohane, "Lessons from EU Peace Operations", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 211.

⁵⁰ Emil Kirchner, "Common Security and Defence Policy peace operations in the Western Balkans: impact and lessons learned", *European Security* 1 (2013): 36-54.

⁵¹ See, for example, Ian Bausbeck, "The European Union and the Security Sector Reform in the DR Congo, " *International Journal of Rule of Law, transitional justice and human rights*, 1 (2010): 154-163.

⁵² Ludovica Marchi Balossi-Restelli, "The Common Security and Defence Policy in a State of Flux? The Case of Libya in 2011. " *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 1 (2014): 88-105.



stage of the crisis.⁵³ Consequently, France decided to fill the gap and intervene in a sub-Saharan country unilaterally.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, there is a wide range of arguments confirming the popular saying the EU would even more resemble a toothless tiger, had certain countries – according to their national interests, however they are understood – not undertaken an action.⁵⁵ Despite the fact that the choices made within CSDP conform to the norm of unanimity, as argued by Balossi-Resteli, the member states and the EU could make an effort, and bridge the gap between the willing to intervene and those less interested in doing so. Namely, the less engaged could at least support the establishment of a (military, for example) operation formed by the “pro-interventionist” and provide other but military instruments for conflict prevention (or crisis management). This suggestion was not, however, supported by the expert participants to the workshop. In their view the EU missions should be represented by most of the member states; otherwise there is a risk that the EU mission is perceived as representing just those member states actively participating in the mission.⁵⁶

"Creating contact groups ([to which] just some of the EU states are members) for particular international issues is not in the favour of a common European security perspective."

(Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments)

Undoubtedly, the EU missions and operations have been most effective when there has been a clear convergence of member states interests'. As noted by Keohane, EU monitoring mission in Georgia has been a case in point. The mission was deployed quickly after the August 2008 war between Georgia and the Russian Federation; more than 200 monitors coming from 22 member states were deployed in two weeks, which was possible due to the efforts by the member states in ensuring the availability of their personnel.⁵⁷ The primary goal of the mission – the only mission

⁵³ The Council of the EU (European Union External Action), *Council Decision 2013/34/CFSP on a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces (EUTM Mali)*, adopted on 13th January 2013.

⁵⁴ Gloria Okemuo, "The EU or France? The CSDP Mission in Mali: the Consistency of the EU Africa policy", *Liverpool Law Review* 34 (2013): 217-240.

⁵⁵ Rok Zupančič, "Slovenia's Ten Years in the Common and Security and Defence Policy of the European Union", *Studia Historica Slovenica* 1 (2014): 97-114.

⁵⁶ IECEU workshop on the current preventive activities of the EU, 21 October 2015.

⁵⁷ *European Security and Defence Policy: European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia* (Oct. 16, 2008). Accessed at: http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/081023-EUMM_in_Georgiaversion3_EN.pdf, 2nd September 2015.



of that kind that could be deployed at that time, as no other international actor could intervene – was monitoring the ceasefire between the warring parties.

This example shows that the political determination of EU member states can translate into a mission that contributes to the stability in the region.⁵⁸ On the other hand, with regard to operational conflict prevention, the EU had no means to prevent the rapid development of violent events, which led to a short-time occupation of a great portion of Georgian territory by the Russian armed forces. The instruments the EU was willing to use back in 2008 were limited to non-military options, such as sanctions, issuing declarations, sending diplomatic envoys to the region, including the leaders of certain member states - although the EU has proven its vested interest for the country for more than a decade by relying on structural instruments of conflict prevention and crisis management.

These options, which could have been different, had the EU member states wanted to play more decisive and active role, confirm the internal divisions and different strategic calculations of the EU member states in different cases. The Georgian crisis, in which the EU's response to the war was led by the member states and the French presidency, in particular, showed also that the overall approach of the EU towards Georgia remained a hostage to a number of inconsistencies rooted in the institutional structure of the EU.⁵⁹ As noted by Bosse, the early framework documents of the ENP, designed predominantly by the Commission made rather insignificant reference to conflict prevention and crisis management, although that changed in 2003 after the South Caucasus as the region found its place in the European Security Strategy.⁶⁰

The convergence of defence and security perceptions of the member states in this case would have been stronger, had more EU member states felt that their security and interests were affected (one of such examples, when the EU member states shared an opinion on what shall be done to address the challenges arising from the piracy off the coast of Somalia, is the naval operation Atalanta with the mandate, among other, to protect trade routes; this operation was launched relatively quickly). Despite an increased number of CSDP interventions, this has yet to result in real integration or harmonisation of defence and security policies of the EU member

⁵⁸ Daniel Keohane, "Lessons from EU Peace Operations", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 211.

⁵⁹ Giselle Bosse, "The EU in Georgia: towards a coherent crisis management strategy?", in Eva Gross and Ana E. Juncos (eds.), *EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: roles, institutions and policies* (New York and London: Routledge, 2011): 131-145.

⁶⁰ *A secure Europe in a better world: European Security Strategy*, adopted on 12th December 2003, Brussels. Accessed on 3rd September 2015, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf>.



states.⁶¹ In other words, what is lacking are not the operational capabilities, but more the member states' preparedness to plan CSDP engagements strategically and to use them adequately.⁶² The studies have confirmed this finding in many cases.⁶³ Therefore, most of the actors in international relations that can foresee *the most likely* responses of the EU in such crises are well aware of the inherent dissonances pervading through the EU, and do not hesitate taking advantage of them. Until the EU develops a consistent strategy and also implement it in practice, the crisis response will depend on the *ad hoc* commitment of the member states.

As the EU's action was often hampered by the unwillingness of certain member states to engage in a crisis – and although CSDP missions and operations still remain the arena of struggling among member states – with years passing and lessons learned, the European Commission found its niche or “trump card”: the so-called Community activities where the EU has a say and is able to manage, mostly independently, financial and technical assistance programmes as well as enlargement processes that have conflict prevention impact.⁶⁴ In other words, saying simplistically that conflict prevention of the EU does not exist nowadays due to common blockades in the Council, cannot be any more argued as easily as it could be a decade ago.

2.2.6 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CSDP MISSION OR OPERATION AND “BRUSSELS”

There is a consensus in the theory of conflict prevention that civilian and military instruments of conflict prevention should be put in place in a long term perspective, rather than just a quick and limited response to an acute situation.⁶⁵ The EU's official policy of Comprehensive Approach is in line with these findings. For this kind of approach, the lesson recommended by Keohane, with

⁶¹ Blanca Ballester, *The Cost of Non-Europe in Common Security and Defence Policy* (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, 2013), 82.

⁶² Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, "ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 197.

⁶³ One of recent examples is the EU's performance in Afghanistan. The case of EUPOL shows that the mission was conceived too small from its inception, and was not equipped with the necessary resources to fulfil the mandate. See: Eva Gross, "The EU in Afghanistan" in Eva Gross and Ana E. Juncos (eds.), *EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: roles, institutions and policies* (New York and London: Routledge, 2011): 128.

⁶⁴ Emil Kirchner, "Common Security and Defence Policy peace operations in the Western Balkans: impact and lessons learned", *European Security* 1 (2013): 36-54.

⁶⁵ See, for example: Michael Lund, "Conflict Prevention Is Happening: Learning from 'Successes' as Well as 'Failures'," in David Carment and Albrecht Schnabel (eds.), *Conflict Prevention from Rhetoric to Reality. Volume 1. Organizations and Institutions* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004): 289–304; Jacob Bercovitch, Jacob, Victor Kremenyuk and William Zartman, *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution* (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2008).



regard to the establishment and support of the EU structures to the CSDP mission, is that “a strong, integrated institutional system is required for successfully managing missions”, and this should be further studied.⁶⁶

Many times the EU has expressed solidarity and acted promptly when the crisis was looming. After some time, and eventually with new crises on the horizon, the interest for solving the particular crisis within the top political structures of the EU and member states decreased. Once the CSDP missions or operations were deployed, they have been subject to modest critical follow-up by EU member states, as found in the study of Asseburg and Kempin.⁶⁷ The regular reports of the Heads of Mission and Operation Commanders have usually been recorded in Brussels. However, as the study found out, EU member states have often accepted reports that generally talk up positive achievements while glossing over existing difficulties, even if the serious problems existed in the field. Therefore, it might be useful that the member states would conduct more open discussion about the progress, mandates, possibilities for modifications of the mandates etc. In addition to this, it has been observed that important issues that should be reported further up the administrative chain to Brussels were occasionally not delivered. It was suspected that there was a lack of support from Brussels for EU CSDP missions that prevented certain themes from being discussed.⁶⁸

The responsibility for sustainability of the CSDP missions and operations, and also to maintain the link between 'Brussels' and the field, including coordination in the planning and implementation of CSDP missions, lies principally with the Council Secretariat, HR/VP, and three other groups: the Political and Security Committee, the Military Committee and the Military Staff.⁶⁹ Therefore, practitioners and scholars favour a permanent interaction between the Brussels-based crisis management committees, the structures of the Council Secretariat and the HR/VP and the European Commission in general. Without this, the cost of 'Non-Europe in CSDP' is not only political, but also has negative financial implications on member states.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Daniel Keohane, "Lessons from EU Peace Operations", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011).

