PROJECT TITLE:
Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

DL 6.1 Standardisation review: Comparing the analysis

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report provides an overall picture of current capabilities, more specifically pooling and sharing, within European Union crisis management and conflict prevention. To extend the discussion to include civilian missions as well as military operations, where pooling and sharing is more typically used, pooling and sharing practices are considered to be examples of institutionalised cooperation between states or other institutions, where capabilities/assets are shared, either in a bilateral, multinational and supranational context.

Based on the methodological framework of the project complemented with a political risk analysis when engaging in pooling and sharing, the report looks at basic activities with increasing risk levels, i.e. training and maintenance, procurement and research and development, operations and strategy and common capabilities.

Chapter 2. details the CSDP-missions and operations related EU training initiatives. These are carried out by a number of different institutions and provide common standards, based on common curricula. The training initiatives also create a common organisational culture for EU member states representatives to work in missions and operations. However, there is also potential for development in terms of joint-standard setting, joint-curricula and certification.

Chapter 3. looks at common procurement and points to its importance in the development of common capabilities for crisis management and CSDP-missions and operations. The work of the EDA is paramount in building common capabilities, based on agreed standards, as this ensures interoperability and support pooling and sharing. Standard-setting between member states is also necessary for joint-procurement, as differences in standards can lead to large discrepancies in estimations of what level of procurement is necessary and what resources are factually needed. By taking one specific example, medical support, an analysis is made of how the process of common capability building works in practice.

Chapter 4. analyses and compares the material on pooling and sharing practices collected by the twelve case study reports on CSDP-missions and operations in the Balkans, Africa, Middle East and Asia. It found examples such as transfer of staff, mission support, standard operational procedures and common warehousing, and sharing knowledge. However, in contrast to the cost effectiveness that pooling and sharing provides as well as other potential benefits in terms of creating better cooperation, strengthening joint operating cultures, forging stronger links between individuals and organisations, this deliverable found surprisingly few examples of pooling and sharing at CSDP-mission level.

The final chapter looks at strategy and shared capabilities and concludes that currently within the CSDP-missions, the pooling and sharing of common capabilities is not frequent. It examines possibilities of creating a more conducive environment for pooling and sharing as well as some relatively easily applicable mechanisms that would strengthen current pooling and sharing, including development of a system or roster of pre-committed capabilities from the member states, which include personnel, equipment and functions such as medical support.
### ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVCOM</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPD</td>
<td>Crisis Management and Planning Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPCC</td>
<td>Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>DG IX</td>
<td>Directorate General of Civilian Crisis Management</td>
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<td>DG RELEX</td>
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<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>EU Military Staff</td>
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<td>Foreign Affairs Council</td>
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<td>FPI</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Instrument</td>
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<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>INTCEN</td>
<td>Intelligence Analysis Centre</td>
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<td>JSSR</td>
<td>Justice and Security Sector Reform</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIP</td>
<td>Mission Implementation Plan</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Member States</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFCA</td>
<td>Political Framework for Crisis Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMG</td>
<td>Politico-Military Group</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>P&amp;S</td>
<td>Pooling and Sharing</td>
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1 INTRODUCTION

Pooling and sharing is a key way for improving the effectiveness of EU’s capabilities in conflict prevention. Although typically espoused as a cost saving mechanism, pooling and sharing of resources within the EU also creates and maintains an organisational cultures, enables expertise to grow, strengthens best practices as well as increases the skill set of EU personnel.

Pooling and sharing is most typically used in defence cooperation, and in the EU context the European Defence Agency plays a central role in its promotion. However, pooling and sharing need not be limited to the military but can be applied to the civilian missions as well. Not unlike their military counterparts, civilian missions also require logistical support, training, coordination, equipment and so forth. Already current possibilities for P&S in civilian operations exist specifically in terms of training and recruitment of personnel and logistics. Naturally, the concerns over national defence are not as pronounced in civilian operations. The former has been especially successful in the EU, and poses few political risks related to national capabilities.

In civilian missions, the added value of pooling and sharing as a concept is to solidify existing forms of cooperation and recognise their centrality in creating a EU culture of crisis management and conflict prevention.

In terms of resources, pooling and sharing can be used both for tangible and intangible resources. For the military, pooling and sharing often requires considerable financial and political investment. On the civilian side, less so. In some cases, the need and high level of investment hamper pooling and sharing by creating high threshold levels.

The potential benefits of pooling and sharing are clear. Its practical implementation within the EU is, however, far less clear. The absence of a core group of member states, and the limited number of EU institutions driving forward pooling and sharing within the EU has resulted in “silos of cooperation”. Of these silos, it is possible to recognise four types of cooperation: unilateralism, where a member state takes action on its own; bilateral ententes, where two member states take joint-action; patchy multilateralism, where member states advance their cooperation in groups, and ad hoc coalitions especially in response to US requests for military cooperation.1

Streamlining “the variable geometry of European defence” would not only strengthen the “ambitions-capabilities” nexus2 but also directly positively benefit crisis management operations. Civilian missions, however, also benefit from streamlining of civilian capabilities across the European Union. The more able the European Union is to pool and share its resources and capabilities, the more able it is also to be effective in its crisis management and conflict prevention activities. As the understanding of how pooling and sharing functions in practical terms is

2 Ibid., 8.
especially lacking for civilian missions, those will be a special focus when analysing the current state of art, of where we are now, in order to understand how pooling and sharing practices can be improved within the European Union.

### 1.1 Purpose and goal of the report

This deliverable is part of Work Package (WP) 6, focusing on the potential for pooling and sharing (P&S) of EU capabilities. It builds on the work done in previous deliverables, most notably deliverable 1.5 (methodological framework) and deliverable 1.2 (Analysis of the current preventive activities) as well as draws on the data collected during WP2, 3 and 4, which focus on discussing specific case studies of EU CSDP missions in the Balkans, Africa, and Middle East and Asia.

This specific deliverable, the standardisation review, aims to provide an overall picture of the current framework and practices of pooling and sharing in CSDP-missions. It delivers a baseline, that informs the subsequent deliverables of WP 6, and thus support the identification of areas where P&S has not been considered but could offer efficiency and effectiveness gains, of areas where P&S has been officially encouraged but not sufficiently translated practice in the operational level, as well as ideas for models of best practice that can be potentially replicated.

### 1.2 Conceptual Framework

In terms of methodological framework, deliverable 6.1 will apply the concept of capabilities, perspectives and levels as detailed in deliverable 1.5 to analyse pooling and sharing. The image below details this:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAPABILITY</th>
<th>PERSPECTIVES</th>
<th>LEVEL OF ANALYSIS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Planning Capacity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisational Capacities</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>Politico-Strategic</td>
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<td>Interoperability</td>
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<td>Field-Operational</td>
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<td>Competences (knowledge &amp; skills)</td>
<td>Non-EU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
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<td>Technologies</td>
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*Figure 1-1. Capabilities, perspectives, and analysis’ levels defined in DL 1.5 (methodology)*
Additionally, the political risk pyramid developed by Kuijpers/Faleg, mentioned in deliverable 1.2 will be incorporated into the methodological framework to link the political dimension to the concept and development of capabilities.

The pyramid defines the four levels of political risks that can be encountered when member states engage in pooling and sharing:

- Strategic (highest risk)
- Operational
- Procurement and R&D
- Maintenance & Training (lowest risk)

In visual terms this combined approach can be displayed as in the following image:

![Political Risk Pyramid and Capabilities Levels](image)

**Figure 1-2. DL 1.5 and DL 1.2 combined**

By combining both perspectives, i.e. political risk pyramid and the project methodology, it is possible to analyse P&S from two complementary levels. The political risk pyramid gives insight in what areas P&S works, whereas the project methodology is geared to understand CSDP-missions and gives the possibility to analyse P&S from a capabilities and levels point of view, thus complementing the political risk analysis. Combining the two perspectives creates a stronger, more comprehensive approach.

Key to this standardisation review is delivering a state of the art of where pooling and sharing stands now in CSDP-missions. In order to do so, it is important to look at how to define pooling and sharing in order to have a common understand of these concepts.

---

1.3 Defining Pooling and Sharing

Deliverable 1.2 gives an overview how pooling and sharing, how it has mainly been developed in the framework of defence cooperation and refers to a number of authors that have attempted at defining these two concepts. It uses the definitions formulated by Mölling:

a. Sharing: “one or more countries provide their partners with capability or equipment (such as airlift) or undertake a task for another country. If this occurs on a permanent basis, the partners can cut this capability – and save on costs. For example, Germany provides maritime surveillance for the North Sea, thus relieving the Netherlands of this task. NATO states take turns to police the Baltic airspace so that the Baltic countries can save the cost of having their own air forces. Other examples of joint procurement and operation include AWACS aircraft and NATO’s command structures.”

b. Pooling: “here too, national capabilities are provided to other countries. A special multinational structure is set up to pool these contributions and coordinate their deployment. The European Air Transport Command is one such example. Pooling can occur in the development, procurement or subsequent operation of shared equipment. This enables countries to either obtain a higher number of units or to co-acquire a capability that a state could not supply alone for cost reasons”.

The key difference between pooling and sharing is the existence of a multinational structure, which exists in pooling but not in sharing. Permanent sharing reduces the need for national capabilities and is an even more effective cost-saving measure than pooling.

Deliverable 1.2 further refers in the footnotes to the authors Overhage and Faleg & Giovanni, who provide similar definitions and elaborate respectively the economic perspective (Overhage) and the specific components for Pooling and Sharing (Faleg & Giovanni).

The standardisation review builds on these definitions and broadens them by expanding the concept to apply to both CSDP missions as well as the military operations, which pooling and sharing originally referred to. In practical terms, it is often not possible to clearly define pooling and sharing separately as they can coexist, or include elements representing either pooling or sharing, simultaneously in the same institutional framework. Moreover, although it might be possible to create clear identifying indicators, the value of these indicators in practical terms is questionable since very few or even no current examples could be identified as being purely pooling or being purely sharing.

Thus the approach taken in deliverable 6.1 is not to see pooling and sharing as separate entities but as examples of institutionalised cooperation between states or other institutions, where capabilities/assets are shared, either in a bilateral, multinational and supranational context. The essence is transnational cooperation targeted at creating and maintaining capabilities.
The major advantage of this approach is that it is broad enough to encompass future developments of the concept of pooling and sharing. In addition, it enables this deliverable and the working package to capture the multitude of on-going cooperation initiatives in European Union crisis management and conflict prevention.

1.4 Structure of the report

The report is structured with the perspective of the political risk pyramid combined with the capabilities in mind. Following this logic, chapter two analyses pooling and sharing within training; chapter three will look at pooling and sharing practices in procurement and common capabilities building; chapter four will look at pooling and sharing in operations (the CSDP-missions reviewed in the case studies) and chapter five will finally discuss strategy and shared capabilities.

Pooling and sharing are not separate entities but rather examples of institutionalised cooperation between states or other institutions, where capabilities/assets are shared, either in a bilateral, multinational and supranational context.
2 POOLING & SHARING: TRAINING

The first stepping stone in the political risk pyramid developed by Kuijpers/Faleg is training and maintenance. As outlined in the introduction, P&S in the area of training is considered as carrying low political risk for the member states.

A number of European initiatives have been developed over the years in the area of training and exercises for pre-deployment of CSDP-missions. The perception that training carries minimal or non-existent political risk has facilitated cooperation between the member states in this field. In addition, joint development and implementation of trainings present cost-effective ways for member states to gain knowledge of current best practices, and cooperation can also be seen as improving the quality of the training as well as facilitating a certain level of standardisation or harmonisation of training in the context of civilian CSDP.

