**PROJECT TITLE:**

**Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention**

# 6.3 Review of the interoperability of resources

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| PU: Public | |
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| RE: Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission) | |

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| Acronyms | |
|---|---|
| C2 | Command and Control |
| C3 | Command, Control and Communication (C3) |
| CDP | Capability Development Plan |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CIS | Communication and Information Systems |
| CIVCOM | Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management |
| CMPD | Crisis Management and Planning Directorate |
| CFI | Connected Forces Initiative |
| CPCC | Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability |
| CSDP | Common Security and Defence Policy |
| DG IX | Directorate General of Civilian Crisis Management |
| DG RELEX | Directorate-General for the External Relations |
| EDA | European Defence Agency |
| EEAS | European External Action Service |
| E&F | Evaluation and Feedback |
| ESDC | European Security and Defence College |
| ESDP | European Security and Defence Policy |
| ESS | European Security Strategy |
| EU | European Union |
| EUMC | EU Military Committee |
| EUMS | EU Military Staff |
| EU OPCEN | European Union Operations Centre |
| EWS | Early Warning System |
| FAC | Foreign Affairs Council |
| FPI | Foreign Policy Instrument |

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|---|---|
| IcSP | Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace |
| IfS | Instrument for Stability |
| INTCEN | Intelligence Analysis Centre |
| JSSR | Justice and Security Sector Reform |
| MIP | Mission Implementation Plan |
| MS | Member States |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| NRF | NATO Response Force |
| OCC | Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) |
| PFCA | Political Framework for Crisis Approach |
| PARP | Planning and Review Process |
| PfP | Partnership for Peace |
| PMG | Politico-Military Group |
| PSC | Political and Security Committee |
| P&S | Pooling and Sharing |
| RoE | Rules of Engagement |
| SoR | Statement of Requirements |
| STANAG | Standardization Agreement |
| TTP | Tactics, Techniques and Procedures |

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## Executive Summary

Interoperability relies on systems being able to both provide and accept services, units, tools and personnel, is the foundation of cooperation and pooling and sharing within crisis management. Poor interoperability or lack of interoperability leads to inefficiency, wasted resources and at the very worst, inability to act.

There are a number of on-going processes and initiative within EU to increase interoperability. The challenges of divergent priorities and fragmentation within EU structures to increasing interoperability are also considerable, although not insurmountable, as is evidenced by the development of interoperable resources in the military.

Uniquely, this report also analyses possibilities of interoperability for civilian missions, where the concept is much less developed and compare these possibilities with those in military operations. Civilian missions, especially police missions, share the same mission cycle and have potential for similar development of interoperability. Strengthening interoperability is vital also within the civil-military environment, with the increasing focus on integrated crisis management operations and an even more complicated security environment in the European neighbourhood.

Through analysis and comparison of interoperability in civilian missions (Chapter 2) and military operations (Chapter 3), the report finds in Chapter 4 potentials for enhancing interoperability in the current EU structure. These can be summarised as follows: (i) reinforcing the jointly initiated crisis management concept with more integrated, structured civilian/military operationalization; (ii) creating a centralised system of mandatory pre-mission training, linked to job descriptions and selection procedures; (iii) discouraging national (re)interpretation of the 'Statement of recruitment' used in CSDP military operations to enhance interoperability of military staff; (iv) support joint civilian-military in-mission trainings where both types of personnel are present; (v) harmonize "working" versions of capacity building concepts such as 'Integrated Border Management'.

Beyond these mechanisms to enhance interoperability, three main challenges for interoperability are identified: i) divergent, non-standardised and sometimes contradictory national practices, which remain evident in CSDP operations and missions. ii) lack of a mind-set for increasing interoperability in practice especially in civilian missions, but also between civilian and military actors, even where increasing interoperability has no foreseen costs; iii) the current intergovernmental set-up of the CSDP crisis management operations, some of which, is based on the very foundations of the EU (including the Lisbon treaty), which hinders the development of interoperability.