⁶⁷ Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, "ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 193.

⁶⁸ Päivi Kuosmanen, "Feedback from Finnish Experts on EU CSDP Missions", *Peacebuilding and Civilian Crisis Management Studies* (Kuopio: CMC Finland, 2014), 10.

⁶⁹ Emil Kirchner, "Common Security and Defence Policy peace operations in the Western Balkans: impact and lessons learned", *European Security* 1 (2013): 38.

⁷⁰ Blanca Ballester, *The Cost of Non-Europe in Common Security and Defence Policy* (Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, 2013).



2.2.7 RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CSDP MISSION/OPERATION AND THE LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS

The EU's conflict prevention actions in the volatile zones do not take place in a political vacuum. On the contrary, these actions are being constantly scrutinized - not necessarily with an objective criteria, though - by local people, who are living in the country where such a mission/operation is deployed and who have high expectations of foreign actors. For this reason, it is necessary that the CSDP missions and operations get well connected with the local populations and its leaders in the field. As argued by Keohane, the narratives associated with each mission are a critical dimension of its political profile and visibility in the eyes of both local interlocutors, potential spoilers and other conflict prevention/crisis management partners.⁷¹

One of the most important lessons the EU has learned in this respect is (from today's perspective rather obvious) fact that the success of CSDP missions is only partly a result of the effective approach of the EU to a volatile zone. As rightly noted by Kirchner, their success is also the product of effective collaboration with local stakeholders and the acceptance and their positive attitude towards the mission.⁷² In the cases when local authorities and a part of the population understood the "EU lessons and recommendations" in a positive way, a foundation for democratic reform, peace and stability was established.

Regarding the local environment, the CSDP missions could have a long-term effect, which was neither envisaged nor desired. Among notable examples is Georgia, where the EU monitoring mission has had a deescalating effect, but due to the fact that its monitors have not had access to the parts of the region they were supposed to monitor, it has happened that their presence has in fact consolidated the *de facto* border between South Ossetia and the remaining part of the Georgian territory.⁷³ Unsurprisingly, the Georgians may thus appreciate that the EU has helped in maintaining status quo, but cannot be satisfied that it unintentionally also helped setting things in stone.

⁷¹ Daniel Keohane, "Lessons from EU Peace Operations", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011).

⁷² Emil Kirchner, "Common Security and Defence Policy peace operations in the Western Balkans: impact and lessons learned", *European Security* 1 (2013): 36-54.

⁷³ Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin, "ESDP in Practice: Crisis Management without Strategic Planning", *Journal of International Peacekeeping* 15 (2011): 192.



Another lesson with regard to the relations between the EU and the local environment the Union has learned is that it is not beneficial, if the EU does not have a unified approach. To utilise the words of one of the respondents to the online survey on conflict prevention instruments, "[one of the main obstacles (for the EU) is bureaucracy and that one is aware of each other's' instruments. The EU structures are currently highly dysfunctional."⁷⁴ Gross illustrates this on the case of Afghanistan, when the CSDP mission is only one of the three 'EU voices': the office of the EU Special Representative, the Commission Delegation and EUPOL.⁷⁵ Being represented with three separate offices that pursue separate, yet essentially, interrelated activities, affects the EU's ability to influence the Afghan government and also its ability to project a united political profile among the local population and international actors operating in Afghanistan. In this regard, the famous Kissinger's question on "the phone number of the EU" is valid again.

"Comprehensive approach with whole of government approach should be targeted by EU to the possible conflict prevention areas (local, regional and governmental levels). Moreover, long term activities like education system strengthening, MMA and rule of law activities would be needed to guarantee local ownership and societal impacts."

(Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments)

2.3 CONCLUSION

The online survey confirmed that CSDP operations have proved their added value to EU conflict prevention. CSDP has undergone a series of professionalisation and improvement in its working methods and demonstrated its ability to contribute to evolving crisis management needs. However, the findings of the online survey indicate that problems in deployment of EU missions and operations point towards greater strategic issues which undermine operational ambitions to their effectiveness on the ground. Further, the online survey confirms the view that currently most CSDP operations operate at a sub-strategic level. What CSDP operations achieve can only be sustained, and properly assessed, in a timeframe or context that go beyond the narrow CSDP agenda.

⁷⁴ Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments.

⁷⁵ Eva Gross, "The EU in Afghanistan", in Eva Gross and Ana E. Juncos (eds.), *EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: roles, institutions and policies* (New York and London: Routledge, 2011): 117-130.



The fact that the EU often does not speak with one voice, when security and defence interests are at stake, has important implications on actual conflict prevention policies of the EU. If it is difficult for the EU member states to unite whether a decisive military action may be appropriate response to an emerging crisis, it is, on the other hand, relatively easier to reach consensus on “softer” conflict prevention approaches, which may have an impact in the ground. As one of the respondents to the online survey put it: the EU “[a]lthough having quite a lot of instruments at its disposal, it [the EU] has a limited power of deterrence because it is only seen as a cash dispenser by failed states and not as a credible or even threatening (when needed) actor.”⁷⁶ This is by far most evident in the case of African volatile regions, where the EU has become increasingly involved in programmes meant to resolve and prevent conflicts in a long-term manner.

Gibert argues that a close look at the EU’s foreign and security policy in Africa reveals that the EU remains an essentially developmental actor, tying political reforms to development programmes rather than creating a diplomatic body able to play a decisive role, which would mean negotiating with conflicting parties and prevent political crises.⁷⁷ The case of preventive engagement in Africa reflects the overall conflict prevention policy of the EU, although it must be admitted that in some regions, for example in the Western Balkans, the EU’s voice is stronger, which is a consequence of the fact that the political elites of the Western Balkans’ countries, aspiring for the accession to the EU, have to be more inclined to listen to the EU.⁷⁸ In other words, for the EU and its member states it might be easier to be a conflict prevention actor by relying on politically less sensitive aspects of conflict prevention (for example, sending developmental aid or initiating educational programmes) than applying hard measures (for example to intervene militarily, if need be, to prevent atrocities or mitigate crises), unless the EU has a promising carrot and a stick, when dealing with the actors in conflict- and post-conflict zones. This was also highlighted through the responses to the survey: CSDP operations are important tools of EU external action, but they also reveal the limits of what the EU are able and willing to do when contributing to international peace.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments.

⁷⁷ Marie V. Gibert, “The EU in West Africa: from development to diplomatic policy”, in Eva Gross and Ana E. Juncos (eds.), *EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: roles, institutions and policies* (New York and London: Routledge, 2011): 103-116.

⁷⁸ Annemarie Rodt and Stefan Wolff, “European Union Conflict Management in the Western Balkans”, *Civil Wars* 3 (2012): 414-430.

⁷⁹ IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments.



On the other hand, in the regions where CSDP missions and operations are in place, the local stakeholders often seem unwilling to see the EU to become involved in other activities than traditional developmental ones, such as the financing of infrastructure building, where the EU, thanks to its considerable financial resources, has comparative advantages. Therefore, as Gibert warns, it seems doubtful that the EU can realistically claim that it contributes to the prevention of conflicts effectively. Gibert applies this argumentation on the case of CSDP missions and operations in Africa, but this could be generalized wider.⁸⁰ To conclude, for the sake of international security, not to even mention the proclaimed attempt of the EU to become a global conflict prevention actor, it might be reasonable for the EU to stop being too diplomatic (and often inactive) under the disguise of impartiality and non-interference in internal affairs, if it really wants to become 'a source of good', or a credible normative actor in international relations, who can prevent conflicts at least in its neighbourhood.⁸¹

"There is now a large array of tools at the disposal of the EU compared to five years ago for instance. With a greater political will to act and clearer political guidance, CSDP missions and operations will be able to act in a better way. That means also at the same time a full commitment of MS to provide manpower, assets, [and] capabilities."

(Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Conflict Prevention Instruments)

⁸⁰ Marie V. Gibert, "The EU in West Africa: from development to diplomatic policy", in Eva Gross and Ana E. Juncos (eds.), *EU Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management: roles, institutions and policies* (New York and London: Routledge, 2011): 103-116.