Furthermore, the practice that the member states are responsible for providing training to their own personnel that is to be deployed to civilian CSDP missions can be seen as having an effect in increasing the willingness for pooling and sharing in the area of training.\(^5\)

The online survey on pooling and sharing, conducted as part of IECEU Working Package 1, showed that training and exercises were regarded as somewhat successfully implemented and training was also seen as the most potential area of further developing pooling and sharing in the context of CSDP.\(^6\)

Against this background, this chapter presents an overview and examples of efforts that contain elements of pooling and sharing in the context of training. These training initiatives include mainly EU-level collaborations that focus on political, strategic, as well as practical level training. Later sections of the working package/deliverable also include case studies on training in the field. In line with the conceptual framework of the IECEU project, when addressing the effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations, particular attention will be paid to the six core capabilities listed in Working Package 1.5 (Planning Capacity, Organisational Capacity, Interoperability, Competences, Comprehensiveness, and Technologies). For this reason, these capacities will be taken into consideration, where applicable, when presenting the existing training initiatives. In addition, a brief overview is given of the existing schemes to commit the trained personnel to rosters, to P&S trained personnel.

2.1 European level training initiatives

The following chapters describe more in detail four key CSDP pre-deployment training offerings, i.e. the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi), the European Police, the European Union Police Services Training (EUPST) and the European Police College (CEPOL).

All these training initiatives can be seen as examples of European cooperation and more specifically as examples of P&S of CSDP-mission-related training. Below the different platforms


\(^6\) IECEU Online Survey on EU Pooling and Sharing.
for training cooperation are analysed in depth, following the capabilities framework referred to in chapter 1.

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<th>EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE COLLEGE (ESDC)</th>
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The European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is a permanent component of the European External Action Service (EEAS), in its Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD).

The ESDC functions as an umbrella organization for CSDP-related training given by EU member states. The college was formed in 2005 as a training instrument to CSDP by the Council of the European Union with an objective to provide strategic level training to civilian and military personnel and to identify and develop best CSDP-relevant practices among EU member states.7

As the leading organization in the context of CSDP training, ESDC is the most developed example of training-related pooling and sharing, functioning as a central coordinator of training provided by member states, as well as providing and contributing to training itself. To do this, ESDC functions as a network college, with national and EU-level institutional members involved in CSDP. The network members represent a broad range of institutions, including national defence colleges, civilian training institutions, universities as well as foreign and defence ministries of member states. ESDC training is provided in cooperation with the member institutions, according to a curriculum set yearly by the ESDC steering committee, with the help of an administrative secretariat. The ESDC is unique among the training initiatives listed here, as it is the only one focused solely on crisis management in the context of CSDP, while the other initiatives also train for missions led by other international institutions or other purposes.8

The curriculum consists of basic training courses, specialised training courses, Pre-Deployment Training (PDT) and in-mission training.9 ESDC training concept includes courses aimed at various levels of decision makers, from mid- to expert-, senior- and high-level representatives of member states.10 Some of the courses are also open to third country nationals. ESDC basic courses include a foundational CSDP orientation course and more thematic courses focused on relevant topics to missions. The concept behind these courses is to build capability and train knowledgeable personnel able to work on CSDP related matters, including field missions.

As a more immediate form of training, the so-called Pre-Deployment Training offered by ESDC is aimed at those staff members already selected for a field mission. Due to the constant circulation of staff in missions, PDT courses are organized more or less monthly, with participant nominations for the courses received from national seconding authorities and through missions themselves. Although the courses are focused for staff being deployed soon after the course, they are not

tailored to specific missions and include participants going to different missions. For this reason the courses include both general training on the operational principles, working methods and code of conduct in EU field missions as well as separate briefings to participants on topics relevant to their specific mission. The objective is for all personnel to have been trained to an adequate level for deployment.\(^{11}\)

As of May 2016, a total of 141 registered participants from 28 countries followed the pre-deployment training. The participants have been deployed to 15 CSDP missions and operations.

Below is included an overview of the ESDC from the perspective of the six core capabilities (as defined in chapter 1.1).

### 2.1.1.1 Planning capacity

Planning capacity is a core capability of the ESDC as a network college. Under the ESDC, the Steering Committee provides the overall coordination and direction of ESDC training activities, and an Executive Academic Board ensures the quality and coherence.

The Head of the ESDC is responsible for the organisation and managing of training activities and supports the work of the Committee and the Board; assisted by the ESDC secretariat.\(^{12}\)

The ESDC secretariat functions as a part of the CMPD and as such the EEAS, managed ultimately by the EU member states. The funding of the secretariat is based solely on an EU commission grant, while funding for the training courses comes both from this grant and the budgets of the organizing member institutions.

### 2.1.1.2 Organisational capacity

In terms of organizational capacity, the Steering Committee that is the decision-making body of the ESDC is composed of one representative appointed by each EU member state.\(^{13}\) The Executive Academic Board is composed of senior representatives of institutes and other actors identified by the member states. The ESDC secretariat, managed by the Head of the ESDC, consists of its staff of eight people in total, including a director, six specialists, and an administrative assistant. As a network college, the common curriculums of trainings are mainly conducted by the member institutions, leaving the ESDC staff to coordinate and develop the overall curriculum.

### 2.1.1.3 Interoperability

With respect to Interoperability, the ESDC is expected to cooperate with the Commission and the EEAS, as well as international organisations and national training institutes in third countries.


Standards for the trainings (establishing the annual ESDC programme, outlining curricula for all ESDC training activities and developing detailed curricula for all training activities) are set by the Steering Committee and the Executive Academic Board consisting of member organisations, with a focus on quality and coherence. In terms of practical interoperability, ESDC trainings include common courses covering broad topics, including civilian and military coordination.

### 2.1.4 Competences

Competences become available for the ESDC in the secondment of staff by member states based on national selection. Training of this staff varies as a result of national differences, but offers broad professional backgrounds. As an EU organization, the ESDC shares the languages and terminology of the EU.

### 2.1.5 Comprehensiveness

Comprehensiveness is evident in the setup of the ESDC as a network college, with member states and a variety of institutions represented in different levels of the ESDC. Due to its official status as an EU institution, the member states are also the relevant actors in setting up and guiding the ESDC.

### 2.1.6 Technologies

The technological capabilities of the ESDC include the goalkeeper software environment and particularly its schoolmaster component that is used to catalogue CSDP-related training opportunities offered at the ESDC and across the member states. In support of training activities, the ESDC manages an Internet-based Distance Learning (IDL) system that contains preparatory modules for training courses. Registration to the courses is done through the ESDC ENLIST system.

### 2.1.2. Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi)

Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi) has since 2011 been developing and harmonizing training standards for civilian crisis management. Based on a previous Commission-funded training project, the European Group on Training (EGT), ENTRi is collaboration between 14 national EU training institutions, funded by the European Commission through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and led by Germany’s Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF).
The second phase of ENTRi was concluded in 2016, with a third phase starting and running until 2018. As ENTRi's focus is on developing and harmonizing training provided by national institutions, it is more of a sharing collaboration. The different trainings conducted as part of this collaboration are also evaluated and certified. These certifications are valid for three years and can be renewed. As such, ENTRi does include some pooling characteristics, particularly related to knowledge management.

Similarly to ESDC, ENTRi course catalogue consists of a Core Course and a selection of Pre-Deployment Training, Specialisation Training, In-Country Training and HEAT courses.\(^{18}\)

The Core Course's focus on a more general introduction to civilian crisis management with participants from various backgrounds, while the Specialisation and In-Country trainings focus on specific topics. Unlike its ESDC equivalent, ENTRi Pre-Deployment Trainings are mission specific, and include personnel heading to the same mission. Between May 2011 and July 2015, 1450 personnel were trained in 67 specialised and pre-deployment courses.\(^{19}\)

### Planning capacity

In relation to the planning of ENTRi activities, during the current second phase of the project (2014-2016), the management of the collaboration is led by the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin, and guided by a steering group comprised of member institutions, chaired by the European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI). The collaboration has been organized into four working groups composed of the member organisations, each with their own chair. These working groups focus on the Evaluation of courses, Certification of courses, Training of Trainers and developing e-Learning. The role of the working groups is to practically coordinate the different aspects of the implementing members training activities and each is chaired by a different member institution.

### Organisational capacity

The organisational capacity of ENTRi is spread out, as it does not include a permanent central organising body. Since the role of ZIF is managerial in nature, the substantive work of the collaboration is left to the working groups and implementing members. The Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) funding of ENTRi is set by the Commission and covers 90% of the collaboration's cost, with the remainder being left to the members to cover. Although ENTRi does not have dedicated staff, the skills of staff in member institutions are developed through its Training of Trainers functions.

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\(^{19}\) Ibid.
2.1.2.3 Interoperability

As a standard-setting collaboration, interoperability is a key characteristic of ENTRi, though limited in focus to the collaboration’s main task of training in relation to civilian crisis management. The responsibility of setting and reviewing ENTRi training standards rests with the working groups, while implementation is the responsibility of the member organisations that conduct trainings.

2.1.2.4 Competences

ENTRi does not have dedicated staff but it is managed by staff of the implementing partner institutions. As such, the training and qualifications of staff working on ENTRi training are subject to the standards and practices of these institutions.

2.1.2.5 Comprehensiveness

The scope of ENTRi activities is limited to training in civilian crisis management, without operational elements, narrowing its scope. Though as a collaboration with 14 members from different countries, representing both public agencies as well as private institutions, the collaboration can be considered comprehensive within its field of work. In addition to this, ENTRi coordinates with the planning and operational bodies of international organizations to further develop their training standards, identify needs and improve coordination with countries contributing staff to these organizations.

2.1.2.6 Technologies

As a relevant technological capacity, ENTRi maintains an In Control mobile application for experts being deployed to the field in crisis management missions, based on a similarly named practical handbook. The application is an updated version of the physical handbook, and includes interactive checklists and quizzes for the users to familiarize with, and test their knowledge on, relevant subjects. The aim of producing an application is to make the handbooks content more accessible and portable, and as such, more usable.

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European Union Police Services Training (EUPST) is a training consortium of 17 police organisations from 13 EU member countries. Its mandate is focused on building capabilities in the areas of interoperability, harmonisation and an international police network for participation in civilian crisis management operations.\(^{22}\)

The current EUPST II programme is funded mainly by the IcSP and runs from 2015 to 2018, following two previous similar police training programmes. In addition to training police officers from EU member states, EUPST also undertakes activities in third countries, based on request, supporting non-EU CSDP contributing countries and African Union member states by assisting in Pre-Deployment Trainings and accepting nominations from these countries to Europe-based exercises.

The EUPST training includes aspects of both pooling and sharing. Individual courses are provided by both members and the consortium itself, with some shared resources and the aim of a common training curriculum. The consortium's working methods include large-scale exercises, modular training courses, conferences and workshops, with an aim to train 2000 police officers and gendarmes, including formed police units, by 2018.\(^{23}\)

The training topics include both themes specific to police as well as civilian-police cooperation.

### 2.1.3.1 Planning capacity

The EUPST consortium's chair is the Royal Netherlands Marechaussee, chairing the steering committee. Overall planning of EUPST activities is decided in the committee and implemented by the member organisations. In order to develop, document and harmonise a common training curriculum for its members, EUPST includes four working groups, focusing on comprehensive live exercises, training skills, interoperability and cross-cutting issues.\(^{24}\) The working groups' activities are monitored by a permanent evaluation committee, chaired by the European Police College (CEPOL). This development process will culminate with a common EUPST training handbook.

