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Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

1.5 Conceptual Framework

Lead beneficiary: SaferGlobe

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Contents

8.4   Example contextual questions: Field-Operational 100

8.5   Example case study: Planning and Strategic Level Analysis 102

8.6   Supplementary fieldwork oriented questions 103

8.7   Guide To Act –IECEU related case studies 105

    8.7.1.   Processes to minimize the risks 105

    8.7.2.   Ensure fair benefit-sharing with NON-EU countries/ICPCs 107

    8.7.3.   Participation to research 108

    8.7.4.   Informed consent procedures 109

    8.7.5.   Requirements for every IECEU partner in terms of research conducting 109

List of figures

List of tables

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Comparative study of conflict prevention and crisis management missions and operations on any extensive scale is very rare; especially, where lessons are sought to enhance an understanding of how their effectiveness can be improved. Task 1.5, which culminates in this deliverable, harnesses centuries of combined experience, both theoretical and practical, in crisis management to collaboratively create the conceptual framework of the IECEU-project. This framework will guide the case studies of EU missions and operations in the IECEU but can also act as a guide for other similar studies.

The first part of the deliverable discusses the process of collaborative creation of the conceptual framework. The second part of the deliverable presents the conceptual framework itself. The framework operates on two different analytical levels: *field-operational and politico-strategic.* These two were chosen from several possibilities (e.g. individual, state, region, global; or strategic, operational, tactical) to highlight the key levels that operations and missions function on. Of the two, the field-operational level of analysis is emphasised as the case studies in IECEU are focused on CSDP missions and operations.

The main themes of the IECEU are six capabilities, chosen collaboratively, which are: *planning capacity (pc); operational capacity (oc); interoperability (i); competences (c); comprehensiveness (ch); and technologies (tc).* Each of these focuses can be analysed from *an EU perspective and a non-EU perspective.* These capabilities further strengthen comparability through emphasising themes that are countered by all missions and operations. Each of the capabilities can be considered from *an EU or a non-EU perspective.* The non-EU perspective is comprised of e.g. the local population and the international community; the EU perspective of e.g. EU officials and personnel. The two perspectives overlap and thus provide a good overview of different opinions and viewpoints.

Together the six capabilities and two perspectives constitute the conceptual framework that has 12 modules. As there are two levels of analysis, the total number of modules rises to 24. Each module in the conceptual framework includes examples of research questions to be taken into consideration in the case study implementation. This conceptual framework is simultaneously flexible and rigid. Usefulness in a different context is achieved through flexibility in research question design, where research themes are set, but the researchers have considerable leeway in how research is carried out and what is emphasised in the study. Comparability is ensured through establishing not just research themes but also by the clear, modular and coded framework.

Cross-cutting themes incorporated into the analysis are gender and human rights, which are key cross-cutting themes the EU promotes in both its conflict prevention and crisis management. Potential interviewees and interview questions are listed in a separate segment

The conceptual framework is designed to go beyond existing barriers and limitations to also find positive potentials, which may not only be learnt from but also used and potentially duplicated in other missions and operations. Thus it strengthens, for its part, the supportive and cooperative function of the IECEU-project.

1   INTRODUCTION

Conflict dynamics are woven into social structures, are multi-dimensional by nature and extend to most core processes of human life. Their study can be similarly multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary. Crisis management and conflict prevention processes also have a wide-ranging impact on the contexts they operate in meaning that their analysis can have multiple starting-points, focuses and emphasis.

The purpose of the IECEU-project is clearly outlined in its Grant Agreement as are the working packages and steps to be taken in the project itself. This report presents the conceptual framework of the IECEU, which will guide the case study implementation especially in terms of information sought in the project. The conceptual framework can be seen to be a foundational methodology for the IECEU-project in its entirety although not a specific methodology for any part of the project. It answers several key questions of *how* the purpose of the IECEU-project can be accomplished through identification of key themes or focuses for the rest of the deliverable (capabilities), key persons to interview, establishing both research and interview questions, cross-cutting themes and ethical guidelines. Moreover, collaborative creation of the conceptual framework has strengthened the consortium as a whole, as well as created stronger cooperation and more understanding of shared goals in the project.

In addition to the Grant Agreement, this conceptual framework is guided by the title of the project "Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention", which already sets up the main research question: "How can the effectiveness of capabilities be improved in EU conflict prevention?" and the underlying assumption of the project that the effectiveness of capabilities in EU

The purpose of the IECEU-project

The IECEU–project analyses and assesses best practices and lessons learned with a view to enhance the civilian conflict prevention and peace building capabilities of EU with a catalogue of practices, new solutions and approaches. It will seek to find out how to increase the interoperability of resources in the crisis management and peace building and what the potential for pooling and sharing of EU capabilities and technologies is. The main goals of the IECEU -project are:1) Analysing and assessing the current situation of on-going and past missions and operations 2) Learning from lessons provided by these missions and assessing the different options 3) Providing new solutions, approaches and recommendations for EU to guarantee long-term stability

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conflict prevention can be improved. The title also focuses the project specifically on the capabilities in EU conflict prevention.

To reiterate: Although the contextual analysis is necessary, the IECEU-project is not a generalised study on conflict processes or dynamics; or conflict prevention and crisis management in the European Union. The conceptual framework is framed so that it can provide answers to the central research question by finding how conflict prevention

Valid and comparable data from the case studies is to be collected using a modular conceptual framework that modified to suit individual case studies.

capabilities can be improved. The main challenge addressed in the conceptual framework is the collection of valid and comparable data from the ten case studies that vary greatly.

The conceptual framework presents a modular approach by which the case studies can find valid and comparable data. Modularity allows for the conceptual framework to be customised for each case study while at the same time retaining comparability. As the case studies differ greatly, modularity enables data gathering in any circumstance. Moreover, it ensures that the framework is simultaneously rigid and flexible through setting the research themes (rigid) but allowing considerable leeway for the case studies. Rigidity ensures comparability while flexibility guarantees validity (i.e. that the project is truly centred on the focuses in its design).

The Conceptual Framework needs to be rigid enough to ensure comparability and flexible enough to ensure applicability in different operations, missions and contexts.

There are, however, clear limitations to the reach of the conceptual framework– most specifically in how the conceptual framework is to be implemented in the case studies. Similarly, although the broad focuses are highlighted, the exact focuses of the case studies will be determined by the case study implementation in the field. These limitations in the scope of the conceptual framework are necessary to ensure that central findings are not precluded by the study design.

This deliverable is the culmination of decades if not centuries of combined expertise in conflict prevention and crisis management. The apparent simplicity was only possible through extended

debate, thought and consolidation of knowledge on EU conflict prevention and crisis management. All partners in the consortium have participated in the creation of the deliverable.

EU conflict prevention and crisis management seek to change the conflict´s original trajectory, which can be achieved in several ways. The impact of the intervention is seen in the change of the original trajectory of the conflict. The positive impact, as demonstrated in table 1., means that conflict-proneness and conflict intensity with intervention have decreased more, increased less or stayed the same (when without intervention they would have increased). The key here is *change* vis-à-vis the situation without the intervention. Change in expected outcomes is inherently difficult to measure and even more so in complex conflict situations. The timescale of effect (when is the effect measured?) can result in the identification of different outcomes. Moreover, these outcomes may change as time passes.

Table 1: Potential impact of intervention on conflict-proneness and conflict intensity

Potential impact of intervention on conflict-proneness and conflict intensity				
Outcome	**Intervention?**	**Effect on conflict-proneness and conflict intensity**		
Positive	**Yes**	Decrease more	No effect	Increase less
	No	Decrease less/ No Effect	Increase	Increase more
Negative	**Yes**	Decrease less/ No effect	No effect	Increase more
	No	Decrease more	Decrease	Increase less/ No effect

CSDP operations and missions have many lessons teach us, both negative and positive. The negative lessons of EU interventions are, on the whole, well-identified, and well-known, especially those challenges stemming from institutional structures and practices. In contrast, the positive lessons are less emphasised and known. Similarly, macro-level challenges stemming from institutional structures and practices are quite well-known but micro-level positive lessons, especially ones related to practice, not so. The identification and potential duplication of practical potentials could lead to improved effectiveness in conflict prevention and crisis management.

In the conceptual framework, the key themes, or focuses, to be examined have been identified as six capabilities. Other, potential, research themes are introduced in additional questions but whether these research themes are to be used or not, depends on the case study and its implementation. The conceptual framework has two levels of analysis: field-operational and politico-strategic. The emphasis here is on the first, as the case study implementation is mission and operation specific. Coding of the modules in the conceptual framework creates a specific and unified method of delivery for comparability. Cross-cutting themes incorporated into the framework are human rights and gender. Actors to be interviewed have been identified in a consortium survey. Central interview questions can be found in their own list; additional interview questions can be found in the appendix.

An often-found weakness in studies and reports on EU crisis management is that the focus is solely on the EU perspective while external points of view are neglected. The operations and missions, however, work in areas with potentially hundreds of other international actors, most notably the UN and NATO. These actors can have external insight into the working methods of the EU. Similarly, the local population may have clear insight into how and where the EU has been successful, which may differ from the successes identified by the EU itself. These non-EU viewpoints are integrated into the IECEU as a second perspective.

1.1 Research Design in IECEU

Comparative study of crisis management missions and operations is a rarity. To many it seems like comparing apples and oranges– and the differences certainly are great. Without comparative study, however, it is not possible to find where the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention capabilities could be improved. Usually, conclusions drawn in studies on the topic are operation or mission specific and lack wider applicability. Already in the creation of the DoA, it was understood that emphasising one viewpoint in the conceptual framework would be detrimental to the project through alienating some

consortium partners and wasting expertise, knowledge and understanding gathered. The collaboration of all consortium partners in the creation of the conceptual framework was considered vital to the success of the project, and the collaborative method was set in the DoA.

In preparing for the collaborative creation of the conceptual framework, researchers from SaferGlobe brainstormed ideas and sketched conceptual approaches to be worked on (rejected, accepted, further developed, modified and so on) in the workshop. The pivotal questions at this stage were: How can the European Union crisis management operations be studied comparatively? What kind of conceptual framework will enable comparability – while at the same time leave enough room for the individual features of each case study to be reflected upon? What do we want to know about the crisis management operations? Who are the primary stakeholders of the project, that is, for whom is the information produced? What information will be important and useful to each consortium partner in their work? What are the ethical concerns the research project needs to address and should they be incorporated into the conceptual framework? What practical limitations for carrying out the case studies may emerge later in the project? How can these practical limitations be taken into consideration?

Modularity allows the conceptual framework to be implemented in a variety of contexts and situations.

Table 2: Challenges for Study Design in IECEU

Challenges for Study Design in IECEU	
Limited access to information	▪ Documentation may be confidential or secret. The potentially poor and changing security situation of some missions may hamper engagement with mission/operation personnel or the operation/mission as a whole.
Variance between case studies and context	▪ The case studies are very different providing a broad view of EU conflict preventative and crisis management activities. ▪ EULEX Kosovo (WP2) ▪ ALTHEA Bosnia and Herzegovina (WP2) ▪ EUSEC and EUPOL in Democratic Republic of Congo (WP3) ▪ EUAVSEC South Sudan (WP3) ▪ European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) (WP4) ▪ EUFOR Chad/RCA (WP3) ▪ EUBAM Libya (WP3) ▪ European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah) (WP4) ▪ European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) (WP4)
Variance between researchers and institutions	▪ Different researchers working from very diverse backgrounds, with different viewpoints and in different contexts.

The main challenges for the study design in the IECEU are limited access to information, the variance between case studies, and variance between those implementing the case studies. The innovative approach developed to overcome these challenges is a modular conceptual framework. The modularity enables participants to implement case studies in a variety of contexts and situations and ensures

some level of comparability even where the implementation is limited by e.g. a difficult security situation.

Annex 2 of the Grant Agreement explains the case study selection: "The conceptual framework will be used in three selected, case study areas, where Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) activities are represented: Balkans, Africa, Middle East and Asia. This comprehensive selection of different missions, will provide data on different mandates, cultural aspects and expertise of the CSDP, and provide comparable data for more detailed assessment of both the missions and the effectiveness of EU to achieve its goals in conflict."

The project partners should use the conceptual framework and the effectiveness criteria developed in D1.4 to assess the impact of the operation. This impact assessment is temporarily bound to the duration of the IECEU-project and as such the long-term assessment of the impact of the operation is limited.

1.2 Key concepts

Several key concepts have a specific meaning within the conceptual framework. Understanding these terms is necessary for the case study implementation as well as for the work carried out in later work packages. The most central concepts are listed below with their meaning. Whenever possible these concepts should be used to convey the indicated meaning. Similar or even the same terms can and are used to convey different meanings in different contexts. For example, "capability grades" are often called "capability levels", which can be easily confused with the "levels of analysis". Here we have chosen to use "capability grades" for overall clarity levels. Capabilities are often clearly identified in military operations (and may include other capabilities too), but less so for civilian missions. In the framework, the emphasis is on capabilities that are shared between civilian missions and military operations.

Table 3: Key concepts used in the Conceptual Framework

TERM/ CONCEPT	MEANING
Level of Analysis	A methodological tool for the organisation of a study by designating an integrated set (a whole). Including units of similar scale and their relationships with one another. Different analytical levels are separate but may be interlinked.
	In the IECEU conceptual framework: i) politico-strategic and ii) field-operational
Perspective	A point of view from which the focus is examined or a position of the interviewee.
	In the IECEU conceptual framework: i) EU (EU policy maker, civilian or military personnel) or ii) non-EU (local or international community).
Focus ("key theme" in DoA)	The issue under scrutiny (what is being studied?).
	In the IECEU conceptual framework: six capabilities: 1) planning capacity; 2) organisational capacities; 3) interoperability; 4) competences (knowledge and skills); 5) comprehensiveness; 6) technologies.
Capability	The capacity to deploy a combination of resources through collective organisational routines to achieve goals.
Capability grade	Capabilities have three grades: static, dynamic and creative. See discussion in 3.1 for more detail.
Effectiveness	From D1.4: "when a mission/ operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner both from the perspective of the EU and the conflict(s) it seeks to prevent."
Conceptual Framework	A framework that establishes a guide for the creation of methodology in individual case studies.

Module	A unit within the conceptual framework.
Methodology	The way in which case study implementation is carried out.
Research questions	Questions that are used to frame the study.
Interview questions	Questions that are asked directly from an interviewee.

1.3 Structure of the deliverable

Ch. 2 introduces the collaborative approach used in the creation of the conceptual framework as well as the results of the collaborative approach, i.e., the building blocks of the conceptual framework (levels of analysis, perspectives, focuses and so on).

Ch. 3 first defines capabilities in EU conflict prevention and crisis management, and the three grades that all capabilities have for capability identification in different contexts. Second, it introduces the conceptual framework and guides in its implementation.

Ch. 4 sketches a process of research that can be used in the case study implementation. It also lists all main research themes in the IECEU-project, including contextualization, effectiveness, pooling and sharing, training-related questions, cross-cutting themes, triangulation, and lessons learned.

Ch 5 provides the ethical guidelines for conducting research for use in the case studies, and throughout the IECEU-project.

Ch.6 gives a summary of the main points in this deliverable for case study implementation.

2   COLLABORATIVE CREATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The IECEU is unique in its ability to draw on a wide array of expertise existing within the consortium. Differing backgrounds, institutional settings and fields of study enable vivid and manifold discussion, as well as provide a broad perspective of conflict prevention and crisis management. However, as anyone who has attended seminars on crisis management can attest, heterogeneity can also complicate joint decision-making if finding common ground is difficult.

To encourage ownership within the consortium over the way that the IECEU is carried out, as well as to harness the expertise of the consortium, the conceptual framework was created collaboratively. As a mechanism of working, collaborative creation has both strengths and weaknesses. The main strength is the incorporation of expertise, flexibility and "give-and-take". However, the mechanism is also time- and coordination intense, especially as decision-making emphasises communication, consensus and "give-and-take".

Similarly, the IECEU conceptual framework has both strengths and challenges. Strengths of the created conceptual framework are related to its broad perspective. It examines conflict prevention and crisis management from the level of political decision-making all the way to the operational level of crisis management, includes aspects both internal and external to the EU, takes into consideration multiple perspectives, provides clear focuses/ and ready-made groupings of questions to be used in the case studies. It is both rigid enough to enable comparisons and loose enough for particularities of each case study to be taken into account. It can be applied to different contexts and triangulation of the sources of truth claims diminishes bias in research and gives room for multiple voices to state their views.

Challenges of the framework are related to its lack of a set, theoretical, foundation and the potential complexity of combining different perspectives and analysis. Different ways of conceptualising crisis management operations and missions, especially as systems or processes (see Appendix 8.1.1), were considered, but also quite quickly discarded as being too restrictive on the final outcomes. Theoretical approaches have, however, greatly influenced and enhanced the final outcome. This early theoretical discussion on framing crisis management operations guided much of the thinking later on, and can quite clearly be seen in, for example, an emphasis on change and relationships between actors. Moreover, the theoretical discussion challenged the consortium partners to stretch individual viewpoints, which in turn helped create later consensus.