⁸¹ For more on the concept of normative power and the quest of the EU to become a normative power actor by relying on conflict prevention as its official policy – and emphasizing this vocally throughout the world –, see: Ian Manners, "Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: Beyond the Crossroads," *Journal of European Public Policy* 2 (2006): 182–199; Emilian Kavalski, "The Struggle for Recognition of Normative Powers: Normative Power Europe and Normative power China in Context," *Cooperation and Conflict* 2 (2013): 247–267; Rok Zupančič and Miha Hribernik, "'Discovering' normative power as a state strategy in the framework of security, foreign, and defense policy: the case of Japan," *Philippine Political Science Journal* 1 (2014): 78-97.



3 POOLING AND SHARING WITHIN THE EU

3.1 INTRODUCTION

After the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009, CSDP saw an increase in the debates how to foster CSDP and how to best implement the provisions laid down in the Treaty. One of the most important debates was linked to the challenge how to make the defence capabilities of the EU member states as efficient as possible for the use in a coordinated action of the EU.⁸² Unlike big countries, the EU member states have to deal with the situation, in which its defence looks like a giant puzzle, composed of various countries with different levels of technological development, diverse structure and size of armed forces, defence budgets and after all, different military doctrines and defence planning.⁸³ As from an institutional perspective, the main decisions regarding CSDP had been made already before the decisions on the Lisbon Treaty, except the new competences for the HR/VP and the establishment of the European External Action Service, and therefore the debates centred on how to best make capabilities available for the EU and to also deploy them in crisis management and conflict prevention missions and operations in the framework of CSDP.

At an informal meeting of EU defence ministers in September 2010, HR/VP Catherine Ashton argued that the EU member states should cooperate more in order to deliver defence capability. At this meeting, three core questions – which 5 years later still remain unanswered – were posed by the German defence minister Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg:

1. Which capabilities would have to remain outside pooling and sharing due to national security reasons?
2. For which capability areas could member states envisage pooling arrangements?
3. Where would member states be willing to consider task-and role-sharing with other EU partners?⁸⁴

⁸² For more, see: Daniel Keohane, *The EU and counter-terrorism* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2005).

⁸³ Michail Vasile-Ozunu, "The impact of the pooling and sharing policy on the Romanian military capabilities development process", *Journal of Defense Resources Management* 3 (1): 3-6.

⁸⁴ Bastian Giegerich, "Foreign and Security Policy", in *Policy-making in the European Union*, eds. Helen S. Wallace, Alasdair R. Young and Mark Pollack (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).



At that time the main focus was thus on whether, and if so, how to implement Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a new mechanism introduced by the Lisbon Treaty (Article 42.6. TEU) intended to make capability development more efficient and coherent. In spite of the lack of common understanding of PESCO whether to start it as an exclusive or inclusive concept, the Ministers of Defence of the EU Member States, urged on by the financial crisis, on 9 December 2010 agreed on potentially far-reaching conclusions: the so-called Ghent Framework.⁸⁵

As the debates on PESCO were at a deadlock, Ministers focused on the immediate need for coordination in view of the declining defence budgets in almost all EU member states and proposed a concrete method.⁸⁶ Another important push for the Europeans to reconsider their military spending and increase efficiency also by bolstering hard-power capabilities was the re-shifting of the strategic orientation of the US towards Asia and the Pacific.⁸⁷ This was a clear sign from Washington that the European countries will have to rely more on themselves in security matters. Thus, Member States were encouraged to “systematically analyse their national military capabilities”, aiming at “measures to increase interoperability for capabilities to be maintained on a national level; exploring which capabilities offer potential for pooling; intensifying cooperation regarding capabilities, support structures and tasks which could be addressed on the basis of role- and task-sharing”. This rather pragmatic than new approach created a positive momentum and made a new impetus for a reinforced CSDP. Subsequently, “pooling & sharing” (P&S) became the new buzzword in CSDP town.⁸⁸

"The member states are still reluctant to participate on a scale that would make a difference."

(Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Pooling and Sharing)

Nevertheless, one should not be misled that the new buzzword meant something very innovative from the conceptual viewpoint, although it did provide a new approach to the issue of

⁸⁵ Food for Thought. 2010. "Pooling and sharing, German-Swedish initiative", http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260511deseinitiative_/sede260511deseinitiative_en.pdf

⁸⁶ The budgetary constraints and the declining defence budgets have always been one of the main arguments on the necessity of P&S. The GDP decreased dramatically in the year 2009 (-4.2%), followed by a timid increase in 2010. Meanwhile, the defence expenditures followed a decreasing trend, even before the onset of the crisis. See: Maria Constantinescu, "Approaches to European Union military collaboration in the current economic austerity environment", *Journal of Defense Resources Management* 3 (1, 2012): 87-92.

⁸⁷ Giovanni Faleg and Alessandro Giovannini, *The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence: Making a virtue of necessity?* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012), 2.

⁸⁸ Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, "Pooling & Sharing: From Slow March to Quick March?" *Egmont Security Policy Brief*, No. 23, (2011).



collaboration and sharing of resources. Namely, the case for deeper armaments cooperation was put forward already back at the 1990s in the framework of the Western European Union.⁸⁹ Furthermore, P&S, as a necessity to enhance efficiency of the EU, was also mentioned in the 2003 European security strategy.⁹⁰ However, efforts in the area remained marginal.

3.2 DEFINITIONS AND FORMS OF COOPERATION

In order to better understand the possible implications of P&S, it is necessary to define what is meant by the two buzzwords. For this document, the definitions formulated by Mölling describing various forms of defence cooperation will be used⁹¹:

- a. **Sharing**: one or more countries provide their partners with capability or equipment (such as airlift) or undertake a task for another country. If this occurs on a permanent basis, the partners can cut this capability – and save on costs. For example, Germany provides maritime surveillance for the North Sea, thus relieving the Netherlands of this task. NATO states take turns to police the Baltic airspace so that the Baltic countries can save the cost of having their own air forces. Other examples of joint procurement and operation include AWACS aircraft and NATO's command structures.⁹²
- b. **Pooling**: here too, national capabilities are provided to other countries. A special multinational structure is set up to pool these contributions and coordinate their deployment. The European Air Transport Command is one such example. Pooling can occur in the development, procurement or subsequent operation of shared equipment. This enables countries to either obtain a higher

⁸⁹ The Western European Union established the Eurocorps back in 1992. The Eurocorps was a brigade consisting of troops from five nations, who were not under the direct command of any single contributing country. In other words, member states' troops have been relinquished from their home nations to serve under the command of a supranational body and have served under this command in potential combat situations. As argued by McCray, the establishment of the Eurocorps serves as an example of how some of the challenges involved in supranational military organizations can be overcome. See: Matthew McCray, "Rapid Reaction Capability of the European Union: Taking that Last Big Step," *Connections : The Quarterly Journal* 4 (2014): 1-24.

⁹⁰ *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy*, adopted in Brussels, 12th December 2003 pp. 13. Accessed at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (27th August 2015).

⁹¹ Christian Mölling, "Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO. European Defence Needs Political Commitment rather than Technocratic Solutions". *SWP Comments* 2012/C 18 (2012).

⁹² There are some other definitions, but they do not substantially contradict the Mölling's definition. According to Overhage, sharing »means the eschewal of one's own national capabilities and is possible in two ways: either the building of common, multinational capabilities that are inseparable, or the use of weapons and forces of other nations that are willing to provide capabilities for others in a specialized role or as a lead nation for special tasks.« See: Thomas Overhage, "Pool it, share it, or lose it: an economical view on pooling and sharing of European military capabilities", *Defense & Security Analysis* 4 (2013): 324.



number of units or to co-acquire a capability that a state could not supply alone for cost reasons.⁹³

According to these definitions, pooling signifies that all member states still have access to their national capabilities, while with sharing this is not the case. Pooling and sharing can occur together. In fact, Pooling & Sharing can cover the full spectrum of capability development from the identification and harmonisation of military requirements to through-life management and support (including certification and standardisation). As argued by Faleg and Giovannini, P&S essentially relies upon three components: pooling of procurement of weapons and services or joint research facilities (e. g. the A400M transport plane); sharing through the partial or total integration of force structures such as training facilities or setting up joint units; and specialization.⁹⁴

"F&S has been implemented on a case by case basis only, with limited impact of EDA."

(Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU Pooling and Sharing)

Since the 2010 decision, many activities evolved, not only on the national but also on the European level, as the Council has tasked the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the HR/VP to support the work on P&S in its military and political dimensions. The most important initiatives are the Franco-British Defence Treaties or also called Lancaster Treaties⁹⁵, the cooperation between the Visegrád states (the Visegrád Four)⁹⁶, the Weimar Triangle Plus (Germany, France, Poland Italy and Spain) and the Ghent Initiative. Only this very last initiative, in which all EU states are involved, is really new. So far, these initiatives have been disparate, with the aims and number of participants varying widely. Apart from some positive developments such as air-to-air refuelling, the results have not been satisfactory or adequate to meet the scale of the challenges involved. Pan-European coordination on how to best do P&S in order to achieve concrete results could not be established.

