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IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EU CAPABILITIES IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

Background Paper for the Policy Dialogue
27 April 2017 in Brussels

Findings for the Capabilities Planning and Technology

The IECEU consortium is coordinated by Laurea University of Applied Sciences (Finland) and consists of a diverse group of research, governmental and private sector organisations.

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Acronyms	
C2	Command and Control
C3	Command, Control and Communication (C3)
CDP	Capability Development Plan
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS	Communication and Information Systems
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
CFI	Connected Forces Initiative
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DG IX	Directorate General of Civilian Crisis Management
DG RELEX	Directorate-General for the External Relations
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
E&F	Evaluation and Feedback
ESDC	European Security and Defence College
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EU OPCEN	European Union Operations Centre
EWS	Early Warning System
FAC	Foreign Affairs Council
FPI	Foreign Policy Instrument
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
IfS	Instrument for Stability

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INTCEN	Intelligence Analysis Centre
JSSR	Justice and Security Sector Reform
MIP	Mission Implementation Plan
MS	Member States
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
OCC	Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC)
PFCA	Political Framework for Crisis Approach
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PMG	Politico-Military Group
PSC	Political and Security Committee
P&S	Pooling and Sharing
RoE	Rules of Engagement
SoR	Statement of Requirements
STANAG	Standardization Agreement
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

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Executive Summary

This background paper aims to prepare the participants to the IECEU policy dialogues by sharing information about the IECEU-project research. It presents the findings from the comparative studies and the research on pooling and sharing. It also provides a compilation of the analysis of the effectiveness of CSDP crisis management operations as well as identifies potential conclusions and recommendations to enhance the effectiveness. More specifically, it aims to:

- Consolidate main lessons identified from the IECEU-project research relating to the capability 'Planning' and the capability 'Technology';
- Aggregate the individual case studies findings and perspectives of the individual researcher to a general level of project findings;
- Ensure the significance and validity of the findings (e.g. ensuring some findings are not emphasized as there are a limited number of findings, ensuring objectivity etc.);
- Inform the subsequent steps of the project, i.e. the policy dialogues and testing of the recommendations at policy level.

Based on a review of eight (8) IECEU Case Study research findings in different regions (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DR Congo, Central African Republic, Libya, South Sudan, Afghanistan and occupied Palestinian Territories) the main findings for the capabilities 'Planning' and 'Technology' are:

1) Civilian and military elements within the EU should combine at the initial planning phase on future missions deploying to a crisis situation and remain in close partnership thereafter. (Planning)

2) Local actors should be involved in the planning phase, particularly at the start. The same applies to partner agencies. (Planning)

3) The desired end-state, purpose or overarching strategic objective of the mission should reflect an appropriate intervention relevant to the needs of the nation it is operating in, at that juncture. Invariably, this may be to stabilise the territory and make it safe for its people. (Planning)

1) The technological solutions have been much technology –driven (Technology)

2) Tailored training is needed and it should be linked to existing technological resources (Technology)

3) The relevancy of local ownership is seen high (Technology)

4) There is a lack of centralised systems aimed at supporting the CSDP crisis management operations (Technology)

These main findings will be discussed in the upcoming policy dialogues, with an aim to get a better understanding of the dynamics at play and possible ways forward to enhance the effectiveness of CSDP crisis management operations.

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1 IECEU Research: Case Studies 2016-2017 and data collection

IECEU Consortium has examined (2016-2017) the effectiveness of EU capabilities in military and civilian crisis management operations by using common IECEU Conceptual Framework. The main data collection methods have been desk study research, active observation and interviews of personnel representing the EU CSDP operation, local authority, other international organizations, local population or EU institute (HQ).

Case Study Region	Operation (s)	Research completed by	Year of the field study	Number interviews
Kosovo	EULEX Kosovo	University of Ljubljana, Slovenia	2016	20
Bosnia and Herzegovina	EUFOR Althea	National Defence University Finland	2016-2017	52
DR Congo	EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL Congo Operation Artemis	Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC Denmark	2016-2017	38
South Sudan	EUAVSEC, South Sudan	Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, Austria	2016	23
Central African Republic	EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUFOR CAR	National Defence University Finland	2016-2017	40
Libya	EUBAM Libya	Crisis Management Centre Finland	2016	18
Afghanistan	EUPOL Afghanistan	National University of Ireland Maynooth— Kennedy Institute Ireland	2016-2017	40
Palestinian Territories	EUPOL COPPS EUBAM Rafah	Crisis Management Centre Finland	2016	34
In total 8 Case Studies	In total 12 operations			In total 265 interviews

Topic	Operations	Research completed by	Year	Number
Interviews on civil-military synergies	All	National Defence University Finland	2016	24
Survey on Interoperability	All	Enquirya	2016	14

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2 Introduction to the capabilities

The conceptual framework of the project[1] identified six capabilities: planning, organisational, interoperability, competences, comprehensiveness and technology. In this background paper, two capabilities will be explored more in depth, i.e. 'Planning' and 'Technology'. These capabilities are defined more in detail by the methodological framework as follows:

IECEU CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK		
perspective / focus	**EU: policy making, military, civilian**	**non-EU: local, international community**
Planning Capacity - Strategic/Operational planning, Management, Budgetary constraints, Consultation of lessons identified reports, Situational Awareness	**PCEUPS/ PCEUFO*:** Decision making process at the policy level, Strategic / operational planning process along the military / civilian track, National caveats and deficiencies, Strategic resources available, Structural organising of the mission / operation and its interconnections, Feedback loops and adjustment to changes in the mission / operation or in its context, Construction and dissemination of situational awareness	**PCNEUPS/ PCNEUFO*:** Decision making process at the policy level, Structural organising of the mission / operation and its connections with the local people and the international community, Incorporation of the local interests and those of the international community in planning, Feedback loops and adjustment to changes in the mission / operation or in its context or within the international community
Technologies - Technological resources at disposal, Pooling & Sharing, EDA priorities	**TEUPS/ TEUFO*:** Technological resources at disposal, Technical interoperability and integration, Processes of pooling and sharing, Integration and evaluation of the results of EDA's R&D, Technical deficiencies or lacking resources, Incorporation of service providers	**TNEUPS/ TNEUFO*:** Technological resources at disposal, Technical interoperability (also with the local stakeholders and the international community), Technical deficiencies or lacking resources
*code of the module on the basis of which the related questions can be found		