Using several research perspectives requires more time and effort from the individual researcher conducting a case study but also from those making the final comparison between the case studies. However, it makes it possible to find contradicting policies, gaps in information sharing, contradicting sub-goals, and differences of opinion between the EU actors and the local population, or other frictions. When detected, these constraints can be tackled. Focuses as capabilities can seem like a restriction to an individual researcher, but they improve the ability to make comparisons. They may also rule out other important focuses. Yet the framework is loose enough so that the individual researchers can incorporate their contribution distinct from the initial framework into it and the disregarded focuses become raw material for further studies. Limited access to information and interviewees in conduction the case studies cannot be denied, but the modularity of the framework ensures that comparability remains.

Table 4: Strengths of the collaborative approach in IECEU

Strengths of the collaborative approach in IECEU	
Draws on a multiplicity of expertise (practical and theoretical)	Collaborative, inclusive, expertise from the partners used extensively
Internal review process within the Consortium	All partners have ownership of the conceptual framework. A rigorous review process of multiple steps.
Connects decision-making with operational activity	A more holistic and balanced view of EUs activities.
Includes aspects both internal and external to the EU	EU operates with other actors and in a specific context; focusing only on the EU limits contextual analysis and provide merely a partial picture of the potential for capability improvement
Plurality of perspectives	Plurality of perspectives reflects the complexity of conflict prevention and crisis management as well as the nature of the contexts in question and allows for wider analysis.
Clear prioritisation of focuses	Creates key focal points to emphasise in the study.
Provides a set of questions to choose from to the researcher	Establishes a foundation for the case studies.
Enables application at multiple levels, in manifold contexts and at different stages of conflict / crisis management.	Jointly created conceptual framework is transferable.
Enables comparability	The framework is sufficiently focused to make comparisons between cases.
Enables particularity	The framework is loose enough so that particularities of each case can be reflected upon.

Triangulation	Inquiring multiple sources of truth claim and crosschecking diminishes bias in research and ensures validity.

Table 5: Challenges of the collaborative approach in IECEU

Challenges of the collaborative approach in IECEU	
Challenge	How the challenge is overcome
Decision-making on majority basis may exclude individual insight.	Collaborative, expertise from the partners used extensively Transparent internal communication that offers a mean to present and discuss alternative approaches e.g. through the portal restricted to the consortium partners (eDuuni).
Only EU perspective in the consortium	More balanced view of EUs activities through incorporating non-EU perspectives.
Constraints caused by time, distance and resources.	Some constraints can be overcome by use of ICT and clear planning. Other constraints are adapted to.
Plurality of perspectives increases complexity	Plurality of perspectives reflects the complex nature of the contexts in question and allows for wider analysis. Explanatory strength is achieved by simplifying scrutinized complex phenomena. The aim is not to be descriptive to a detail, but to find explaining causalities and patterns.
Clear prioritisation of focuses	Creates key focal points to emphasise in the study.
Provides a set of questions to choose from to the researcher, which may be restricting	Establishes a foundation for the case studies.

Creators of the conceptual framework potentially different people than those carrying out the case studies	The implementation requires input from work package leaders.

For large-scale studies on conflict prevention and crisis management, the strengths of the collaborative method far outweigh the challenges. Indeed, it seems difficult to conceive how joint understanding can be created without collaboration. The main benefit of the collaborative approach will be visible in the "lessons learnt", where lessons distilled from multiple perspectives at the same time can be identified for both operations and missions.

2.1 Collaborative creation of the Conceptual Framework

Collaborative creation of conceptual frameworks is rare in projects. It is a unique working method adopted by the IECEU to maximise positive impact of the project. Typically, the core themes and methods are set very early on in the project process with little input from those who will be implementing the project. Similarly, in the IECEU the Description of Action (DoA) describes the exact actions to be taken in the project. Uniquely, however, the DoA is supplemented by the Conceptual Framework, which guides the case study implementation further.

As the mechanism of working is unique in its own right, this segment begins with a description of the working method. It then describes the building blocks of the conceptual framework that were decided collaboratively.

Figure 1: The process of the creation of a collaborative conceptual framework

The consortium organised a two-day conceptual workshop at FINCENT in Santahamina on the 26th and 27th of July to harness the vast knowledge and experience on crisis management existing within the consortium to serve the development of the conceptual framework. Present were theorists and practitioners (both civilian and military). The goal was to drill into the practices of European Union crisis management and develop a conceptual framework that would enable their comparative study.

The preparatory work for the workshop was done in two separate groups in order to enable crosscheck. Additionally, consortium partners were actively engaged in sharing their expertise to determine outcomes for issues that arose in the planning process as well as to highlight any potential concerns they had.

To ensure that all consortium partners were able to voice preferences, potentials and concerns, the "IECEU Workshop Participant Survey" was carried out online before the workshop, at the beginning of July 2015. The survey was designed to find answers for several essential questions for the design of

The IECEU has two perspectives: EU and non-EU.

the conceptual workshop as well as the whole IECEU-project. The survey questions were consolidated from questions supplied by consortium partners. Altogether, there were 17 questions under four different categories. The categories included (1) Respondent information, (2) Effectiveness and pooling & sharing of capabilities, (3) Identifying end users, and (4) Case study methodology. The survey was specifically useful in focusing the workshop. The interviewees were also determined by the survey. It also gave an indication as to what levels of analysis ought to be included.

The workshop included a short introduction by SaferGlobe but was mainly focused on group work. In the first session, four originally presented analytical levels (EU policy-making, EU mission [strategic], EU mission [tactical] and EU mission [operational]) were simplified into a two-level model: (1) field-operational level and 2) politico-strategic level. These two were considered to give a broad

The IECEU has two levels of analysis: field-operational and politico-strategic.

overview of missions and operations. This simplification is a departure from other models typically in use and was only possible through the participation of different consortium partners and their agreement. Similar findings were already made in the pre-workshop survey.

The second session simplified originally formulated perspectives, which included policy-maker, civilian operation, military mission, research, international community and local, to two: EU and non-EU. Both the EU and the non-EU combine a number of perspectives and thus differ from one-sided opinions. Perspectives in the conceptual framework should not be mistaken for opinions, where the EU becomes "pro-EU" and the non-EU becomes "anti-EU". Instead, both perspectives are heterogeneous and hold a number of opinions. The pre-workshop survey had already highlighted the importance given to the inclusion of non-EU perspectives by the consortium partner, and this stance was strengthened at the workshop.

Finally, the workshop decided on what would be the focuses of the framework. These are the six capabilities in IECEU: (1) Planning Capacity; (2) Organisational Capacities; (3) Interoperability; (4) Competences (knowledge and skills); (5) Comprehensiveness and (6) Technologies.

The six capabilities in the IECEU: (1) Planning Capacity; (2) Organisational Capacities; (3) Interoperability; (4) Competences (knowledge and skills); (5) Comprehensiveness and (6) Technologies.

The end-users of the IECEU-project are already identified in the grant agreement. However, the survey highlighted two specific end-users to be taken into consideration when implementing the case studies, EUG1: EU institutions, especially EEAS and EUG4, especially training providers.

Figure 2: The end-users of the IECEU-**project in the** Grant Agreement

The IECEU participant survey emphasized two end-users:

1. EUG1: EU institutions, especially EEAS

2. EUG4: especially training providers.

Feedback of the workshop was positive. It succeeded in generating discussion and engaging the consortium partners with the creation of the conceptual framework. It also familiarised the consortium partners with one another and introduced them to each other's point of views.

2.2 Conclusion

Through collaborative methods, the IECEU was able to get consensus on several important themes that would have potentially caused challenges in case study implementation. These included the levels of analysis (field-operational and politico-strategic) and perspectives (EU and non-EU). The focuses of the IECEU were identified as six capabilities: (1) Planning Capacity; (2) Organisational Capacities; (3) Interoperability; (4) Competences (knowledge and skills); (5) Comprehensiveness and (6) Technologies. These became the building blocks of the IECEU Conceptual Framework, which is presented in the next chapter.

3 FOCUSING IECEU: CAPABILITIES AND THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The core of the IECEU-project is the European Union's capabilities in conflict prevention. In military operations, the idea of capabilities is often used but not necessarily well defined. The EU has been actively engaged in civilian and military capability development for years. Often the proposed developments are tangible (e.g. buying new equipment for shared use) or macro-level (e.g. support for member states). Both examples are useful for capability development, but there may be additional micro-level potentials for capability improvement. To find these additional potentials, the IECEU has identified six key capabilities to give a more detailed overview of the types of capabilities present in both missions and operations.

This chapter first defines capabilities and capability grades. Then it broadens the discussion to the six capabilities identified in the conceptual framework. Finally, the chapter introduces modular codes for the conceptual framework and the conceptual framework itself.

3.1 Capabilities, competences and resources[1]

To implement a robust examination of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) capabilities, the IECEU developed a clear definition of 'capability' in an organisational context. In doing so, it drew on established management literature in the field, around which there is general agreement. Despite the broad conceptual agreement, there is a substantial confusion of terms and language. From the outset, the IECEU, therefore, assigned definitions to terms. There are two dimensions to terminology: firstly, the definition of a capability and secondly, the identification of different grades of capability.

A *capability* has two components, *resources* and *competences* and each is defined below.

Resources	The stocks of tangible and intangible assets that are available to the organization
Competences	The collective organizational routines used to deploy resources

Resources are tangible and intangible assets under the effective control of the organisation. They are the building blocks of the organisation that are combined and deployed to achieve outcomes. Resources are categorised as:

·   **Physical resources:** Buildings, equipment, tools, weapons, etc.

·   **Financial resources:** Cash, budget commitments, or other instruments that are liquid.

·   **Technological resources:** Computers, software, networks, databases, communications systems, satellites, etc.

·   **Human resources:** Physical, intellectual, and emotional.

·   **Social resources:** Relationships, networks, trust, norms, friendships, and reputation.

·   **Organisational resources:** Information, systems (formal and informal), procedures, structures, management know-how, culture, organizational relationships (e.g. alliances), etc.

Competences put resources into action. These actions are collective (social) interactions that (part of) the organisation can perform proficiently and repeatedly. They are contextualised social routines based in explicit and tacit knowledge.

Capabilities are the capacity to deploy resource combinations through collective organisational routines to achieve goals. They can be considered a high-level set of routines that together with resource stocks provide management with a range of decision options to produce desired (high level) outcomes.

Capabilities are fundamental building blocks of strategy (particularly implementation).

Figure 3: Strategy formulation

Capabilities	The capacity to deploy a combination of resources through collective organizational routines to a achieve goals

The IECEU identified three **grades** at which capabilities operate: static, dynamic, and creative. With each of the grades in turn exhibiting a greater capacity for self-reorganisation.

Static capabilities are low-grade capabilities that have little or no capacity for self-organisation. They are based in highly codified routines using established and known resources.

- Known configurations of resources and competences
- The capabilities to achieve well-specified outcomes within understood contexts

Dynamic capabilities. The capacity to learn from experience, have three important micro foundations. These are the capacity (1) to sense the need to change, (2) to select new capability configurations, and (3) to transform established resource sets and routines. The impact of dynamic capabilities manifests in improved, extended, and newly developed static capabilities.

- Reconfiguring existing resources and competences
- The ability to learn, adapt and improve capabilities over time and in the face of changing circumstances

Creative capabilities provide organisations the ability to go beyond learning from experience and to develop novel strategies. Creative capabilities allow organisations not just to learn from experience, but also to consider how they learn. It allows movement beyond experience where leaders can conceive of configurations and approaches not yet seen.

- Create innovative solutions to higher-order challenges
- The ability to learn how to learn, reimagine capabilities and reframe challenges

In the specific context of CSDP, capability grades will be broadly aligned with field-operational and politico-strategic levels of analysis. Different capability grades manifest in different degrees and with different emphasis in each of the six capabilities on different analytical levels. Figure 4 shows to what extent the different capability grades are likely to manifest on the different analytical levels. In the field-operational level, we are likely to see a significant emphasis on static capability grades while, on the politico-strategic level, the emphasis is likely to be on the creative capability grade.

Figure 4: Levels of Analysis and Required Capability Grades

It is important to note that organisational routines are, by definition, repeatable on demand. The development of one creative solution that worked is not evidence of an established routine and creative capability. Sometimes successes emerge from a chance coalition or presence of expertise. In such a case, the organisation may not 'own' the capability. Any successes must be interrogated to identify if the mechanism of success is known, and can or has been established as a routine that is actionable on demand, rather than a result of chance.

3.2 Central research questions at each competency grade

The research questions below on the capability grades above and can be applied to all of the research focuses. They are cross-cutting and thus listed separately from research questions in the conceptual framework, which are tailored to fit each of the modules. These questions highlight the different grades of capabilities, which in turn helps identify different capabilities in different contexts. In other words: capabilities may look different depending on the context. The different capability grades help identify

different capabilities regardless of how they "look" on the ground. These grades also aid in narrowing case study implementation. As Figure 5 shows, the likely emphasis on field-operational level, especially for the military, are static capabilities whereas on the politico-strategic level, the emphasis is likely to be on creative capabilities.

3.2.1. STATIC CAPABILITY GRADE

- Do CSDP missions/ and operations have the capability to deliver defined functional outputs? Where have expectations been exceeded? Where are shortfalls?

- To what extent has CSDP mission and operations capability been effected by the availability of basic resources (e.g. staff, technology, equipment, procedure manuals, plans, management expertise, social ties, etc.)? Where have expectations been exceeded? Where are shortfalls?

- To what extent has CSDP mission and operations efficiency of implementation been influenced by the contextual embeddedness of competences (resources and collective routines) in the member state(s)? What are the greatest possibilities/challenges in transferring existing capabilities from home state to the missions?

- What has/can be done to aid the transfer of (functional) organizational competences from member states to CSDP activities? What further actions would be helpful? (Consider civil-military differences.)

3.2.2. DYNAMIC CAPABILITY GRADE

- Do CSDP missions and operations have the ability to be effective in the delivery of established mission and operations objectives?

- Do the EU CSDP institutions and agencies (e.g. CMPD, CPCC) have the ability to reliably and repeatedly recognize changing needs? Do they select appropriate options, and reconfigure (including the establishment of new) resources and routines in response to changing needs? If so, how is a response to change achieved? Where are the potentials? Where are the shortfalls?

- Are EU CSDP missions and operations responsive to changing needs? Do they select appropriate options, and reconfigure (including the establishment of new) resources and routines? If so, how is this achieved? Are there differences between civilian and military in this regard? (e.g. OPLAN revisions - How prepared/aware member states are for changing needs?)

- How is change measured?

- How do EU missions and operations integrate the 'comprehensive approach'? What works well? Where are the shortfalls?

- What have been the major barriers to improvement?

- What have been the major enablers of improvement?

3.2.3.   CREATIVE CAPABILITY GRADE

- Does CSDP have the ability to create objectives to aid in achieving highest-level societal goals?

- Have the CSDP institutions the ability to access and interrogate exogenous knowledge? Is external knowledge accessed and integrated?

- Have CSDP agencies and institutions the ability to reflect on, conceive of, and influence system-wide changes that can produce novel approaches to conflict intervention where established approaches are sub-optimal? If conflict prevention methods are found lacking, can better new approaches to conflict prevention be created and used? E.g. CONOPS/OPLAN sets parameters - How rigid are these parameters? Is change possible?

- What have been the major barriers to the development of appropriate novel approaches?

- What have been the major enablers in the development of appropriate novel approaches?

3.3 The Six Capabilities in EU conflict prevention and crisis management

The six capabilities and what they consist of are presented in table 6 below.

Table 6: The Six Capabilities in IECEU

The six capabilities in IECEU	
Planning Capacity (PC)	Strategic/Operational planning, Management, Budgetary constraints, Consultation of lessons identified reports, Situational Awareness
Organisational Capacities (OC)	Leadership, Training, Mission organisational structures, Mission decision making process, Human resources (deployment, expertise), Technologies, Mission funding, Culture, Security, Housing, Procurement
Interoperability (I)	Cooperation/Collaboration, Coordination, Civ-Mil/Civ-Civ/Mil-Mil synergies
Competences (knowledge and skills) (C)	Communication, Training, Professional background
Comprehensiveness (CH)	Cooperation, Coordination, Actors: Civilian, Military & Other, NGOs, Locals, International community
Technologies (T)	Technological resources at disposal, Pooling & Sharing, EDA priorities

3.4 Conceptual framework

The conceptual framework presented in this segment consists of modules, which are formed by combining the research focus (capability), with a perspective. Each of these modules contains a series of research themes, which aid in the identification of the kinds of information sought in that module. The modules operate on both levels of analysis, and the research questions of the conceptual framework can be modified to focus on either.

The conceptual framework is a proto-methodology to aid implementation of the hypothesis set already in the DoA. The exact methodology is set by those responsible for the implementation of the different deliverables.

Hypothesis of the project are developed in the DoA of the project, which is found in Annex 1 of the IECEU Grant Agreement. Working hypothesis can and should be developed further in other working packages.