⁹³ Overhage defines 'pooling' as the merging of capabilities, whereby the national power of disposition stays national. Pooled assets are no longer separate, but separable. See: Thomas Overhage, "Pool it, share it, or lose it: an economical view on pooling and sharing of European military capabilities", *Defense & Security Analysis* 4 (2013): 324.

⁹⁴ Giovanni Faleg and Alessandro Giovannini, *The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence: Making a virtue of necessity?* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012).

⁹⁵ "Treaty between the UK and the French Republic for Defence and Security Co-operation" and the "Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the French Republic relating to Joint Radiographic/Hydrodynamics Facilities" signed on 2 November 2010 in London.

⁹⁶ For more information on the Visegrad Group Defence Cooperation see <http://www.visegradgroup.eu/about/cooperation/defence>.



It was then in fact left to the EDA to make a selection which out of the 300 projects had the most interest and potential. As a result, the debate is limited to a few military capabilities. Some of the aforementioned initiatives even duplicate or block each other. For example, the Franco-British Defence Treaty duplicates a mine-clearing project by the EDA. In order not to endanger this pact, Paris has abandoned the project to set up an EU headquarter, while Italy responded to the deal by signing a bilateral treaty with Germany so as not to fall behind in the un-manned aerial vehicle (UAV) industry.⁹⁷

3.3 POOLING AND SHARING WITHIN EDA⁹⁸

As it has already been stated, the European Defence Agency plays an important role in the context of P&S. Since the launch of the Ghent initiative, the EDA has followed a twin-track approach: on one hand identifying and pursuing practical solutions towards delivery of quick wins and longer term operational projects and on the other hand providing an analytical overview, including the identification of potential obstacles to P&S and of enablers and incentives in response.

On 23 May 2011, following the Council conclusions on Pooling and Sharing of military capabilities, the EDA Steering Board tasked the Agency to “produce, in close cooperation with the EUMC and other EU actors, proposals on how European Pooling & Sharing could be taken forward”. The Steering Board of 30 November 2011, further to its tasking of 23 May, endorsed the EDA twin-track approach. Ministers endorsed eleven Pooling & Sharing opportunities identified by the report as well as the recommendations towards further work on incentives - including financial - on models and on legal frameworks. They also tasked EDA to prepare an overview of the consequences of individual budget cuts on the overall European defence effort. The Steering Board of 22 March 2012 following the Foreign Affairs Council the same day⁹⁹ noted the progress on identified P&S opportunities. In particular, it endorsed a political declaration on Air-to-Air Refuelling and welcomed the signature of a Declaration of Intent for the Establishment of Multinational Modular Medical Units.

⁹⁷ Christian Mölling, "Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO. European Defence Needs Political Commitment rather than Technocratic Solutions". SWP Comments 2012/C 18 (2012), 2.

⁹⁸ The historic oversight of P&S within EDA in this subchapter is mainly based on EDA's Pooling & Sharing, Fact sheet, https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/final-p-s_30012013_factsheet_cs5_gris.

⁹⁹ Council conclusions on pooling and sharing of military capabilities, 3157th Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 22 and 23 March 2012.



An important agreement among EU member states was reached on 19 November 2012, when EDA member states adopted a Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing¹⁰⁰, a document that provides guidelines to “support cooperative efforts of EU Member States to develop defence capabilities” and help “[mainstream] Pooling & Sharing in Member States’ planning and decision-making process”.¹⁰¹

In this Code of Conduct, the EDA discreetly shifts its emphasis from promoting Pooling & Sharing as a way to contribute to combating the economic crisis, to protecting the EDA’s acquis. Whereas the forefather of the Pooling & Sharing initiative, the November 2010 Ghent Initiative between Germany and Sweden, stated that “there are great profits to be made by finding ways of sharing expenses and burdens”— underlining that collaborative efforts and rationalization efforts could be a useful tool to help boost the economy in the sector of the defence industry – the EDA has now entered into a more conservative and protective mode, reflecting the climate of pessimism and in anticipation of additional budgetary cuts in defence spending.¹⁰²

Among the 11 points listed in the Code of Conduct, of particular interest are points 6 (“When a Pooling & Sharing project is agreed, endeavour to accord it a higher degree of protection from potential cuts”) and 11 (“Benefit from information through EDA when conducting national defence reviews, for example on Pooling & Sharing opportunities and the impact of budget cuts.”)¹⁰³

One of the key obstacles to making P&S really work has always been the lack of political will and motivation of EU member states to share its part of a project in the name of cooperation. It seems that still national interest are prevailing and hindering an effective and efficient EU cooperation. Another challenge hindering more efficient P&S revolves around the three dimensions pertaining to different strategic cultures of the EU member states. Cardoso categorized them into three groups regarding:

- i) Role of the EU and the US in providing European security: »EU-firsters« (France, Germany, Belgium, Finland ...) vs. *Atlanticists* (the UK, Portugal, the Netherlands, majority of Central and East European countries)

¹⁰⁰ See European Defence Agency. 2012. "Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing", <https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/news/code-of-conduct.pdf>.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 1.

¹⁰² See Philip Worré, "Pooling & Sharing: The EDA in Protective Mode" (2012). <https://isiseurope.wordpress.com/2012/11/23/pooling-and-sharin/>.

¹⁰³ Ibid.



- ii) National sovereignty in defence matters: “*Multilateralists*” (large number of countries) vs. stricter »*Neutralists*« and »*Sovereignists*« (Austria, Ireland, also the UK to some extent)
- iii) Willingness to forcefully intervene overseas: those *more willing to do so* (mostly former colonial powers - the UK, France, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal) vs. *anti-interventionists* (Germany, the Nordic countries).¹⁰⁴

As the group of countries on board is very diverse, it does not come as a surprise that cultural and ideational cleavages persist, and hence, that the EU security agenda pertaining also to P&S is being influenced by several actors with often contrasting views. Thus it is still surprising that the record list of P&S demonstrates already some good practices of cooperation. Out of the eleven presented P&S opportunities, nine of them are considered to have made good progress, namely:

1. Helicopter Training Programme (HTP)
2. Maritime Surveillance (MARSUR)
3. European Satellite Communications Procurement Cell (ESCPC)
4. Multinational Modular Medical Units
5. Air to Air Refuelling (AAR)
6. Pilot Training
7. European Naval Training
8. European Multimodal Transport Hubs
9. Smart Munitions

Only two opportunities are still offering room for improvement: Future Military SATCOM as well as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) are lacking behind, as no member state has indicated a willingness to pursue concrete initiatives in this context.¹⁰⁵

At the EDA Steering Board Meeting 18th Nov 2014, Defence Ministers agreed to a list of priority actions derived from the Capability Development Plan (CDP) and their implementation. This succeeds the priority list of 2011¹⁰⁶:

¹⁰⁴ Cardoso Reis, B., “Europeans are from Athens: European Strategic Culture and the deepening of ESDP in an enlarged EU”, paper based on discussions held at the Lisbon conference on “New Perspectives for European Security”, 2009, 16. Accessed on: 26th August 2015, <http://www.eu-consent.net/library/deliverables/D161.pdf>.

¹⁰⁵ EDA was supposed to launch a feasibility study in June 2015 to identify the way ahead on a future collaborative programme among its member nations for the acquisition of SATCOM. The results would be known in 18 months. See: Brooks Tigner, “EDA organises feasibility study of military/government SATCOM capability,” *Jane’s Defence Weekly* 18 (2015).



Figure 3. Priority list of the Capability Development Plan

2011 Priorities	2014 Priorities
1. Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED);	1. Enhance C- IED and CBRNe Capabilities in Operations
2. Medical Support;	2. Provide Medical Support to Operations
3. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance;	3. Remotely Piloted Aircraft providing Surveillance (RPAS)
4. Increased Availability of Helicopters;	4. Inter-Theatre Air Capabilities
5. Cyber Defence;	5. Counter Cyber Threats (Cyber Defence)
6. Multinational Logistic Support;	6. Enhance Logistic Support for Deployed Forces
7. CSDP Information Exchange;	7. Enhance Battlespace Information/Communication Services
8. Strategic and Tactical Airlift Management;	8. Intra-Theatre Combat Capabilities
9. Fuel and Energy;	9. Provide SATCOM Capabilities
10. Mobility Assurance.	10. Provide Air and Missile Defence for deployable forces
	11. Maritime Patrolling and Escorting
	12. Naval Surveillance systems
	13. Energy and Environmental Protection
	14. SESAR
	15. Modeling, Simulation and Experimentation
	16. Space based information service

3.4 THE FOUR LEVELS OF POLITICAL RISKS IN P&S

Why is it so hard for EU member states to foster defence cooperation and to move P&S ahead? There might be a long list of reasons, but losing national sovereignty and trust are at the forefront of the considerations.¹⁰⁷ As put forward by Risse, economic and financial initiatives are not the only thing that shall be taken into consideration:

“Although the economic success has been the main element of building up the Union, it has eroded itself as the economic crisis escalated and "Europeans" have not been a reality (psychological, mental, and social) just as safe as before. In other words, in certain

¹⁰⁶ Graph taken from Christian Mölling, "State of play of the implementation of EDA's pooling and sharing initiatives and its impact on the European defence industry". Study for the European Parliament, AFET-SEDE (2015), 39.