### 2.1.3.2 Organisational capacity

Similarly to ENTRi, EUPST organisation is spread out among its members that form the steering committee, working groups and permanent evaluation committee, without a dedicated structure. The members are also in charge of organising EUPST trainings using their own staff. With 80% of the consortium’s funding being set by the IcSP, the remainder is left for the implementing members to cover.\(^{25}\)

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\(^{23}\) Ibid.

\(^{24}\) Ibid.

\(^{25}\) Ibid.
Interoperability is a key focus of EUPST. As one of its goals is to harmonize training, EUPST has a specific working group on interoperability. Due to the nature of EUPST as a police training consortium, however, the scope of this capacity is limited.

Similarly to ENTRi, the EUPST does not have dedicated staff but it is managed by staff of the implementing partner institutions. As such, the training and qualifications of staff working on EUPST training are subject to the standards and practices of these institutions.

Comprehensiveness is evident in the EUPST approach to training police from both EU-member states and third countries, to participate in international crisis management missions related to the United Nations, European Union, African Union and others. To enhance civilian and police cooperation, EUPST has also held a shared event with ENTRi. The aim of this has been to develop further collaboration between the two similar projects.

As a training consortium the EUPST does not have specific technological capabilities, relying upon those of the implementing members.

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26 Ibid.
2.1.4. **EUROPEAN POLICE COLLEGE (CEPOL)**

The European Police College (CEPOL) is an agency of the European Union, established by the European Council and Parliament in the year 2000, later amended in 2005 and 2014. CEPOL is also a member of the EUPST consortium. In practice CEPOL works as a network of national law enforcement training institutes that share and develop training together. These member institutes are represented in a governing board, while the administrative center is the college's headquarters in Budapest, Hungary. The network aspect combined with the college's role as an agency of the European Union makes CEPOL an example of both pooling and sharing in training.

Through courses, e-learning and research, the aim of CEPOL is to standardize police practices in the European Union. Civilian crisis management is one of the training curriculums thematic areas, with 50-100 courses yearly open to member states. Nominations for courses are taken through national contact points.

2.1.4.1 **Planning capacity**

The overall decision making body of CEPOL is the Governing Board, comprised of representatives of member states police training institutions and chaired by the member state holding the presidency of the European Union. The board's role is to set CEPOL strategy, while implementation is the duty of the senior management based in Budapest, in cooperation with national institutions. The funding for CEPOL's HQ and management comes from the budget of the EU commission.

2.1.4.2 **Organisational capacity**

Due to the revolving nature of the presidency of the governing board, CEPOL development is tied with the goals of the member state holding the EU presidency, subject to the board's approval. As of 2016, under the Netherland's presidency, CEPOLs legal mandate is being developed, expanding the agency's role and the governing board's role. The management of CEPOL is led by an executive director in charge of an administration consisting of a single Operations Department, further divided into a Training and Research Unit, Strategic Affairs Unit and Corporate Services Unit. CEPOL staff comes from different member states, totalling approximately 30 persons.

2.1.4.3 **Interoperability**

The standards of CEPOL training are set by the governing board through a common curriculum, for the use of member state institutions organizing trainings. The curriculum focuses on a wide range

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of topics deemed relevant for police training, outlined on a European level. These include cooperation between civilian crisis management actors, but exclude civil-military cooperation.

### 2.1.4.4 Competences

CEPOL recruits staff on five-year fixed contracts, subject to renewal. Seconded national experts are also engaged based on calls. Applicants are evaluated by a selection committee against position-specific criteria, governed by CEPOL’s staff regulations. As such, the competences and training of staff is also specific to their duties. As an EU agency, the working languages and terminology of the EU are used at CEPOL.

### 2.1.4.5 Comprehensiveness

The main partners in CEPOL are the member police colleges of EU states. Through its functioning as a network college and role as an EU agency, CEPOL also cooperates with other institutions in the field of rule of law within the EU as well as international organizations. In addition, the college drafts cooperation agreements and working arrangements with police colleges in Associate, Candidate, Potential Candidate, and Strategic Partner countries of the European Union.

### 2.1.4.6 Technologies

Through its training and research unit, CEPOL also develops e-learning based training approaches.

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This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653371. The content of this document reflects the authors’ view and the European Commission is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains.
2.2 EU Trained Personnel

Building an exact picture of the number and availability of personnel trained in civilian crisis management courses of the various collaborations is difficult, as even though the previously mentioned collaborations include joint training, the personnel are listed primarily in national registers & pools. This is due to the fact that currently the staffing of missions is to a large extent based on national secondments in response to published calls for contribution by the EEAS.

In order to develop sharing & pooling in this regard, a Registrar-application being developed as part of the Goalkeeper environment makes it possible for national authorities to submit and create rosters of qualified and deployable personnel. The aim of Registrar is to make it easier to identify qualified secondees for missions and expedite calls for open posts.

Two examples of pooling trained personnel already exist within the EEAS. These are the rapid response expert pools for Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Civilian Response Teams (CRT), which consist of highly-qualified and fast deployable experts. These formations can be called upon by the Council, the PSC or the HR for deployment, based on EEAS selection. Both pools date from before the Lisbon treaty and are managed by the EEAS (CMPD & CPCC). Only members of CRT have been deployed so far.

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35 Ibid.
2.3 Conclusions

The current training-related P&S structures include a variety of different types of collaborations, ranging from more permanent organisations to fixed-term projects. Primarily these consist of shared course-based trainings that are open to member states, and in some instances also incorporate training-related R&D. In general, the training approaches of these collaborations are similar to each other and the EU Training Concept for CSDP.\textsuperscript{36}

However, the coherence of the training collaborations has been questioned as there is no central governing body and the decisions to launch the initiatives is done independently from CSDP training policy.\textsuperscript{37}

As listing and promotion of available courses, nominations and rostering of personnel are separate for all the collaborations and participating states, it is difficult to form a single picture of CSDP-related training offered to Member States. To develop this aspect, the Goalkeeper software environment and in particular its Schoolmaster platform is under development to function as an information hub for CSDP-related training, rostering, call for contributions and documents. As of 2016 the software is still under-utilized and not systematically integrated by the training collaborations.\textsuperscript{38}

In any case, the emerging picture is that P&S of training is well on its way, with for instance pre-deployment trained personnel deploying to 14 ongoing CSDP missions and operations.

This confirms that P&S in training knows advanced levels of cooperation and as such it could also support the conclusion that, in terms of political risk pyramid, it is a low-risk activity, that is easy to sign up for/ engage in.


3 POOLING & SHARING: COMMON PROCUREMENT & CAPABILITIES BUILDING

One of the important milestones in the evolution of the idea of pooling and sharing (P&S) within the EU was the informal meeting of EU defence ministers in Ghent in 2010. At that meeting, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs, Ms. Ashton, argued that member states should intensively cooperate in order to strengthen defence capability and later on also to rationalize financial means for the defence.

The main questions at the time were which capabilities would member states pool, what would they task- and role- share and what should stay outside P&S. Also, during that meeting, defence ministers agreed upon a list of projects that could serve as a tool to establish or improve cooperation by P&S military capabilities.

The European Defence Agency (EDA), has been appointed ‘in charge’ of the P&S development process. The mission of the Agency is to support the Council and the Member States in their effort to improve the Union's defence capabilities in the field of crisis management and to sustain the CSDP as it currently stands and as it develops in the future. Its work is based on article 42 of the Lisbon Treaty, where capability development is defined as a EU-competence.

In terms of risk pyramid (chapter 1), the scope and work of the EDA lies primarily in common procurement and R&D as a hub for the European defence community. Its task is to identify operational requirements, defining capabilities and strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector. It is worth noticing that currently there is no specific EU-agency dealing with improving the civilian capabilities in the field of crisis management. This explains the focus of this chapter on the EDA and defense capabilities in the field of crisis management.

This chapter will look more in detail into how the EDA has operated in developing P&S. After a general introduction on the EDA’s work, a specific capability, i.e. the medical, will be analysed in depth. The rationale behind this choice is that the medical capabilities are, in terms of P&S, at an advanced state, with a number of cases of successful implementation thereof in CSDP-missions.

Additionally, it is a capability that is both civilian and military and also well developed at UN and NATO-level, making it an interesting use case to explore.

39 Institutionally speaking, the EDA reports to the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Denmark opted out from the EDA.
40 COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2015/1835 of 12 October 2015 defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency (recast), Article 2.1.
41 Ibid, Article 2.2
42 The EEAS Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) acts as a missions HQ for ongoing missions and is developing a shared services platform. However, this is far from developing capabilities such as mission airlift capacity or field hospitals.
3.1 European Defence Agency and P&S

The landscape of the European Defence expenditure was and is still very fragmented. A quick analysis of the EDA Defence Data Portal shows that in 2014 a total defence expenditure is at 186 billion euro, or 1.45% of GDP. However, European collaborative defence equipment procurement expenditure displays a downwards trend, just above the 2005 levels. In terms of absolute percentages it is small, approximately 2.41%. In addition, in terms of equipment there is duplication and fragmentation, for instance there are currently 29 types of frigates, 19 different types of armoured fighting vehicles, 14 main battle tanks.

It is in this context that the EDA efforts in terms of P&S must be placed. As such P&S must also be seen as methodology to be more efficient and effective with limited resources. It also echo's NATO's concept of smart defense, which is a cooperative way of thinking about generating the modern defence capabilities that the Alliance needs for the future.

After an initial in-house exercise in 2010, to identify areas for P&S, the Agency was tasked in 2011 by the EDA Steering Board to cooperate with the EUMC and other EU actors with the purpose to provide proposals on how European P&S could be taken forward.

Key to the process (and EDA's work in general) is the Capability Development Plan (CDP). It is produced since 2008, to address security and defence challenges in the short-, mid- and longer-term. The plan defines common European capability requirements, based on the 2010 Headline Goal and lessons identified by the EUMC as well as future capability trends and defence plans and programmes identified by the EDA.

Based on the identified trends, information gathered from Member States and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), capability shortfall assessments, and pooling and sharing opportunities, a set of priority actions were selected by Member States. As of 2014 there are 5 priority actions:

- Protection of Forces in Theatre
- Securing Sea lines of Communication
- Gaining information superiority
- Enabling Expeditionary Operations
- Crosscutting Drivers

Within this framework of CDP, in November 2011, the Defence Ministers adopted an initial list of eleven P&S priorities, based on the proposal of the EDA. Currently, mid-2016, there are more than 50 multinational projects ongoing, with 126 staff and an effectively decreasing budget.

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44 EDA Presentation, Symposium Medical Support to EU CSDP Operations.
45 See: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm
47 EDA Factsheet Pooling & Sharing
In participating in more than 30 projects, four countries show particular interest in cooperation: Germany, France, Italy and Sweden. A second section of countries actively pursuing cooperation is composed of the Netherlands, Spain, Finland, Belgium, Austria and Norway, which can participate in EDA Projects since 2006.\(^{49}\)

The P&S projects can be clustered in the following six areas (Mollinger):

- Armament & Development
- Operational Capability & Command
- Training & Education
- Maintenance, Supply & Logistics
- Surveillance & Information
- Transport

Next to projects, the EDA has taken a number of initiatives supporting the development and adoption of codes of conduct. It developed, together with the member states, a voluntary “Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing”, which was adopted by the EDA Steering Board and welcomed in November 2012 by the Council.\(^{50}\) The Code comprises a series of actions to mainstream Pooling & Sharing in Member States’ planning and decision making processes. The actions are to be implemented on a national and voluntary basis, in line with defence policies of Member States.