Establishing clear causal relationships is challenging in all social sciences as it is not possible to study different factors in isolation. There may also be both different kinds of causalities as well as different potential causal outcomes. When possible those implementing case studies will evaluate causal relationships with reference to conflict dynamics and while keeping in mind that some interviewees are likely to be subjective in their views. If clear causality cannot be determined, the different potential causalities should be elaborated on.

Broader perspectives and more in depth analysis on causality in qualitative research in social sciences can be sought from grounded theory, where the material collected in case study implementation plays a central role in the establishment of potential causalities.

The research questions can be answered directly but they can also be used to inform the research carried out. There may be overlap between different modules and the two levels of analysis; thus, not all modules require independent or additional research.

A good starting point for using the conceptual framework is to familiarise oneself with the capabilities and the kinds of questions that may arise before starting to conduct field research.

All modules are coded in the way described below in the modular code guide. ***These codes must be used in the deliverables when discussing capabilities as they ensure comparability***. Ideally all

three parts of the code should be used. However, some research themes and indeed some research questions can apply to both politico-strategic (ps) and field-operational (fo)-levels. In these cases, the latter part of the codes are missing and can be added for clarity if need be later. The module codes are necessary for comparison of data for working package 5. They are formulated so that later analysis can pinpoint data to compare using the "find"-function. Moreover, it is imperative that those carrying out the case studies code their own research results and are thus the ones to define which results should be compared, as it removes one layer of interpretation and allows for a better analysis.

It should be emphasised that analytical levels are only tools for analysis, and that the two analytical levels are very much interlinked. Moreover, the division between the two levels of analysis cannot be reduced to a simplified divide between "EU member states" and "the field" as strategic planning also happens in the missions and operation, and operational planning is also of interest to the strategic planners. The intersection of the analytical levels should be emphasised in the analysis as having potential for improving the effectiveness of EU capabilities. This intersection is nuanced and operation/mission-specific. However, broadly speaking the divide is between the planning stage of the mission and operation and its implementation.

Table 7: Modular Code Guide

MODULAR CODE GUIDE: The Modular Codes are combined from the code for capability, the code for perspective and the code for the level of analysis		
CAPABILITY	**PERSPECTIVE**	**LEVEL OF ANALYSIS**
- Planning Capacity (PC) - Organisational Capacities (OC) - Interoperability (I) - Competences (knowledge and skills) (C) - Comprehensiveness (CH) - Technologies (T)	- EU - Non-EU (NEU)	- Politico-Strategic (PS) - Field-Operational (FO)
Example: Capability (PC)+Perspective (NEU)+ Level of Analysis (FO)= PCNEUFO		

Table 8 lists all module codes used in the IECEU Conceptual Framework. In addition, to being necessary for later comparability, the codes can be useful in organising data. In this deliverable, they have also been used to organize additional research questions in the appendix.

Table 8: All Module codes for the IECEU Conceptual Framework

Module codes for the IECEU Conceptual Framework			
Module code	**Focus/ Capability**	**Perspective**	**Level of Analysis**
PCEUPS	Planning Capacity	EU	Politico-Strategic
PCNEUPS	Planning Capacity	non-EU	Politico-Strategic
PCEUFO	Planning Capacity	EU	Field-Operational
PCNEUFO	Planning Capacity	non-EU	Field-Operational
OCEUPC	Operational Capacity	EU	Politico-Strategic
OCNEUPC	Operational Capacity	non-EU	Politico-Strategic
OCEUFO	Operational Capacity	EU	Field-Operational
OCNEUFO	Operational Capacity	non-EU	Field-Operational
IEUPS	Interoperability	EU	Politico-Strategic
INEUPS	Interoperability	non-EU	Politico-Strategic
IEUFO	Interoperability	EU	Field-Operational
INEUFO	Interoperability	non-EU	Field-Operational
CEUPS	Competences	EU	Politico-Strategic

CNEUPS	Competences	non-EU	Politico-Strategic
CEUFO	Competences	EU	Field-Operational
CNEUFO	Competences	non-EU	Field-Operational
CHEUPS	Comprehensiveness	EU	Politico-Strategic
CHNEUPS	Comprehensiveness	non-EU	Politico-Strategic
CHEUFO	Comprehensiveness	EU	Field-Operational
CHNEUFO	Comprehensiveness	non-EU	Field-Operational
TEUPS	Technologies	EU	Politico-Strategic
TNEUPS	Technologies	non-EU	Politico-Strategic
TEUFO	Technologies	EU	Field-Operational
TNEUFO	Technologies	non-EU	Field-Operational

Table 9: IECEU Conceptual Framework

IECEU CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK		
perspective / **focus**	**EU: policy making, military, civilian**	**non-EU: local, international community**
Planning Capacity - Strategic/Operational planning, Management, Budgetary constraints, Consultation of lessons identified reports, Situational Awareness	**PCEUPS/ PCEUFO*:** Decision making process at the policy level, Strategic / operational planning process along the military / civilian track, National caveats and deficiencies, Strategic resources available, Structural organising of the mission / operation and its interconnections, Feedback loops and adjustment to changes in the mission / operation or in its context, Construction and dissemination of situational awareness	**PCNEUPS/ PCNEUFO*:** Decision making process at the policy level, Structural organising of the mission / operation and its connections with the local people and the international community, Incorporation of the local interests and those of the international community in planning, Feedback loops and adjustment to changes in the mission / operation or in its context or within the international community

	EU: policy making, military, civilian	non-EU: local, international community
Operational Capacities - Leadership, Training, Mission organisational structures, Mission decision making process, Human resources (deployment, expertise), Technologies, Mission funding, Culture, Security, Housing, Procurement	**OCEUPS/ OCEUFO*:** The process of operational planning and execution, Feedback loops and adjustments to changes, Operational capabilities available or within the capacity of ad hoc construction, Connections (information flows, sharing of resources, co-training, shared situational awareness) within the mission / operation, Incorporation of human rights and gender issues in the execution of the mission / operation	**OCNEUPS/ OCNEUFO*:** Execution of the mission / operation, Feedback loops and adjustments to changes, Operational capabilities available, Operational deficiencies (also in the mandate), Connections to the locals (local ownership) or the international community, Incorporation of human rights and gender issues in the execution of the mission / operation
perspective **focus**	**EU: policy making, military, civilian**	**non-EU: local, international community**
Interoperability - Cooperation/Collaboration, Coordination, Civ-Mil/Civ-Civ/Mil-Mil synergies	**IEUPS/ IEUFO*:** The processes of cooperation and collaboration in the mission / operation, Coordination processes, National caveats or deficiencies, Prior mission co-training and exercises, Different aspects of interoperability (technical, skills-related, resources-related), Civ-Mil / Civ-Civ / Mil-Mil dimensions of cooperation and synergies	**INEUPS/ INEUFO*:** The processes of cooperation and coordination (also with the local stakeholders), Different aspects of interoperability (technical, skills and training related, resources related - also in the local context or with local stakeholders and within the wider international community), Civ-Mil / Civ-Civ / Mil-Mil dimensions of cooperation

	EU: policy making, military, civilian	non-EU: local, international community
Competences (knowledge & skills) - Communication, Training, Professional background	**CEUPS/ CEUFO*:** Prior training of personnel, Experience of personnel, Language skills, Area knowledge and cultural awareness, Information sharing within the mission / operation, Communication about the mission / operation outwards, Adaptation of the identified lessons learned, Familiarity with human rights and gender issues.	**CNEUPS/ CNEUFO*:** Prior training and experience of the personnel, Area knowledge and cultural awareness, Willingness to learn and adapt to local circumstances, Communication about the mission / operation outwards, Interaction with the locals, Appreciation of human rights and gender issues
perspective **focus**	**EU: policy making, military, civilian**	**non-EU: local, international community**
Comprehensiveness - Visibility, Mission Communications (strategic level external communication), Information Sharing, Cooperation, Coordination, Actors: Civilian, Military & Other, NGOs, Locals, International community	**CHEUPS/ CHEUFO*:** Visibility of the CSDP Mission/Operation, Communication procedures, Information Sharing Levels. Aspects of the conflict that the overall mission / operation addresses, Actors incorporated and the ways of incorporating them, Congruence of ends and goals (or incongruity of sub-goals), Cooperation and coordination processes, Satisfaction / dissatisfaction within the mission / operation concerning comprehensiveness, Ability to adapt to changes, Local ownership	**CHNEUPS/ CHNEUFO*:** Visibility of the CSDP Mission/Operation, Communication procedures, Information Sharing Levels. Aspects of the conflict that the overall mission / operation addresses, Actors incorporated and the ways of incorporating them, Congruence of ends and goals (or incongruity of sub-goals), Cooperation and coordination processes, Satisfaction / dissatisfaction concerning comprehensiveness, Ability to adapt to changes, Local ownership, Compatibility with the efforts of the international community

40

Technologies - Technological resources at disposal, Pooling & Sharing, EDA priorities	**TEUPS/ TEUFO*:** Technological resources at disposal, Technical interoperability and integration, Processes of pooling and sharing, Integration and evaluation of the results of EDA's R&D, Technical deficiencies or lacking resources, Incorporation of service providers	**TNEUPS/ TNEUFO*:** Technological resources at disposal, Technical interoperability (also with the local stakeholders and the international community), Technical deficiencies or lacking resources

*code of the module on the basis of which the related questions can be found

4   CASE STUDY IMPLEMENTATION

This chapter presents potential steps in case study implementation as well as some guidance to the use of the conceptual framework.

As per the grant agreement, in all case studies, the methodology will be a combination of qualitative research (interviews, desk studies, panels of experts), quantitative analysis (surveys) and finally an expert analysis of the efficiency of the missions.

The choice of the method used in research is to a large extent up to those implementing the case studies.

The foundational document of the IECEU is the grant agreement. Should there be any discrepancies between the DoA and the conceptual framework, the DoA is primary.

However, for the collection of some information, the method used has been pre-determined. For example, for WP6 quantitative data is necessary.

A typical case study implementation process should begin with a careful reading of the DoA and this document. As WP1 as a whole establishes the foundation for the IECEU-project, a close reading of all deliverables in WP1 is highly recommended before embarking on case study implementation. This reading should be followed by the desk study, interviews and surveys. An early structuring of the deliverable helps focus the research. Underlying the case studies should be questions of change and improvement. What has changed in the context? What has changed in the operation/mission? Why? Are the changes something that signal improvement?

Conceptual Framework builds the integrated approach for the work to be conducted in IECEU. Presented here are 1) contextualisation, including a potential way of carrying out the contextualisation, 2) capabilities in field studies, which presents an example of how capabilities can be studied in the field 3) effectiveness criteria (which are elaborated in 1.4), 4) training related questions (WP5 in IECEU,) 5) pooling and sharing, including emphasis of themes presented (WP6) 6) lessons learned (WP7), 7) cross-cutting themes of gender and human rights and their incorporation into the case study implementation, 8) triangulation to ensure a

potential way of carrying out contextualisation, 9) Interviews and interview questions, 10) ethical and security considerations for case study implementations.

4.1 Contextualization

All case studies have some level of contextualization included in them. Contextualization is important as it lays the groundwork for the later focus on capabilities. The operating context influences all operations and missions deeply, and delineates what is possible and what is not.

Some level of contextualization is necessary to understand the operating contexts, operations and missions. However, contextualization can also easily overtake the research process and lead it down a side-track of interesting information about the conflict, which is related to but not on the research focus. The way of contextualising proposed in Table 10 is useful for to ensure contextualization is not too time-consuming. Its use is recommended for comparability, but not mandatory.

Table 10: Proposed Contextualization of Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Operations and Missions

Level of Analysis: Politico-Strategic/ Field-Operational						
Focus Perspective	Mission Ends (goals from conflict prevention/ crisis management)	Contextual- EU Policy Making	Mission life cycle (Timescale: what happens when? Development of the mission; timeliness)	Actor-specific (Who does what? How does that influence the outcomes)	Mission Means: Conflict prevention/ Crisis Management Instruments available	Mission Ways: Conflict prevention /Crisis management prevention mechanisms chosen for implementation
EU						
NON-EU						

4.2 Joint Emphasis for Case Studies

The Joint emphasis for the case studies is created during collaborative workshop of IECEU (July 2015). The joint emphasis aims to gather the relevant capabilities to be addressed during the field study implementations. Moreover, the Case Studies should follow the principles of field study visit.

The field studies will be conducted during year 2016 through following tasks:

- Task 2.3 Primary field research and analysis: study (Kosovo and BiH)
- Task 3.5 Study of RD Congo, South-Sudan, CAR and Libya
- Task 4.3: Study of Palestine Territory and Afghanistan

Also the Case Studies will analyse the current situation in the case study area and organise round-table discussions of the experts in order to finally provide the overall reports with the conclusions and recommendations.

The Joint Emphasis for the IECEU case studies (field studies) is presented in the table below. The main purpose of the joint methodology is to give the guidance for case study, especially field study, implementation from the comprehensive perspective. This methodology aims to support with the progress of primary data collection until analysis and reports to be produced part of IECEU project. Moreover, the implementation of the methodology will enable the possibility to compare the analysis and reports in later stage.

The Joint Emphasis divided into four (4) key columns, which are: Capabilities, Considerations (Primary Data) and Analysis (Reports/Conclusions) and Case Study Output (to comparative reviews). The Capabilities are Planning Capacity (PC), Operational Capacities (OC), Interoperability (I), Competences (CO), Comprehensiveness (CH) and Technologies (T). These are already presented more in details in this deliverable earlier (Chapter 3.3. The 6 Capabilities). The Considerations are guiding the case study responsibles to be able to provide relevant primary data from the field study. Moreover, the two different perspectives (EU and Non-EU) should be followed during the field study implementation. The last column "Analysis" is providing the information regarding the primary data will be transferred to the forms of reports and/or conclusions. The Case Studies should finally provide the collection of considerations (primary data) and analysis (reports) as outputs to be able to compare and review.

There can be seen a huge variance between case studies and contexts. Therefore, IECEU project will highly underline the persons in charge of case study implementation to deepen their understanding regarding the case study context.

Table 11: Field study joint emphasis

FIELD STUDY JOINT EMPHASIS			
Capabilities	**Considerations** (Primary Data)		**Analysis** (Reports)	**Case Study** Output
Strategic /Planning Capacity (S/PC)	**EU** Achievements Primary Responsibilities EU engagement in Security Sector Reform Understanding of EU Visibility and EU Presence (EU delegations, EU representatives, EU missions and/or operations)	**Non-EU** Achievements Primary Responsibilities EU engagement in Security Sector Reform Understanding of EU Visibility and EU Presence	**Lessons identified report (discussion report)** Impact of the EU engagement Comparing EU and NON-EU perspectives ('executors' and 'beneficiaries' of the CSDP missions/operations) Assessment of the developments and progress achieved	A comprehensive report (aiming towards the comparative analysis) on the current situation (WP2)
Operational Capacities (OC)	**EU** Implementation of the mandate (identify the successes and potential shortcomings)	**NON-EU** Implementation of the mandate (identify the successes and potential shortcomings)	**Current Situation Report** Assess the contribution by EU CSDP mission Impact / Added value of EU on the ground	

	Understanding of EU mission/operation activities

Understanding EU mission/operation mandate implementation

Impacts of EU mission/operation activities to local population

Added value of EU activities

Human Resources Aspects (expertise needed, deployment)

Duty of Care (relationship between MS/State Employer and EU)

Local Ownership

Local Staff Contribution | Understanding of EU mission/operation activities

Understanding EU mission/operation mandate implementation

Impacts of EU mission/operation activities to local population

Added value of EU activities

Local Ownership

Local Staff Contribution | EU engagement in support of security and stability

Comparing EU and NON-EU perspective

Elaborate on the expectations | Useful information when planning and designing potential future EU engagements |
| **Interoperability** | **EU** | **NON-EU** | **Current Situation** | |

(I)	Existing practices for pooling and sharing Cooperation Coordination Civil-Military Synergies	Existing practices for pooling and sharing Cooperation Coordination Civil-Military Synergies	**Report** Identification of the key issues related to successful coordination and cooperation The potential for pooling and sharing The overlap between civilian and military efforts	Conclusion Report on the current assessment of the effectiveness of EU capabilities (WP3 and WP4)
Competences **(skills and knowledge) (CO)**	**EU** EU Personnel Expertise EU Personnel Skills and Competence EU Personnel Professional Background EU Personnel Training and Deployment	**NON-EU** EU Personnel Expertise EU Personnel Skills and Competence EU Personnel Professional Background EU Personnel Training and Deployment	**Conclusion Report** Support for future mission planning and mandate design How could multinational knowledge and experience be used to improve the effectiveness of the EU capabilities and encouraged by the knowledge management?	
Comprehensive ness (CH)	**EU** EU contributions Training	**NON-EU** EU contributions Training available (also	**Current Situation Report** A presentation of the current and actors	A primary set of conclusions and recommendati

	available (also identification on lack of training)\n\nInternational support and actors in the field\n\nThe mandate framework	identification on lack of training)\n\nInternational support and actors in the field\n\nThe mandate framework	EU supporting contributions\n\nInternational organisations relevant	ons for developing the future action both in the region/area as well as on a wider level
Technologies (T)	**EU**\n\nImplementation of the EDA priorities in field level (e.g. Cyber Security)\n\nInformation Sharing technologies and capabilities	**NON-EU**\n\nImplementation of the EDA priorities in field level (e.g. Cyber Security)\n\nInformation Sharing technologies and capabilities	**The potential for pooling and sharing of EU capabilities**\n\nFunctionalities of information systems\n\nInformation Sharing	

4.3 Effectiveness

Analysing and assessing CSDP missions/operations will provide significant amount of primary data in analysed format, such as reports and conclusions. However, in IECEU –project the emphasis is on the effectiveness of EU's crisis management and peacebuilding. This chapter provides an overall understanding for evaluations and analysis on effectiveness.