These main challenges require political discussion on which alternatives are viable and which are not. To create a basis for policy dialogues, the deliverable finally presents a list of discussion points for policy dialogues to be conducted in this working package.

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# 1 Introduction

Interest in, and development of, interoperability has been a key focus of the European Union from its inception, as from an interoperability point of view, the institutional framework of the CSDP crisis management operations is challenging, as all 28 member states, the European Commission, the Council General Secretariat, and the European Parliament (as budgetary authority) have their role to play. The impact of this complex decision making matric varies between civilian missions and military operations.

On the military side, there is a clear argument for enhancing interoperability as promoting national interest, stemming from the post WW2 and cold war context. The need to cooperate, as ingrained by the Alliance and NATO, has become an integral part of a common defence culture extending to a mind-set where cooperation is enhanced by a common doctrine and a series of mechanisms from common training and exercises to equipment. The standardization process within NATO is very developed, with three standardization bodies, a NATO Standardization Documents Database (NSDD) and 231 (often very detailed) standards, whose implementation is facilitated through apps and training.

This acquis has been the starting point of the military component of the CSDP, giving it a competitive advantage over civilian missions, where both the rationale behind the CSDP missions as well as interoperability in general is a work in progress. Development of interoperability in the CSDP missions is also much less developed in terms of common doctrine and implementation hereof, as well as focus of the central organisation in charge of steering the process, but cooperation is also 50 years younger than on the military side.

Specifically, the development of interoperability is focused mainly on council conclusions and strategies, whereas implementation in the field is equally vital, if not more so. In the field, interoperability is often quite detailed and technical, and lagging behind on the civilian side. Taking the example of pre-mission training and capabilities of the CSDP-staff, one finding is that relying on the member states resources leads to the result that staff is pre-mission trained in 28 different ways, affecting both their level of preparedness as well as their ability to work on-site in a standardised way. Such an effect is much less noticed in military operations, where the benefits of the common defence culture nurtured by NATO (and now further enhanced by the EDA) are clearly evident in the field.

**Increasing interoperability is a key mechanism for the CSDP to improve its efficiency.**

There is now the potential of renewed political will to increase interoperability as evidenced in the vision of 'integrated CSDP crisis management operations' in the 2016 Global Strategy, an increased focus on EUs neighbourhood as well as growing security concerns. Interoperability is a key enabler of Pooling and Sharing, both central mechanisms for improving the effectiveness of CSDP crisis management operations, as well as improving potential for cooperation between national actors. Although interoperability is often seen as mainly seen a cost saving mechanism, it builds common organisational culture and solidarity. Interoperability leads to more effective use of current capabilities and increases availability of resources for the States to deploy for EU, NATO, multinational or national purposes. In short: increasing interoperability is one of the key mechanisms that EU can use to improve its effectiveness.

This understanding has not gone amiss within the EU in general, and there have been several positive initiatives to create greater interoperability. One applaudable example is the recent force generation planning

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guide for civilian CSDP missions[1] that revised the existing job descriptions in order to ensure continuity within and between them for comparable functions across the missions. It is detailed and practical, with harmonised job descriptions, job categories and references to the European Qualifications Framework.

Other positive developments are taking place in mission support platform and the common warehouse initiative. By centralising assets that are used in missions, there are greater economies of scale, and speed for both deployment and liquidation of missions can be significantly enhanced. The centralisation creates a common rulebook, this time about the equipment and services needed for a crisis management operation. It establishes a de facto standard that ideally is again linked to the training system and national states. On the military side, a similar initiative is the work on the capabilities performed by the EDA. By developing European core operational concepts, that are both highly relevant in any crisis management operations and enable capabilities of 27 member states to work together, interoperability is enhanced and the potential for pooling and sharing of capabilities is realised. Here too agreeing on a common rule book is a key part of the process.