This definition has been applied by the IECEU researchers in all case studies and the research relating to pooling and sharing, thus enabling the capturing findings that are comparable. In terms of the IECEU case studies focused on analyzing the technological capabilities of EU operations, while taking into consideration also the technology available to the local counterparts (e.g. police and customs). Both the EU and non-EU perspectives were aimed to be assessed, as well as the functionalities of information systems, and the specific needs and characteristics of operation's technological requirements. All case studies also evaluated the possibilities for pooling and sharing of technologies and information. The methodological framework is set already in the beginning of IECEU –project, namely in the deliverable 1.5. Beyond from the set methodology, some of the IECEU research data clarified further analysis based on interview themes according to these subthemes.

[1] Deliverable 1.5, the IECEU methodological framework.

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3 Identified lessons and recommendations

This chapter will attempt to categorize the findings of chapter 3 (Planning capability) and chapter 4 (Technology capability). In addition, it identifies main finding that will be discussed in the policy dialogue with the key stakeholders.

3.1 Lessons identified: Capability 'Planning'

The findings of chapter 3 indicate that aspects of mission planning lack clear goals and related exit strategy. This has created uncertainty and a challenge, not just for EU staff, but also for other actors. That lead to EU staff having an unclear understanding what the EU mission was ultimately about and its future role in the host country. For example the EUPOL Afghanistan mission mandate changed 5 times over the 10 year period of the mission. Given the political origins of CSDP missions, their duration is a political decision in the hands of 28 member states. As a result, the mission end state can be vague in some areas and unrealistic in others. The following points summarise conclusions of this analysis on the relevant reports:

- The major obstacles for the implementation of effective CivMil cooperation, coordination and synergies is the planning and decision-making process and financial and command aspects of CSDP missions.
- Inadequate contact at appropriate level exists between civilian and military staff.
- Expanded and purposeful joint civilian and military training could be useful.
- The current development under way in establishing a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) for non-executive military missions needs to be addressed with a degree of caution.
- The pre-mission planning needs to be of higher quality and firmer agreements with the host country need to be negotiated.
- The time between the fact finding mission and the actual political decision and deployment allows gaps to emerge with the realistic picture of the situation on the ground and the EU response.
- While concrete recommendations can be made to strengthen CivMil cooperation, political will isn't always coupled with realistic levels of ambition.

Lesson 1: Civilian and military elements should combine at the initial planning phase

Civilian and military elements within the EU should combine at the initial planning phase on future missions deploying to a crisis situation and remain in close partnership thereafter. Advanced communications between the heads of the MPCC and CPCC at Brussels level and between the mission commanders in joint or adjacent theatres on all aspects of the missions should be further developed. In order to support this communication, consideration should be given to a programme of staff exchanges and expanded purposeful training between the military and civilian institutions.

Lesson 2: Local actors should be involved in the planning phase

A recurring phenomenon of most theatres studied, is that local host nation actors were consulted but it is unclear to the extent regarding the nature of consultation regarding other actors alongside the EU deployment. This was reported as a wider issue than just EU deployments and some IECEU reports mentioned marginal or completely exclusion from the wider international planning process.

Local actors should be involved in the planning phase, particularly at the start. The same applies to partner agencies. In the same vein, the mission should have more influence on the MIP. A core planning team with accurate equipment should be established on the ground in order to report political developments and to adjust the strategic and planning documents accordingly.

Lesson 3: The desired end-state of a crisis management operation should be relevant

The desired end-state, purpose or overarching strategic objective of the mission should reflect an appropriate intervention relevant to the needs of the nation it is operating in, at that juncture. Invariably, this may be to stabilise the territory and make it safe for its people.

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3.2 Lessons identified: Capability 'Technology'

Lesson 1: Need for user centric technologies

Lesson identified The technological solutions have been much technology –driven. Moreover local representatives in crisis area can be trained by EU/operation with equipment/ technologies which they (locals) normally do not have in use. As a result no real capability has been established.[2]

Recommendation Consider to strenghten the planning phase of the crisis management operation by implementing a technological needs assessment before the start of the mission/operation. Should a needs assessment should be linked to the mandate of the mission/operation, tasks to be accomplished by international and local staff, levels of technological proficiency of identified users and existing local technological infrastructure. Such a needs assessment can be preventive and an ongoing process, facilitated by EU delegations and implemented in areas where there a not yet missions/operations.

Lesson 2: Tailored training linked to existing technological resources

Lesson identified: People should be trained to use technology, which requires tailored training programs and education.[3] [4]

Recommendation Include the competence-based learning objectives to current training curricula and link them strongly with the current ICT infrastructure in the field (since one fits all –solution does not exist)

[2] References:

1. Case Study Report Kosovo (D2.3)
2. Case Study Report Bosnia and Herzegovina (D2.3)
3. Case Study in Central African Republic
4. Case Study Report - Congo (D2.5)
5. Case Study Report – Afghanistan (D4.3)

[3] Interviews no. 11 and no. 16.