¹⁰⁷ IECEU Online Survey on EU Pooling and Sharing.



situations the EU citizens were "European" and in others they were "Germans", "British" or "French".¹⁰⁸

However, in the longer run the debate on P&S will also focus on the question between sovereignty and effectiveness. As Mölling states: "The crucial difference between the defence cooperation as practised by states so far and the current trend towards P&S is that the main purpose of the latter is to save money. At the same time, states are blocking a higher level of economic efficiency and military effectiveness by clinging to their desire to decide unilaterally on the interests of their armed forces."¹⁰⁹

According to the respondents to the online expert survey, so far EU pooling and sharing has been ineffectively implemented and thus remains an unexploited potential.¹¹⁰ The primary challenges for the successful implementation of pooling and sharing which were identified in the online survey are:

- Absence of coordination tools to facilitate pooling and sharing
- EDA's limited impact on pooling and sharing in CSDP missions
- Absence of coherence between CSDP objectives and member states' decisions on spending
- Absence of scale in mission which acts as deterrent
- Differences between civilian and military systems and further additional diversity within civilian structures
- Reluctance to contemplate P&S when projects are sensitive to national issues or involve national intelligence gathering capacity
- Absence of noticeable interest and political will among MS
- Absence of awareness and information
- Lack of leadership within EU institutions to drive P&S activities

¹⁰⁸ Gheorghe Risse in Stoiu, "The current global economic environment's impact on smart defence and pooling and sharing concepts' implementation, *Strategic Impact* 53 (2014): 54-60.

¹⁰⁹ Christian Mölling, "Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO. European Defence Needs Political Commitment rather than Technocratic Solutions", SWP Comments 2012/C 18 (2012), 3.

¹¹⁰ IECEU Online Survey on EU Pooling and Sharing.



Following Kuijpers/Faleg there are four levels of political risks that can be encountered when member states engage in pooling and sharing that need to be taken into consideration when evaluating forms of defence cooperation¹¹¹:

Figure 4. The levels of political risk in pooling and sharing



In order to avoid a complete loss of a capability, it seems logical to share the costs of maintenance, as it would take up to twenty years to re-install an abandoned military capability. By pooling maintenance, the capability can be preserved on a smaller scale instead of being lost (e.g. BENESAM cooperation between the Netherlands and Belgium, which decided to share the maintenance costs of mine sweepers and frigates). Following the approach of Kuijpers, the political risk of sharing the costs of maintenance in order to maintain certain capabilities is low. When it comes to small-scale regional initiatives, such as BENESAM, the commonalities as well as the very similar strategic culture in combination with the tit-for-tat-principle by which all participants have a clear benefit has even led to a permanent structure. Task specialisation for maintenance has taken place as well as a coordination of planning between the Belgian and Dutch fleets (even during operations).¹¹²

¹¹¹ Dieuwertje Kuijpers, "Reducing Political Risk in EU Pooling and Sharing". European Liberal Forum (2014), 5.

¹¹² Ibid, 9.



When it comes to **joint training**, the political risk is again almost non-existent: training national troops with other European countries is no taboo in a time where virtually no European country operates on a unilateral basis and where no single European state is able to conduct training activities on its own. Looking at NATO, there are in-depth training opportunities in order to enhance interoperability during its missions having therefore also a positive impact on EU. However, those initiatives with a permanent character are bilateral. France and Germany both train Tiger helicopter crews in Le Luc and share the annual budget for this training centre.¹¹³

France and the United Kingdom have set up an exchange program 'to provide RAF pilots and engineers with experience of operating the A400M.'¹¹⁴ Also on a regional basis, NORDEFECO and Visegrad as well as other

"The ESDC is an excellent example of pooling and sharing civilian and military capabilities in the field of CSDP related training."

(Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU pooling and sharing)

bilateral arrangements provide for sound training opportunities. An existing initiative in this regard is also the cooperation between Belgium and the Netherlands, which takes part within three main areas: operational steering, workup and training; navy military education; operational support.¹¹⁵ Also the various training courses of the European Security and Defence College, the European New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management and European Police College are good examples of pooling and sharing activities in the field of training mission and operations as well as headquarters' personnel to be deployed in the framework of CSDP.¹¹⁶

Training and exercises were regarded as somewhat successfully implemented by the respondents to the online survey. Training was also seen as the most potential area of developing pooling and sharing in the context of CSDP. Also, the ESDC was complimented as a successful example of pooling and sharing capability in this regard. Its work strengthens a common training and strategic culture in CSDP and promotes training initiatives. The development of this dimension of EU Pooling and Sharing can ultimately lead to greater

¹¹³ NATO, Smart Defence, strategic defence: pooling and sharing from the start, NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Draft report – Xavier Pintant (France) Rapporteur of the sub-committee on future Security and Defence capabilities, 11 April 2013, 061 DSCFC 13 E, 5.

¹¹⁴ Gov.uk: UK and France agree on closer defence co-operation, 31 January 2014, www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-france-agree-closer-defence-co-operation.

¹¹⁵ Maria Constantinescu, "Approaches to European Union military collaboration in the current economic austerity environment", *Journal of Defense Resources Management* 3 (1, 2012): 87-92.

¹¹⁶ The Belgian-Dutch has had a long cooperation. Since 1996 the part of the defence staff responsible for operational steering and training of the Belgian navy is integrated with its Dutch counterpart in the structures of the Dutch navy. See: Maria Constantinescu, "Approaches to European Union military collaboration in the current economic austerity environment", *Journal of Defense Resources Management* 3 (1, 2012): 87-92 and ESDC-Website: 'Pooling and Sharing' in the area of Training and Education in practice. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-military-staff/news/archives/2013/20130913_en.htm.



interoperability, readiness and operational effectiveness. Efforts to seek synergies with NATO – notably in the context of its Connected Forces Initiative – should allow enduring coherence and mutual understanding.¹¹⁷

Regarding **procurement and R&D**, there are concrete regional examples, such as NORDEFECO, Visegrad4 or the Franco-British Defence Cooperation. NORDEFECO aims for closer practical cooperation in capability development and clearly states that it has no intention to align the political or military aspirations, but solely strives for more effectiveness in procurement. A second example, more based on similar security rationale, are the Lancaster Treaties of 2010.¹¹⁸ Even though some operational intentions are mentioned, the main focus lies on materials and equipment. Kuijpers considers the political risk of P&S in common procurement as medium.¹¹⁹ It should be noted however that there is a risk of free-riding since the ten biggest defence spenders in the EU account for more than 90% of whole EU defence outlay.¹²⁰

Regarding **operations**, the largest part of European post-Cold War-missions were multinational and under international operational command in the framework of the UN and NATO. Especially at the operations level, the political risk for member states seems to be still too high to really moving ahead with P&S. Sovereignty issues still prevail and hinder an effective cooperation. If we consider current multinational operations, we can identify “coalitions of the willing” that are based on an opting-in possibility for European states depending on their countries priorities and interest. However, the fear of ‘losing control’ over when, how and where national troops are deployed causes political reluctance towards permanently integrating operational resources. This is mainly due to domestic internal political reasons and budgetary restraints. Examples include the position of Germany in 2003 in the war on terror as well as the intervention of Libya in 2011. These (domestic) political considerations caused some operational problems, since Germany became very reluctant to let German crew fly the AWACs during the missions in Iraq and Libya.¹²¹ The second reason, financial considerations, can be explained by EU regulatory framework of conducting crisis management and conflict prevention operations that are financed within the so-

¹¹⁷ IECEU Online Survey on EU Pooling and Sharing.

¹¹⁸ Two historic rivals, the UK and France, signed the defence agreement in 2010, involving cooperation to share facilities for nuclear warheads testing, sharing of aircraft carriers for training purposes and possible military operations, the creation of joint expeditionary forces and shared resources on training, maintenance and logistics of A400M transport aircraft. For more, see: Giovanni Faleg and Alessandro Giovannini, *The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence: Making a virtue of necessity?* (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2012), 2.

¹¹⁹ Dieuwertje Kuijpers, "Reducing Political Risk in EU Pooling and Sharing". European Liberal Forum (2014), 10.

¹²⁰ Thomas Overhage, "Less is More: Pooling and Sharing of European Military Capabilities in the Past and Present". Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School, June 2012.