Effectiveness is when a mission/ operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner both from the perspective of the EU and the conflict(s) it seeks to prevent.

In the IECEU effectiveness of the EU´s crisis management is defined as…"*when a mission/ an operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner both from the perspective of the EU and the conflict(s) it seeks to prevent.*"[2] Effectiveness thus entails both the achievements of a CSDP mission/operation as well as the ways through which these achievements are sought. Assessment of effectiveness is done through two perspectives: internal to the EU and external to the EU. Further categorisation of the perspectives provides three internal EU viewpoints: policy-makers, civilian mission personnel and military operation personnel. The external EU viewpoints include the local actors in the host country and the international community. The weaknesses in several EU crisis management evaluations is that the focus has been solely on the internal EU perspective focusing on EU input and output while external points of view on the impact on the ground have been neglected, and even less seldom combined in one study. Missions and operations operate in areas with a number of international actors, and they impact the local populations, and thus add value to any study on EU crisis management. EU conflict prevention and crisis management seek to create change in the expected trajectory, which can be achieved in several ways.

The IECEU constructs an understanding of both internal and external EU context-specific effective courses of action in order to produce positive change. For this purpose, effectiveness criteria has been established in D1.4, which directs assessment towards internal EU goal

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[2] D1.4 "Identifying the Success Factors (Indicators)", 8.

attainment and appropriateness and external goal attainment and appropriateness. A more detailed discussion of these criteria, as well as their practical application, can be found in D1.4

ANALYSES: Key success factors / Effectiveness Indicators stemming from framework proposed in D1.4 and participant survey for D1.5.	
	D2.1, D3.1, D3.2, D3.3, D3.4, D4.1, D4.2 analysis of best practices, lessons identified and drawbacks from EU engagement
	D2.3, D3.5, D4.3 impact assessment results of analysis based on the field study visits
	D2.5, D3.7, D4.5 an assessment of the impact of EU engagement in this field
Internal goal attainment	
Politico-strategic objectives	Power (material, normative, etc), influence (e.g. promotion (or damage to) explicitly articulated core EU values (Human Rights (incl. minority protection), democracy & rule of law), Overall, regional, country, conflict, thematic (e.g. conflict prevention) strategies (e.g. ensure no major violent conflicts within the EU, in its neighboring areas or in areas (not only in geographical sense) where/in which the EU has decided to engage actively)
Operational objectives	Main goal/subgoal achieved
Internal appropriateness	
Timeliness	Before launch & during operation (e.g. extension of mandates, etc) Launch, Initial Operating Capability, Full Operating Capability, transition strategy (end state/date), (possible) handover of mandate, equipment, personnel, etc (transition between missions)
Efficiency	Political will, force generation, financial contributions, equipment, appropriate resources for appropriate tasks, etc. Appropriate analysis (before, during & after) of relevant (f)actors: threat/risk analysis,

contingency planning and intervention paths; appropriate planning (for launch, implementation & withdrawal), incl. mandate, OPLAN, MIP, RoE, PME-cycle, budget. Clear overall mandate, goal and subgoals that support that overall strategy, plan of action; appropriate evaluation (during & after deployment), incl. benchmarking and lessons learning (bottom-up/top-down) Appropriate adaptability/flexibility (room for in-theatre adjustments) vs. clear mandate/maintaining intent (necessary/-li paradox)? Quality of mission management structures (in/between HQ & field); leadership staff, organization, skills, communications, culture; intelligence/information sharing; (air) transportation - integrated communications; coordinated logistic support, etc. Coherence, complementarity, coordination, division of labour/expertise, interoperability between interveners/-tion(s)/instruments/policies: (a) internally between EU institutions, instruments, MS, in HQ as well as in the field (e.g. pooling & sharing, training & education, standards & procedures, comprehensive approach) and (b) externally with local, national, regional & international actors (partners and others), private sector, NGOs - (when) was it integrated enough?

A large number of these questions will be examined within WP 6, where in order to generate specific actionable results for the audience of the project, the method is to narrow analysis to three areas: training, equipment and procedures.

4.4 Training-related questions for WP5

The questions below are designed to be specifically useful for the development of training tools for WP5. They are framed so that they can be directly used in interviews. However, some of the material on educative learning tools may be available on-line or through desk study. These questions are mandatory for all case studies as they support one of the key purposes of the IECEU, which is the development of new tools for training. These tools in turn translate the lessons gathered in the IECEU into practical and applicable potentials, with impact for future missions and operations.

Table 12: WP 5 Online learning tools / eLearning environment related questionnaire for the partners responsible for conducting case studies

Questions:	Sub-questions	Remarks (Any other NMLA related information not listed in this questionnaire may be helpful)
1. Has the pre-mission training included educative learning tools / online learning tools / eLearning tools? **2. Has the pre-deployment training included educative learning tools / online learning tools / eLearning tools?** **3. How is the feedback from the monitors studied and used to develop pre-deployment training?** **4. How is the feedback from monitors studied and used to develop**	If yes, a) What kind of applications were included? b) When and where they have been used? c) By whom were they used (training conducted by national authorities, training provided by the mission, other type of training)? d) Are the applications accessible to the public? d) Which kind of technical specifications the learning tools/ eLearning environments are using? f) Have any type of impact assessment carried out on effectiveness of the training utilizing educative learning tools? g) What type of	The questions can be addressed to interlocutors on various levels: - EU authorities -National sending authorities - Mission HQs (operations/training sections) - Field office staff

mission training?	assessment? h) What were the findings of the assessment? i) What type of benefits was gained by using the application? j) What kind of challenges (technical or other) were faced while using the online educative tools / eLearning environments	
3. If educative learning tools/ eLearning environments have NOT been utilized during the pre-mission training, do you think that it would be helpful to utilize them?	a) Yes, please describe what kind of application could be helpful. b) No, any reasons given? c) No opinion	The question is invalid if the interlocutor has no knowledge of NLMA. In this case, the interviewer could very briefly provide examples of existing training (eHEST, landmine awareness training, online training on ethics)
4. Has the mission-specific training included educative learning tools/eLearning environments?	a) What kind of applications? b) When and where they have been used? c) Are the applications accessible to the public? d) What kind of technical specifications are the learning tools/ eLearning environments using?	

	e) Has any type of impact assessment been carried out on effectiveness of the training? f) What sort of assessment? g) What were the findings of the assessment? h) What type of benefits were gained by using the application? i) What kind of challenges (technical or other) were faced while using the training application?	
5. If no educative learning tools / eLearning environments have been utilized in the mission-specific training, do you think that it would be helpful to utilize them?	a) Yes, please describe what kind of application could be helpful. b) No, any reasons given? c) No opinion	The question is invalid if the interlocutor has no knowledge of NLMA. In this case, the interviewer could very briefly provide examples of existing training (eHEST, landmine awareness training, online training on ethics)

4.5 Pooling and sharing for WP6

In terms of methodology, CSDP Pooling and Sharing has a number of major challenges. The first and foremost is that it has not been legally defined in the EU law, thus leading into a variety of definitions used by different stakeholders (e.g. EDA, academia, etc.). Another major challenge is that its scope is rather extensive, as in principle everything can be pooled and shared.

In order to narrow down the topic, the consortium has chosen to follow the so-called "pyramid of risk" regarding pooling and sharing activities (developed by D. Kuijpers and G. Faleg, explained in detail in deliverable WP 1.2). The pyramid identified four areas:

- Maintenance and training (low political risk)
- Procurement and R&D (medium political risk)
- Operations (high political risk)
- Strategy (very high political risk)

Based on this pyramid, a large set of quantitative and qualitative questions has been developed within the framework of WP 1.5, which will be used in WP6.1. It contains questions specifically addressing interoperability in each area (to provide answers for deliverable WP6).

4.1 Lessons Learned for WP7

All consortium partners will take part in WP7, where the main aim, as listed in the DoA, "is to define new approaches and solutions together with policy-level to enhance the current EU capabilities as well [as] find the solutions for the future research and policy concerns. The long-term and preventive solutions of peacebuilding will be identified (such as the role of the educational institutions, treatment of the national minorities, harmonized curriculum in EU trainings) and during this WP some preventive approaches we have created during the project will be tested."

Although work in the case study will be carried out during the appropriate WP,

Keep in mind that IECEU is about defining new approaches and solutions. The conceptual framework should enable rather than restrict finding new potentials

56

collecting potentials, discussion points and, potentially, material for WP7 at the same time is wise – even if the notes would only be one page of bullet points.

4.2 Cross-cutting themes: gender and human rights

The cross-cutting themes for the IECEU-project reflect the key focus areas highlighted by the European Union in regard to CSDP activities; the themes are **gender[3] and human rights**. Gender and human rights are deeply imbedded in the foundational documents of the EU and considered key values that are therefore reflected in external activities. These cross-cutting themes of rights are integral to the IECEU assessment of the effectiveness of European Union conflict prevention activities under the CSDP umbrella. As foundational principles of the Union itself as well as a key feature of CSDP policies and mission mandates, the cross-cutting themes have an intrinsic role in the methodology of the IECEU-project.

The Treaty on the European Union (TEU), specifically mentions gender and human rights in Article 2 and highlights them as fundamental values of the Union:

> *"The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality a, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the right of person belonging to minorities, These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail."*

The Union policies and frameworks pertaining to human rights and gender in external activities, specifically in the CSDP context, are derived from both international and European conventions and policies including the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on

EU policies link gender and human rights dimensions to the achievement of peace, security and development.

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[3] Gender is defined by Council document 15671/08 as, *referring to the socially constructed differences, as opposed to the biological ones, between women and men; this means difference that have been learned, are changeable over time, have wide variations both within and between cultures.*

Human Rights, UNSCR 1325 and 1820. Since 2005, the EU has developed a number of policy tools to enable the mainstreaming of human rights and gender in the CSDP context, emphasizing their role in all phases of missions and operations.

The EU policies on mainstreaming the gender and human rights dimensions in CSDP proclaim that this is part of a holistic or comprehensive approach and directly link these dimensions to achieving the aim of peace, security, and development. This prevailing emphasis stems from the recognition that the root causes of conflict and insecurity are often linked directly to inequality, discrimination, poverty and poor governance among other drivers, all of which must be addressed with gender and human rights perspective. Important elements of CSDP activities, therefore, include trust building between the local community and host government, building the rule of law and promoting good governance, all elements that are considered a necessary condition for stabilisation. This is highlighted by Council document 15671/08 *Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on women, peace and security*:

> *"A gender perspective, encompassing both women and men, should inform EU external actions in order to achieve a comprehensive response to the threats faced by the civilian population times of conflict and in its aftermath. This is the premise for effective stabilisation, peace building, post-conflict reconstruction and institution building. Moreover, a strengthened commitment to gender issues in the EU activities, with regard to conflict prevention, crisis management, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and institution building, can enhance efficiency and effectiveness."*

Human rights and gender have also been underscored in the development of CSDP mission mandates and in the mission/operation planning documents. The Council Join Action (mandate) of both EULEX Kosovo and EUJUSTLEX Iraq explicitly mention gender and human rights, and all missions[4] reference to gender and human rights in either the OPLAN, the CONOPS or within the strategic principles of the mission.[5]

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[4] EU NAVFOR ATALANTA, EUBAM Moldova-Ukraine, EUBAM Rafah, EUFOR Althea, EUJUST LEX Iraq, EULEX Kosovo, EUMM Georgia, EUPM BiH, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL RDC, EUSEC RDC, EUTM Somalia.
[5] Report on the EU-indicators for the comprehensive Approach to the EU implementation of the UN Security council UNSCRs 1325 & 1820 on Women, Peace and Security, 9990/11.

The EU views the inclusion of gender and human rights as an essential aspect of CSDP activities as well as a means of effectiveness. Human rights and gender awareness and sensitivity have been in many instances regarded as positively contributing to operational effectiveness[6]. For this reason, human rights and gender must be mainstreamed into the IECEU-project as the cross-cutting themes.

To analyse the effectiveness of the EU CSDP missions and operations in conflict prevention, the IECEU-project consortium has developed a methodology and framework to examine the CSDP missions and operations at different levels, the policy and strategic levels in Brussels as well as the operational at the field level. The gender and human rights dimension of CSDP missions and operations will therefore also be evaluated in terms of effectiveness at the same levels. In the IECEU-project, the means of mainstreaming the cross-cutting themes of gender and human rights include the following methods:

- The research questions are mainstreamed, for example, there are gender and human rights focused questions, and other questions are formulated to ensure that the cross-cutting themes are included.
- In interviews conducted will have a gender balance of interviewees to the extent possible.
- Utilisation of the gender analysis matrix as outlined in page 10 of the DoA (pg. 161/270 of the Grant Agreement).

Table 13: IECEU Gender Analysis Matrix

Expectations	Needs
Examples: - Different countries will have separate expectations - Understanding the benefits of communities in different working areas - Participating organisations may have different	- The different needs of research by respective countries - The different needs of local authorities (case studies) - Civilians in conflict zones are a heterogeneous group with differing needs from men, women and children and all of them have their needs regarding the conflict prevention.
Impact	Access
- Participation the research work understanding - Understanding cultural differences	- Understanding the access differences by communities in decision-making processes

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[6] See, for example, Council Conclusions on promoting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis management (doc. 14884/1/06); Check list to Ensure Gender Mainstreaming and Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Planning and Conduct of ESDP Operations (doc. 12068/06); Javier Solana, Foreword for Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender into European Security and Defense Policy (http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/news144_en.pdf).

4.3 Triangulation

Social science is a specific field of inquiry, often criticised as not being exact and 'scientific' in essence. Leaving ontological debates aside, it is inherent to all kinds of scientific observation that they aim at explaining phenomena "as they really are" or, in other words, to be as accurate as possible. As the same social phenomena can be analysed through various lenses, the research methods have to be adjusted to the characteristics of the field. As social phenomena can rarely be observed *in vitro*, it is necessary for a scientist – aspiring to acquire as exact results as possible – to observe the same phenomena by the combination of different research methods.

The names for adopting such a research approach, which, in essence, means the concurring use of various methods to observe the same social phenomena, are different: *convergent methodology*, *multi-method research, multi-trait research*, or *triangulation*, to name but as few. As the use of the latter term has been widely used in social science, also the IECEU-project relies on it.

In the history of social science, there has been a traditional friction between those who favoured two different 'camps' of research: *quantitative* and *qualitative* research methodology. However, with the evolution of social science it has been confirmed by many that single method designs can provide a limited set of results only. Nowadays, triangulation has become a norm of social scientific research, taking into consideration that both 'camps' of methods should be perceived as complementary rather than a rival.

As pointed out by Jick, those authors who have been calling for greater use of triangulation often fail to indicate how the prescribed triangulation shall actually be performed and accomplished.[78] The efforts to use triangulation have been reflected in attempts to integrate field-work and survey methods. Such a linkage has been advocated by various social scientists, who argue that quantitative methods can make an important contribution to field-work (which in Jick's language means mostly qualitative methods), and *vice versa*.[9]

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[7]   University of Leicester, *What is scientific about social science.* Available at: http://www.le.ac.uk/oerresources/media/ms7500/mod1unit2/page_03.htm (28th September 2015).
[8]   Jick, Todd J., 'Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action,' *Administrative Science Quarterly* Vol. 24 (1979), pp. 602. Available at: http://faculty.washington.edu/swhiting/pols502/Jick.pdf (28th September 2015).
[9] See Jick's article for details.

Triangulation of methods is time-consuming and may seem unrewarding for a scientist, who aspires to discover 'valid truths'. Analysing the same phenomenon by using different research methods may bear different, often counter-evident results, which question the 'truth' discovered by the use of a single-method approach. Nevertheless, the scientists' attempts should be linked to a commitment to explain the 'reality' as accurately as possible. Moreover, contradicting results can pin-point methodological weaknesses helping to adjust the study leading to more robust and solid research structures increasing the validity of the project findings.

Triangulation of methods has to be adapted to the research of inquiry. Given the nature of research within the IECEU-project, which is analysing the CSDP missions and operations and the conflict prevention capabilities of the EU, triangulation of the following research methods could be used in conducting research within WP2, WP3 and WP4: *interviews*, *analysis of secondary and primary sources*, and *surveying.*

Triangulation is a method, which can be used in qualitative research to assess the validity of the research results by scrutinising the structure of the study and out-comes from various perspectives. Guion, Diehl, and McDonald present five triangulation methods that can be used in qualitative research:

1. Data triangulation

2. Investigator triangulation

3. Theory triangulation

4. Methodological triangulation

5. Environmental triangulation

In Data triangulation, researcher(s) use multiple sources to increase the validity of the research. This is a common form of triangulation executed in the case of IECEU surveys by involving diverse stakeholders – relevant to the research – in the interviews.