However, it seems, and as this study will show, interoperability is seldom hampered by the lack of a joint rule book (as there are many) per se but rather by the lack of implementation and focus on interoperability in the field. Certainly, rule books themselves could be more comprehensive, tailored (e.g. for strategic, tactical and operational levels) and cover the crisis management operation life-cycle better. Indications from the field, however, show that the main obstacle to interoperability is in a mind-set, where even when there are relatively simple potentials for increasing interoperability, these potentials are not acted on.

A new dimension to interoperability is both the potential of a greater number of integrated missions necessitating a higher level of civil-military interoperability as well as the increased need to include civilian components into military operations (generally to add expertise), and military components into civilian missions (generally to increase the security of the mission). Where military or civilian components are added, the mission/operation becomes somewhat integrated while still remaining purely military or purely civilian in terms of organisation.

The increased cooperation and integration between civilian and military actors is both positive and negative. Integrated structures typically increase efficiency and unity of actors response, but there are also dangers of over militarization and potential negative implications on civilian objectives.[2] Often in civil-military cooperation, and certainly with interoperability, there is a perception (whether true or not) that civilian concerns become side-lined in favour of a stronger military presence).

As the “soft-power” afforded to the EU in the form of its civilian missions is unique global asset for the EU, there are also clear limits to increased cooperation and integration between the civilian missions and operations to ensure that that “soft power” is not lost through lack of credibility as a civilian actor.

Similarly, although the EU cooperates with a large number of actors, third country and international participation and cooperation in CSDP is growing emphasis. The larger the number of actors, the more clearly challenges of interoperability become visible, and the more benefit EU has on increasing interoperability. Moreover, the more divergent EU practices are, the more challenging will cooperation be with external partners and the less likely it is to produce desirable outcomes.

1 Force Generation for the civilian CSDP Missions: A planning guide for Member States Seconding Authorities September 2016, Ref. Ares(2016)5438627 - 19/09/2016.

2 Svoboda Eva. “The interaction between humanitarian and military actors: where do we go from here?” Policy Brief, Humanitarian Policy Group Vol. 58 (2014): 1-3, Accessed December 13, 2016 http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/53d0c2fb4.pdf

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## 1.1 Defining interoperability in CSDP crisis management operations

Interoperability is defined in the conceptual framework of the IECEU-project Deliverable 1.5 (DL1.5), where interoperability is one of the six capabilities examined in the IECEU-project. D1.5 defines capabilities as 'resources plus competences' and gives an overall description what interoperability is in the context of the project as follows:

- Cooperation/Collaboration
- Coordination
- Civ-Mil/Civ-Civ/Mil-Mil synergies,

This definition gives a very broad understanding of interoperability. To enable more in-depth analysis, this report will use a more detailed definition, provided in 2011 by the Presidency in a note issued to the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, on the subject of Standardization and Interoperability.

In this note, interoperability is identified as one of several levels of standardization described. The note defines interoperability in the context of CSDP crisis management operations as[3]:

> *"The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together."*

This definition is in use within the EU currently and as such provides a good basis for further analysis.

## 1.2 Limitations of the report

The focus on CSDP crisis management operations and the defined case studies, the scope is narrowed down to one of the tools that the EU has at its disposal in terms of common security and defence policy. Other tools such as humanitarian assistance, development aid, neighbourhood policies, etc. are not analysed in the context of this specific deliverable. However, they will be included in a wider discussion in the context of work package 7, which will be defining new approaches and solutions to enhance the current EU capabilities as well find the solutions for the future research and policy concerns.

Interoperability is contextual and dynamic as systems, units or forces are living organisms that change, adapt and innovate. Interoperability on a strategic level is typically more static and political, whereas on the operational level interoperability is more dynamic, adaptive, and situational. Ideally, the legal and policy frameworks that govern interoperability should take into account this dynamic nature and encourage

[3] Council document from 2. April 2003 on Interoperability of Integrated Police Units and Police Headquarters (8009/03).