The EDA also supports the EDTIB, the 2006 Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, where states that have signed up to it undertake to open up their defence equipment markets and to publish their invitations to tender on the EDA website (EBB 1).\(^{51}\)

Another EDA initiative is the Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, encouraging increased competition and fair opportunities for all suppliers, including for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). It supports the better access to defence contracts by publish all contract opportunities for small and medium-sized defence companies on the Agency’s Electronic Bulletin Board 2 (EBB 2).\(^{52}\)

In terms of P&S and common procurement, the EDA has three offerings (a) the use of projects developed within the EDA framework and internal expertise; (b) ad-hoc contract support and; (c) pre-mission solutions for both civilian missions and military operations.

An operational commander can ask the EDA for support when force generation fails. The aforementioned options can then be offered to the commander. In case of offering projects, the EDA assessed the pertinence to the operation and, if required, adapts or complements them to better fit with end-user needs. The ad-hoc contract support consists of a database of suppliers, certified by the EDA as well as a library of procurement documents and consultancy. One example of ad-hoc contract support is EUTM Mali, where the EDA helped with writing the specifications for a medical incinerator.

\(^{49}\) C. Mollinger, State of play of the implementation of EDA’s pooling and sharing initiatives, page 19.

\(^{50}\) Foreign Affairs Council 3199, 16062/12, PRESSE 467 PR CO 61.


\(^{52}\) Source: https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/documents/CoBPSC_final
Pre-mission solutions are currently limited to the military domain, where a common platform is created beforehand, together with industry, for specific capabilities. An example is the EU Satellite Communications, where four different missions use the same SatCom services offered by one provider.

In terms of assessing the EDA’s role in P&S, the most recent analysis is the study of the European Parliament, authored by Mollinger. Three limits of this agency are listed: (a) from innovator to facilitator; (b) risk of overstretch and; (c) the EDA is kept out of the game. One of the key points made is that many projects from the EDA consist in harmonising standards, establishing regulatory frameworks and roadmaps, or simplifying certification procedures. With a few exceptions such as Air-to-Air Refuelling or Medical Support, these projects tackle technical and regulatory issues rather than concrete Pooling and Sharing of capabilities and large-scale projects.

53 Mollinger, Study on State of play of the implementation of EDA’s pooling and sharing initiatives, p. 17 and page 21.
### 3.2 Medical Support Capabilities Building & Procurement

Medical support is a key enabler for any missions and operations as it part of the duty of care for the deployed personnel. At the same time it is also costly resource, that requires specialised personnel, equipment and logistics. Also, its components vary, according to the needs and existing infrastructure on the ground. They range between small units providing basic medical support (role 1) to a fully equipped medical treatment facility with specialist diagnostic resources, specialist surgical and medical capabilities, preventive medicine, food inspection, dentistry, and operational stress management teams (so-called role 3).

In terms of P&S, capabilities building and the CDP, medical capabilities are part of the priority action ‘Enabling Expeditionary Operations’, where it is listed as ‘Provide Medical Support in Operations’. The main goals of P&S medical support are:

- Increase interoperability of equipment, expertise, and training in Medical Support to CSDP operations.
- Analyse new areas for medical capability development and Pooling & Sharing opportunities.
- Promote cooperation amongst all actors involved.
- Enhance dual-use capabilities for medical assets in disaster relief and other emergencies.

Under the EDA-umbrella and more specifically the EDA Project Team Medical54 and related Ad-Hoc Working Groups a number of projects aiming at identifying possible solutions for P&S medical support have been carried out, most notably focusing on the multinational Modular Medical Unit (M3U) and Multinational medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

The main project is the Multinational Modular Medical Unit (M3U), which involves 16 contributing member states. Its goal is to develop deployable Multinational Field Hospitals to for the full spectrum of CSDP Operations. In paragraph 3.3 the M3U will be analysed in depth as it is, in terms of P&S, an interesting case study.

The EDA’s project on Multinational MEDEVAC has the scope to find shared effective solutions (P&S) in the field of Medical Evacuation from a Multinational cooperation in terms of assets, training, procedures and interoperability. A first step is the future implementation of Multinational MEDEVAC training.56

Other ongoing initiatives in the field of medical support are two studies commissioned by the EDA. One is focusing on Interoperability in forward aeromedical evacuation with rotary wings and the other is focusing on medical support to small operations (so-called light foot operations). Finally, the EDA is also active in organising high-level stakeholders consultations, such as the 7-9 June symposium on medical support to EU CSDP operations, where key experts exchanged views on the state of play and future initiatives.

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54 EDA’s coordinating body for Medical Support activities is the Project Team (PT) Medical, where representatives from Member States meet and discuss all aspects relating to medical support, including training.

55 There are: AT, BE, BG, CY, CZ, DE, EL, ES, FI, FR, HU, IT, IE, NL, RO, SE, SI.

The P&S and common procurement of medical support capabilities are not only developed but also deployed in CSDP missions and operations. Two specific examples exists for medical support at the time of writing (June 2016):

- **EUTM Mali:** the EDA provided technical, contractual and administrative support in writing the tender specifications for a medical incinerator\(^\text{57}\) and the contracting of in-theatre rotary wing medical evacuation (MEDEVAC)\(^\text{58}\).
- **EULEX Kosovo:** contracting of in-theatre rotary wing medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

Finally, in order to be comprehensive, the European Air Group (EAG) should be mentioned as an example of P&S of medical capabilities at European level. The EAG is a multinational organization based on intergovernmental agreements between the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Spain and Belgium. The goal is to improve their capabilities through interoperability.\(^\text{59}\)

The technical agreement for the Aviation medicine (AVMED) and the subsequent AVMED Coordination Board (CB) was signed in 2005 and amended in 2012 by the EAG air chiefs. The CB is comprising one National specialist representative from each nation and personnel from the EAG logistics area, which promotes and facilitates collaboration and cooperation between the EAG air forces in the field of aviation medicine. Further on, the goal was to promote cooperation between European defence agency (EDA), NATO Aeromedical working group (AMDWG), Air and space interoperability council (ASIC). Common knowledge, exchange of information and consultation are the building blocks for the coordination board.

The example of cross-national sharing are: EAG’s common medical courses (sharing the knowledge), common catalogue of experts (sharing the personnel), medical standards, high-cost equipment (sharing the equipment), etc.

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\(^{59}\) For more information: http://www.euroairgroup.org/about-eag/
3.3 Multinational Medical Module (M3U)

The multinational modular medical unit (M3U) presents one of the options for P&S medical support. The main idea behind the M3U is to stimulate member states to combine their efforts to enhance medical support in EU missions. The purpose of the M3U program is to ensure standardization and integration of medical modular assets of different (or all member states) participating countries. Its precise aim has been defined by the EDA as follows:60

The M3U main aims is to standardise national medical capabilities to achieve a high level of interoperability so that different medical modules can be integrated within a framework structure offered by a Frame Nation. The final outcome is a deployable and sustainable M3U.

In order to build this capabilities, if needed, an EU Common Procurement Program can be started. The initial focus will be on developing a level of care equivalent to NATO Role 2 and Role 3 Medical Treatment Facilities. However the duplication with NATO should be avoided. Hence the cooperation between countries as well as with other organizations (e.g. NATO, UN, WHO) and civilian sphere has been emphasized throughout the project.

When a M3U will be deployed, the leading nation will ensure the minimum function services as well as the coordination among the modules contributed by other countries. Key to its functioning is a so-called Programme Arrangement. This is a structure, with a central decision making body, the Management Committee, composed of the representatives of all M3U contributing Member States.

In 2011 Italy initiated the M3U project and took the lead in the development of the M3U module within the EDA.

3.3.1.1 Planning capacity

Currently, 16 member states contribute to the M3U-project. Part of the project is the development of Common Staff Requirement (CSR) and the Project Arrangement, in which contributing member states with common interests can activate sub-projects for practical outcomes such as common procurement.

The Multinational Modular Medical Units project aims to develop a state-of-the-art deployable field hospital that should become available to CSDP operations. It is designed to be used in a wide range of missions, from peacekeeping to humanitarian relief and coercive operations.61

The Programme Agreement between participating states is expected to be signed in 2016. The agreement will bring the first phase to the end and afterwards the proper conditions will be established to deploy M3U in CSDP mission.

Medical support to a CSDP mission must maintain a high state of readiness and availability, providing timely, responsive and continuous care to any patient or casualty within the medical system. Its characteristics are following:

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60 EDA presentation, 7-9 June, Symposium on medical support to EU CSDP operations.
Highly flexible, modular arrangement.
- Trained personnel with state-of-the-art equipment.
- All the resources of a modern hospital, in the most challenging environments.
- Avoiding duplication, building on best practices.\(^{62}\)

In the operational phase, before the deployment of M3U to specific missions, in the planning process four minimum capability requirements will have to be included: personnel, equipment, material, and procedures.

The planning process will follow the general EU rules; namely 1) Routine phase when monitoring and exchange of information is carried out within the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and relevant Council Working groups; 2) Crisis build-up and elaboration of a Crisis Management Concept (CMC); 3) Approval of the Crisis Management Concept and Development of Strategic Options; 4) Formal decision to take action and development of planning documents when the Council adopt the Joint Action drawn up by the Working Group of Foreign Relations Counselors (Relex Group).\(^{63}\)

Afterwards the Concept of operation and the Operational plan are prepared. The latter define the capabilities each member state can offer and the training required before the deployment.\(^{64}\) Based on the national capabilities the lead nation is selected and when it comes to M3U the lead nation require additional modules to establish the M3U.

In terms of planning of medical support to CSDP-missions, one key document must be mentioned, i.e. the EEAS document on Comprehensive Health and Medical Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Missions and Operations, approved both by CIVCOM and the Military Committee.\(^{65}\)

It sets out medical support principles for the guidance of Commanders, Head of Missions and their staff, and to provide functional direction to the medical staff, in order to optimize health and healthcare support on EU-led Crisis management missions and operations. It consists of detailed operational guidelines, guidance on how to organise medical support and perform medical planning. Its annexes define a medical treatment facility (MTF), such as the M3U.

### Organisational capacity

The lead nation is identified in order to ensure the basic services for M3U to be functional and to ensure coordination. However the lead nation does not provide the whole M3U, but only ensures the minimum military capability requirement as declared in Combined Joint Statement of Requirements and Theatre Capability Statements of Requirement.

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\(^{62}\) EDA: Multinational modular medical units. Available at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2014-10-07-factsheet_field-hospitals


\(^{64}\) Phone interview with EDA official, 29th of March 2016.

\(^{65}\) EEAS document number 00559/6, 14 CSDP/PSDC 559 of 3 June 2014.
The lead nation for example defines regulations and implementation procedures, prepares the memorandum of understanding, technical agreements with contributing nations and other organizations, controls and evaluates procedures and standards, takes care of the lessons learned process. Troop contributing nations contribute modules or other contributions in personnel, equipment or material.

The budget, common funding, cost-sharing and other financial aspects will be agreed upon before the deployment of M3U in a Technical Agreement specific for each mission.

In this phase, Italy offered the training center for synchronization of individual modules before combining them in field.66

### 3.3.1.3 Interoperability

In terms of structure, the medical treatment facility core module is an indivisible entity and composed of medical personnel, equipment and material. The medical modules are grouped in Core Modules, Enhancing Modules and Complementary Contributions.

The single framework national will provide the medical treatment facility. Troop contributing nations will contribute additional capabilities and standardized modules that are required in the specific mission. Together they form a M3U. The additional capabilities can be specific personnel, specific material and/or equipment.