[4] References:

1. Case Study in Kosovo:
2. Case Study in Libya
3. Case Study in Afghanistan

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Lesson 3: The relevancy of local ownership

Lesson identified: Local representatives in the crisis area can be trained by EU/operation with equipment/ technologies which they (locals) normally do not have in use. As a result no real capability has been established. [5]

Recommendation: The operation and personnel should always take into account that the local perspective that the country representatives (target audience) are trained with the similar technological equipment that they have in use in practice.

Lesson 4: Need for CSDP Technology Infrastructure

Lesson identified A number of case studies mention the lack of centralised systems, aimed at supporting the CSDP crisis management operation. Two specific findings are observed:[6]

(a) The lack an integrated management system that would be readily available to all CSDP missions.
(b) The lack of a common warehouse for technologies has also been mentioned.

Recommendation To strengthen the technological capability of CSDP crisis management operations, consideration can be given to further strengthen the development of a centralised technological capability that supports the field activities. Priority should be given to the development of so called integrated management systems, supporting the management of the crisis management operation and common warehousing for technologies

[5] References
1. Case Study Report Kosovo (D2.3)
2. Case Study Report Bosnia and Herzegovina (D2.3)
3. Case Study Report - Congo (D2.5)
4. Case Study Report – Afghanistan

[6] References:
1. Case Study in occupied Palestinian Territories (D4.3)
2. IECEU WP6 Interoperability of the resources
3. Case Study in Libya
4. Case Study in South Sudan

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ANNEX: IECEU Findings

IECEU Research Findings: Capability 'Planning'

The planning of civilian CSDP missions is based on the EU's Crisis Management Concept. This outlines what is needed from the political level down to the mission level, how responses are planned, implemented and ended. The same procedures broadly apply to civilian and military responses. The main difference is that military planning practices are based on national and NATO standards.

The research reports identify the key documents in the civilian planning are: Political Framework for Crisis Response (PFCA); Crisis Management Concept (CMC); Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA); Civilian Strategic Option (CSO); and the Operational Plan (OPLAN). The EU's Crisis Response System was developed after the adoption of the Lisbon treaty and is based on a comprehensive approach. Central to the system is the crisis platform in the EEAS. This drafts response options to a crisis.

When a crisis is identified the PSC employs the crisis platform to see if a CSDP operation is appropriate. This will result in a possible PFCA if the Council agrees to a crisis management response. The assessment explores a range of EU instruments, selecting the best suited for the situation. The PFCA establishes the overall political approach to the crisis. Once the PSC decides that action is needed, the CMPD is tasked to frame the CMC, triggering the planning process.

Kosovo

The report on Kosovo indicates difficulties in coping with the violence in the field, which was the consequence of poor logistical planning. The research paper points out that both the EU Planning Team (EUPT) and the ICM/EUSR Preparatory Team were responsible for maintaining close cooperation between all relevant actors, including within the different EU actors and with the UN, OSCE and KFOR, as well as other key actors such as the US and the Russian Federation. This coordination between international organizations proved problematic and was limited during the set-up phase of the EULEX mandate. This made strategic planning regarding interactions with the new Kosovo institutions very difficult.

That report quoted interviewees who noted that: "Brussels is not well-informed about the challenges in Kosovo, which has a negative impact on the mission planning process" . The report also shows the 'Kosovo perspective' was rarely considered and that staff in Brussels tended to 'micro-manage.' This, the report argues, worked against the field staff developing an effective Mission Implementation Plans (MIP) at the operational level. The paper shows that a rigid and lengthy planning process hindered the mission. It usually took 12-18 months for the mission to change direction and operational focus. Logistical planning, particularly defined logistical planning cycles, was weak.

With regard to the EU planning process, the report suggests that decision times can be improved, indicating that it usually takes too much time to reach political consensus within the EU. Second, the planning process

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is still too long. Third, there are too many partial interests within various EU institutions as well as among member states, which prolong the decision making process and often result in poor agreement that does not reflect the actual needs of post-conflict environment. Fourth, the comprehensive approach was still not at the desired level (e.g. in the planning process there are at least four phases led by four different bodies). Fifth, there is a very well elaborated analysis and lessons learned process; however, the implementation of the findings on the operational level was weak. But positively, the report indicates that the planning process has been elaborated through the past 10 years and major steps forward have been taken. The MIP now includes clearer directions, albeit that MIP planning relies too much on quantitative data at the expense of qualitative data.

EULEX was planned at a time when the CMC had only started to develop. To a degree, the EULEX planning process copied the Bosnian case which has sometimes been referred to as a 'testing ground' for the CSDP from the point of view of planning and coordinating the different EU crisis management instruments. The EU planning process has developed since then, particularly after the Treaty of Lisbon. A step forward was the new planning phase which stimulated the interested actors (EU institutions, member states and so on) to contribute to the preparation of the first report on the necessity of a mission.

While the EULEX paper points out that in general the planning process within the EU takes up to 1 year, in cases when strong political will is exhibited it can take less. Planning and implementing the EUMM Georgia could be perceived as a best practice case, since the process took around 2 months. In terms of local involvement, in Kosovo a positive aspect of the mission is that local actors were consulted in the planning process of majority of MIP (except for sensitive cases, such as witness protection). EULEX officials were also embedded in local institutions alongside their local counterparts, which enabled daily exchanges and cooperation.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

In Bosnia, from an operational planning perspective, the transition from SFOR to EUFOR Althea was smooth and relatively simple. This was mainly due to the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements and existing SFOR operational plans. This was the foundation for EUFOR Althea's strategic/operational planning.

The Bosnian paper shows that, on the planning side EUFOR Althea profited from access to NATO along with the infrastructure provided by SFOR. The paper underscored the role of NATO as the main counterpart for EUFOR in the planning process, and that NATO is considered to be better at planning and resource allocation. The paper points out that during the mission planning phase there were unexploited opportunities for joint work in the areas of security, logistics, force protection, medical, CIS etc. and even more importantly it could have provided an opportunity to ensure that planning of civilian and military missions is not done in isolation but with considerable consultation and mutual support.