¹²¹ Ibid.



called ATHENA mechanism.¹²² In this case, 90% of the financial burden of these operations is for the participating nations, making it less appealing for countries to participate and deploy troops.¹²³ This was also echoed in the online survey where a solution was proposed, by way of "setting up an Athena-like financial mechanism to fund 'common' costs (the difference with the existing Athena mechanism is that the latter is sourced from the member states, but to make P&S work the EU has to put in European money)".¹²⁴

Regarding **sharing capabilities and strategy**, Kuijpers concludes that there is a difference in joining the same multinational operations on an ad hoc basis, or committing oneself as a member state to the strategic needs of the other 27 EU member states. In this context the issue of role specialisation has been almost totally neglected. Many European states refuse to do so as they are afraid of mutual dependence.¹²⁵ Sharing capabilities and the ultimate aim of member states to 'specialise' in certain military capabilities, for instance the UK and France in nuclear capabilities, or countries such as Austria in mountaineer troops or Belgium and the Netherlands in maritime capabilities, will also require a common long-term strategy. However, as it can be seen in many concrete examples, such as the Russia-Ukraine crisis, the war in Syria, etc., the European member states are not capable of formulating a common strategy. Here, we can clearly conclude that domestic political incentives prevail even in crisis – thereby potentially underestimating the risk of not having a clear strategy.¹²⁶

"The extent to which P&S has been implemented in different areas depends very much on the political will of Member States. In addition internal and external pressures play a significant role in this. In the end, participating fully in P&S would mean for smaller Member States to give up some of their capabilities, being dependent in some areas on larger Member States and specialising on some capabilities that also smaller Member States can provide."

(Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU pooling and sharing)

Rated as ineffectively implemented also in the online survey, probably the most difficult area of P&S is **intelligence**, as it concerns the vital national security interests of a state.¹²⁷ From the perspective of scarce capacity, it may be worthwhile for counter-terrorism organizations in the member states to engage in networking and contacts with national and foreign law enforcement

¹²² See Factsheet "Financing of military operations: the ATHENA mechanism". Brussels, 10 January 2014, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/139880.pdf.

¹²³ Dieuwertje Kuijpers, "Reducing Political Risk in EU Pooling and Sharing". European Liberal Forum (2014), 10.

¹²⁴ Respondent to the IECEU online survey on EU pooling and sharing.

¹²⁵ Christian Mölling, "Pooling and Sharing in the EU and NATO. European Defence Needs Political Commitment rather than Technocratic Solutions". SWP Comments 2012/C 18, 2.

¹²⁶ Dieuwertje Kuijpers, "Reducing Political Risk in EU Pooling and Sharing". European Liberal Forum (2014), 10.

¹²⁷ IECEU Online Survey on EU Pooling and Sharing.



organizations, in order to share specific knowledge about terrorism and the way to investigate terrorist crimes. As argued by Den Boer and Wiegand, the states may be interested in pooling specific devices (tracking devices, scanners, etc.); at the same time it seems logical for national counter-terrorism agencies to pool knowledge, expertise and resources. On the other hand, considering the highly sensitive character of counter-terrorism activities and distrust in international relations, pertaining also to the EU internal matters, the incentive for pooling and sharing may be less than in other fields of crime and security (for example, in the fields like drug trafficking or trafficking in human beings). Though the national counter-terrorism systems (national criminal intelligence services, national information desks, national coordination units, etc.) show certain similarities, the cultures, working procedures and priorities of the counter-terrorism organizations in the EU member states still differ from one another.¹²⁸

There are some other difficulties particularly the new member states are facing. For Romanian armed forces, for example, P&S means **a new process of thinking (paradigm shift)** and developing its desired military capability packages. Romanian military has had plans in participating within a group of 13 nations (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the United States) to purchase five Global Hawk drones.¹²⁹ This certainly meant a new way of thinking in security and defence matters for a country – once member of a Warsaw Pact – which has just recently professionalized its armed forces and abolished the conscription service back in 2007.

3.5 CURRENT DEBATES AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN P&S

Common trainings and joint international exercises are the first possible form of emphasizing P&S in the future as also demonstrated by the survey.¹³⁰ This area does not tend to be that sensitive, as it does not touch upon the 'core principles of national security', but on the other hand it can stimulate positive atmosphere and friendly attitude among European armies. Although the position and the role of armed forces in a modern country is evident – and this is that the government (Ministry of Defence) is the institution guiding the defence and security policy of a state – such trainings and exercises can create a bottom-up request of the armed forces to their

¹²⁸ Monica Den Boer and Irina Wiegand, "From Convergence to Deep Integration: Evaluating the Impact of EU Counter-Terrorism Strategies on Domestic Arenas," *Intelligence and National Security*, Vol. 30, Issue 2-3, 2015, pp. 377-401.

¹²⁹ Michail Vasile-Ozunu, "The impact of the pooling and sharing policy on the Romanian military capabilities development process", *Journal of Defense Resources Management* 3 (1): 3-6

¹³⁰ IECEU Online Survey on EU Pooling and Sharing.



respective ministry for international cooperation. The final say, of course, shall rest in the hands of the elected government. As proposed by Constantinescu, the cooperation in the field of defence training as a part of P&S may take the form of educational institutions, exchange programmes, harmonization of training contents and curricula at all levels, beginning with basic training programmes to advanced military education, or any other agreed form in order to decrease duplication, save costs and increase interoperability.

Another potential area of P&S, although more difficult as it interferes to a larger extent in national security issues, is **the area of force structures, command structures and procedures**, aimed at increasing effectiveness and interoperability.¹³¹ In this regard, P&S may also require addressing the correlation and harmonization of the EU member states' military requirements, capabilities goals and capabilities development plans.¹³²

Constantinescu mentions **the areas of research and development and acquisitions** as another alternative for P&S, which "may provide substantial benefits in terms of economies of scale, elimination of duplication, freeing funds for the acquisition of more modern equipment, providing the EU countries with access to expensive military systems which would be out of reach for individual countries, due to tight defence budgets."¹³³ However, the facts on the joint research programmes are speaking for themselves: in 2013, only one-eighth of the research and technology money was used for common research programmes.¹³⁴

Interestingly, respondents in the online survey commented that, perhaps counter-intuitively, cost issues are a significant factor in the retardation of development of P&S. Specifically they mentioned that little savings were made when embracing P&S, that P&S involves unnecessary duplications, and that there are few penalties for not embracing P&S.

Recently, the debates on pooling and sharing for **providing medical support in operations and missions** have drawn attention. According to the online survey, this aspect of pooling and sharing has been already somewhat successfully implemented¹³⁵. In this regard, it should also be noted that outsourcing will most probably happen in this field, although there is a long list of things the EU Military Staff forbids to be outsourced. The reason for shedding the light on the

¹³¹ Maria Constantinescu, "Approaches to European Union military collaboration in the current economic austerity environment", *Journal of Defense Resources Management* 3 (1, 2012): 87-92.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Thomas Overhage, "Pool it, share it, or lose it: an economical view on pooling and sharing of European military capabilities", *Defense & Security Analysis* 4 (2013): 323-341.

¹³⁵ IECEU Online Survey on EU Pooling and Sharing.



possibility of P&S in providing medical support is that many military experts share the opinion that this footprint has been too big in the past, and this drains resources away from the operation itself.

The outgoing Chief of the EU Military Committee General de Rousiers recently admitted that the obstacle for a relatively slow progress in terms of P&S are not only Europe's industry and national military structures, but also the inherent logic of the national security and defence systems of the EU's nations:

".../because defence investments are made to defend a single country, and not a group of countries. That's an issue of sovereignty."¹³⁶

Respondents in the online survey concurred and suggested that internal and external political pressures in member states resist full participation in P&S. They suggested that small member states are reluctant to cede some of their operational capabilities in order to specialise in specific capabilities and thus become dependent in other capabilities on larger member states. Likewise larger member states are reluctant politically to cede certain operational capabilities to smaller member states.¹³⁷

However, the head of the EU Military Committee remains optimistic, referring to the preparation, which is already under way to engage in more substantial programmes, such as joint procurement of air tankers or remotely piloted aerial systems. At the same time he notes that the purchase and benefits of these projects are still years away. Encouraging sign of a more nuanced approach to P&S is also the close relationship between the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and Federica Mogherini, the EU's new high representative for foreign affairs and security policy, who shows much more interest in defence matters than her predecessor.¹³⁸

Mogherini's interest for P&S was expressed also at the European Council meeting as of 17th and 18th November 2014, in which the Council welcomed the progress achieved by Member States in P&S in the four key projects endorsed by the European Council in December 2013: Air-to-Air Refuelling, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems, Governmental Satellite Communications, and Cyber Defence.¹³⁹ As reported by Tigner, the draft concepts are "linked to the wider obligation of

¹³⁶ Brooks Tigner, "EU defence chief bemoans lack of pooling and sharing progress," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 51 (2014).