Investigator triangulation implies using several researchers during the analyses phase. In this method, the researchers commonly use the same qualitative tools. Their findings will then be compared, which will either confirm the individual findings or lead to reassessment and restructuring of the research methods.

Theory triangulation means a system where different disciplines are examining the same events/phenomena by using their own methodological tools typical for their own discipline. The IECEU is from its very nature a multidisciplinary project. Methodological triangulation utilizes both qualitative and quantitative methods in its research approach.

Environmental triangulation seeks to assess whether or not a specific location or time influences the research results. Unchangeable results will support validity. The IECEU is covering diverse case studies conditioned by the very different environments, history and dynamics of the conflict. However, as the methodology of the project focuses on comparative elements environmental triangulation is part of the IECEU.

Triangulation should be viewed as a complementary rather than a rival issue. The results of the interviews (surveys, if we are going to use them in the field) should be confronted with:

1) Information from the secondary sources that have analysed certain aspects of respective CSDP missions and operations;

2) Comments of our results given by experts in research institutions: i) in the field (e. g. think-tanks researching on security-related topics in the field), ii) EU-based research organizations. The main question is if we can offer any incentives to them to read our reports and even provide comments.

3) From the triangulation perspective, it would be ideal if the interviews are confronted with the data from the surveys

Figure 5: Triangulation methods in the IECEU-project

Interviews – one of the most widely used qualitative methods of social scientific research – conducted with the officials and experts working in CSDP missions and operations will provide useful data to the research questions, addressing the direct goals of the project. However, information acquired from interviewees will provide only one aspect of 'reality', and are by no means accurate *per se*. Therefore, these pieces of (valuable) information would be confronted with the findings published on the same or similar issues in secondary sources that were written in the past by other researchers working in academia, think-tanks, etc. (articles, papers, monographs and other types of publications will be of particular importance). Last, but not least, as the IECEU-project envisages the use of surveying, which can be compared to the interviews were done on a larger scale, the data acquired through surveys will be further explaining (or negating) the 'truths' from the two previously mentioned research methods. Ideally, the refined results would be scrutinized by other researchers, who are not a part of the IECEU consortium but who have been working in similar research projects or who have analysed the CSDP missions and operations in the past. With this, the validity of the research results would be further checked and put into a wider context. However, the latter method has not been mentioned in the Grant Agreement, and as no specific funds are allocated for this, it might be naïve to expect that the researchers outside of the IECEU-project would be prepared to scrutinize the results and provide valuable comments.

4.4 Interviews

All case studies within the IECEU carry out interviews. The interviews must comply with the IECEU ethical guidelines. In general, it is a good idea to conduct interviews after conducting at least some part of the desk study, as interviews can be useful in filling gaps in existing knowledge. The central questions for all interviews are identified below as are the proposed interviewees. The interviews can be modified by adding questions to both fill gaps identified as well as to tailor

All IECEU interviews must comply with IECEU ethical guidelines, which are in the appendix to this document.

the interview to the expertise of the interviewee. Understanding of the mission/ operation makes the interview process more fruitful.

At the very minimum, each case study should include 12 interviews. The threshold is relatively low to give some leeway to those case study implementing partners, who may face security challenges. However, each interview strengthens the study, and a more comfortable number of interviews would be in the range of 20-60.

In addition to the number of interviews, the selection of interviewees is of central importance, and should be guided by the desk study, which identifies key actors and experts in the case study implementation area, as well as the selection of the different capabilities the case study will more specifically focus on. Selection of the interviewees should reflect both EU and non-EU perspectives, as well as the different sides of the conflict. Those interviewed should also include the EU personnel who are responsible for the deployment and development of the capability in the operation or mission, whenever possible.

All case studies should have a sufficient number of interviews to ensure triangulation and the broad representation of both EU and non-EU perspectives. These perspectives are comprised of different viewpoints (e.g. civilian mission, military operation, the international community, local, etc.). Ideally, three or more interviews should be conducted per viewpoint so that the interview results are not skewed by individual interviews. Similarly, interviewee selection should be made carefully, so as to give a full picture of the operation or mission.

Essential to conducting successful interviews are active listening, limiting pre-conceived notions and finding positive examples of where the mission or operation has been able to exceed expectations. Identification of positive examples is made more difficult by the challenging contexts that the missions or operations operate in, where positive potentials can be overshadowed by the pressing and evident needs in the context in question. These positive examples and strengths can, however, be hugely valuable for the development of other missions and operations.

It is essential that case study implementation incorporates different sides of the conflict, and has good coverage of the main actors within the case study implementation area.   Clear bias in the selection of interviewees to favour one side of the conflict has the potential of skewing results. Potential bias in the selection of interviews has also, at the very least, complicates triangulation but has the potential of making triangulation of the results impossible.

Local actors should include both representatives of the governing authority as well as local civil society, and where possible, local experts.

National staff/ interpreters may be excellent interviewees as they are familiar with the mission goals, with the existing reality, as well as with the opinions/perceptions local stake holders have on the mission.

Table 14: Proposed interviewees for case studies

Importance to interview	Interviewee	Number of "very important to interview" answers in the pre-workshop on-line survey conducted amongst the IECEU consortium partners
1.	EU civilian officials (leadership) in field missions	14
	EU military officials (leadership) in field missions	
2.	EU civil servants doing operational planning, benchmarking and evaluation	12
	EU personnel in field operations	
	Former mission personnel	
3	Former EEAS personnel on EU level	10
4.	EU policy makers/EEAS	9
5.	Local actors (but very evenly divided between very important to interview and important to interview)	N/A

Additionally, external actors to interview include, but are not limited to, UN, NATO, OSCE, IOs, Council of Europe, NGOs, regional organisations, MFA, academia, relevant implementation projects.

4.4.1.   INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Example questions to be considered for *all* interviews:

1. What are the key things that make the missions most important activities possible? (competences)

2. What are the most important resources for those activities? (physical, financial, human, technological, social, organizational)

3. What barriers do you encounter? (This may be the absence of competences and resources or the presence of the wrong competences and resources)
   a. How did you overcome these obstacles?

4. Could you describe some breakthroughs that you have had?
   a. What activities made them possible?
   b. What were the key assets?

5. Where has the EU and the member states have done well?
   a. Can you give some examples?

6. What resources have been lacking? What competencies have been lacking?
   a. How and where have you been able to overcome limitations placed by lacking resources and lacking competences?
   b. Where have you not been able to overcome these limitations? Can you think of alternative ways of working that would have allowed you to overcome these limitations even partially?

7. What have been the main lessons learned? Has there been a functioning and effective feedback loop? What new practices or routines have been developed? Can these be further developed or duplicated? How?

8. How has the mission evolved? How have these changes been taken into account? Has there been enough stability and flexibility within the structures over time?

9. Where do you think the EU mission/ operation has made a positive change in the earlier conflict trajectory?
   a. What, in your opinion, have been the key factors behind the positive impact?

10. Where do you think the EU has not been able to make a similar impact?
    a. What do you think have been the key factors limiting the impact?

11. Can you give some examples where and how, in your opinion, the EU could improve the effectiveness of its capabilities?

Examples of additional questions that can be considered for interviews can be found underneath. The list is not exhaustive but rather offers a starting point for question formation.

Table 15: Example questions to be considered for interviews

EXAMPLE QUESTIONS TO BE CONSIDERED FOR INTERVIEWS	
Module code*	Example question
PCEU	• Which short/medium/long-term strategic objectives are foreseen for a certain region where a mission/operation is deployed? How did the CSDP mission/operation fit in the overall EU foreign policy? What are the lessons learned?
OCEU	• What does the mission/operation do? What are the most important activities? (activities, services, outputs)
OCEU/ PCEU	• What are the mission/operation prime objectives? (objectives) and desired outcomes as defined by the OPLANs.
PCEU	• Was the member states' expressed will clearly enough so that the CMPD (or its predecessors) was able to develop the mission concept? If not, what were the consequences or next steps?
PCEU	• Was the CMPD's mission concept (approved by PSC) clear enough so that EUMS able to begin strategic/ operational planning?
PCEU	• Was the CMPD's mission concept (approved by PSC) clear enough so that CPCC was able to begin strategic/ operational planning?
PNEU/ CHEU/ EHNEU	• Was the planned mission discussed with other international organizations in advance? Where and how? With what kind of results?
PNEU/ CHEU/ CHNEU	• Was the planned mission discussed with the local stakeholders? Where and how? With what kind of results? Who was perceived as an acceptable counterpart? (From the operational perspective: were these the most important or appropriate counterparts?)
PCEU/ OCEU	• Have the national caveats impacted planning and execution? How? What has been done to overcome the obstacles?
	• Regarding this operation, is the planning and commanding structure in

PCEU	Brussels (PSC/CIVCOM/CMPD/CPCC) appropriate? How do they function in relation to missions/operations? How strategic guidance for the Mission (HoMs/Commanders) is given?
PCEU/ OCEU	• Was the strategic planning (Crisis Management Concept/CONOPS) conducted in a manner that enabled the making the OPLAN? Were there difficulties? How were those overcome?
PCEU/ OCEU	• From the mission commander/Head of Mission: Was the strategic planning so clearly done in Brussels that making the OPLAN was possible without too big challenges (ownership for the OPLANS rests with MS as they approve it)? Which difficulties there were? How were those overcome?
PCEU/ OCEU	• Did loss of time or delays occur due to the planning process? Were there other consequences for achieving the mission goals? How to improve? How the Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) was designed on the basis of OPLAN? What was the level of interaction between the CPCC/military staff and the mission in creating the MIP?
OCEU	• Were there enough capabilities? Which capabilities there were? Was it possible to use them? How were they used? Was the use efficient and suited for the purpose? What was lacking? Where, how and what can be improved?
OCEU	• Have the capacities changed over time? How and why? Have the national caveats impacted planning and execution? (As an example: EUPOL AFG Field offices embedded with NATO/ISAF Provincial reconstruction teams, PRTs). You may request access to EUPOL SPEREP on field office operation lessons learnt (Sept-Oct 2015).
OCNEU	• Has the option of using inter-organizational capacities (e.g. the utilisation of NGO's capacities or NATO's command and force structures) been utilised in the operation? If yes, how, where, when and with what consequences?
IEU	• What was the required level of interoperability in beginning? Has it been developed? If not, has it prevented the execution of some aspects of the planned operation? How has this impacted the operation? How has re-planning been done?
CHEU/CHN EU	• How comprehensive has the planning and execution been? Were all societal aspects (military, political, social, cultural, economic, and so on) included in the planning and execution well enough and straight from the beginning? Was this a suitable, effective approach? Has there been any

	gaps? Of what kind? Where, how and what can be improved?
CHEU/ CHNEU	• What does comprehensiveness in the particular mission entail? Is it an appropriate approach? Why, why not?
CEU/ CNEU	• What has been the knowledge and skills base of the mission personnel? Has it been good enough for the successful accomplishment of the objectives? Has there been enough coordinated, cross-national training and exercises in advance? Do people know each other, trust each other and are the social networks strong and encompassing enough to best support the accomplishment of the objectives? Has the knowledge and skills base developed over time? How to improve?
INEU	"Which other international organisations / actors are operating in the country/region?"
PCNEU/ INEU	"To what extent the EU actions (civilian and/or military crisis management) have been linked with the other international efforts", or "are the objectives of the (EU) mission supporting the efforts of the wider international community?"
IEU/INEU	"Are there any coordination mechanisms between the different international organisations in place?"
IEU/INEU	"In case of any overlapping activities between the international actors, how have those been rectified?"
PCEU/ CHEU/ CHNEU	"How have the national strategies been taken into account when designing and planning the mission?" Or "are the mission objectives in line with the (possible) national strategies?" Or "are the objectives of the mission in line with other international framework documents for the country/region?" (these international documents could be PRSP - Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers)?" In many instances, there are already some institutions in place that (may) have been able to develop national strategies etc. that the mission would optimally 'plug in' or at minimum align their plans (provided that they are in line with EU objectives).
IEU/INEU	How do the different units/departments of the mission cooperate or relate to each other?
OCEU/ OCNEU	Whether the mission structure is suitable for implementing its objectives? Does it reflect the mandate?" What is the organisation' capability to develop the organisational/social culture of the operation?

PCEU/ PSNEU/ OCEU/ OCNEU	Was there early warning?
PCEU/ OCEU	How would you describe the decision making process? For how long did it take? Actors/Time/Stakeholders/Consultations Did it meet the time-requirements?
PCEU/ PCNEU	What decisions were made and why?
PCEU/ OCEU	Have you established a baseline for mission follow up?
TEU/OCEU	Do the goals of the mission take capabilities/technologies into consideration?
PCEU/ OCEU	Were the different budget lines optimised in terms of spending?
PCEU/ OCEU	How is the OPLAN connected with other EU strategies?
OCEU/ OCNEU/ IEU/ INEU	Did the host nation have requirements/restrictions in terms of capabilities?
OCEU/ OCNEU/ IEU/ INEU	Did your capabilities meet the local needs/expectations/operational requirements?
OCEU/ OCNEU	Do the organisational capacities exist? Does the organisation fit for the purpose?
OCEU/ OCNEU/ CEU/ CNEU	Does the mission/operation have enough human resources?
OCEU/ OCNEU	Are there identified lacks of capabilities?
CEU	From deployed personnel: Did you receive enough pre-mission training and guidance? Did it meet your needs?

CEU	From deployed personnel: Did you receive enough training during the mission/operation? Did it meet your needs?
PCEU/ OCEU	Was the security plan of the mission composed in a solid manner? Please elaborate (e.g. health care - local hospitals, own medics, evacuation routes and capabilities, alternative communication means)
OCEU/ IEU/ INEU	Is the mission/field office receiving enough analytical (intelligence) information for constructing accurate situation analyses in the area of responsibility? If not, what can be done better?
OCEU/ OCNEU	Was the possibility of variation in conflict intensity taken into account in planning? How has adaptation taken place?
OCEU/ OCNEU	Does the mission have an exit plan? Is it comprehensive and operational to your mind? Please elaborate.
OCEU/ OCNEU	Does the limited mission mandate have a strong impact on the implementation of the mission mandate?

* These modular codes should be appended with either PS for politico-strategic level of analysis or FO for field-operational level of analysis.

5   ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR CONDUCTING RESEARCH AND CASE STUDIES

The Ethical Guidelines aim to especially support from the ethical perspective the IECEU Consortium and its participants implementing the Work Packages and especially in order to analyse the CSDP missions/operations. Together, IECEU Technical Annex, Ethical Guidelines, Guide to Act, and Ethical Committee will ensure that IECEU –project respects, fulfils and follows the European Commission Ethics Requirements:

OTHER ETHICS ISSUES - Copies of ethical approvals by the competent Ethics Committee will be submitted to the EU

HUMANS - The IECEU ensures in the Technical Annex a mitigation plan (including insurance) in order to address the risks researchers and participants are exposed to during field work.

HUMANS - The IECEU clarifies in the Technical Annex whether vulnerable individuals/groups will be involved. Details must be provided about the measures taken to prevent the risk of enhancing vulnerability/ stigmatization of individuals/groups.

HUMANS - Details on the procedures and criteria that will be used to identify/ recruit research participants is provided in the Technical Annex.

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA - Detailed information is provided in the Technical Annex and Guide to Act on the informed consent procedures that will be implemented.

HUMANS - Interviewees (e.g EU and other organization officials which have taken part in various operations) may be revealing information which may be harmful to individuals, organizations or peace processes. Therefore, details on incidental findings policy is provided in the Technical Annex.

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA - The IECEU clarifies in the Technical Annex how consent/assent will be ensured in case children and/or adults unable to give informed consent are involved.

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA - The IECEU clarifies in the Technical Annex whether children and/or adults unable to give informed consent will be involved and, if so, justification for their participation must be provided.

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA - Copies of approvals for the collection of personal data by the competent University Data Protection Officer / National Data Protection authority is submitted to the EU by the end of month 7.

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA - Justification is provided in the Technical Annex for the collection and/or processing of personal sensitive data.

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA - Detailed information is provided in the Technical Annex on the procedures that will be implemented for data collection, storage, protection, retention and destruction and confirmation that they comply with national and EU legislation.

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA - The applicant is explicitly confirmed in the Technical Annex that the existing data are publicly available.

PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA - In case of data not publicly available, relevant authorizations are provided by the end of month 1.

OTHER ETHICS ISSUES - The IECEU is confirmed in the Technical Annex that the ethical standards and guidelines of Horizon2020 will be rigorously applied, regardless of the country in which the research is carried out.

NON-EU COUNTRIES - Detailed information is provided in the Technical Annex to confirm that fair benefit-sharing arrangements with stakeholders from ICPC are ensured during the project.

NON-EU COUNTRIES - The applicant is provided details in the Technical Annex on the material which will be imported to/exported from EU and provide the adequate authorizations by the end of month 1.