In the conduct phase, the Bosnia paper suggests furthering communications between the heads of the MPCC and CPCC at Brussels level and between the mission commanders in joint or adjacent theatres on all

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aspects of the missions. It could also facilitate joint reviews by CMPD and even joint reporting to the PSC by the Civilian and military Mission Commanders. This is very important as it would help to develop the CivMil interface at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, thereby countering the tendency for separateness at the strategic level to cascade down to mission ground level.

The overlap paper argues that purposeful coordination and cooperation between the different actors is important in peace building efforts. This is based on a philosophy that a single actor does not have all the assets needed to restore peace. Joint planning, coordination and cooperation between different organisations are needed. To do this requires acknowledging the competencies of others, identifying the full mix and range of available capabilities and using them in a coherent manner. This is the essence of a Comprehensive Approach which integrates the full measure of components.

DR Congo

The reports indicate that deployments in Africa such as the particularly hostile environment in Democratic Republic of Congo suffered similar planning shortcomings as other missions.

South Sudan

The South Sudan report actually demonstrates that the planning was made difficult by various EU member states that had mixed feelings about the operation. This was due to the fact that in general member states had little knowledge of the situation in South Sudan and questioned the need of the EU to engage. Once the mission deployed, however, there was good support in general by the member states.

This paper in its conclusion reads: “For the South Sudanese government nonetheless any help and support was highly welcomed immediately after gaining independence and thus no political pressure was exerted for a stronger mission. The CONOPS and OPLAN were generally based on the (wrong) assumption that the new airport terminal would have been constructed. However, the GoSS [Government of Southern Sudan] failed in taking real ownership of the project, since the outbreak of the internal conflict hindered the completion of the new airport terminal and thus limiting the training impact of EUAVSEC South Sudan” (page 44). The paper shows that the mission deployed along the usual lines. It points out that in 2012 the initial planning phase produced a needs assessment and “thick report.”

In its conclusion section, South Sudan report demonstrates that even against the backdrop of various shortfalls in planning, logistics, procurement and overall strategy, the mission staff had succeeded to train an impressive number of South Sudanese officials in issues such as civil aviation, airport security, border management and overall public administration.

The South Sudan paper presents concrete recommendations to be taken into consideration for crisis management missions and operations in general. These are:

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- The pre-mission planning needs to be of higher quality and firmer agreements with the host country need to be negotiated.

- The time between the fact finding mission and the actual political decision and deployment needs to be shortened in order to provide a realistic picture of the situation on the ground. It would have been wise to keep a core team with accurate equipment on the spot in order to report political developments and to adjust the strategic and planning documents accordingly.

Central African Republic (CAR)

The CAR paper concludes that the early response to the crisis in that country and the deployment of EUFOR RCA was undoubtedly a result of a French diplomatic offensive aimed at Europeanising the intervention. France led and put pressure on its EU partners for the purpose of stopping massacres. It also provided most of the troops for the mission. The operation commander and the force commander were French generals. It is unlikely the operation would have happened had it not been for France, particularly when considering a taxing force-generation process wherein France filled the gaps, similar to what had happened during the establishment of EUFOR Chad/CAR in 2007/2008.

The CAR study mentions that the EU should have taken additional time to plan the operation, with staff on the ground indicating they had a 500 pages OPLAN for a 700 men operation. It was a problem because at the beginning as they had a staff of 10 officers and couldn't digest such a huge OPLAN. The paper in fact highlighted a point mentioned earlier in Civilian Military section of this report, that operational planning was quicker in Brussels than in European capitals. Similarly, it also raised the point that it seems some Member States felt that EUFOR's planning process was actually 'too quick.' The contradictory points show the difficulties faced by EU institutions and the problem in pleasing everyone. Clearly the planning does seem to have been done expeditiously, but such a performance matters little if Member States refuse to provide the equipment and troops required on time. It is true that the institutional structures used for decision-making differ from one country to another. However, at the end of the day, what matters was the result in terms of lives saved and reduction of violence in the crisis-beset country, and the problems in the CAR case stemmed from an apparent lack of political will, not from cumbersome institutional procedures.

In terms of local involvement, according to a non-EU official, the challenge with the stabilisation process in CAR was that the local actors were rarely involved in the process efficiently. Others observed that despite the planning being rapid, key partners on the ground, including the United Nation and African Union were consulted throughout.

Libya

The reports indicate that deployments in Africa such as the complex environment in Libya suffered similar planning shortcomings as other missions. The biggest problem in Libya, according to the EUBAM paper, was

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that, in essence, there was not a single accountable recipient representing a particular branch of border management that could have served as an established partner. Instead, the limited strategic planning that the mission was able to carry out was unproductive, partly because the absent and changing partners, partly because of the misplaced idea that the Libyans would be interested in what was described as an 'IBM' style way of arranging border management. While the strategic goals of the mission failed, it has, however, engaged in some operational training. Like other missions, the intervention in Libya suffered greatly from a dire security situation and dysfunctional politics. Several excerpts of the paper follow. Each is insightful.

"This, certain out of sync-nature between the operational reality and the strategic level ambitions is where the most important lessons in the case of EUBAM Libya might be learned. Therefore any assessment of the mission has to analyse both the politico-strategic level of the mission planning and execution with the operational reality of the mission" (page 10).

"In hindsight the deeply factional nature of the country and the way that this directly influenced the security situation should have reflected the way in which outside powers formed their policies towards Libya, starting from the decision to intervene. On the other hand, the situation in Libya had a level of complexity that would have been very difficult to analyse and use as a base for a strategic planning within the spectrum of instruments that the CSDP has" (page 21).