Each nation can contribute to each module, therefore the interoperability of personnel, material and equipment is absolutely necessary. The required standardisation is described in the Common Staff Requirement (CSR) and Programme Arrangements, however, these are at the time of writing (June 2016) not published and thus unavailable for analysis.

Based on interviews, the statement can be made that M3U the medical equipment and material aim at being compliant with NATO standards (COMEDS) and EU standards (the Comprehensive Health and Medical Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Missions and Operations mentioned in 3.3.1.1.). Other equipment and material (e.g. floors, connectors …) should be designed the way to achieve the easiest connection among modules. Common procurement program will be launched to help participating nations to achieve required capabilities and interoperability.

### 3.3.1.4 Competences

The working language in M3U is English, the personnel will refer to EU and NATO language standards. The ability to communicate between the patient and the medical personnel have been prioritized, hence the necessary measures should be taken into account as early as in planning phase for each mission. The possible solutions are: translators, multilingual personnel, etc.

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66 Interview with representative of Slovenian armed forces, January 2016.
3.3.1.5 Comprehensiveness

The development of the M3U module is done in close cooperation with key stakeholders such as the UN, the European Commission / DG ECHO and NATO.

The UN has published a UN Medical support manual, which was updated in 2014 (3d edition, 01/01/2015). It contains the minimum requirements of medical capability per mission in terms of staff and type of equipment. It also includes reimbursement rates for contributing countries.

As CSDP-missions can be implemented in the framework of UN-missions, close cooperation between both organisations on the medical support aspect is paramount. It is unclear whether such contacts are institutionalised. In any case, as the medical support and planners community is small, working contacts at medical planners level are ensured at conferences level.

The European Commission, through DG ECHO, provides humanitarian aid and civil protection. It has defined four types of medical modules in the Commission Decision of 20 December 2007 (2008/73/EC, Euratom) and 29 July 2010 (2010/481/EU, Euratom), i.e. Advanced Medical Post, Advanced Medical Post with Surgery, Field Hospital and Medical aerial evacuation of disaster victims. These can be deployed at the request of an affected nation. On 30 June 2015, the Commissioner of DG ECHO and the EDA Chief Executive signed a cooperation agreement, and following this, EDA and DG ECHO experts are investigating possible synergies in different areas, among which medical support and medical evacuation. In any case, in the EDA presentations about the M3U module, the Civil Protection ‘use case’ has been mentioned as a possibility for deployment of the M3U.

Finally, NATO has a long tradition of standards as well as doctrine on medical support and is currently working on developing standards for multinational medical support (AJMedP-9), which includes the Multinational Health Service and the modular approach for medical treatment facilities Multinational (MTF).

It has a specific structure to deal with this, i.e. the Chiefs of Military Medical Services (COMEDS). It is the Alliance’s senior military medical body on military health matters and acts as the central point for the development and coordination of military health standards and for providing medical advice to the Military Committee.68

COMEDS is the tasked authority to set up medical standards, which in turns leads to doctrine. Once doctrine is there, nations are asked by NATO to offer assets, in line with the standards. When missions occur, and the requests for assets is not met by nations, contractors can be approached.

There is cooperation between NATO and EDA at different levels. There are informal staff-to-staff meetings as well as the participation in EU/NATO capabilities group meetings. Also, the EDA has observer status at COMEDS Working Group meetings and NATO has the same status at the EDA.

67 A copy of the document can be downloaded here: http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/387299/2015.12%20Medical%20Support%20Manual%20for%20UN%20Field%20Missions.pdf?sequence=4&isAllowed=y
68 Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49168.htm
Project Team Medical meetings. This close cooperation is not surprising as both organisations serve the same military community and 21 out of 27 states are the same nations.

However, an interesting point is that, in terms of standard-setting, there seems to be a different approach between the EU/EDA and NATO. NATO has less detailed rules and asks for capacities, i.e. 8 surgeries per day. At EU level, the standards are more detailed, defining also the for example the surgeons needed. Even though NATO standards were followed when setting up the M3U standards, the question remains about interoperability and compatibility between the M3U module and the NATO draft-standard on multinational medical support.

3.3.1.6 Technologies

In terms of technologies and M3U, two major observations can be made. Firstly, in terms of creating a M3U module, member states can use EDA’s contract support facilities to implement common procurement for the modules’ assets, including contracting and fund re-allocations (e.g. setting up bank accounts, etc.).

To facilitate P&S, the EDA has a collaborative database where MS can put their assets and those they wish to develop. Matching can be made between MS, which then can result in P&S resources.

In terms of the technologies the M3U unit would have to use itself (e.g. logistical databases, etc.), there has been debate among the countries in the project on whether to include details on technical standards. The outcome of this specific debate was that this was not needed as function is central (outcome base, not technology based).

69 This finding is based on interviews with officials involved in the debate and cannot be verified as the draft programme arrangement is not made public and available for further analysis.
3.4 Conclusion

This chapter looked at the current state of art in the field of common procurement and capability building, the second step of the political risk pyramid. It focused on one specific capability, the medical support capability, in order to get a deeper understanding of how the P&S at capability building level works in practice and what the current state of art is.

A first concluding remark is that in terms of building capabilities and common procurement, this is mainly led by the EDA, and has thus a strong orientation on defence. No similar organisation exists in the civilian field, and although the EDA also promotes dual use, it remains a defence oriented organisation, with its main stakeholders in the defence/military community and not civilian.

A second concluding remark is that, compared to training, the building of common capabilities and common procurement has still some road ahead in terms of mainstreaming into CSDP missions and operations. In the area of medical support only two cases are recorded of common procured capabilities and the situation for other capabilities (e.g. camp management, armoured vehicles, etc.) is similar, with 2 CSDP-missions (EUFOR Althea and EUTM Somalia and EUTM RCA). The M3U is not yet into play as the Programme Arrangement is not agreed upon yet.

In terms of the political risk pyramid, this confirms its position of medium political risk, that requires some further work in terms of political will, financial commitment, operational availability, proven interoperability and trained personnel to make it happen as a default for CSDP-missions and operations capability generation.
4 POOLING & SHARING: OPERATIONS / CASE STUDIES

Pooling and Sharing is not only happening on the lower levels of the risk pyramid such as maintenance and training as well as procurement and R&D, but as it was illustrated in the introduction of this chapter as well as in DL 1.2, it should also be taken into consideration on operational level where the risks are obviously higher than on the two lower layers. In order to do so, selected case studies will help in answering the question of how much of the potential of pooling and sharing has been used so far in CSDP missions and operations.

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter the analysis and reports from the different IECEU-project case study areas will be compared in order to give insight in the current framework and practices of pooling and sharing of EU-capabilities. Furthermore, one particular case study will be analysed more in depth, to analyse how it benefitted from pooling and sharing of capabilities.

The project defined in total eight case study area’s (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya, Palestine Territory and Afghanistan). Within their respective work packages, each one of them delivered in April/May 2016 a review, based on desk research and field interviews.

In terms of methodology and project conception, the analysis on pooling and sharing is based on the data collected in these reviews. To facilitate the comparison between the case studies, a common structure for the reviews was agreed beforehand between all work package leaders.

This common structure includes detailed interview questions. In terms of pooling and sharing, the following three standardised questions were asked in all case studies:

3.3 Establishment of CSDP mission/operation (legal framework, deliberations/challenges within the EU about the establishment of the mission/operation …has P&S been considered, if so: civilian or military means or both?, if so: were these capabilities identified by the EDA?, if so: what capabilities were P&S?; how did this work at legal level and procurement level? What structure was responsible for implementing P&S? Were there standards for interoperability and were these applied?

3.4 Dynamics of the CSDP mission/operation (change in the mandate, structure, staff (more or less experts deployed, what kind of experts, new functions, how did the P&S capabilities work in the field? Were they considered effective by the staff? Were gaps identified for the P&S capabilities in terms of the mission goals? Was interoperability of the P&S capabilities an issue, if so how? Was there any overlap between civilian and military efforts?)

3.8 Existing practices of pooling and sharing (if any)

The standardisation of questions relates back to the definition of pooling and sharing that is used (see 1.2 Conceptual Framework). When analysing the results of the case studies, it is noticed that the term ‘sharing’ is used frequently, however not as part of the concept of pooling and sharing of EU-capabilities.
For instance, the case study of South-Sudan mentions the sharing of power and revenue-sharing. This is not pooling and sharing of EU capabilities, but sharing of power at national level. Therefore, this is not taken into account in the analysis of the case studies in terms of pooling and sharing as it falls outside the scope of pooling and sharing of D6.1.

This chapter is divided into three sub-headings:

- Heading 4.2: giving an overview of the findings of each case study in terms of pooling and sharing
- Heading 4.3: providing a comparison of all case studies and analysing the findings
- Heading 4.4: in-depth analysis of one case study

### 4.2 Overview of case study results

The IECEU-project defined in total eight case study area’s (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya, Palestine Territory and Afghanistan).

These case studies studied a total of 15 CSDP-missions and operations:

- EULEX Kosovo
- EUPM-BiH
- Operation Arthemis
- EUFOR RD Congo
- EUPOL RD CONGO
- EUPOL Kinshasha
- EUSEC RD Congo
- EUFOR ALTHEA
- EUFOR RCA
- EUFOR Tchad/RCA
- EUAVSEC South Sudan
- EUBAN Libya
- EUBAM (Rafah)
- EUPOL COPS
- EUPOL Afghanistan

In this paragraph 4.2, for each mission some key factual data is listed and an overview is given of the case studies’ findings in terms of pooling and sharing. Based on this information, the comparative analysis is carried out in the next heading.
4.2.1. D2.1 - THE KOSOVO REVIEW

The case study deliverable ‘D2.1 The Kosovo review’ researched the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). The mission was launched in February 2008 and has its mandate extended until 14 June 2016.\(^70\)

The mission goal is to support Kosovo on its path to a greater European integration in the rule of law area, notably to support the key EU aims in the visa liberalization process, the Feasibility Study and the Pristina-Belgrade Dialogue. EULEX also supports the Structured Dialogue on the rule of law, led by Brussels and concentrates on the fight against corruption and works closely with local counterparts to achieve sustainability and EU best practices in Kosovo.

The mission has currently 1400 staff, international and national staff combined. Its annual budget is € 76 million. EULEX is supported by all 28 European Union Member States and five contributing States (Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States).

In terms of pooling and sharing, the D2.1 The Kosovo review has recorded a number of findings about practices of pooling and sharing in this CSDP-mission. In paragraph 3.4, on existing practices of pooling and sharing in EULEX it outlines a few findings from the EULEX mission relating to ‘pooling and sharing’:

- **Transfer of staff:** EULEX had, for example, sent a border advisor, who had special knowledge needed in another civilian crisis management mission, to work on a particular project/task for a couple of weeks (EU BAM RAFAH).

- **Mission support:** the mission is responsible for carrying out a lot of work that could be centralized, for example procurement, financial control etc. In the example of the latter it means that there are a dozen of procurement officers working in EULEX in Kosovo. This could have also been done in the spirit of ‘pooling and sharing’, had these kind of activities been centralized. Some progress in this regard has been made with the idea to establish the shared service platform, which has been debated for quite some time. Nowadays each of the CSDP missions/operations has to develop its own intranet system.

- **Standard operational procedures:** EULEX adopted standard operational procedures, developed by the office of Chief of Staff. Procedures on how to deal with recruitment, regulating procurement etc. are now exactly specified in a single document. At the later phase, this was then shared also with other civilian missions.

- **Common warehousing:** the idea is mentioned that a common warehouse for CSDP missions would be established – premises similar to the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi (Italy), which is considered to be a model upon which the CSDP missions/operations can build. There was a proposal to have EULEX transformed into a hub for other missions, but this has not materialized yet.