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adaptability of processes, but they seldom do so. In general, interoperability is a key priority within the EU, and there are a number of new initiatives and documents yet to be published that will impact later analysis.

## 1.3 Structure of the report

The report is structured with the CSDP crisis management operations in mind. It´s three body chapters follow the six key components of the mission cycle, which are analysed providing an overview of the whole mission cycle to determine potentials for interoperability.

These six key components are:

(1) planning
(2) staffing
(3) shared services (mission support)
(4) command systems and information sharing
(5) Third state participation and cooperation
(6) Review systems.

Chapter 2 reviews interoperability in the context of civilian CSDP missions. Chapter 3 reviews interoperability in the context of military CSDP operations. Chapter 4 analyses inoperability in the context of an integrated civilian mission / military operation and finds potentials for developing interoperability, that will be discussed in the policy dialogues planned to take place in early 2017. Finally, chapter 5 takes stock of the previous chapters' findings, and identifies three underlying challenges that hinder the full development of interoperability.

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## 2. Interoperability in the context of Civilian CSDP Missions

EU civilian crisis management seldom receives as much attention as its military counterpart, although there are more civilian missions in number and civilian missions also cover a larger geographical area. The need for development of civilian capabilities, and beyond to military operations[4], for crisis management reflected the changing nature of international conflicts, which the EU has most significantly experienced in its neighbouring Western Balkans[5]. The centrality of civilian aspects of CSDP to EU crisis management is evident through both the early emphasis on civilian crisis management (first EU CSDP mission in 2003 to Bosnia Herzegovina was a civilian mission), the larger number of EU civilian missions, and continued development of CSDP missions.[6]

Although interoperability in the realm of civilian CSDP missions may be a less central issue or at least a different kind of issue than it is as for the military operations, several important and specific features of interoperability are certainly relevant for the analysis with an overall objective of improving the effectiveness of civilian CSDP missions. Observing the definitions in use in the official EU documents related to the civilian missions, it can be argued that the theoretical definition of interoperability is primarily the same or deriving from military operations. As defined by the Council document from 2. April 2003 on Interoperability of Integrated Police Units and Police Headquarters (8009/03), the interoperability (i.e. in civilian police mission) is

> *"the possibility/ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together."*

The discussion paper on arrangements for common equipment for EU police operations (11839/1/02 REV 1) notes that interoperability refers to both operational issues and logistic issues and can be defined as a condition where two or more structures or systems can work in a cohesive way. In general terms it can be considered as sufficient compatibility between systems and procedures in member states which would allow them to work together effectively.

Assessing these and other sources, we may conclude that the 2001 note by the Presidency issued to the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, on the subject of Standardization and Interoperability (document 13307/01)9 seems to be a central piece for defining interoperability also in the civilian sphere, as it is referred to also by the EU documents dealing with interoperability aspects of civilian crisis management.

4 Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, "EU capabilities for a comprehensive approach: Broad interoperability as comparative advantage," Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (2009). accessed December 15, 2016. https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/09-01300.pdf.

5 Chivvis, Christopher S., "EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record So Far". Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation (2010), Accessed December 15, 2016. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG945.pdf

6 European Union External Action Service. "Military and civilian missions and operations." Accessed. December 5, 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en.

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Several initiatives with different perspectives and different emphasis on interoperability have been developed in the sphere of civilian CSDP framework. The requirements of interoperability for Police Substitution missions are the most similar to military requirements. As noted by the Comprehensive Concept for Police Substitution Missions (8655/5/02), such missions have to develop interoperability (in operational and administrative aspects of logistics and equipment management as well as common vocabulary and guidelines) in order to achieve rapid deployment.