¹³⁷ IECEU Online Survey on EU Pooling and Sharing.

¹³⁸ Brooks Tigner, "EU defence chief bemoans lack of pooling and sharing progress," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 51 (2014).

¹³⁹ Council of the EU, Press Release: 3346th Council meeting - Foreign Affairs, 17-18th November 2014. Accessed on 27th August, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145816.pdf.



the ministries to step up their cross-border defence cooperation to eliminate duplication of effort and squeeze more efficiency from their military expenditures.” The new framework targets mutual alignment of their national defence research and development (R&D) planning cycles, which would eventually lead to a common definition of military requirements. As this process is not easy, some incentives were thought to be offered, such as exemption from VAT for EDA-managed multi-nation defence research projects. In this regard, the Belgian government granted provisional VAT exemption to the agency for three of its projects involving research or capability development.¹⁴⁰

At this meeting, some innovative P&S concepts were discussed. Consequently, a new policy framework for promoting systematic and long-term defence cooperation was adopted. In accordance with this framework, a new barter mechanism for exchanging services between them was envisaged. This would widen the possibilities for P&S activities by sharing or lending services between their militaries based on a credit or bartering system.¹⁴¹ The exchange mechanism could be applied to a whole range of things, for example medical services, logistics, land or maritime transport etc.

3.6 CONCLUSION

Having started with lots of good ideas and commitment and having been considered as a change of European mind-set, it is still obvious how difficult it is for EU member states to overcome traditional thinking in defence cooperation and to give up sovereignty for the sake of the EU becoming a real actor also in security and defence policy. There is a significant gap between the cooperation rhetoric of governments’ joint declarations within the EU and what they deliver. Another challenge that has to be taken into consideration is different strategic cultures of 28 member states, which hurdle not only the desire for P&S, but also has strategic and operation consequences, as they affect the way member states’ armed forces operate. Hence, the marginal results of P&S are not yet an adequate response to the size of problems European member states are facing in maintaining their capabilities, not to mention those already lost. The

¹⁴⁰ Brooks Tigner, "EU defence ministers discuss new pooling and sharing concepts," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 1 (2014), 19th November 2014.

¹⁴¹ In some ways, this is already implemented in practice already between militaries for "tanker refuelling, strategic transport services, and pilot training where one ministry commits to support or buy a certain number of hours of flying or training time, but can then trade them with others who may be short of hours or need extra ones for operations." See: Brooks Tigner, "EU defence ministers discuss new pooling and sharing concepts," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 1 (2014), 19th November 2014.



cooperation framework misses definitions for success and a permanent monitoring of opportunities and capabilities.¹⁴²

To date, P&S is being used to its highest potential within the maintenance and training component where similar strategic cultures and interests make it easier for countries to cooperate and a constant increase of initiatives, in the framework of the ESDC or on a bi- or multilateral basis, can be witnessed. Regarding procurement and R&D, the nonexistence of a common European approach to defence procurement and the provision of Article 346 TFEU are hindering real cooperation which

"Cooperation in all mentioned areas is possible however, a change of mind is necessary - trust in each other (military vs. civilian) has to be established and the idea, that all of us are working in the same direction albeit most of the time on different tasks which should complement each other."

(Respondent to IECEU Online Survey on EU pooling and sharing)

for Europeans also means impeding cooperation in a sector which heavily depends on innovation. In operational terms, sovereignty still prevails and member states are only willing to participate on an opt-in basis rather than being outvoted on a more supranational basis. This kind of cooperation faces serious challenges, as it is rather likely that the national defence contractors – challenged by greater competition – would do almost everything to prevent this form of P&S from happening, as they may be facing severe losses in their defence-related business, and therefore trying to “securitize” it and thus present the proposed cooperation as a national security threat. This is very much related to the question what genuine European interests are and how they need to be tackled in a coherent European manner.

On the other hand, the idealistic goal of P&S in the EU that each of the EU countries would focus on the development of those capabilities in which they have relative comparative advantages should be taken cautiously. As argued by Overhague, it is better that P&S is organized in a way that it has redundancies, for example, that role-shared capabilities are made available by at least two or three nations. In such way, a member state that does not want to participate in a particular

¹⁴² Christian Mölling, "State of play of the implementation of EDA's pooling and sharing initiatives and its impact on the European defence industry" (2015).



common activity would not be able to paralyze the whole system or would not be able to use its capabilities as a trump card for outwitting other member states, or the EU in general.¹⁴³

The decisions of the June 2015 European Council to elaborate a new European Global Strategy could be a tool to respond to the need to formulate common basic criteria for national strategies in order to converge national defence planning which would also allow for a more coherent European approach in crisis management and conflict prevention. This is the only way to really move P&S on a European scale forward. A way forward in this regard is also the adoption of the policy framework document for P&S: when such a document is agreed upon, it will become an obligation, which means it will lead to concrete P&S projects.

This resonates with the online research survey which suggests that progress could be better if there were:

- A political imperative with increased transparency and information sharing
- Incorporation of pooling and sharing into national defence plans
- Integration of EU capability development plans into national defence planning with a focus on key capabilities
- Further cooperation in defence support activities including logistics and training
- A long term strategic roadmap for defence cooperation
- Further exploitation of Lisbon provisions on Permanent Structured Cooperation
- Innovative Financial Incentives for P&S projects that have dual-use technology¹⁴⁴

In terms of concrete implementation of these points, key policy analysts such as the EUISS (2014) urge greater involvement of EU agencies such as EUROPOL and FRONTEX in CSDP missions and EU external relations would continue to create joint synergies. Last, but not least, the thinking regarding P&S should not stay limited to the understanding of it as the process exclusively driven by EDA. Countries will cooperate in defence and security related issues, with or without EDA, should the needs arise. One of the most recent and ambitious examples of this argument is a long-term plan of defence cooperation among the countries of northern Europe, which is driven by a common understanding of the security threats. As a consequence¹⁴⁴ of the Ukrainian-Russian crisis, Sweden, Finland, and two non-EDA members Norway and Denmark

¹⁴³ Thomas Overhage, "Pool it, share it, or lose it: an economical view on pooling and sharing of European military capabilities", *Defense & Security Analysis* 4 (2013): 337.

¹⁴⁴ IECEU Online Survey on EU Pooling and Sharing.



developed a strategic plan to build more joint capabilities and share land, air and naval capacities to offer a credible and collective deterrence against regional threats.¹⁴⁵

4. CONCLUSIONS

Conflict prevention is considered a key objective of the EU's external relations and foreign policy, and according to the Lisbon Treaty that defines the objectives of the EU external actions, the EU prides itself as "a successful example of conflict prevention, based on democratic values and respect for human rights, justice and solidarity, economic prosperity and sustainable development". As an integral part of the external relations of the EU, conflict prevention has also been part of EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (since 2009 the Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP) since its naissance.

The current relevant conflict prevention activities of the EU can be divided as belonging to long-term (structural) and short-term (operational) conflict prevention instruments. Structural conflict prevention instruments and activities, which effectively will remain outside the scope of IECEU project, include measures such as trade, arms control, economic cooperation, development cooperation and humanitarian aid by the EU towards and with third countries, and wider political processes such as the EU accession process, European Neighbour Policy or Programmes and other initiatives for regional cooperation. Through these measures the EU can contribute to wider peacebuilding by addressing the root causes of a conflict. Optimally these activities or tools would be engaged before the outbreak of a conflict or crisis, but should also be utilised in preventing the (re)lapse of a country recovering from a crisis back into conflict.

The development of the EU's external actions towards conflict prevention is based on the European Union Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts from 2001. Of the current preventive activities of the EU, mediation is a key component of the EU's conflict prevention activities, conducted in multiple areas and regions in the world. EU actors that are engaged in mediation activities are the EEAS, the EU High Representative, the EU Special Representatives, EU Delegations as well as CSDP missions. The EU Delegations are also profoundly engaged in implementing preventive activities under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace which

¹⁴⁵ Gerard O'Dwyer, "Nordic, Baltic states to share capabilities," *Defense News*, 11th May 2015. Accessed on 22th August 2015, <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/industry/2015/05/10/nordic-defense-to-reinforce-strong-collective-military-dimension/70951164/>.



is the main external instrument of the EU to prevent or respond to emerging crises; including both immediate short-term activities and longer term capacity building efforts. A challenge that yet remains, given the different mechanisms and instruments for preventive activities, is that it is sometimes difficult for the EU to "speak with one voice" or ensure coherence of its different activities both of short- and long-term nature.