"Based on the contextual assessment, the mandate of EUBAM Libya was clearly overoptimistic and its task to develop a completely new (to Libya) concept for border management was not realistic. However, the worsening security situation, which effectively ended EUBAM Libya in the summer of 2014 might have masked the other problems that the mission had, also in terms of its effectiveness and the lessons learned. These lessons seem to be mostly related to the mission planning and to the assessment process that predated EUBAM Libya. One must ask how was it possible that the problems that the mission faced were not to be seen by the time of its planning, or did the political ambitions of member states cloud the decision making process in such a way that a mission that was not scaled up to the challenges it was facing, was capable of escaping the drawing board?" (page 50).

"The mission planning as well as the operational and political-strategic objectives were based on false assumptions and although the mission personnel managed to apply the mandate in a flexible manner, the goals were not reachable and as such the mission [was] doomed to fail from the start … Furthermore, the cooperation between Brussels and the field did also not work properly" (page 38).

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan the report shows that a fact-finding mission visited for several weeks in 2006. A team from the Political and Security Committee (PSC) planned how the police mission would be done. This guided the Council on the type of approach to be implemented. It is unclear whom the planning team engaged with (inclusive of local actors) or what their report contained. "From 2010 onward, representatives from the European External Action Service (EEAS) chair the PSC and planning phase. Notwithstanding these

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unknowns, there are questions about the planning phase that still appear to be relevant despite the development of the EEAS".

During a round table in Maynooth, Ireland, experts in the field of Security Sector Reform including both practitioners from the field, and those who have worked in Brussels, and academics considering the Afghanistan review, observed that the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is under-resourced. In essence, one person - the Director - is expected to do everything.

The report indicates that the CPCC is essentially a planning and conduct body that is capable of performing the principal functions required of it. It has an adequate budget for its activities and it has adequate competencies in the planning, conduct and mission support areas. The main deficiency is in terms of personnel resources, especially in planning staff, but also in other areas of conduct and support. Some of these deficiencies could be alleviated by assistance from the EUMS, especially in the matter of planning staff, but there are limits to the extent to which this can solve the problems because of civilian-specific issues and areas of technical speciality.

Occupied Palestinian Territories

In Palestine, the observation was made that the short rotation cycle of EU CSDP missions – for example, police experts' deployment to a CSDP mission is limited to one year by many EU Member States - as well as the one-year mission mandate period which determines the cycle of planning and implementation of operational activities and leaves the experts little time to invest on developing a deeper understanding of conflict context and Palestinian society. This does not mean that all EU CSDP activities would lack awareness of local society and conditions, and indeed a number of individual projects of EUPOL COPPS and some of its international experts were mentioned as good examples on how local conditions have been taken into account. Rather, the question is: 'how the EU CSDP missions could ensure that all their activities are based on local ownership and inclusiveness?'.

As for the local involvement, the research indicates that likewise in Palestine, the PA officials are involved in planning process of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah activities, however there seems to be few efforts to involve other Palestinian actors. Perhaps the research team were unable to uncover examples, but the representatives of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah who were interviewed for this research did not mention Palestinian civil society organizations or other non-PA actors as their local contacts, though civil society representatives were occasionally invited to participate in workshops or seminars organised by EUPOL COPPS.

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IECEU Research Findings: Capability 'Technology'

The key findings of the technology as capability are iterated from the several case studies and analysis completed part of this project. In total, IECEU –project has looked into 12 CSDP crisis management (both civilian and military) operations. In addition, it also reviewed the state of art in pooling and sharing, the civil-military interface and the interoperability of resources. More specifically, the following areas have been analysed in-depth basis of this review :

1) D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH
2) D3.5 The Study Report of DR Congo, South Sudan, CAR and Libya
3) D4.3 The Study Report of Palestinian Territory and Afghanistan
4) D6.1 Standardisation Review
5) D6.2 Identification of the gap
6) D6.3 Review of interoperability of resources

The findings from each case study region are listed below.

Shortcomings in Kosovo

- EULEX has sufficiently good equipment and ITC system for its requirements;
- EULEX and KFOR have established channels for pooling and sharing of equipment (e.g. rotor wing aircrafts, capabilities for imagery detection, analysis and support, etc.)

Challenges identified in Kosovo

- Need to improve training of EULEX staff for advanced equipment to ensure its maximum usability;
- Need to improve Kosovo technology for data bases management and advanced IT systems;
- Kosovo IT systems not integrated in international systems such as INTERPOL, EUROPOL, etc.
- Lack of appropriate ICT technology within Kosovo police and customs (not yet on the level of the EU standards);
- Local IT systems are not connected with Europol, Interpol and several other crucial international systems.
- People should be trained to use technology, which requires tailored training programs and education.[7] The main issue in regards to technology is thus often not the technological equipment itself, but rather the lack of proper training.

[7] Interviews no. 11 and no. 16.