The document thus offers a mission structure concept that shall contribute to ensuring grater interoperability during the entire mission life-cycle. It also stresses the importance of material and equipment compatibility, which should be achieved, among others, through regular exchange of information regarding the necessary material. Police missions in general tend to be the most valuable in terms of analysis of the potential for interoperability as they are typically, as noted by Chivvis, more staff-intensive than for example monitoring or rule of law missions. The more staff and equipment there is, the more potential there is also for enhancing interoperability.

Other types of civilian CSDP missions (e.g. rule of law missions) may face entirely different set of interoperability challenges, such as for example the question of applicable law and the necessity for interoperability among CSDP staff coming from different legal systems and backgrounds (e.g. difference between civil law and common law systems).

The EU concept for CSDP Justice Missions (within the Rule of Law framework) (18173/10) recognizes the potential issue of determination of applicable law and (indirectly) its consequential relation to (inter)operability of CSDP staff:

> *"When developing or reforming their legal framework some countries receive assistance and advice from experts with background from different legal systems which are not always compatible with local legal rules and tradition. As a result the legal framework is often inadequate for the specifics of the country with many structural deficiencies, inconsistencies, overlapping and contradictions and often does not address the local needs".*

The EU committed to develop strong and effective non-military component in the framework of the EU by the decision to develop the civilian aspects of the crisis management in four priority areas defined by Civilian Headline Goals adopted at the Feira European Council in June 2000: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection.[7] In 2004, two additional areas (monitoring and supporting EU Special Representatives) were added by the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. The aspirations and goals of the EU in the field of civilian crisis management have been further reinforced by the Civilian Headline Goal 2010[8]. Despite a hardening of the security atmosphere, and an increased focus on the military, the EUs civilian capabilities are often seen as an example of EU's unique "soft power" and are also noted as such in the new EU Global Strategy:

7 European Union External Action Service. "Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy." Accessed November 23, 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-safety/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy-_en

8 Ibid.

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> *"CSDP must become more rapid and effective. This requires member states to enhance the deployability and interoperability of their forces through training and exercises. /…/ at the same time, we must further develop our civilian missions – a trademark of CSDP – by encouraging force generation, speeding up deployment, and providing adequate training based on EU-wide curricula."* [9]

With the availability of wide spectrum of civilian instruments of an economic, social or diplomatic nature, the EU focus on preventative activities is not surprising. [10] Since the first civilian deployment in 2003 (EUPM BiH), civilian CSDP missions have varied in scope (police, monitoring, justice, and security sector reform), nature (non-executive and executive), geographic location and size. There are currently 10 civilian CSDP missions on 3 continents: Afghanistan, Ukraine, Georgia, Kosovo, Libya, the Palestinian Territories (Ramallah and Rafah), Niger, Mali, and the Horn of Africa (Somalia & Somaliland). [11]

The objective of this chapter is to analyse and assess different aspects of interoperability in civilian CSDP missions, specific cases and responses gathered by the researchers in the framework of the IECEU project, while taking in consideration institutional and theoretical framework of interoperability in EU civilian crisis management system.

9 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy. Accessed November 23, 2016. https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union

10 Malešič, Marjan. "EULEX Kosovo: A Test of the EU's Civilian Crisis Management". In Towards a Strategic EU Vision for Security and Defense. (2015). Ed. Maria Raquel Freire and Maria Grazia Galantino. Palgrave Macmillan.

11 European Union External Action Service. "Military and civilian missions and operations". Accessed. November 23, 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en

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## 2.1 CSDP Missions Analysed

The interoperability in civilian CSDP missions will be analysed by focusing on seven mission components: planning, staff, shared services, equipment, command systems & information sharing, third states participation in crisis management operations and review systems. This chapter draws from the findings case studies of the IECEU-project and relies on other sources and additional research in order to provide a comprehensive analysis.