\(^70\) Source: http://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,16
• Sharing of knowledge: the idea of sharing the knowledge through CPCC on the thematic seminars and between the missions (for example the seminar on gender topics, human rights etc.) is mentioned. In practice this means that experts from different CSDP missions and operations gather in Brussels and exchange their experiences on certain topics, and then try to implement the relevant findings in their respective missions/operations.

• Joint use of resources: it happens at two different levels. Firstly, between is the EU Office in Kosovo/European Special Representative in Kosovo and EULEX. For example, EULEX provides security services to the Delegation members when they travel to Northern Kosovo. Situational awareness, security information analysis and, in the past also threat assessment done by EULEX have been shared with the EU delegation in Kosovo, given the fact that EULEX has comparative advantage here. Secondly, with other international organizations that do not have sufficient resources available, when it comes to the logistics. In the elections planned for April 2016 for example, EULEX will lend its cars to the OSCE staff that will be collecting votes from the Serbs casting ballots at the Serbian parliamentary elections.

In addition, the EDA helped with the outsourcing of in-theatre rotary wing medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) in EULEX Kosovo.71

4.2.2. D2.2 - BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA REVIEW

The case study deliverable ‘D2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina Review’ researched two CSDP-missions, i.e. the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM/BiH) and European Union Force Althea (EUFOR Althea).

The two missions were launched respectively in 2003 (EUPM/BiH) and 2004 (EUFOR Althea). One is civilian and finalised in 2012 (EUPM/BiH) and one is military and ongoing ((EUFOR Althea). Both missions have different goals, staff size and budget.

The goal of the mission EUPM/BiH was to establish sustainable policing arrangements under BiH ownership in accordance with best European and international practice. Focusing on police reform, and keeping a finger on police accountability, EUPM’s primary centre of attention has been the fight against organised crime and corruption and strengthening the rule of law. It was the first ever CSDP-mission to be established and had an initial strength of 478 international staff and 296 national staff. At the end of the mission (June 2012) this was 34 international staff and 47 national staff. Its budget total from 2002-2012 was EUR 32.9 million and the mission budget 2012 was EUR 5.250 million. Contributing states were EU member States, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine.72

The goal of the mission EUFOR ALTHEA is to ensure continued compliance with the Dayton/Paris Agreement for peace in BiH and to contribute to a safe and secure environment in BiH. Operation

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ALTHEA is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements.\(^{73}\)

Currently, the EUFOR Commander has 600 personnel under operational control. The common costs of the operation are € 71.7 million\(^{74}\) The common costs of Operation ALTHEA are paid through contributions by Member States to a financial mechanism (Athena) based on GDP\(^ {75}\). The Troop Contributing Nations are 17 EU Member States plus Albania, Chile, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Switzerland and Turkey.

In terms of pooling and sharing, the D2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina Review only recorded findings for EUFOR Althea. It mentions that the European Defence Agency (EDA) did not play a role in capability development or identifying pooling and sharing capabilities during the first years of the operation as it was established in 2004, when the mission was already ongoing. In the initial phase pooling did not take place as such. Some – mostly purchased from NATO – infrastructure and nationally procured material was shared.\(^ {76}\)

However, this is not a complete picture, as the EDA has signed in May 2014 with the Operation Commander of EUFOR Althea and Deputy SACEUR a Procurement Arrangement concerning the acquisition of Air to Ground Surveillance services to operation ALTHEA. This is the first time EDA has signed a procurement arrangement directly with an EU mission.\(^ {77}\) Also, the EDA has supported EUFOR Althea by giving advice on outsourcing the camp management operations at Butmir.\(^ {78}\)

### 4.2.3. D3.1 – THE DR CONGO REVIEW

The case study deliverable ‘D3.1 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Review’ researched five CSDP military operations and missions to the Democratic Republic of Congo. More specifically, it looked at the military operations Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo and the missions EUPOL-Kinshasa, EUPOL RD Congo and EUSEC RD Congo.\(^ {1}\)

The first EU operation, Operation Artemis, was the first independent military operation launched by the EU, and became a milestone in the development of the ESDP, that came to shape future operations. It was deployed in the Ituri provincial capital of Bunia in 2003 with the aim of stabilizing a deteriorating security situation. The force was deployed parallel to the existing UN PSO mission in the DRC. Operation Artemis lasted 3 months, and after that became part of the international

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\(^ {73}\) The decision to launch Operation ALTHEA followed the decision by NATO to conclude its SFOR-operation and the adoption by the UN Security Council of resolution 1575 authorising the deployment of an EU Force (EUFOR) in BIH.

\(^ {74}\) Source: Consilium website, EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation EUFOR ALTHEA); http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/080929%20Althea%20update%2011_EN.pdf

\(^ {75}\) The information relative to the funding is taken from the web site of the European External Action Service, http://www.eea.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/financing-csdp-military-operations/

\(^ {76}\) D2.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina Review, paragraph 3.3 Establishment of EUFOR Althea; page 47.


\(^ {78}\) This example was mentioned by an EDA-representative at the 7-9 June 2016 Symposium on Medical Support to EU CSDP operations.
community’s overall assistance to the country.\textsuperscript{79} It had 1800 troops deployed\textsuperscript{80} and a budget of 7 million Euro was made available for common costs, whilst the reminder of the cost was based covered by the contributing states. However, Operation Artemis was exceptional in the sense that France covered much of the costs of the operation, and used 46 million Euros on this operation. Eighteen states contributed to the operation; fourteen EU member states and four third states (Brazil, Canada, South Africa, Cyprus).\textsuperscript{81}

It was a French dominated operation, but with a clear EU and UN mandate, and was supported by non-EU states, for instance South Africa with two Oryx helicopter platform, Canada provided strategic and tactical airlift capacity, and Cyprus. The inclusion of a small British contingent helped create access to Entebbe airport, since France role in Central Africa remained a tensious issue due to its role during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The operational area was logistically close to Entebbe Airport, which is a regional logistical hub, and only 300 km from the operational zone in Bunia.

The second EU operation, EUFOR RD Congo, was deployed 30 July 2006 and withdrew 30 November 2006. The difference with Operation Artemis is however that the bulk of the forces was only deployed as a rapid deployable capability in neighbouring Gabon, which could be deployed in hotspots all over the DRC. The force was under German command, and had contributions from 21 EU member states, and Turkey.

The objective of EUFOR RD Congo was basically to prop-up the MONUC force already in operation, and operated in close cooperation with that force. This can be also inferred from the four operations’ objectives:

- supporting and providing security to MONUC installations and personnel;
- contributing to airport protection Kinshasa;
- protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence; and
- evacuation operations in case of emergency if needed.

In terms of financing, the force was based on the same model as Artemis, where common costs were covered for by the Arthena mechanism, whilst the national costs were covered by the contributing state. The budget for the four months deployment was 16.700 million Euro to cover the common costs for the 2500 troops deployed in DRC and Gabon.\textsuperscript{82} The estimated total cost of the mission was 100 million Euros.

This operation had a clear UN mandate, and there was local consent regarding the deployment. However, this mission also showed some of the weaknesses that EU military operation is facing. It


\textsuperscript{80} France provided 900 of the combat troops, whilst Germany’s 350 contribution was of a non-combat nature. On top of that France had over a 1000 troops in reserve in Gabon and Chad.

\textsuperscript{81} Source: Factsheet Artemis; \url{http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/csdp/missions-and-operations/artemis-drc/index_en.htm}

\textsuperscript{82} EUFOR RD Congo had approximately 1000 troops deployed in Kinshasa, whilst the bulk of the force was either in Gabon, and, as an additional reserve, in Germany and France.
was only the Spanish contingent that did not have national caveats baring them to intervene when the government forces attacked the oppositional presidential candidate Jean-Pierre Bemba. Furthermore, the Congolese government forces fortified the international airport to such an extent, that it would have made it difficult to bring in the reserve force stationed in Gabon without at least being delayed.

The EUPOL and EUSEC missions were launched in 2005. Their aims were to help train the Congolese police and military institutions as part of the SSR and state-building project initiated after the signing of the two peace agreements. The EUPOL project was ended in 2014, EUSEC in 2016.

The missions’ tasks and objectives changed over time, due to the fact that the missions lasted for nearly ten years. The initial task was to train the interim security forces, both army and police, to provide security related to the elections in 2006. After that the missions was involved in reforming, integrating and training the security forces, and had a focus on human resource development, including payment of salary. In the last part of the EUSEC mission leading to the closure in July 2016, the mission focused on the military training infrastructure.

EUSEC DRC Congo had during its last mandated year it a budget of 2,5 million Euros, and had 10 international staff, down from a budget of 11 million Euro and 48 international staff during the financial year of 2012-13. EUSEC managed during its time in operation to build an IT system for the Congolese army, financing the building of 11 armouries, introduce identity cards for the army personnel, and focused in the last years in operation on creating capacity in the military education system.

EUPOL DRC Congo, initiated in 2005 as EUPOL-Kinshasa, and changed into EUPOL RD Congo in 2007, and had during the last five years of the mission a yearly budget between 6-7 million Euros. In its last year in operation it had 31 international staff, stemming from seven, mostly, French speaking EU member states. Focus has been on help establishing the legal framework for the police, increasing and improve the training and specialised training facilities in the police force, whilst attempts of creating a biometric payment and identity card system has been less successful.

In terms of pooling and sharing, the D3.1 DRC Congo Review has recorded the following findings:

The Artemis Operation identified strategic lift as a weakness in the operation, where it had to bring in non-EU partners to provide logistical support for the mission. Another challenge was that budgetary problems meant that the EU had to reduce its original force target.

The operation EUFOR RD Congo identified that contributing countries are reluctant deploying troops in theatre Of the total 2500 troops on site, France contributed 1090 troops, whilst Germany deployed 780 soldiers. Also, the needed strategic and tactical lift capabilities were not available. Finally, the EUFOR deployment showed that if the intelligence is not shared and accessible, and the national contingents do have national caveats that bloc them from operating effectively, it can in-danger the missions and its objectives.

83 The EUPOL mission was launched in two phases, with the smaller EUPOL-Kinshasa deployed from 2005-07, which was then replaced with EUPOL-RD Congo which ran from 2007-2014.
As for EUPOL and EUSEC DRC Congo, the recorded findings relate to the implemented EU-projects, most of which have been done in partnership, or sometimes in competition with other donors, also EU member states. Belgium, France and the UK have for instance been running large bilateral training programs, parallel to the EU-projects. Coordination between the donors have often been absent, or insufficient, leading to overlapping of programs and duplication. The problem has been that national donor interests, and a reluctant national DRC partner which prefers easier controllable bilateral partnerships, have reduced cooperation and had a significant negative effect on the impact of the projects.

4.2.4. D3.2 - THE SOUTH-SUDAN REVIEW

The case study deliverable ‘D3.2 The South Sudan review’ researched the European Union Aviation Security Mission (EUAVSEC) in South Sudan. The mission was launched in June 2012 with a duration of 18 months.\(^84\) It was completed in January 2014.\(^85\)

The mission goal was to assist and advise South Sudan authorities to establish the aviation security organisation at the Ministry of Transport and to strengthen aviation security at Juba International Airport. EUAVSEC trained and mentored security services, provided advice and assistance on aviation security, as well as support the coordination of security activities related to aviation.\(^86\)

The mission had 34 international staff and 15 national staff. Its overall 19-month budget was € 12.5 million. In total 14 member states contributed to the mission.\(^87\)

In terms of pooling and sharing, the D3.2 The South Sudan review has not recorded any findings about practices of pooling and sharing in this CSDP-mission.