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• In the case of EULEX, the pooling and sharing of rotor-wing transportation and airlift capabilities has been identified as an example of good practice between EULEX and KFOR missions. Specialized equipment, such as imagery detection is also noted among technical capabilities that are pooled and shared between the missions (for example for the mapping of possible mass grave locations)

Category	EU Perspective	Local perspective
Successes	EULEX has sufficiently good equipment and ITC system for its requirements	
Challenges		Lack of appropriate ICT technology (not yet on the level of the EU standards);
Challenges	Need to improve training of EULEX staff for advanced equipment to ensure its maximum usability	Need to improve Kosovo technology for data bases management and advanced IT systems;
Challenges		Local IT systems are not connected with Europol, Interpol and several other crucial international systems.
Pooling and Sharing Practices or Potentials	In the case of EULEX, the pooling and sharing of rotor-wing transportation and airlift capabilities has been identified as an example of good practice between EULEX and KFOR missions	

Lessons identified based on IECEU case study in Kosovo:

1) There is a lack of appropriate ICT technology within Kosovo police and customs (not in the level of the EU standards) (local perspective)
2) Local Kosovo police and customs IT systems are not connected with Europol, Interpol and several other crucial international systems (local perspective)
3) People should be trained to use technology, which requires tailored training programs and education.[8] The main issue in regards to technology is thus often not the technological equipment itself, but rather the lack of proper training. (local perspective)
4) EULEX CSDP operation has sufficiently good equipment and ITC system for its requirements;In the case of EULEX, the pooling and sharing of rotor-wing transportation and airlift capabilities has been identified as an example of good practice between EULEX and KFOR missions. Specialized

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equipment, such as imagery detection is also noted among technical capabilities that are pooled and shared between the missions (for example for the mapping of possible mass grave locations)

Shortcomings in Bosnia and Herzegovina

• According to the interviewees, HQ EUFOR Althea possesses the technological resources, such as computers and means of communication that staff officers/members need for carrying out their work and supporting COM EUFOR Althea in execution of the Operation Plan (OPLAN).

• The HQ also has enough vehicles – though only soft-skinned – for the staff officers to perform their duties outside Camp Butmir. From a technical point of view, also the medical and other logistics services are on a satisfactory level.

• Several interviewees stated that, besides the use of NATO planning experience and capabilities (see Chapter 3.1), the possibility of using the NATO CIS, the NATO secure networks and intelligence systems, and the NATO intelligence database has provided an efficient and cost-effective mechanism for EUFOR Althea since the beginning of the operation.

• One very good asset/resource in EUFOR Althea's matrix is the Airborne Ground Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AGSR) system. It enables real-time information-gathering and advance warning from remote areas that are not covered by, for example, the LOT houses or flows of information from the persistent hot spots.

• Some interviewees stated that the 'hardware technology', such as tanks and weapons, within the AFBiH is satisfactory but what is really needed is, for example, bridge-building, alongside horizontal and vertical construc¬tion equipment.

• However, one 'low level' model for pooling and sharing in possible future CSDP operations might be found in multinational logistics units (MLUs) or transport units (MTUs); the participating nations could agree on specific responsibilities and deploy the assets in accordance with the agreement.

Successes in Bosnia and Herzegovina

• HQ EUFOR Althea has necessary technological resources, e.g. computers and means of communication for staff officers/members to carry out their work and support COM EUFOR Althea to execute the OPLAN;

• EUFOR Althea benefits from the access to NATO planning assets, structures and capabilities under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements;

• EUFOR Althea's Airborne Ground Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AGSR) system enables real-time information gathering and advanced warning from remote areas which are not covered for example by the LOT houses or getting information from the ongoing hot spots;

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Challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina

• The only EUFOR military manoeuvre unit operating in BiH is the MNBN. The battalion is only equipped with weapons for self-defence and soft-skin vehicles;

• ATHENA mechanism cannot be used to fund equipment or materiel to AFBiH. AFBiH is trained with equipment/technologies which they normally do not have in use. As a result no real capability has been established;

• The idea of pooling and sharing is considered desirable but does not work in practice due to national caveats or restrictions, political and financial issues, non-interoperability, unwillingness, etc.;

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Challenges	The only EUFOR military manoeuvre unit operating in BiH is the MNBN. The battalion is only equipped with weapons for self-defence and soft-skin vehicles;	ATHENA mechanism cannot be used to fund equipment or material to AFBiH. AFBiH is trained with equipment /technologies which they normally do not have in use. As a result no real capability has been established;
Challenges	Firstly, lack of HUMINT capability is a gap that hinders efficient and effective intelligence-gathering.	
Pooling and Sharing Practices or Potentials	The idea of pooling and sharing is considered desirable but does not work in practice due to national caveats or restrictions, political and financial issues, non-interoperability, unwillingness, etc.;	

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Shortcomings on DR Congo

The issue of technology was a priority area for the EUSEC mission. A cornerstone of the project was to use modern technology to improve personnel management in the FARDC. This was done by using biometric data registration conduct a census of the force and by issuing ID cards based on the data obtained from the census. On top of that the EUSEC attempted to introduce a personnel database for personnel management by distributing 800 computers to the FARDC and helping provide some connectivity. Although the project might have been a good idea, a combination of the sheer geographical size of the DRC, the absence of any IT infrastructure, the Congolese lack of ability to maintain the system, the lack of economic and human resources, and finally a limited project budget ultimately resulted in the inability to roll out the system to all FARDC units. This means that the system is now a hybrid between more ancient filing systems done by hand and modern technologies, which has had a limiting effect on the electronic system.

DRC, the absence of any IT infrastructure, the Congolese lack of ability to maintain the system, the lack of economic and human resources, and finally a limited project budget. The issue of technology was a priority area for the EUSEC mission. A cornerstone of the project was to use modern technology to improve personnel management in the FARDC. This was done by using biometric data registration conduct a census of the force and by issuing ID cards based on the data obtained from the census. On top of that the EUSEC attempted to introduce a personnel database for personnel management by distributing 800 computers to the FARDC and helping provide some connectivity. Although the project might have been a good idea, a combination of the sheer geographical size of the DRC, the absence of any IT infrastructure, the Congolese lack of ability to maintain the system, the lack of economic and human resources, and finally a limited project budget ultimately resulted in the inability to roll out the system to all FARDC units. This means that the system is now a hybrid between more ancient filing systems done by hand and modern technologies, which has had a limiting effect on the electronic system.