### 2.1.1 Planning

The planning of civilian CSDP missions is based on the EU's Crisis Management Procedures, which outline EU engagement in a crisis from the political level down to the mission level, how responses are planned, carried out and terminated.[12] The procedures are common for both civilian and military responses, beginning with a reaction mechanism and political decision making but differing in their planning of and application of responses. Also, it is observed that while military planning practices have been drafted based on national and NATO standards, civilian missions have been developed from the ground up.[13]

The key documents in the civilian planning are:

- Political Framework for Crisis Response (PFCA)
- Crisis Management Concept (CMC)
- Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA)
- Civilian Strategic Option (CSO)
- Operational Plan (OPLAN)

The EU's Crisis Response System has been developed after the adoption of the Lisbon treaty and is based on a comprehensive approach. At the heart of the system is the Crisis Platform in the EEAS, tasked to draft options for an EU response to a crisis.

The response and planning happens in several phases, detailed in DL 1.3:

**Phase 1: Identification of a crisis and development of an overall EU approach**

When a crisis is observed[14], the PSC, with the support of the crisis platform considers whether a CSDP crisis management operation is appropriate. This will result in a possible PFCA if the Council agrees to an EU crisis management response. This assessment includes identifying the range of available EU instruments that could be used, and selecting the best suited with regards to the crisis at hand. The PFCA sets out the overall political approach to the crisis. Once the PSC has decided that action is appropriate, the CMPD is tasked to frame the CMC, beginning the planning process.

12 Discussed in detail in D.1.3

13 Yves de Kermabon, "Crisis Management Procedures" in Handbook for decision makers- The common security and defence policy of the European Union, ed. Jochen Rehrl, (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014), 43 - 47.

14 EU Early Warning System discussed in D1.1

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**Phase 2: Development of the CMC and establishment of the mission operation**[15]

The CMC describes more specifically the EU's political interests, viable options (civilian and/or military) and objectives of a possible mission or operation. At this phase, CMPD consults with all the relevant EEAS services, in particular the CPCC, EUMS and other relevant directorates, EU delegations and Commission services. This phase can also include a Fact Finding Mission (FFM) to the country concerned. This stage is finalised with the Council's approval of the CMC.

**Phase 3: Operation planning of the CSDP mission or operation and decision to launch**

After the Council's approval for a civilian mission, the operational planning starts. The CMPD is tasked with drafting the CSOs, which details the missions' approaches to the crisis. The drafting is done in consultation with CIVCOM and is subject to the advice and consent of the PSC. The PSC also tasks the CPCC director (as the civilian operations commander - CivOpsCdr) to begin operational planning and the recruitment of the Head of Mission and his/her core team.

Once this is concluded, the Council then adopts a Decision establishing the mission and setting out its mandate. The Head of Mission (HoM) becomes active and begins developing and staffing the mission, involving member states and approaching third states (if applicable).

During this time the CivOpsCdr also begins drafting the missions CONOPS, which are submitted to the PSC/CIVCOM for advice and subsequently to the Council for approval. After this and based on the CONOPS, the mission OPLAN is drafted, specifying the missions tasks. This period also includes the negotiations for the Status of Mission Agreement, an agreement with the host nation, specifying the legal status and basis of the mission.

In order to maintain a level of flexibility and to enable a rapid deployment of a mission or operation, the above described process can be circumvented. For the establishment of a civilian mission, the minimum decision-making process includes the approval of the CMC, developing the CMC, the adoption of the Council decision that establishes the mission, and the approval of the OPLAN.

**Phase 4: Deployment of the CSDP mission**

The next phase is the deployment of the mission. In terms of planning, the PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of the CSDP mission, subject to the approval of the Council and the HR. The strategic control is in hands of the CivOpsCdr and the operational (field) control is in hands of the Head of Mission.

**Phase 5: Refocusing of the European Union action and termination of operations**[16]

Planning continues throughout the missions' mandate, at minimum during strategic review processes and near the end of the mission, focusing on transition. The strategic review is conducted usually during renewals of the mandates of civilian missions, or when needed due to changing circumstances. The review process is based on mission reporting, usually six monthly reports and other materials when needed. Based on the reporting and consultations with CIVCOM, the HR proposes new measures for the mission to the PSC, usually in the form of a new mandate, which is subject to Council approval.