4.2.1. D3.3 - THE CAR REVIEW

The case study deliverable ‘D3.3 The CAR review’ researched two of the three CSDP military operations and missions to the Central African Republic. More specifically, it looked at EUFOR Tchad/RCA and EUFOR RCA.\(^88\)

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\(^{85}\) According to the EUAVSEC mandate the Mission was closed on 17 January 2014.


\(^{88}\) EUMAM RCA was not focus of the case study CAR as it a recent mission, launched in 2015.
The two missions were launched respectively in January 2008 (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) and February 2014 (EUFOR RCA) and are both finalised. Although both are military missions, they do differ in duration, goals, staff size and budget.

The goal of the mission EUFOR Tchad/RCA was to coordinate closely with the multi-dimensional United Nations presence in the East of Chad and in the North East of the CAR in order to improve security in those regions. The EU operation had the following specific objectives:

• to contribute to the protection of civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced persons;

• to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian aid workers by helping to improve security in the area of operations;

• to contribute to the protection of UN personnel, premises, installations and equipment and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel, of UN personnel and of associated personnel.

The EUFOR Tchad/RCA mission lasted 14 months. It had 3300 troops deployed, and an annual budget of € 119.6 million. Twenty-six states contributed to the mission; 23 EU member states and three third states (Albania, Croatia and Russia).  

The goal of the mission EUFOR RCA was to provide temporary support in achieving a safe and secure environment in the Bangui area, with a view to handing over to African partners. The force contributed to international efforts to protect the populations most at risk, creating the conditions for providing humanitarian aid. The mission lasted 13 months. It deployed 945 staff, of which 750 combat troops. It had an annual budget of € 25.9 million. Eighteen member states contributed to it, plus Georgia and Montenegro.  

In terms of pooling and sharing, the D3.3 CAR Review has recorded some findings about practices of pooling and sharing. It mentions that with limited resources, due to difficulties in generating forces for the operation, pooling and sharing of resources was important. For example, Germany offered strategic airlift capability for EUFOR RCA. In addition, it mentions that areas where improvements were especially needed were related to sharing of information and resources. Sharing the information was highlighted as especially crucial for reaching common goals. In a country where hostilities towards humanitarian workers are common, the military are able to travel to places where it is too dangerous for the other internationals to go.

It is interesting to notice here that the third CSDP-mission in the Central African Republic, EUMAM RCA, does have an example of pooling and sharing too. This mission is a recent one, launched in March 2015, it still ongoing and does have a record of pooling and sharing as the EDA has given to EUMAM RCA ad-hoc contract support for the procurement of armoured vehicles.

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91 DL3.3 CAR Review Final, page 82 and footnote 313.
92 This example was mentioned by an EDA-representative at the 7-9 June 2016 Symposium on Medical Support to EU CSDP operations.
4.2.2. D3.4 - THE LIBYA REVIEW

The case study deliverable ‘D3.4 The Libya Review’ looked into the EU Border Assistance Mission Libya (EUBAM Libya).

EUBAM Libya is a civilian mission, with the aim of supporting the Libyan authorities in improving and developing the security of the country’s borders. It was deployed in May 2013 and significantly amended in 2016. It has currently 17 international staff, with a revised capacity of 16 international staff. Its annual budget is € 4.475 million.\(^93\)\(^94\)

In terms of pooling and sharing, the D3.4 The Libya Review has not recorded any findings about practices of pooling and sharing in the aforementioned CSDP-mission.

4.2.3. D4.1 - PALESTINE TERRITORIES REVIEW

The case study deliverable ‘D4.1 Palestinian Territories Review’ researched two CSDP-missions, i.e. the European Union Border Assistance Mission at the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) and the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS).

The two missions were launched respectively in 2005 (EUBAM Rafah)\(^95\) and 2006 (EUPOL COPPS)\(^96\) and are both ongoing. Although both are civilian missions, they do differ in goals, staff size, and budget.

The goal of the mission EUPOL COPPS is to support both immediate operational capacities of Palestinian police forces and more long-term reforms. The mission has 69 international staff and 45 national staff. Its annual budget is € 9.175 million. Twenty member states, Canada, and Norway, contribute to the mission.\(^97\)

The goal of the mission EUBAM Rafah is to monitor, verify and evaluate the Palestinian Authority's performance with regard to the implementation of the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing and will act with authority to ensure that the Palestinian Authority complies with all applicable rules and regulations concerning the Rafah Crossing Point and the terms of the Agreed Principles for Rafah Crossing.\(^98\) It also contributes to Palestinian capacity building in all aspects of border control and

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\(^95\) COUNCIL JOINT ACTION 2005/889/CFSP of 12 December 2005 on establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point


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customs operation. It is a relatively small mission with five international staff, four local staff and an annual budget of € 0.96 million. Three members states contribute to the mission.

In terms of pooling and sharing, the D4.1 Palestinian Territories Review has not recorded any findings about practices of pooling and sharing in the aforementioned CSDP-missions.

4.2.4. D4.2 - THE AFGHANISTAN REVIEW

The case study deliverable ‘D4.2: The Afghanistan review’ researched the ongoing EUPOL Afghanistan (European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan) mission. The mission is launched in May 2006 and is ongoing. The EU has extended EUPOL's presence in Afghanistan until the end of 2016.

The mission focuses on institutional reform of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and on the professionalisation of the Afghan National Police (ANP), including the development of local training capacity and institutions. In addition, it supports the improved interaction among Afghan law enforcement and criminal justice actors such as cooperation between police officers and prosecutors in criminal investigations. Human rights and gender, as well as aspects related to enhancing accountability and transparency are being mainstreamed across all mission's activities.

The mission has 127 international staff and 142 national staff. Its annual budget is € 43.7 million. Twenty Two member states contribute to the mission.

In terms of pooling and sharing, D4.1 The Afghanistan review has not recorded any findings about practices of pooling and sharing in this CSDP-mission.

4.3 Comparison and analysis of case studies

The previous heading gives a comprehensive overview of all missions researched by the case studies. On the basis hereof, this heading will compare the researched CSDP-missions and operations in order to give insight in the current framework and practices of pooling and sharing of EU-capabilities.

The approach chosen to implement this is to do a comparative analysis of the crisis management missions. Before doing so, a brief reminder is given of the overall CSDP-crisis management operations, to allow the reader to relate the given analysis to the overall picture. After that a comparative analysis is done based on a number of indicators to establish whether there are factors facilitating pooling and sharing.

The proviso to these findings is that the available data on pooling and sharing is very limited. As such, the findings must not been seen as an absolute truth but as plausible observations.

4.3.1. OVERALL STATISTICAL DATA

As per May 2016, a total of 32 CSDP-crisis management operations can be counted, of which 17 are on-going (53%), and 15 are completed (46%). Of these 21 are civilian missions (66%) and 11 are military (34%).

The IECEU-project has looked into 15 CSDP crisis management operations (see paragraph 4.2 for the list), of which ten are civilian and five are military. The time frame is also different, spanning between 2 months for the shortest crisis management operation and 12 years (and still going) for the longest mission.

4.3.2. CASE STUDIES COMPARISON

As mentioned in the introduction, all case study reviews were implemented according to a common format, which included three standardized questions on pooling and sharing. These were

(a) whether when establishing the mission pooling and sharing had been considered;

(b) how did the pooling and sharing work in the field; was it considered, and;

(c) were there existing practices of pooling and sharing (if any).

The findings will be compared at two sublevels, i.e. at quantitative, statistical level and at qualitative level in terms of what is pooled and shared.

Comparing the results of the case studies, only 8 out of 15 have recorded findings in terms of pooling and sharing. However, six of these are negative findings, i.e. in the case of EUFOR Althea an explanation on why pooling and sharing was not considered at the start of the mission and in the case of the DRC Congo review, a list of areas where pooling and sharing could have been beneficial but was not implemented. The two positive findings are for the CSDP-missions EUFOR RCA and EULEX Kosovo, where practices of pooling and sharing have been identified.

This means that out of 15 CSDP-missions researched, only 2 have practices of pooling and sharing (13.33%). The vast majority does not, which in itself is an interesting finding. Of course, this finding cannot be directly extrapolated to all 32 CSDP-missions, as it is still perfectly possible that in all 22 other not researched CSDP-missions pooling and sharing is happening.

However, if the researched case studies are by any means indicative, then this theoretic scenario is not really plausible and safe to say that pooling and sharing is not yet mainstreamed in the setup and implementation of CSDP-missions.

The next step is to look closer at the two missions that did have positive findings for pooling and sharing, to detect commonalities. EULEX Kosovo is a civilian mission and EUFOR RCA is a military mission. The geographic area is different (Europe and Africa). The start date is also different, where EULEX Kosovo started in 2008 and EUFOR RCA in 2014. The timespan of EULEX Kosovo will be 8 years, whereas EUFOR RCA lasted 13 months.

In terms of budget and staff, both missions are comparable with respectively 1400 staff (EULEX Kosovo) and 945 staff (of which 750 combat troops). There is a substantial difference in annual budgets (EULEX Kosovo: 76 million euro in 2015 and EUFOR RCA 25.9 million euro). There is also a difference in number of countries contributing: in EULEX Kosovo this is 33 states and in EUFOR RCA this is 20 states.

This could be a driver for pooling and sharing as the more states contribute to a mission, the more international it becomes, with subsequent needs for coordination and role for international organisations. As pooling and sharing is an expression of international cooperation, the chances that it is considered in missions with many participating states is higher than in missions that have a more national/lead nation imprint on them.

Apart from this rather speculative observation, the main finding here is that both missions are very different and have little commonalities that could explain why pooling and sharing happened from a statistical point of view.

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104 It referred to the start of the mission in 2004 and that the European Defence Agency (EDA) did not play a role in capability development or identifying pooling and sharing capabilities during the first years of the operation as it was established in 2004, when the mission was already ongoing.
4.3.2.2 Mission areas analysis

In terms of what is pooled and shared, both CSDP-missions have also very different results. EUFOR RCA pooled and shared airlift capacity, which makes sense as it is a scarce and expensive resource.

The EULEX Kosovo mission shows more complex finding for pooling and sharing, as it mentioned different points, such as transfer of staff, mission support, standard operating procedures and sharing / joint use of resources. This could be partly explained by the length of the mission (8 years), giving more time to develop pooling and sharing initiatives.

In any case, again the main finding is that both missions are also very different in terms of what is pooled and shared.
4.4 Case study in-depth analysis

Providing the EU with an operational capacity for crisis management operations and missions is at the core of the concept of CSDP as defined in Article 42 TEU. Therefore, pooling and sharing could be seen as a tool for making EU crisis management more effective. Taking into consideration the high political risks this level encompasses, the willingness of applying pooling and sharing in practice is quite limited. This argumentation was confirmed by the case studies described before which show only little results of pooling and sharing at mission level.

Mainly two explanations besides the high political risk can be considered: first, the concept of pooling and sharing was developed from 2010 onwards and thus does not fully apply to missions and operations that had been launched before that date. Secondly, pooling and sharing at mission level depends on a large scale on previous planning and capability development. If there is already little pooling and sharing at those levels, it logically drops down to mission level.

All missions and operations in common is the fact that almost all deployed mission personnel underwent the pre-deployment training by the ESDC providing thus a standardized training and thereby creating a European strategic culture.