Another problem has been that the bank-based salary payments system has only worked properly in the areas around Kinshasa, while fewer soldiers have access to banks in other parts of the country. This points to the fact that the DRC, like many other African states, has only limited access to reliable banking, which could indicate that models like the Mpesa-cellular telephone-based system would be a more workable option.

EUPOL did implement a national registration project for the PNC. The problem with this system is that it is based nationally, while most police officers work at the local level, where there is no connectivity or even IT infrastructure. This means that everything has to be reported manually through the chain of command, which makes it extremely vulnerable. Currently the system is not being used to its full capacity. One of the problems was the three trainers from Morocco and Tunisia that the EU decided to recruit to train their Congolese counterparts, who did not manage to provide the necessary training to make the local operators capable of operating the system, in stark contrast to the EU arguing that the system is fully operational.

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Another aspect of the technological dimension is the physical infrastructure of the PNC. The force lacks the most basic infrastructure. Consequently, if EUPOL had been focused on the national level and not on improving the physical infrastructure of the PNC units that are to implement the proposed reforms such as the PdP, then reform would have been extremely difficult to achieve. Another problem facing EUPOL in relation to the technological aspect was that the mission was willing to provide training, but could not and would not help equip the trained police units due to the arms embargo imposed on the DRC during the first part of the mission. The EU even helped block Congolese attempts to acquire the necessary equipment from elsewhere. As one local informant argued this was nonsense, and it undermined the whole training initiative.

Shortcomings on South Sudan

The mission lacked almost all basic infrastructure. In certain areas, the Government of South Sudan had to start from zero. Already the South Sudanese Development Plan of 2011 underlined the need for building up the necessary infrastructure in the country. Thus, it was of no surprise that none of the South Sudanese Airports did fully comply with standards set by the International Organisation of Civil Aviation (ICAO). Juba International Airport was very small and the number of passengers using the Terminal exceeded the capacity of the building. By the time of the independence celebrations in Juba, the area of the Airport was even not fenced and easy to access.

Therefore, technological capabilities turned out to be one of the critical issues related to EUAVSEC as basically everything was needed on the ground to run the mission properly. The IT equipment, personal protection gear and motor vehicles were generally perceived as a disaster. There was a lack of radios, satellite phones, etc. In the opinion of leading mission staff, this was a procurement and logistics issues which was handled from the beginning in Brussels. The procurement process caused long delays and essential IT equipment only started to arrive about six months into the mission. Seconded personnel arrived with their own personal protection equipment but contracted staff had none until some nine months into the mission. This was not acceptable in the view of the mission leadership.

Especially transport vehicles turned out to be problematic as the advices from the mission were largely ignored. The mission had to operate in an undeveloped equatorial area of Africa and the mission personnel was mainly deployed in the open air in extreme heat and weather conditions. The supply of suitable vehicles that could also be maintained and supplied with parts in South Sudan would have facilitated the mission operation on the ground enormously. Instead of providing the mission with Toyota vehicles – although there was a dealership in Juba with a good workshop and parts support, vehicles were sent from storage in Kosovo because they were surplus to the needs there.

This procurement however did not take into consideration that there was no support for VW or Skoda vehicles in entire South Sudan as for African purposes Toyota vehicles are the most often used. Also the air conditioning was reported as absolutely inadequate for the hot African climate. As a result, more than a third

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of the cars were unserviceable within months and with little chance of being fitted in the country. Some were used as warehouses to restore other cars and improvising became the key skill within the mission.

Also the mission uniforms were unsuitable for the African climate with short sleeved Polo-shirts and baseball caps. The mission staff was also very concerned about the way vital equipment was shipped. The procurement of supposedly vital equipment, including shredders and secure safes was delayed by the fact that the EU mission support was trying to consolidate the shipments in one container. Thus, vital security equipment was delayed whilst other less necessary equipment was added to the shipment inventory.

Also necessary IT equipment arrived a year later after the mission was deployed and the same happened with equipment for hearing protection, eye protection or high visibility clothing for staff members working at the airport did not arrive until the very late in the mission. Several items needed to be bought directly by mission staff, such as specific safety lights to be fitted to the vehicles which were substituted by flashing lights acquired from local stores in Juba.

The importance of having a central warehouse was strongly underlined as the vital equipment needed to fulfill the tasks of the mission did not arrive on time and was rather inappropriate. Also from a financial perspective it was argued that too many resources were spent in the wrong issues in advance. By following the recommendations and advices from the ground, many resources could have been saved or better used in other vital equipment areas.

Shortcomings Central African Republic

CAR has long been one of the least developed countries in the world, with poor and underdeveloped infrastructure. The lack of necessary infrastructure renders parts of the country accessible. Consequently, moving around the country outside the Bangui area is difficult. Furthermore, the country's communication network is limited. Fixed telephone lines are rare, and those that exist are in bad shape. The main communication channel for reaching the majority of the population is radio. There is also a broadcast television station, but it does not reach the entire population. Also, television sets are expensive, and the majority cannot afford them.

The lack of logistical and communication networks, and lack of skilled local human resources made the establishment and running of the operation challenging. The security situation in Bangui area was dangerous, and EUFOR RCA had to build the camp with limited local resources and infrastructure, and before it had reached its full operational capability.

According to several EUFOR RCA Officers, building the camp took too long, and was built with too much care and resources, considering that the operation was meant to last one year maximum. For the first two months staff of EUFOR RCA stood with Sangaris at the M'Poko airport. That was considered as a real weakness, as it showed that such Force as EUFOR cannot be deployed in a country where there isn't already an international Force able to take some things in charge.

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Challenges related to poor road network the lack of internet connection and electricity, also created difficulties for the day-to day running of the operation. Consequently, the second problem was the information systems. It took more than two months before the operation managed to establish secure information sharing and communication systems, as well as basic IT equipment. Until then, the staff had to work on their personal computers, and the only way to communicate with the OHQ was internet. Furthermore, during the mission, equipment deficiencies were identified in some contingents but few or none were addressed. Soldiers even complained about outdated software and cheap computers. Because of lack of an Internet connection and electricity, crucial information was lost or not available.