Transition usually take place at the end of mission but can also happen due to change of duties to another mission or other instruments. Although no general format for transitions exists due to different mission

15 Kermabon, Crisis Management Procedures, 43 - 47.

16 Ibid.

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contexts, transitions are increasingly planned into the mission life-cycle from the start, in the form of an exit strategy[17] to provide clear goals for the mission and its partners to work towards. As civilian missions usually do not work in the lowest security environments, their transitions usually focus on transferring duties to local actors.

## 2.2 Staff

Staff is a central capablity of any (civilian or military) CSDP mission/operation. CSDP missions typically rely primarily and almost exclusively on well-qualified, well-trained and capable personnel for their success. Although military operations rely on expert personnel as well, the broader use of high-tech equipment, the hierarchies in the military as well as the larger number of personnel in military missions, the skill-sets of individual crisis management professionals or their lack are not as vital for the success of the operation as a whole.

### 2.2.1 Selection of staff

Recruitment of personnel for civilian operations/missions is managed by the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Civilian missions have three types of staff: i) seconded staff ii) contracted international staff and iii) contracted local staff. [18] Each type has its own working contracts. However, these contracts as well as the remuneration for the same or similar positions may also vary greatly depending on which member state has seconded them.

The selection process is done on the basis of job descriptions. In 2016, job descriptions have been unified with the 'Planning guide for Member States Seconding Authorities for Force Generation for the civilian CSDP Missions'. The guide details the 61 general and specific functional profiles for CSDP-missions.[19]

The process of staff recruitment starts with missions sending out a Call for Contributions (CfC), which is normally done 3-6 times a year (three regular CfCs and 0-3 extraordinary ones). The member states decide on the basis of national procedures which of the positions at missions they are interested in, and national staff apply for those positions. In terms of selection of staff, CSDP-missions have the final word in the selection process, even for the seconded positions.

As of 31 August 2016, of the current civilian personnel in EU CSDP operations, 885 persons have been seconded by the member states and third states[20] contributing to CSDP missions and 457 (international) persons have been directly contracted by the missions. The amount of local staff in civilian CSDP missions is 1200. In terms of gender, 20.6% of seconded and 27.6% of contracted personnel is female; with local staff the percentage of female employees is higher, 36.1%.[21] With reference to the above, in the spirit of "Common" security and defence policy, it is interesting that the civilian CSDP missions get most of their

17 Eva Gross. "Exit strategies: What's in a name?" Brief ISSUE, No. 23, 18 (2014):1, Accessed December 2, 2016. http://www.iss.europa.eu/publications/detail/article/exit-strategies-whats-in-a-name/

18 European External Action Service. "Working in a CSDP mission - General conditions." Accessed December 9, 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/5401/working-csdp-mission-general-conditions_en

19 The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. "A planning guide for Member States Seconding Authorities for Force Generation for the civilian CSDP Missions." Ref. Ares(2016)5438627. Brussels.

20 As of 31 August 2016, the following 3rd coutries have been contributing staff to civilian CSDP missions: Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Georgia, Turkey, and United States

21 Personnel Figures of the Civilian CSDP Missions, as of 31/08/2016, Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, European External Action Service.

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personnel as local contracted staff while secondments from the member states are the second most common with only a smaller part of international contracted staff.