5.1 Background

In the IECEU-project we understand ethics as norms of conduct. To ensure this, the ethical aspects are highly appointed in methods, procedures, and/or perspectives. The research conducting must follow the guidance of scientific research. The IECEU-project is taking ethics issues into serious account. Ethics Issues are pointed in all levels of project implementation (partner, project management, task, work package, external committees). Integrity and honesty will be a duty of each participant who will be involved to the IECEU-project.

The IECEU consortium has ensured in Grant Agreement the compliance of the performed activities with national and EU legislation, especially in the case of children, and with the basic ethical principles that represents the shared values upon which the EU is founded and that are laid down in the European Charter of Fundamental Human Rights:

• Respect for autonomy, based on people decisional capacity

• Right to the physical and mental integrity of the person

• Protection of individual privacy and protection of personal data

74

IECEU will strictly adhere to the Data Protection Directive (1995/46/EC), which currently addresses data protection, privacy, and to a certain extent, security. Besides, attention must be paid to the potential approval of the recent proposal for a comprehensive reform of the EU's 1995 data protection rules, including the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data. The IECEU-project has ensured that fair benefit-sharing arrangements will be confirmed with non-EU countries and stakeholders during the whole duration of the project. It is both of benefit to research subjects and in their interests to be in a society, which pursues and actively accepts the benefits of research and where research is given a high priority.

5.2 Nature of the research conducting environment

The case study implementation will be done in the areas where the European Union (EU) has past or on-going external actions: CSDP missions and operations. The non-EU countries where the research conducting of European Union effectiveness will happen: Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, RD Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya, Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. The research conducting will be supported by the participating organisations' current activities and connections. After this said, the collection of data will be done in the context of EU CSDP mission environment.

5.3 Data Protection

- Data Protection issues, raised in Grant Agreement must be followed
- Data Protection Issues were raised in IECEU Conceptual Workshop (July 2015)
- Data Protection Guidance has been provided for IECEU partners

5.4 Collection of Personal Data

We confirm that the data collection and storage will be handling with high-level carefulness and based on the national requirements as well as high-level research. All of the partners have been required to provide the Approval for Collection of Personal Data (D9.9, M6), since the IECEU-project is loosely linked with possible sensitive data.

Every partner needs to ensure that the data collected will not harm the individual persons. In research, which involves operation of collection and processing of personal data, it is necessary to ensure respect for the principles of personal data protection -- this is particularly significant and unavoidable for people/researchers who collect personal data through interviews and surveys, especially when personal data relate to specific categories of people (civilian or military personnel) or in specific social circumstances (post-conflict societies).

Guide to Act (Appendix) includes the IECEU expectations, risk management processes (risks and mitigation) and guidance for IECEU partners and staff. All the guidance documents will be analysed again in Steering Committee Meeting (M9) and once again circulated among the partners before the Case Study Implementation.

5.5 Research participants

The IECEU will primarily interview international and national experts who work or have been working in CSDP Missions. The research participants are:

- Experts sent by the EU member states to work in the mission or recruited locally to work in the mission.
- Local counterparts, such as representatives of local police, security agencies and/or criminal justice institutions naturally depending on the mandate of the mission in question, who have worked with, either in partnership with or as recipients of activity by EU CSDP experts will be interview so as to hear opinions of the locals on the effectiveness and impact of the missions. The participants for the research will be further explained by the Case Studies.

5.6 Processes and guidance to ensure Ethics Issues

1) Follow the agreed principles (especially ethics and security sections) (Grant Agreement, Consortium Agreement)

2) Research Ethics are coordinated through SC and is part of Conceptual Framework (D1.5)

3) Peer-Reviewed Processes will be implemented in every task implementation and deliverable

4) Quality Plan Indicators are followed in Quality Review

5) The research information and knowledge will be handled confidentially

6) Approvals from Ethical Committees (partner internal and IECEU external Ethical Committee)

7) The evaluations and assessments follow the principles of the UNEG (United Nations Evaluation Group) and apply Code of Conduct in every situation.

5.7 Commitments from every IECEU –partner

- We will share the data and results via deliverables to ensure the openness
- We will avoid duplicative publication and discrimination
- We will respect human dignity, privacy and autonomy when conducting research on human subjects
- We will work carefully and critically
- The existing data used in the IECEU is publicly available
- No personal data are listed in the questionnaires (i.e. health, sexual lifestyle, ethnicity, etc.)

5.8 Approvals provided by Ethical Committees

The competent Ethical Committee should approve the research first internally (by partner organisation) and then externally (by the IECEU external Ethical Committee). The written approvals will be conducted by the PC.

6   CONCLUSION

The European Union carries out manifold conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. Due to this versatility, evaluating and comparing the effectiveness of the Union's measures is challenging. However, overcoming the challenge is exactly what the IECEU-project has been set to do.

The varying contexts and goals, applicability of capabilities, limited period of time for (re)acting and availability of resources can be addressed partly by creating a research framework, which is able to take the versatility into account. In the IECEU-project, collaborative creation conceptual workshop was the tool chosen for constructing that framework. Individual researchers carrying out the case studies will address the rest of the challenge. Reaching the desired end state of valid and comparable case study results hence depends on the quality of the framework, as well as on the skills and innovativeness of individual researchers. An additional, important influencing factor is the researchers' access to information.

6.1 Main points of the Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework of the IECEU consists of modules that each individual researcher applies to his or her case study as applicable. There are two levels of analysis: politico-strategic and field-operational. The case studies will examine the EU's missions and operations at both of these levels. Furthermore, both EU and non-EU perspectives will be included in the study through the selection of interviewees, sophisticated tailoring of questions and triangulation. EU perspectives entail those of policy-makers, civilian crisis management personnel and military crisis management personnel. Non-EU perspectives consist of the dispersed entities of "international community" and "local actors". Focuses of the study are the following six capabilities: planning capacity, organisational capacity, interoperability, comprehensiveness, competences (skills and knowledge) and technology.

Challenges overcome in the process of collaborative conceptual framework creation were: deciding on the focuses of the research project and developing a ready-made set of questions available to the individual researchers. The EU's conflict prevention and crisis management

operations vary to the extent that questions proving to be essential in one context may be less relevant in another.

The questions developed for the case studies serve as example questions that can be further modified by the individual researchers, although all research must use the modularity proposed as well as the modular codes. The modular codes are comprised of codes for the six capabilities, EU and non-EU perspectives and the two separate levels of analysis. Using the framework and the modular codes proposed will ensure comparability through a level of rigidity in the framework. Simultaneously, the framework is flexible enough (entailing plenty of choice and room for application for individual researchers) to be used in varying contexts. Both the structure of the EU's missions and operations and the actual processes taking place in them should be reflected upon in all case studies.

Focusing the conceptual framework further as well as adding research themes or emphasis will also take place when the implementation of case studies is carried out. There are limits to research design before the actual study is carried out. The created research framework guides the case studies but does not dictate them. It guarantees comparability while enabling the specification of the unique characteristics of each case. The initial attempt of creating a more rigid framework may have been too ambitious and leading to excessive micro-management. As the reasoning behind the entire IECEU-project is to improve the effectiveness of the EU's capabilities in conflict prevention and crisis management, evaluating capabilities and their use will be at the core of the research.

MAIN POINTS OF THE IECEU CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

- The conceptual framework is modular and each module has a code that must be used in case studies for comparability.

- The conceptual framework consists of research themes that should be taken into consideration when implementing the case studies.

- The framework has two levels of analysis: field-operational and politico-strategic. Of the two, field-operational is emphasised. Analysis takes place on both levels of analysis.

- The framework has two perspectives: EU and non-EU. The EU perspective includes policy-makers, civilian crisis management personnel and military crisis management personnel; the non-EU perspective consists of the dispersed entities of "international community" and "local actors".

- Focuses of the study are the following six capabilities: planning capacity, organisational capacity, interoperability, comprehensiveness, competences (skills and knowledge) and technology.

- In addition to the DoA and the conceptual framework, each case study must consider: effectiveness criteria (D1.4), information on training (WP 5), quantitative data for pooling and sharing (WP6), lessons learned (WP7), cross-cutting themes meaning gender and human rights, and triangulation.

- All case studies must also follow the ethical guidelines presented in this document.

6.2 Final Words

This deliverable is a considerable contribution to the study of missions and operations. It is unique in its approach, creates a foundation that can be further developed and duplicated by others. It clarifies and simplifies many questions that are often easier to be left unanswered, but if done so, weaken study design.

To the extent possible, no aspect of conflict prevention or crisis management has been left unconsidered or un-discussed. Still, depending on the viewpoint, the conceptual framework presented can be quite easily criticised for being too broad or narrow, too theoretical or not theoretical enough, too rigid or too flexible or for relying too much on individual expertise or being too consensus-oriented. The easy criticism is, however, juxtaposed by the near impossibility of finding something that would function better in either this project or the comparative study of crisis management and conflict prevention in a non-hierarchical and practice-oriented project.

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8   APPENDIX

8.1 Expert commentary: Arto Nokkala: Thoughts for the Conceptual Framework and Methodology

Arto Nokkala
8th July 2015

Project: Improving the Effectiveness of the Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

THOUGHTS FOR THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

Basic Problems in Planning of the Research

This memorandum aims to stimulate the conceptual workshop and research planning and preparations for it. It seems that we have in front of us a very practice-oriented work. It is based on concrete cases in conflict management [10] and aimed to bring clear policy recommendations. The two central challenges for the study project are 1) delimitation of the research subject and 2) reaching of the necessary generalization for a long-term novel policy application from a rather large group of cases which are multidimensional and multilevel and actually very different from each other, even if they all go under the heading of civilian conflict prevention and peace-building. The cases are also in many senses particular.

One basic problem relates to the setting of objective already. It does not state clearly, what is the actual target of the research project, so it must be elaborated. Some kinds of sticking-points exist anyway:
- nine different cases, including both civilian and military or combined efforts, missions and operations[11]. These are time-limited, but the delimitation problem especially affiliates with the setting of boundary of the cases and their context, as well as the external boundary of the context.
- the aim is to improve the effectiveness of the capabilities in EU conflict prevention by e.g. assessing the potential for pooling and sharing of capabilities and technologies (which means attention on cooperation)
- the attention is on long-term utilization of civilian means, even if civil-military-coordination will be emphasized
- solutions, approaches and recommendations should be new (which is a strong demand considering a long history of these kind of operations)
- the work aims to guarantee long-term stability (which is an understandable political goal, even if its attainment has proved very difficult in many conflict-ridden regions).

Several questions can be raised:

 1. It is far from clear, which will specifically use the provided recommendations. Is the study supposed to guide EU policy-making or national policy-making, or both of them, operational

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[10] I use this wider concept here instead of crisis management, even if it is widely used in actual political wording and documents.
[11] After this I prefer the concept of operation instead of mission.

planning of EU civil-servants, training in EU civilian crisis management for different tasks of personnel, personnel selection, or maybe all of these? Where is the specific focus, if it must be set? This problem is different from the obvious expectation that 'everyone' will read results of the study.

2. Are the cases approached from a political/policy perspective or from an organizational perspective?

3. How and to which extent we emphasize structures and institutions vs. processes, and on which level each of them, or is it better to leave that to be induced?

4. On what kind of information should the studies within the project be based?

5. How do we understand the influence, roles and mutual interactions of the personnel in an EU operation and in the area of operation? (Note: EU actors, local actors with a variating relation to EU actors, 'outsiders' or 'third-party actors').

Originally, it must be assumed that the project altogether will be based on underline expert knowledge and information, but without losing sight on the local society and its actors, largely those who also suffer from conflict, or whose interests are more or less advanced, hopefully, by the EU operations.

It is important, that actor's perceptions (inside perspective) will be underlined, and a strong top-down attitude from the direction of the EU bureaucracy will be avoided. But, on the other hand, if such a stance prevails in the operation on the field itself, it must be found out and included in facts which have an effect on recommendations to find best practices in the future.

Multi- and interdisciplinary is in this study in a way unavoidable, and it is not necessary to underline it. It is only essential that a group of separate studies can be sufficiently unified within a common framework, so that the result will be what is expected: a catalogue of best practices.

A Few Conceptual Delineations

Conflict and conflict management

A base of any research is a sound conceptual analysis and a consideration of the role of theory in the planned study. Central scientific concepts are *conflict* and *conflict management.* Both of them, as well as the project itself, could and maybe even should be based on what is known about social (and political) conflict and the post-cold war intervention into it, and politics/policy involved, together with the institutional framework of conflict management. A present trend is to talk about crisis-management (with its derivatives) as the action covering the whole intervention by any EU or other international organization, or by mediation and other political measures, but to some extent loses sight into the actual and different dynamics of conflict and its different dimensions and phases. It is only important here that a unified conceptual framework exists in the whole project. In the conceptual analysis, it is important that also the politicians know what has been studied, so EU definitions can be recommended, even if they must be adapted to general conflict-theoretical frame. This kind of theoretical and conceptual frame will help to sharpen the focus of actual empirical data collection in a sufficiently unified manner.

We need some unanimity about the conflict-theoretical base and its research-situation. A simple phase-model may be too rigid here, but an advanced elaborated model, which takes contextual differences and multidimensionality more into account and stresses interests, identities and power-relations would be more applicable. It is important to note that conflicts to be examined, all of them have a strong international dimension even without involvement of international organizations. They are not purely intra-state.

If some kind of phase-model is used, it must be delineated, which phase in a conflict-cycle is studied, and how it effects on the EU policy and action during the focused period. As a starting point, it is not yet defined, what is the phase of each studied operation. Even if there is no time for any thorough preliminary study, some discussion might be useful. It would help to orientate to produce recommendations which are supposed to serve a large scope in conflict prevention and peace-building. Another reason is that seemingly relatively equal operations have been, however, conducted in rather different conflicts what concerns their parties, regional and other context, chain of events and consequences.

A few moments of consideration could be devoted to the concepts of *conflict prevention* and *peace-building*. How they relate to each other in this study? What is done in actual operations? In conflict-theoretical literature they have a slightly different focus, even if in politics they are used often interchangeably. How much will peace-building be considered when the title if the project is "Improving the Effectiveness of the Capabilities in EU conflict prevention"? Is *early-warning* included in conflict prevention? Also the difference between primary, secondary and tertiary prevention could be kept in mind. As far as the concept of *human security* is involved, it should be carefully operationalized, because it is often seen as too sweeping to be a useful research concept. The workshop could produce a conceptual chart for the whole project, based on the pre-existing knowledge participants have.

Wide definitions in the preparatory work refer to an evaluation, that the relationship between the study and politics will be a close one. Spite it and the policy-orientation with applicable recommendations, the research itself must not be politics. Additionally, the study must be able to contribute to further studies, planning, personnel selection and training, but it is not planning itself. These differences must be kept in mind in the research design and its framework. What makes research in this study, and even scientific research? Rules and instructions for collection of evidence and its interpretation for the project have a central position. An inevitable close affiliation with policy interests can be turned into strength. Joint methodology work can ensure this, as well as continuous control of scientific validity.

When the research task is approached from such a close perspective between management (politics, decision-making) and research, it is understandable, that 'politically' the task represents participation in a definition of the current situation in the field of EU conflict- (or crisis) management by trying to point out its problems and shortfalls of action and capabilities and finding lasting solutions, but does it in systematic, argumented and problem-oriented terms. In this sense, they must differ from what e.g. politicians and civil-servants could produce without any specific study for the same purpose (like those based on intelligence and plain unreflected experience).

Effectiveness of capabilities

Effectiveness of capabilities should be taken seriously as an analytical concept and not just easy political rhetoric that is commonly used in this context. How should we approach the

effectiveness of capabilities? Is it the same as in the requirement that more and better results must be reached in operations with fewer resources and in a shorter time? Or something else, when we talk about international conflict management? What are its dimensions? How is effectiveness measured or evaluated? How much the effectiveness depends on the quality of resources and its development? Will the major obstacles of effectiveness reside on EU politics or policies (like often a wrong or insufficient mandate as a result), planning (like the composition of participants in the organization or their cooperation), insufficient intelligence or knowledge about the particular conflict, or even in more fundamental issues? What kind of effectiveness should be focused when trying to improve and where is specifically the target of that effort? Is it already there, when a conflict is picked up to be managed? Or is it more in defining the mandate, personnel selection and training? Must the improvement reach widely the organization of the whole of the conflict-management action of the European Union (institutional changes and changes of rules), or maybe even more widely to CFSP or CDSP of the Union? Some of these must be considered with the actual planning of the study, but after we've decided, what we understand by the effectiveness of capabilities.