Furthermore, the operation also suffered from a shortfall in intelligence capabilities and from a lack of intelligence sharing. This intelligence capability could have been provided by drones or helicopters, with which EUFOR could have been more reactive. However, as an air component is by nature very costly and heavy from a logistics perspective, no participation states wanted to provide such equipment to EUFOR RCA. The importance of having timely geospatial intelligence available was highlighted. The delays in operational deployment could be caused if the required maps were not produced in time. Hence, developing Timely Geospatial Requirements Management could help to overcome these challenges. Both civilian and military missions would benefit from enhanced Geospatial capability. These capability needs are not only equipment related, yet to fully benefit from the Geospatial information, this capability would include staff planning and technical support.

* *Member states are often reluctant to commit manpower and hardware to foreign operations of any kind. It does not help that military CSDP operations are funded principally by intergovernmental means (the 'costs lie where they fall' principle).*

Shortcomings on Libya

Mission members who were deployed right from the start of the mission, told that being without a computer was precisely the reality of EUBAM Libya at first, and that this carried on for quite a while. There were problems with getting computers and when getting them, getting them without software. In addition, there were technological limitations of the competences of the mission personnel that effected the mission. This was because the mission did not have an expertise like that could have advised the Libyans of what kind of technology they needed.

In essence, this was a procurement problem and goes to the foundation of the mission thinking. As stated above, the EU did not want to give the Libyans the kind of a technology that they wanted and needed, but wanted to develop an IBM concept with the Libyans and then provide assistance in the procurement. However, other operators, like US and UK worked the other way around and offered systems of technology first and had personnel who were trained in helping with those technologies.

In terms of technology for the disposal of the mission, the people interviewed seemed generally disappointed in the working of the warehouse concept, according which the technology needed is ordered from an EU

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warehouse. The warehouse was seen as too rigid, handing out already outdated devices. The logic of stockpiling items that are outdated rapidly, like computers, was questioned by many. As was the fact that the warehouse did not have the items that the mission would have required badly, such as armored cars. Also the location of the warehouse was criticized. On the other hand, IT-support was also said to have worked very well and the availability of the satellite images, when needed, was good, although one person interviewed questioned the rationality of paying for the as they were provided by the EU for an EU CSDP mission. In terms of e-learning, the people interviewed felt widely that the Libyan absorption capability is not good enough for those kinds of applications, although they were considered the future.

Shortcomings on Occupied Palestinian Territories

Both EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah use Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) as the key planning and monitoring tool for operational activities. The MIP is a project management tool that helps the mission leadership to plan how the mandated tasks are operationalised, to keep track on ongoing activities, to assess progress, and to make adjustments as required. For CSDP missions like EUPOL COPPS that has many activities and counterparts MIP offers a good tool to follow up the progress both inside the mission and from the CPCC. The use of MIP in planning and monitoring of progress - the mission's progress reporting to Brussels and MIP follow the same structure that is outlined in the OPLAN - also helps the CPCC and the EU Member States to follow and assess progress and effectiveness of CSDP missions. The EUPOL COPPS Planning and Evaluation Department is responsible for managing the mission's programmatic approach to mandate implementation. EUBAM Rafah has also developed its own MIP system through which mission activities are followed in respect of its defined objectives. There is an ongoing process in the CPCC to develop a standardised MIP to all CSDP missions, but currently the missions still create their own MIP templates.

Another often presented remark was that not all mission members were familiar with project management tools such as MIP, and thus did not possess the necessary knowledge and skills to use the system, or indeed did not understand the purpose of using it. MIP system has also introduced increased reporting requests to international experts that some mission members find burdensome.

Shortcomings on Afghanistan

"Technology tended to be counter-intuitive. The clearest example is computers. “We had to create a Case Management System to help the police and prosecutors process a crime. The US [Justice Sector Support Programme] supported this was what they called a CMS programme, computers and software. But it was never properly linked and not that relevant. The problem was electricity supply and buying ink cartridges. Equipping them with computers doubled their work. We got too modern too soon.

Technology is something that needs to go into the strategy from the start. What kind of technology? How relevant is it? Are the end-users computer literate, or even literate? That sort of enquiry is needed. I saw projects where we gave Afghans 100 computers. After that no one reviewed what they did or how they

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worked. Most disappeared into peoples homes." In the same vein another mission member notes: "They did not so much need computers as supervision. A photocopy machine would have been better, build on the paper-based bureaucracy..."

Potentials in pooling and sharing

The technology findings in the research on pooling and sharing, civ-mil interface and interoperability offer a variety of results, such as:

"*The material and technical capabilities offered for use in crisis missions and operations are the foundations on which all else rests. Here, the potential for joint-procurement and standard setting in the civilian missions is vast and has the potential to directly positively impact also civilian capabilities within the European Union. Currently, there is overlap between both NATO and the UN, as well as between the civilians and the military, but also potential for cooperation. The potential for civ-mil cooperation in common capabilities development and procurement, especially, is considerable and could be better much better utilized*." (D6.1)

"*Explore the development of a unified Command and Control system for joint civilian and military deployment*" (D6.2)

"*In the field of technology the mission members hoped the EU to speed up developing an integrated management system for the EU CSDP. Currently, all missions develop their own software solutions for managing human resources, logistics and mission reporting purposes. This is time- consuming and makes the systems vulnerable to maintenance problems.*"

"Adopting project management tools such as MIP planning and evaluation tool for CSDP mission work also requires new type of skills sets from seconded experts and EEAS officials in Brussels." (D4.3)

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