In particular, elements of pooling and sharing could be found in operations such as EUFOR RCA/Tchad as well as EUTM Mali and EUTM Somalia (the latter two not covered by the case studies of this project) and to a lesser degree in EULEX Kosovo where the findings can only be related to pooling and sharing in its broadest sense. This leads to the conclusion that pooling and sharing can be easier applied on a military level where also an agency, EDA, is responsible for capability development and common procurement. Also the fact that from an operational logic, military operations are more relying on scarce and cost-intensive resources might easier trigger pooling and sharing initiatives at the military side.

These are of course rather vague arguments for the limited existence of pooling and sharing elements at mission level. Therefore, it needs to be stated that due to a lack of proper data, an in-depth analysis of pooling and sharing is not possible. This clearly indicated that the theoretical potential of pooling and sharing has not been implemented fully on the mission level.
5 POOLING & SHARING: COMMON CAPABILITIES & STRATEGY

Since the launching of the concept of pooling and sharing by the Ghent initiative in November 2010 as an immediate consequence to the financial and economic crisis and the decrease in defence spending all across Europe, almost all official EU documents and Council Conclusions related to CSDP underline the need for stronger cooperation in European defence demonstrating thereby that there is political commitment for pooling and sharing initiatives.

However, the concept and political declarations regarding pooling and sharing were mostly not further elaborated and aside of the projects launched under the frame of EDA, no detailed guidelines defining minimum requirements for crucial issues, such as standardization, liability, ownership have been formulated.

The result therefore is that whenever pooling and sharing could be invoked and the sovereignty of member states is endangered, member states are coming up with national caveats or even do not commit themselves to such initiatives and thus pooling and sharing remains on the theoretical level. As Giovanni Faleg points it out correctly, aside of lacking political/administrative will to implement pooling and sharing, also solidarity and trust in common capacity-building are lacking across Europe. This can be seen that only EDA is partly able to steer and trigger pooling and sharing initiatives.

Despite the fact that the current initiatives and examples seem not to be far reaching enough, it is encouraging that when approaching pooling and sharing as a methodology, there are examples in other civilian and military areas with similar workflows that show that fine-tuning is possible to make pooling and sharing work. In essence, working with a roster of pre-committed, pre-defined capabilities, supported by EU financing might be a possible way ahead.

In the civilian domain, there is such an example within the humanitarian sphere. Within the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, a European Emergency Response Capacity (EERC) in the form of a voluntary pool of pre-committed capacities from the member states (and participating third states) is established. It includes 165 national and multinational different types of modules, other response capacities and experts. Also, there is a common training, exercises, certification and funding system (e.g. with seed money for new capacities) supporting it, ensuring standardisation and quality.

Key to success of the pool perhaps that it is a compromise between EU and national interests. On the one hand, member states keep control, as they are in charge of identifying and registering the response capacities which they commit to the pool. Also, the legislation is clear in giving the member state the control over the response capacity as the ultimate decision on the deployment is taken by the member state, the module remains under the command and control of the member

107 Currently, the Mechanism counts 34 participating states; see: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/factsheets/thematic/civil_protection_en.pdf
108 Data as of May 2014, the trend is increasing. Source: http://www.prometheus2014.gr/content/major-events/c59-hellenic.../76-workshop-files?dl...
state and can be withdrawn when domestic emergencies, force majeure or, in exceptional cases, serious reasons require this. On the other hand, the Commission gets a roster of pre-set, committed and specialised capabilities, that is expanding in size and types of available capabilities\textsuperscript{109}, complies with basic standards about tasks, capacities, components, self-sufficiency and deployment.

In the military field, the concept of battlegroups could be used as a starting point of such a roster. As it was demonstrated by a study written by Christian Mölling for the European Parliament\textsuperscript{110}, merging the Battlegroup and the Framework Nations Concept of NATO could trigger such pooling and sharing effects. Both concepts are based on the assumption that the states can jointly offer what they alone are not able to deploy, such as reconnaissance and transport capabilities and are providing a roster for EU crisis management. The FNC’s core idea is to build defence clusters of varying member states that coordinate the commitment of key equipment and forces to the cluster on a long-term basis. As the author points it out, the FNC represents a means to achieve many objectives: it provides a more tangible and realistic answer to the demands of P&S and thus can re-energise coordination in defence and capability planning among European Member States to increase sustainability in such multinational frameworks. By supporting this developments with a similar fund as the start-up fund for operations as defined in Article 41 (3) TEU, the EU could move closer in the direction of establishing a kind of CSDP warehouse also in the military domain.

To have such mechanisms at play, the next sub work packages will look at two key elements to enhancing pooling and sharing, namely civil/military cooperation and interoperability (standards).

\textsuperscript{109} One of the latest additions is the European Medical Core (EMC), consisting of 12 response teams from 9 member states and with a joint certification processes EU-WHO. It includes Emergency Medical Teams, Public Health Teams, Medical Assessment and Coordination Experts, Medical Evacuation Capacities, Mobile Bio-safety laboratories as well as logistical support.


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6 CONCLUSION

This standardisation review delivered the state of art of where pooling and sharing stands now in CSDP-missions, and found that there is significant potential for more pooling and sharing. The findings of case studies of the IECEU echo the modest success of pooling and sharing

The very modest success of current pooling and sharing initiatives can, at least to some extent, be attributed to concerns over national capabilities, especially in times of crisis, as well as questions over national sovereignty and determination. Joint use of any resource requires more coordination, negotiation, and an understanding that some capabilities may not be usable immediately. In the backdrop, there are also hugely variant political processes, historical concerns defence budgets, military structures, equipment, leadership styles, conditions, etc. creating what Vasile-Ozunu calls a "giant puzzle" of European defence. Moreover, some pooling and sharing arrangements are based on long processes of procurement and development, which cannot be easily or quickly undone. For some, it may be difficult to justify the long-term commitment.

However, these modest successes of the current initiatives does not belie the great potential of pooling and sharing to create cost-benefits, more effective capabilities and better-coordinated responses to crisis management. This potential of pooling and sharing goes beyond the military operations to include civilian missions.

Chapter 2 showed how multifaceted, developed and versatile pooling and sharing in training in different training initiatives is in the European Union is. The core pooling and sharing mechanisms within training function well, and there is on-going development. Cooperation between different training instruments is, however, limited or siloed nor is standard-setting shared. Especially where Member States offer training, the training may differ greatly in both content and quality but this difference may not be noted outside the training institutions. Moreover, for some training there is a general question of what are we training personnel for, whether and to what extent the training provided by the institutions reflects the needs of the European Union. As the pooling and sharing in education is mature, there may also be potential for ensuring that skills are updated and that the current pool of experts and expertise remains so.

Chapter 3 showed how joint-capabilities are built in procurement in very practical and concrete terms. The material and technical capabilities offered for use in crisis missions and operations are the foundations on which all else rests. Here, the potential for joint-procurement and standard setting in the civilian missions is vast and has the potential to directly positively impact also civilian capabilities within the European Union. Currently, there is overlap between both NATO and the UN, as well as between the civilians and the military, but also potential for cooperation. The potential for civ-mil cooperation in common capabilities development and procurement, especially, is considerable and could be better much better utilized.

Chapter 4 shows in more detail of the current state of art in terms of pooling and sharing in the operations and missions analysed in the IECEU-project. The results are not that encouraging, as few practices of pooling and sharing are found. Of course, this is not conclusive as just a selection of CSDP-missions and operations were studied, and many were already concluded for some time, thus making it difficult to capture examples of pooling and sharing. However, it might well be that the results of the case studies are very well representative as pooling and sharing of capabilities in operations does not fall from the air, but is based upon previously commonly developed capabilities and standards. As this is still incidental, the subsequent pooling and sharing in missions will also suffer.

Chapter 5 discusses the main elements necessary for developing pooling and sharing including common culture, solidarity, trust, sharing and a common strategy. The chapter also gives some clear, practical examples for how pooling and sharing can be improved in the short-term.

### 6.1 Towards more effective pooling and sharing

Until relatively recently, EU discussion and debate on pooling and sharing has focused on the existence of pooling and sharing and defining the term itself. As this deliverable shows, the present discussion is on how we can create more effective pooling and sharing, with clearer benefits for both member states and the European Union.

Extensive cooperation in the form of pooling and sharing both on the civilian side as well as the military is cost effective but also brings intangible benefits of strengthening EU’s capabilities as the EU rather than a collection if member states. These benefits include a clearer vision of what EU’s priorities are in crisis management, and stronger ties between both individuals and institutions within the EU.

The present pooling and sharing initiatives are relatively self-contained or siloed, meaning there is limited parallel cooperation, expertise sharing and cooperation between the initiatives. In some instances, the lack of parallel cooperation may result in competition and retard the development of state of the art practices. Some EU pooling and sharing practices have the potential of creating unique benefits and excellence globally but require on-going development to do so.

More traditional mechanisms of military pooling and sharing often require significant investment as well as the political will to create the mechanisms necessary. The investment may not always be necessary. Beyond pooling and sharing, there are numerous low-level cooperative efforts between both individuals and certain member states, which may offer potential for wider cooperation in pooling and sharing. These smaller cooperation clusters may not just be able to drive wider development of pooling and sharing forward but also to leapfrog.
6.2 For further work packages: eight potentials for stronger pooling and sharing

A key question raised by this deliverable is why is pooling and sharing not being more fully streamlined? Where are the roadblocks? Beyond the concerns for state sovereignty that underlie discussions on the military side, there is much room for strengthening the pooling and sharing that is already taking place.

The eight potentials that we highlight here for more detailed discussion in the further work-packaged are listed in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Interoperability</th>
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<td>2. Ongoing standard setting</td>
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<td>3. Certification</td>
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<td>4. Cooperation between current clusters of cooperation</td>
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<td>5. Full-process view</td>
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<td>6. Increased civ-mil cooperation</td>
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<td>7. Excellence</td>
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<td>8. Mind-set</td>
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Table 2: Eight potentials for stronger pooling and sharing in crisis management

Although some equipment is mission or operation specific, much is not. Greater interoperability results in cost-savings not just in terms of the equipment itself but also in terms of all supporting functions including maintenance, training.

**Ongoing standard-setting** across the EU creates a clearer picture of what capabilities we really require and thus is key to creating better and more streamlined missions and operations. Standard setting is especially needed for support functions, e.g., how many doctors are needed per 100 civilians. Standard setting, however, must be ongoing as needs change.

**Certification** ensures quality of the pooling and sharing but also requires cooperation between current clusters of cooperation so that the certification processes are similar, and that the certification is meaningful. For meaningful certification, there needs to be standard setting where certification is not automatic but rather must be accomplished through filling some criteria. Here, the full process view is vital. When something or someone is certified, their skill set should match EU’s requirements, and the certification should aid e.g. in the recruitment of the best personnel for specific tasks within the EU.

Larger civilian missions have many of the same requirements as military operations. Increased civ-mil cooperation especially in terms of supportive functions like procurement, logistics and information sharing would not impinge on the divide that needs to exist between the two functions.

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When EUs crisis management was conceived, a key understanding was that EU could offer the very best knowledge and the highest-level personnel. As such, it’s unique role was to strive for excellence and development of top expertise. Although the practices of pooling and sharing need to be strengthened, beyond quantity there are also a questions of quality. Pooling and sharing practices have their part in also creating excellence in crisis management.

As a final point, one of the key roadblocks for the development of pooling and sharing seems to be a mindset where cooperation is shunned and considered risky. Although there may be room for larger debates on state sovereignty and the development of joint foreign and defence policy within the EU, there are more practical, smaller scale potentials for the strengthening of pooling and sharing in the current context through e.g. the standard-setting and certification mentioned above. These smaller scale potentials can be utilized at present with small changes in mindset regardless of what takes place with the larger and more fundamental debates.
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