Before Setting the Research Problem and Questions

Certain <u>background questions</u>, present in every conflict, are or have been these:
- what is the conflict about?
- how the conflict has developed?
- who are its parties? How they can be defined with their relations? (Note: for instance the problem of 'guest fighters')
- What do the parties want, to be exact? (Including short-term/long-term, different levels of objectives and the change in them)
- How the parties understand, what their adversaries aim at?
- What are their policies and strategies?
- What are their resources and where they come from?
- How the parties understand aims of third parties?
- do they have certain widely adapted beliefs, prejudices, cultural norms concerning third parties? Why?
- Who, in general, are third parties, and what are their policies in the particular conflict?
- how the conflict parties see e.g. that the intervention by the EU and its organization, promotes their own interests, adversary interests or common interests, or the interests of EU and its member states?
- How the parties evaluate that the foreign intervention is pro-active in promotion of their interests?
- Where lies the power of the conflict parties, and who are powerless in the particular conflict?
- What are previous successes and set-backs in the management of this conflict? From whose viewpoint?
For the project, we need a preliminary understanding based on earlier research concerning the conflicts and interventions to be studied.
Further <u>basic questions</u> to be considered in the planning phase might follow:
- What might be greatest problems of the effectiveness in the field of operations, or in the EU organization?
- Wherefrom they might arise?
- Which of them are probably resolvable by developing EU capabilities?
   - By politics and planning (like overall strategy, selection of the conflict, civilian or/and military means, suitable mandate, operational and tactical planning, anticipation of mission-creeping etc.)
   - Distribution of resources (including finances)
   - Selection of right personnel, education and training

                    - Feedback and systematization of knowledge, including research
- In which relation problems are conflict-specific; depending on a certain contextual issues
- To which extent we can expect generalizations and what are they like?
- Where should we concentrate on?

The nine cases to be studied are different in their size and focus. Common to them seems to be that despite they are rather restricted, e.g. a reform of security or police sector, border management, aviation security or development of rule of law. It is possible that mostly they represent only a small step forward in peace-building and future conflict prevention. Some of them are though rather encompassing in terms of advancing stability and creating favourable conditions. If the desirable knowledge is drawn too much from these specific operations, many other influences on effectiveness must be left out, or will be left. Still, it is possible that the knowledge will centrally deal with conduct and personal experiences of the personnel or the framework they have had in operations, as well as practical concrete results what they believe they have received, or what their contact persons evaluate they have gained. In this sense, the results of the study will largely give applicable observations on that level of EU action for operational planning, training and selection of personnel, but the larger improvement of capabilities may appear thin, and generalization problems will be large.

Spite that, it would be warranted to find out, where the observed problems of effectiveness stem from. Is the blame mainly far from the actual conflict-site, in activities of different organizations, misunderstandings about the context, or in the problem, that the whole framework of the operation stumbles in terms of politics and economy? What can be done in an operation according to its mandate, and what can be done in advance? These questions can be examined with the help of the participants in the operation and the local people, but also by studying past and existing preconditions of the operation in EU and national levels.

In general, it can be said that to improve a conflict-(crisis) management operation either by the European Union or any other international organization or coalition requires that
- Preconditions of the operation will be improved what comes to available capabilities and planning, including selection, mandate, organization and resources and also coordination and cooperation on the ground,
- know-how of the participating personnel is will be on a better level, including its knowledge of conflict and its cultural roots, but especially that the personnel fits to tasks they have.

In setting the actual research questions different groups of factors must kept separate from each other. It must be separated, if we study in practical experiences and solutions:
- The mandate and organization of the exemplary operation
- Activities of individual persons and good practices and arguments they give to them
- unifying the previous two issues
- How the two depend on the context like
          - Parties and their policies
          - Jurisdictional conditions of the operation
          - History and societal roots of the conflict
          - Other conditions, like the role and action of other international organizations in the
          region, especially military organizations, even if they are not under EU command

Specific questions can be presented about how
- Interaction within the operation has worked with representatives of the parties and how it has promoted better results in the work
- What have been major obstacles and points of friction the EU personnel has faced and what have been methods which have worked

90

- What have been reasons why something has not worked according to 1) EU persons, 2) representatives of parties

An attention in the objective of the project has been given to 1) the interoperability of capabilities and 2) civil-military coordination. They could be taken to be studied in the research of cases on the level of single operations, and at least in the whole project on the EU level. It seems that at least cases of EUFOR ALTHEA and EUFOR Chad give only restricted knowledge on the operational level, but they can give it on the EU level and be to some extent transferable to other cases.

In cases, where a military crisis management operation has not been underway, it could be taken into account as a factor whose absence has effected on the conduct of civilian operation. Even if development of military practices is not the aim of the study, it is reasonable to disclose, how military practices or lack of them have effected on conflict prevention and its preconditions in a civilian operation and capabilities for it.

Thoughts on methodology and evidence

Methodologically, the project could work based on a wide and diverse material. The research can be both qualitative and quantitative. It may be mainly characterized as an evaluative multiple case research that to some extent is comparative but rather focused cross-case research. Independent factor for the nine cases of conflict management could be EU policies, resources, planning, and capabilities, but focused on evident connection with the studied cases. The cases should not delimited to be only EU operations but seen as a more comprehensive and interdependent instances of conflict management in a certain conflict and region, where the EU operation is at the heart but almost an equal importance must be attached to its immediate context and to the interaction where the EU body presents one interested (third) party in the conflict.

Discussing if the study is process- or structure-oriented, it could be focusing on the process (conflict-management in its several forms) but it could depend also on observation concerning structure and produce structural and institutional result. Sophisticated methods or methodological approaches and research strategies like operation research, system analysis, network research etc. are not necessary, and actually many of them tend to be just a way to organize thinking about the phenomenon. More general methodological overall orientation in this research could be named as objectivist and rationalist, which makes policy-oriented recommendations easier to reach, but it does not mean a strong objectivist-rationalist programme.

Obviously, the data must be collected from very different sources. Partly, ethical consideration and some practical limits of research economy guide the collection. The sources could be divided to different groups like
- Scientific and other literature
- Newspapers
- Speeches
- Documents
- Letters
- Questionnaires (e-mail, survey)
but central observations could be produced by focused structured or semi-structured interviews.

It is a risk to try to gain too much with this study. Getting valid primary data may be tedious especially what comes to evaluations of local participants. Interviewing other than such EU personnel, who have participated in operations and are now available in their home countries, may turn out costly. Interviewing local actors may turn out impossible in some cases. This problem puts pressure on using literal sources and verifying action, but on the other hand unique to-the-point-data could be obtained.

To gather the evidence persons could be seen in different groups like
I   EU participants of examined EU operations
II   local personnel of examined EU operations
III   local people (representatives of conflict parties or contact persons but also other local people)
IV   participants of other operations in the region, or of other international and non-governmental organizations)
V   EU civil servants and other experts
VI   experts needed to conduct the project as research personnel

The idea could be that the evidence is collected with the help of groups I – V and after elaboration and analysis with single case studies the cross-case analysis would be conducted as an iterative *expert analysis* with the help of a panel of 6 – 10 experts, who are not the same persons which belong to groups I – V, but who would have experience both from EU conflict management activities and research. If this is not possible, the panel could be formed out of leaders of the project and nine case studies.

THE WORKSHOP DESIGN

The Conceptual Workshop with its four sessions could proceed (based on a preliminary e-mail questionnaire and material distributed by the project leader) like this

COMMON AND NEW THEMES, LEVELS OF ANALYSIS
1
- Creation of general framework, conceptual discussion, preliminary delineation of the pattern unifying different cases, boundaries of cases
- Elaboration of basic research outline and objectives (including the role of theory)
- Practical and theoretical definition of the research problem
- Delimitation of research
2
- setting of research questions for the project and common questions for cases
- setting of specific questions (the case designs in single cases will be done after this as a 'homework')

METHODS
3
- Discussion of methodology; evaluative and comparative multiple case study; process research
- Definition of data collection methods; interviewees preliminarily, need of survey-research, other data collection methods applicable to different target persons
- Preliminary outlining of interview questions, especially those common to the project
- Norms that guide the research, interaction between case study groups

4
- Forms of reporting

- schedule planning
- Feedback

8.2 Expert commentary: Mirva Salminen: two (main) potential approaches to the study of crisis management, process-oriented and systems-oriented approaches

1) Process-oriented approach

Strengths: Does not concentrate on particular functions or actors, but on processes and hence enables the overcoming of traditional mental boundaries, such as civilian / military, our organization / your organization, economic / political. Enables process modelling and then comparison of the actual situation with the constructed model. Enables finding both differences and similarities in processes running through the operations. Can include pre- and post-operation phases and monitoring of processes can facilitate learning or efficiency assessment. Diversity of processes can illustrate different aspects of the operation and enables analysis on different levels.

Potential negatives: Crisis management operations are not necessarily planned and constructed as processes but on the basis of capabilities or functions. Thus, requires a twist in thinking. Identification of supporting or disrupting processes is not necessarily easy and requires time, effort and access to information, as well as knowledge about the environment.

EU Conflict Prevention Strategy/ Strategies =

Ends: goals from conflict prevention strategy/ strategies

Means: conflict prevention instruments available

Ways: conflict prevention methods chosen for implementation

1. Phase
   Describing the overall and sub-goals of the crisis management operation: Overall goals from strategic planning and constitutive documents, sub-goals from the ground i.e. from those doing the operational planning and building up the structure of the crisis management operation. Vision (an ideal state after the operation) and mission (what the operation is to achieve).
2. Phase

Turning these overall and sub-goals into vertical processes running through the crisis management operation: What are the core processes of the operation? What are the support processes? How can it be evaluated whether the support processes actually support the core processes or not? If yes, where and what are the success factors? If not, where and what are the gaps or obstacles? How could it be guaranteed that they do? Do the core processes support or hinder the attainment of the overall and sub-goals of the crisis management operation?

3. Phase

Evaluating the processes: Who is in charge/responsible for which of them? How are they organized e.g. what are the different process stages? Who participates in which? What are the essential nodes or interfaces between different process stages or between different participants that need to be secured – the move from a stage to another made as smooth as possible. What energizes a process or keeps it going? What causes friction in or dissolution of a process?

4. Phase

Evaluating the environment of each process: Are there external pro- or counter-affecting processes? What are they like? How can they be supported or counter-influenced? What are the facilitators or impeders present in the environment? On the other hand, what are the values that guide the process? Are there collisions of values, operational cultures, internal structures or so amongst the participants that could influence the process?

5. Phase

Evaluating the evolution of each process: How does the process change over time? Does its goals change; its participants; its phases; its environment; its supportive or hindering processes? How the process accommodates these changes? What is it good/poor at? Do the feedback loops work? Does information about the changes reach every participant?

6. Phase

Evaluating alternative ways of organizing the processes: Are there other ways in which the processes could be organized? Are there ways, which might improve the efficiency of a process? Or convert it towards achieving its goals better? How could processes be changed purposively?

7. Phase

Evaluating the life cycle of the operation: What is the current phase of the operation? Where it is likely to go next, how will it develop? Who will participate the next phase? What will they do? Or is there several phases going on simultaneously? Do these phases support or counteract one another? Does the operation work as an entity or are there several different operations going on? What are the likely processes utilized in future phases of the operation?

8. Phase

Comparison between the different case studies and finding out success factors.

2) Systems/Network approach

Strengths: Can provide a comprehensive map of an operation (participants, their connections and interfaces, their tasks) and an understanding of how information flows within the entity (including feedback loops). Hence enables finding both differences and similarities in the structure of the operations. Effects observed in one part of the network could potentially be traced to their "origins" and through learning be taken into consideration the next time when actions are planned and executed. Examination of the system environment could help explaining why particular actions may lead to unexpected effects (feedback loop from the outside).

Potential negatives: Mapping requires lots of time, energy and access to information i.e. access to a position from which observation can be carried out effectively. Interconnections and feedback loops are not necessarily easy to recognize or abstract from their environment. A very wide and broad approach which, on the other hand, can be applied to subsystems as well i.e. the level of analysis can be changed. In order to study the development of the crisis management operation the empirical study needs to be carried out sequentially.

1. Phase
   Describing the overall and sub-goals of the crisis management operation: Overall goals from strategic planning and constitutive documents, sub-goals from the ground i.e. from those doing the operational planning and building up the structure of the crisis management operation.

2. Phase
   Mapping the network of actors on a practical level: Who participates? Who is linked to whom and how? Is the flow of information between two participants one- or two-directional (gives an idea of the authority structure)?
   ➢ Mapping the network provides visibility over the structure of the crisis management operation at the practical level (vs. the planned structure which is presumably always different). Also over how big and complex the structure is.
   ➢ Mapping the flows of information and the respective feedback loops provides visibility over the authority structure of the crisis management operation at the practical level i.e. who coordinates tasks and actions? Is there such coordination and how well does it work? Where there are gaps and obstacles (in information sharing, cooperation [including pooling and sharing], coordination, funding) – How these can be overcome?

3. Phase

Mapping the main tasks and actions of each participant: What does each participant do? How and by which means? What is the mandate of each participant (gives an idea of what is possible and what is out of the scope)?

4. Phase

Mapping the terrain and circumstances: In what kind of conditions is the crisis management operation carried out? Natural and man-made, cultural, historical, political, economic, social, etc. Is there an enemy/enemies? If multiple, how are these linked to one another? Are there (actual/potential) partners? How are these linked to one another? Are the potential ways to turn enemies into partners / dangers of turning partners into enemies? Who does one cooperate with at the local level? How do the locally existing structures permit, facilitate, restrict or prevent certain actions and influence in effects of these actions?

5. Phase

Mapping the effects of different actions of each participant: What are the effects of a particular action? Are they as expected or do they have unexpected effects? Describing the particular circumstances of each action and listing the known effects. Are the actions taken in line with the overall goal or the sub-goals of the crisis management operation? Do they support or undermine the achievement of the overall goal? Do they support or counteract actions taken by other participants in order to achieve similar or different goals within the crisis management operation?

6. Phase

Evaluating the development of the crisis management operation: a process-oriented description of how the operation proceeds from planning to execution and, finally, to evaluation i.e. How has the crisis management operation evolved? When estimating this, change in the aforementioned factors should be taken into consideration: goals, participants, tasks, circumstances and effects of certain actions. Is it achieving its initial goals? Have more important goals of which achievement is more urgent emerged? How is the crisis management operation changing the circumstances in which it is carried out? Was the planning sufficient in comparison to the realities of the operation? Has it continued and been adaptive to the changes? Do the feedback loops from the ground to planning and execution work? Has the execution been flexible enough in order to support the achievement of the preferred goals? What has gone wrong? How has the overall operation accommodated these setbacks and come over them? How have failures been dealt with? How have successes been dealt with? What has been judged as a success/a failure according to which criteria? Has this been the correct criterion for evaluating such a

thing? Have the lessons learned been collected, analysed and disseminated throughout the network?

7. Phase
Evaluating the life cycle of the operation: What is the current phase of the operation? Where it is likely to go next, how will it develop? Who will participate the next phase? What will they do? Or is there several phases going on simultaneously? Do these phases support or counteract one another? Does the operation work as an entity or are there several different operations going on?

8. Phase
Comparison between the different case studies and finding out success factors.

8.3 Example contextual questions: Politico-Strategic

Table 16: Example Contextual Questions: Level of Analysis: Politico-Strategic

Example contextual questions: **Level of Analysis: Politico-Strategic (Commission, EEAS)**						
FOCUS **PERSPECTIVE**	**Mission Ends** (goals from conflict prevention/crisis management) **WHY?**	**Contextual-EU Policy Making** **WHAT?**	**Mission life cycle** (Timescale: what happens when? Development of the mission, timeliness) **WHEN?**	**Actor-specific** (Who does what? How does that influence the outcomes?) **WHO?**	**Mission Means:** Instruments available **HOW?**	**Mission Ways:** mechanisms chosen for implementation **HOW?**
EU	What are the mission/operation ends? Have they been clearly defined by EU policy makers? Where has the decision-making taken place? What are the goals/ sub-goals of the civilian/ military component in the operation? How have the goals of the mission been set? What are the EU-wide/national interests in the matter?	What is the context of the EU decision-making? What is the decision-making process? How was the final decision about the mission reached? Has the military/civilian perspectives been taken into account in mission policymaking? How well is the EU-wide and national decision-making synchronised?	Why did the mission start when it did? Where is the emphasis in different stages of the mission life cycle? What concerns have been evident in the pre-planning, planning and continuation of the mission? Is so-called mission creep evident? What further policy decisions are expected to be carried out during the mission? How will a decision concerning the end of the mission be reached?	Who are the actors on the ground? How do they relate to each other? Who were key planners of the mission? How much did military/ civilian leadership influence the decision making and planning? Who takes part in the decision making about the mission?	What means are available? What means were chosen for to use in this mission? Could other means be used as well? Why are certain means not used? How are the different means emphasized in the mission? How large is the military/ civilian component and	Are the civilian/military mechanisms chosen for implementation appropriate for the goals intended? Is there a feedback loop? How does feedback loop / lessons learned process function? Are different levels (of the mission? conflict?) taken into consideration?