Within the context of this project, the primary focus is on the operational, short-term conflict prevention consisting of activities such as political dialogue, diplomatic measures, issuing demarches or declarations calling for a peaceful resolution of conflict, sending diplomatic envoys to a crisis area, mediation in peace talks, mechanisms of early-warning, fact-finding missions, observer or monitoring missions and deployment of armed forces. It is in this context that the CSDP missions come into play as part of the EU's overall approach to preventing violent conflicts.

In regard to CSDP activities, both on civilian and military domain, one of the observations is that it seems easier for the EU (or, rather, its member states) to reach consensus on longer term conflict prevention activities such as development cooperation than to agree on taking tougher short-term action; such as (military) CSDP engagement. In addition to this more political consideration of utilising CSDP as part of the EU's conflict prevention activities - whether to respond to a conflict or crisis with CSDP means to prevent their escalation - naturally there are some preconditions for the successful implementation of CSDP missions and operations. Requirements such as proper planning of CSDP interventions, clear and realistic mandates for the missions, timely deployment and cooperation with other actors involved in conflict prevention have been observed as enhancing the effectiveness of CSDP, thus contributing to successful conflict prevention. Related to increasing the efficiency of the EU, and making available capabilities for the EU to deploy to crisis management and conflict prevention, widening the concept of pooling and sharing in the context of both civilian and military CSDP, can offer potential for improving the effectiveness of CSDP activities. Pooling and sharing has first and foremost been linked to (national) defence cooperation, and as regards CSDP so far, mostly the military aspects of CSDP. In regard to pooling and sharing in the area of defence cooperation, there has been, however, rather limited progress in particular in areas that are considered as carrying high political risks; intelligence being one of the most controversial issues.

As part of developing the concept, and application, of pooling and sharing, there are (at least) a few areas that are identified as potential as well as useful for combining civilian and military



capability development: communications, information, transport, protection and logistics.¹⁴⁶ The applicability of pooling and sharing in regard to civilian conflict prevention in the context of CSDP has been thus limited; however, there exist few potential areas for "adopting" the principle of pooling and sharing on the civilian side. Examples of such areas where certain initiatives already exist, or could be further developed, include common or joint training and exercises, communication systems, procurement and deployment of logistics or transport capabilities and dual-use capabilities. Initiatives such as the Goalkeeper / Schoolmaster process, in regard to recruitment and training of civilian personnel for CSDP missions, CSDP Warehouse and Shared Service Centre/Mission Support Platform could be good practices of pooling and sharing common capabilities that deserve further research when assessing the current CSDP missions and operations within the context of the IECEU project.

¹⁴⁶ Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, "Pooling & Sharing: From Slow March to Quick March?" Egmont Security Policy Brief, No. 23 (2011).



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ANNEXES

ANNEX 1. ONLINE SURVEY ON EU CONFLICT PREVENTION INSTRUMENTS

1. To what extent do the current EU conflict prevention activities contribute to "preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security"?

No contribution	Minimal contribution	Partial contribution	Sufficient contribution	Significant contribution
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2. How do you rate the importance of EU conflict prevention instruments?

	Not important	Less important	Important	Very important	No Opinion
Early warning and conflict assessment					
Diplomatic measures and mediation					
Long-term development assistance					
Economic cooperation					
Crisis management (CSDP)					

3. Please share your views on conflict prevention instruments of the EU:

4. What are the main obstacles to the functioning of EU conflict prevention mechanisms, and how to overcome those?

5. How do you see the current role of EU CSDP civilian crisis management missions in conflict prevention?



No role at all	Minimal role	Partial role	Sufficient role	Significant role
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6. How do you see the current role of EU CSDP military crisis management operations in conflict prevention?

No role at all	Minimal role	Partial role	Sufficient role	Significant role
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7. How can the EU CSDP missions and operations better contribute to conflict prevention?

8. What kind of future conflict scenarios do you foresee that EU conflict prevention and crisis management missions will be faced with?

9. For statistical purposes, please indicate your professional affiliation:

This question is optional.

EU institutions	Member State (national governmental representative)	Academia / think-tank	Other
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ANNEX 2. ONLINE SURVEY ON EU POOLING AND SHARING

1. To what extent has EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been implemented in practice?

Insufficiently Implemented	Somewhat Insufficiently	Implemented Somewhat	Sufficiently Implemented	No Opinion
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2. Please share your thoughts on what has been done and/or what could have been done more:

3. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful?

	Unsuccessfully implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully implemented	Somewhat successfully implemented	Successfully implemented	No Opinion
Training of personnel (e. g. pilots)					
Exercises					
Logistics					
Intelligence					
Strategic transport capability					
Air to air refueling					
Medical support					
Surveillance and reconnaissance					
Maritime surveillance					
Naval logistics					
Military communication satellites					



Other (please elaborate below)					
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4. Please share your thoughts on why EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing has been implemented more successfully in some areas than others?

5. Do you think that EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing could have a role in developing civilian-military synergies?

Yes	No	No Opinion
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6. Please elaborate your answer:

7. In what areas could the idea of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing be further developed in the context of civilian crisis management / conflict prevention?

	No	Partially	Yes	No Opinion
Early Warning Systems				
Communication Systems				
Information Sharing (common operational picture, analysis)				
Training				
Transport / Logistics				
Onsite Security (Mission)				
Personnel (such as the CRTs, provision of specialized				



expertise)				
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8. Please elaborate your views about utilising Pooling and Sharing in the context of civilian crisis management /conflict prevention:

9. For statistical purposes, please indicate your professional affiliation:

This question is optional.

EU institutions	Member State (national governmental representative)	Academia / think-tank	Other
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ANNEX 3. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS OF THE ONLINE SURVEY ON EU CONFLICT PREVENTION INSTRUMENTS - Fixed Response Segments

1. To what extent do the current EU conflict prevention activities contribute to "preserving peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security"? [EU conflict prevention activities contribution]

No Contribution	Minimal Contribution	Partial contribution	Sufficient Contribution	Significant Contribution
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2. How do you rate the importance of EU conflict prevention instruments? [Early warning and conflict assessment]

Not Important	Less Important	Important	Very Important	No Opinion
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3. How do you rate the importance of EU conflict prevention instruments? [Diplomatic measures and mediation]

Not Important	Less Important	Important	Very Important	No Opinion
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4. How do you rate the importance of EU conflict prevention instruments? [Long term development assistance]

Not Important	Less Important	Important	Very Important	No Opinion
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5. How do you rate the importance of EU conflict prevention instruments? [Economic cooperation]

Not Important	Less Important	Important	Very Important	No Opinion
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6. How do you rate the importance of EU conflict prevention instruments? [Crisis management (CSDP)]

Not Important	Less Important	Important	Very Important	No Opinion
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7. How do you see the current role of EU CSDP civilian crisis management missions in conflict prevention? [Role of EU CSDP Civilian Crisis Management]

No role at all	Minimal Role	Partial Role	Sufficient Role	Significant Role
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8. How do you see the current role of EU CSDP military crisis management operations in conflict prevention? [Role of EU CSDP Military Crisis Management]

No role at all	Minimal Role	Partial Role	Sufficient Role	Significant Role
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ANNEX 4. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS OF THE ONLINE SURVEY ON EU POOLING AND SHARING - Fixed Response Segments

1. To what extent has EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been implemented in practice? [Practical Implementation of EU Pooling & Sharing]

Insufficiently Implemented	Somewhat Insufficiently Implemented	Somewhat Sufficiently Implemented	Sufficiently Implemented	No Opinion
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2. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful? [Training of personnel (e. g. pilots)]

Unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat successfully Implemented	Successfully Implemented	No Opinion
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3. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful? [Exercises]

Unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat successfully Implemented	Successfully Implemented	No Opinion
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4. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful? [Logistics]

Unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat successfully Implemented	Successfully Implemented	No Opinion
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5. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful? [Intelligence]

Unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat successfully Implemented	Successfully Implemented	No Opinion
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6. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful? [Strategic transport capability]



Unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat successfully Implemented	Successfully Implemented	No Opinion
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7. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful? [Air-to-air refuelling]

Unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat successfully Implemented	Successfully Implemented	No Opinion
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8. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful? [Medical support]

Unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat successfully Implemented	Successfully Implemented	No Opinion
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9. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful? [Surveillance and reconnaissance]

Unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat successfully Implemented	Successfully Implemented	No Opinion
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10. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful? [Maritime surveillance]

Unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat successfully Implemented	Successfully Implemented	No Opinion
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11. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful? [Naval logistics]

Unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat successfully Implemented	Successfully Implemented	No Opinion
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12. In what areas has the implementation of EU CSDP Pooling & Sharing been successful or unsuccessful? [Military communication satellites]

Unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat unsuccessfully Implemented	Somewhat successfully Implemented	Successfully Implemented	No Opinion
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