Example contextual questions: **Level of Analysis: Politico-Strategic**					
FOCUS **PERSPECTIVE**	**Mission Ends** (goals from conflict prevention/crisis management)	**Contextual-EU Policy Making**	**Mission life cycle** (Timescale: what happens when? Development of the mission, timeliness)	**Actor-specific** (Who does what? How does that influence the outcomes?)	**Mission Means:** Conflict Prevention/ Crisis Management Instruments available	**Mission Ways:** Conflict prevention/Crisis management prevention mechanisms chosen for implementation
	WHY?	**WHAT?**	**WHEN?**	**WHO?**	**HOW?**	**HOW?**
NON-EU	How do policy goals stated by the EU affect the local population? Have they benefitted the local population? Note: all local factions may not be interested in promoting the well-being of the population. How are the EU-set goals expected to affect the balance of power at the local level? How do different interest groups attempt to influence EU decision-making?	Do the EU policy level decisions refer to the local level? How much have (and are) local actors been consulted in the mission planning?	At which point in the local conflict did the mission begin? Was the intervention a preferred policy option? How has it influenced the local conflict ever since?	How did the parties to the conflict respond to the conflict? Note: were the parties parts of the conflict before the conflict became a violent conflict? How did local fractions and other actors respond to the crisis? Who are the actors EU cooperates with or avoids? Has this changed? How did some actors become parties in the conflict / in the intervention?	What agreements have been made with the locals?	Are the prevention mechanisms tailored to the local environment?

D1.5 Conceptual Framework

Public

IECEU
CSA project: 653371
Start date: 01/05/2015
Duration: 33 months

8.4 Example contextual questions: Field-Operational

Table 17: Example contextual analysis, level of analysis: field-operational

Example contextual questions: **Level of Analysis: Field-Operational**					
FOCUS PERSPECTIVE	**Mission Ends** (goals from conflict prevention/crisis management)	**Contextual-EU Policy Making**	**Mission life cycle** (Timescale: what happens when? Development of the mission, timeliness)	**Actor-specific** (Who does what? How does that influence the outcomes?)	**Mission Means:** Conflict Prevention/ Crisis Management Instruments available	**Mission Ways:** Conflict prevention/Crisis management mechanisms chosen for implementation
	WHY?	WHAT?	WHEN?	WHO?	HOW?	HOW?
EU	What are the mission ends on the ground? Are they inline with the mandate? Why, why not? How do the military and the civilian components complement one another? Do civilian / military strengths translate into operational practice? How, why or why not? What are the ends achievable via civilian/ military means? How does planning take place? How does political guidance impact strategic planning?	How is the mission impacting the region? The state in question? How is the relative importance of different actions determined? How is the relative importance of different actions determined? How have the strategic choices made in the operation impacted EU foreign policy goals regionally/ in the mission country? What are the key military considerations in the implementation EU mission operations? How does the planning function as a whole? Do the operations deliver what they have been tasked to do? How does the feedback loop impact future actions (lessons	What are the vision (ideal state after the operation) and mission (what is the operation to achieve)? How has strategic decision-making evolved? Has there been a need to change the strategic goals? What are the overall and sub-goals of the crisis management operation/ mission for the civilian component/ the military? How has decision-making evolved? Is there an exit plan? Has transitions from e.g military to civilian crisis management been planned? Is there an exit plan? What are the different operational steps taken and how do they impact the mission as a process? What kinds of operations are carried out at different stages of the mission?	What are the planned/actual actors in the mission? How are the actors chosen for the operation? Who are they? Are the actors chosen able to carry out their duties? How do they relate to one another? Do all actors know what their chosen roles are? Do all actors within the mission share the same goals? Why or why not? How is cooperation between different actors? Who are the key planned military/civilian actors? EUMS's role in the mission?? What is the management system of the operation like? Who is in charge? How do the different actors relate to one another and cooperate? How can the strategy be improved to enhance cooperation?	What civilian/military means are included in the mission/operation? Do they differ from the ones chosen in the policy context?	Are the mechanisms chosen for implementation appropriate for the goals intended? How do mechanisms chosen in strategic planning reflect the mandate of the mission? Are the actors chosen able to carry out their duties?

	learned)?					
NON-EU	How are local wishes and preferences taken into consideration in the strategic formulation of mission goals? Are the measures taken in-line with local interests? If so, why or why not? Do they have local support? Whose support?	Do the EU strategic level decisions refer to the local level? How much have (or are) local actors been consulted in the mission planning? Are threats to the locals and other unbalancing factors taken into consideration? How do the steps taken by the EU mission impact the local/regional environment?	Is there a local exit plan? Is there a transitional plan? Are the effects of the mission on local economy taken into consideration? How has the mission changed over time? At what stage of the mission life cycle are different operations carried out? How has operational decision-making evolved? How has the impact of the mission on the local/regional changed during the life cycle of the mission? How has local involvement evolved?	Which local partners cooperate with EU strategic planning? Which local partners take part in the operations of the EU missions? Who are they? Who are included, who are excluded? What is the impact of inclusion and exclusion? How are partners chosen? What roles do local partners have? How are these roles decided? Do local actors adhere and agree with the roles that they have been given? Why, why not? Do they support actions on the ground or are they against them?	Does planning take local capabilities into consideration? Does the mission support local capabilities? Does the mission support local stability?	Are the prevention mechanisms tailored to the local environment? Is there friction between the local and the EU perspectives on the methods chosen?

8.5 Example case study: Planning and Strategic Level Analysis

The purpose is to benefit from all the case study tasks and deliverables as parts of overall analysis. These reports and deliverables will be implemented part of IECEU case studies. This example is prepared part of Case Study Kosovo. This can be modified for all the Case Studies by following IECEU DoA.

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS	Politico / Strategic – Field / Operational (CASE: Kosovo)		
PERSPECTIVE / FOCUS	**PERSPECTIVE EU: the personnel of mission/operation; experts on international and national security from the EU, the Balkans and elsewhere**	**PERSPECTIVE NON-EU: representatives of local institutions**	
	D2.1 & D2.5 an introduction to the general context	D2.1 & D2.5 an introduction to the general context	1. An overview of the current situation
	D2.1 analysis of the existing practices for pooling and sharing	D2.1 analysis of the existing practices for pooling and sharing	2. Existing practices of pooling and sharing
	D2.4 lessons-identified report (discussion report)	D2.4 lessons-identified report (discussion report)	3. Lessons identified report
	D2.1 assess the impact and achievements of EULEX	D2.1 assess the impact and achievements of EULEX	4.The impact and achievements of EULEX
	D2.1 identify the successes and potential shortcomings in the implementation of the mandate of the mission	D2.1 identify the successes and potential shortcomings in the implementation of the mandate of the mission	5.Assessment of the developments and progress
			6. An assessment of the level of coordination

8.6 Supplementary fieldwork oriented questions

• PCEU Was the member states' will expressed clearly enough so that the CMPD (or its predecessors) was able to develop the mission concept? If not, what were the consequences or next steps?

- Was the CMPD's mission concept (approved by PSC) clear enough so that EUMS able to begin strategic-operational planning?
- Was the CMPD's mission concept (approved by PSC) clear enough so that CPCC was able to begin strategic-operational planning?

• PCNEU Was the planned mission discussed with other international organizations in advance? Where and how? With what kind of results?

• PCNEU Was the planned mission discussed with the local stakeholders? Where and how? With what kinds of results? Who was perceived as an acceptable counterpart? (From the operational perspective: were these the most important or appropriate counterparts?)

• PCEU/ OCEU Have national caveats impacted planning and execution? How? What has been done to overcome the obstacles?

• PCEU Regarding this operation, is the planning and commanding structure in Brussels (PSC/CIVCOM/CMPD/CPCC) appropriate? How do they function in relation to missions/operations? How is strategic guidance for the Mission (HoMs/Commanders) given?

• PCEU Was the strategic planning (Crisis Management Concept/CONOPS) conducted in a manner that enabled the making the OPLAN? Were there difficulties? How were those overcome?

• PCEU From the mission commander/Head of Mission: Was the strategic planning so clearly done in Brussels that making the OPLAN was possible without too big challenges (ownership for the OPLANS rests with MS as they approve it)? Which difficulties there were? How were those overcome?

• Did loss of time or delays occur due to the planning process? Were there other consequences for achieving the mission goals? How to improve? How was the Mission

Implementation Plan (MIP) designed on the basis of OPLAN? What was the level of interaction between the CPCC/military staff and the mission in creating the MIP?

• Were the capabilities sufficient? Which capabilities there were? Was it possible to use them? How were they used? Was the use efficient and suited for the purpose? What was lacking? How to improve?

• Have the capacities changed over time? How and why? Have the national caveats impacted planning and execution? (As an example: EUPOL AFG Field offices embedded with NATO/ISAF Provincial reconstruction teams, PRTs). You may request access to EUPOL SPEREP on field office operation lessons learnt (Sept-Oct 2015).

• Has the option of using inter-organizational capacities (e.g. the utilisation of NGO's capacities or NATO's command and force structures) been utilised in the operation? If yes, how, where, when and with what consequences?

• What was the required level of interoperability in beginning? Has it been developed? If not, has it prevented the execution of some aspects of the planned operation? How has this impacted the operation? How has re-planning been done?

• How comprehensive has the planning and execution been? Were all societal aspects (military, political, social, cultural, economic, and so on) included in the planning and execution well enough and straight from the beginning? Was this a suitable, effective approach? Has there been any gaps? Of what kind? How to improve?

• What does comprehesiveness in the particular mission entail? Is this an appropriate approach?

• What has been the knowledge and skills base of the mission personnel? Has it been good enough for the successful accomplishment of the objectives? Has there been enough coordinated, cross-national training and exercises in advance? Do people know each other, trust each other and are the social networks strong and encompassing enough to best support the accomplishment of the objectives? Has the knowledge and skills base developed over time? How to improve?

8.7 Guide To Act –IECEU related case studies

The IECEU participants work for reaching the excepted impacts of the project:

- IECEU should develop a clear assessment of the capabilities of the EU for external conflict prevention and peace building and identify the best civilian means to enhance these capabilities
- IECEU should provide a set of clear policy priorities and technological needs on civilian conflict prevention, with a focus on the exploitation of civilian-military synergies

The presented impacts will finally aim to indicate by reducing the number of civilian victims in crisis by long-term and preventive solutions as well as enhance the interoperability of the resources in peacebuilding and crisis management.

To achieve the expected impacts, the IECEU –project will implement several activities during May 2015 – January 2018. The most of the activities will be organised through cooperation and support activities. Of those activities the Case Studies (WP2-WP4) in non-EU countries will be the key actions in order to analyse and assess the CSDP mission and operations as well as the EU capabilities for external conflict prevention and the potential for pooling and sharing. In practice it means that the field studies will be taken place in CSDP mission and operation areas: in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, South Sudan, Libya, Central African Republic, Palestine Territory and Afghanistan.

8.7.1.   PROCESSES TO MINIMIZE THE RISKS

Moreover, from the traditional project risk management, IECEU –project has created the internal processes (9 separated processes in total) to minimize the risks related especially to case study/field study participants, but also the whole staff involved in this project:

1. **Risk Management Process: Description of risks and risk mitigation plans (Table)**

IECEU –project has, early stage of the project implementation, created the descriptions of possible risks regarding the project implementation (specified by WPs). In order to mitigate the risks, the risk mitigation measures have planned. The planned activities include actions in

several level of the project implementation. Moreover, the updated risk descriptions and mitigation plans will be analysed in M7 in Steering Committee meeting. The Case Study work packages are playing the key role in IECEU –project. Therefore, IECEU PC suggests to analyse the ethical and security related risks again before the field study work. The M6 Risk Description and Risk Mitigation Measures –table introduces all the risks addresses in IECEU –project. The risks number 13-17 are new described risks that are completed during the project implementation M1-M6.

2. Joint Methodology Process: Collaborative Methodology and Framework building

- Work Package 1 (Tasks 1-5)
- Work Package 9 (Coordination)
- Work Package 8 (Communication)

3. Recruitment Process

- Selection of competent organisations implementing Work Packages (responsible)
- Establishment of recruitment recommendations for the participating partner organisations

4. Knowledge rising regarding the field study context and environment

- Summary of Case Study environment (CSDP mission and operation)
- Advisory Board Advising Session: Security in mission areas
- Case Study current situation reviews (reports)

5. Completion of Ethical Guidelines and Guide to Act

- in order to support WP implementations (especially WP2-WP4)

6. Completion of Ethics Issues (ref. GA) –document

7. Security and Ethical Considerations

- Establishment of Security Board
- All the partners need to have valid insurance when collecting and storing the data
- Establishment of competent, external Ethical committee (to ensure that ethical requirements are taken into account)

8. Research Ethics (special attention to Data Protection)

- IECEU Grant Agreement (Technical Annex, Ethics section)

- National law requirements and legal standards provided by nations and EU
- Data Protection Lesson provided in IECEU Methodological Workshop (2015)
- Data collection anonymously
- To collect the data the authorisations to the research and approvals for collection of personal data (M1, M6)

9. Quality Assurance

- IECEU Quality Plan with clear set of procedures and guidelines
- Internal Review required
- Internal Review in Consortium
- Quality Review (PC, Quality Manager)
- Advisory Board
- Steering Committee

Through implementation of these processes IECEU aims to provide safe and ethically competent platform to conduct all its activities. The following chapters will provide more guidance in terms of fair benefit-sharing, participation, informed consent procedures, and research conducting. The special attention will be paid to ensure that IECEU partners are following the respecting research ethics, ethical guidelines and security recommendations.

8.7.2.   ENSURE FAIR BENEFIT-SHARING WITH NON-EU COUNTRIES/ICPCS

The overall aim is to improve the current EU capabilities, resolve the tensions and prevent conflict by providing new approaches and solutions, but the decisions and implementation of them will be done by decision makers (such as EEAS and EU Member States). IECEU aims to improve accounting, monitoring and evaluation. The collaboration helps partners to understand the potential of improvement of conflict prevention. This project will not have expectations of direct impact on national benefit-sharing arrangements (e.g. development funds, support) of Case Study areas. Nevertheless, IECEU aims to improve collaborative measures and building the capacity of EU participating to areas. The detailed fairness of benefit sharing implementation in IECEU:

1. The participation of International Cooperation Partner Countries (ICPC): IECEU follows EU international policy objectives and will enhance the cooperation with partners in case study areas by participating to the research as interviewees by providing first-hand knowledge (no harm, anonymously)

2. The ICPC countries will not attend to the project by providing any work.

3. The benefit for the ICPC countries will be the research results and impact assessment/evaluation

4. Through implementation of external actions of EU: opportunity for ICPC countries to learn from Europe

5. The EU missions/operations experts (seconded by EU Member States) will provide the most important links to the case study areas (use of public data).

6. Project will share the results (reports, articles, research) openly to all. The main stakeholders of the project are EU Officials that also guarantees that benefit of the results will be delivered for everyone's best.

8.7.3.   PARTICIPATION TO RESEARCH

9. We will not involve any children and/or adults unable to give informed to the project.

10. We will not involve any vulnerable individuals or groups to the research activities or project.

11. Vulnerable groups will not face any harm of the project because they are not included to those who will be interviewed, or targeted otherwise, during the project.

12. Also the main stakeholders in the project are EU Officials, and hence vulnerable groups will not be harmed by the project.

We understand that the interviewees may reveal information which may be harmful for the individuals or groups. To minimize the risks in this regards, IECEU Ethical Committee will provide more specified details on incidental findings policy. IECEU management structure (will including SC, EC and Advisory Board) strongly tackle the risks regarding publishing incidental findings. The deliverables will be reviewed and evaluated in every case. SC is

responsible of implementation of incidental findings policy. The information will be analysed from different perspectives and approved by an independent Ethical Committee. In case of any possible harmful information reveal, that information will not be published.

8.7.4.   INFORMED CONSENT PROCEDURES

The WP1-4 Leaders will be responsible for informing the research participants in the early stage of IECEU project. To ensure the implementation of informed consent and data protection issues we will provide informed consent procedures in this document. The six steps of procedures are:

1. The researcher must explain the study and project verbally

2. The researcher must explain the related information (purpose, risks, benefits, procedures…)

3. The researcher must provide the documented information of IECEU project

4. The researcher must provide the possibility for questions the whole duration of the interview/discussion

5. The case studies will be based on open questions to ensure the possibility for individuals to neutral answers

6. During the research work the signed consent form can be decided to use

7. The individual need to agree to participate to the research and project

8. All work packages should respect the Conceptual Framework and Joint Methodology in terms of questionnaires and surveys.

8.7.5.   REQUIREMENTS   FOR   EVERY   IECEU PARTNER IN TERMS OF RESEARCH CONDUCTING

- All the IECEU project partners are required to follow the rules of EU Framework Programme, signed Grant Agreement and Consortium Agreement

- Goal to integrity and honest remarks and information delivery will be underlined to all who will be interviewed.

- The norms of conduct research need to be followed (every research conducting partner need to ensure the understanding of ethics norms)

- The national guidelines, standards and procedures need to be followed to ensure the responsible conduct of research

- IECEU –project members will follow the national law requirements

- Ethical aspects need to be appointed in methods, procedures, and/or perspectives

- Every partner need to respect Intellectual Properties

- The information and knowledge will be handled confidentially (anonymously when needed)

- Interviewers are advised to be especially sensitive and decreased when dealing with vulnerable interlocutors

- The researcher/supervisor is the custodian of the research data and is responsible for its management, including security, storage and retention.

- He/she is also responsible for informing the research participants of the researchers' obligations in relation to the data.

- The researcher/supervisor must determine and control access rights to research data. Those are only few of the questions arising from collection and processing of personal data which have to be answered