## STAFF SHARES IN CIVILIAN CSDP MISSIONS[22]




Figure 1 Staff shares in civilian missions

On example to tackle persistent staffing and training issues that also closely relate to interoperability, is the online platform “the Goalkeeper”. The platform is intended to support specific objectives of civilian capabilities' development (e.g. supporting training, recruitment, and the development of national rosters, capability development and institutional memory). The system is currently in testing phase.[23]

When fully operational, the Goalkeeper will consist of four elements: Schoolmaster (database aimed at capturing and making easily accessible information on training opportunities relevant to CSDP and international crisis management for both specialized audiences and the interested public); Registrar (web-based technology for standardized management of civilian personnel, applications from member states to the EU for seconded positions and overview of civilian capabilities and facilitate member states' keeping of rosters of deployable personnel); Headhunter (a catalogue of standard job descriptions enabling missions to form mission-specific job descriptions to be published in calls for contributions) and Governor (on-line database of the conceptual documents governing EU civilian crisis management under CSDP and the national measures in the area of civilian crisis management).[24]

In relation to staff selection process, the case studies found that some mission staff lacked adequate language and cultural skills. Of these two, the lack of sufficient cultural awareness[25] (which relates to mission culture and training) was noted as lowering efficiency of the mission and the interoperability of the staff with

22 Source: CPCC Personnel Figures of the Civilian CSDP Missions (as of 31/08/2016).

23 Interview with EASS official. Brussels 28. November 2016.

24 The Goalkeeper. “About.” Accessed, November 9, 2016, https://goalkeeper.eeas.europa.eu/about.do

25 Lack of cultural awareness as an obstacle was noted in case studies for EULEX Kosovo, EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUPOL COPPS, and EUBAM Libya etc..

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with local actors. It was also noted that these skills are not emphasised in the selection of the mission personnel and insufficiently in their training.

### 2.2.2 Training of staff

Training is an essential starting point in assessment of interoperability of civilian CSDP missions.[26] Staff that is not properly trained may be a liability to themselves or others.[27] According to the 2004 training concept (11970/04), all member states are responsible for training their seconded experts. The need for common training framework is recognized by the EU Training Policy in ESDP (14176/2/03), which is currently under revision.

The draft of the revised training policy (dated 1 July 2016) and draft implementing guidelines (dated 30 June 2016) recognize the need for training to be flexible in its response to current needs and adapted to the evolving ambition, scope and range of the EU's missions and operations.[28] While acknowledging that the primary responsibility for training of seconded staff lies with the member states, it notes the need for improvement of common standards, pooling and sharing of training responsibilities and better coordination.

The draft implementing guidelines introduces the EU Military Training Group (EUMTG) and the EU Civilian Training Group (EUCTG), which according to the draft will be responsible to prepare the Training Requirements for CSDP training, the biennial CSDP training programme and the Comprehensive Assessment Report on CSDP training.

To ensure better civilian and military coordination on CSDP training, at least one joint meeting of the EUCTG and EUMTG should be organised each year according to the draft guidelines.[29] The civ-mil training coordination is an emphasized need identified by the draft training policy, aiming to bring closer civilian and military training and putting a special emphasis on civ-mil interactions and synergies as horizontal theme in EU training activities.[30]

Korski and Gowan note that "The EU has no “civilian standing forces” it could deploy for civilian CSDP missions.[31] On the contrary, it needs to rely essentially on seconded personnel from member states.[32] Although not "standing forces", the EEAS has in its disposal two expert pools for rapid deployment, a

[26] Monica Oproiu. “The European Union's Comparative Advantage At A Crossroads,” Annals of University of Oradea, Series: International Relations & European Studies 3 (2011): 86-93.

[27] Working draft EU Policy on Training for CSDP (as of 1 July 2016)

[28] Tommaso De Zan, Paola Tessari and Bernardo Venturi (2016) “Procedures, Personnel and Technologies for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: An Assessment of EU Member States’ Capabilities” EU-CIVCAP Report DL2.1, available from: http://www.eucivcap.net/files/2016/11/Procedures_Personnel_Technologies_Conflict_Prevention_Peacebuilding-Assessment_EU_Member_States_Capabilities.pdf.

[29] Working draft EU Policy on Training for CSDP (as of 1 July 2016); Draft Implementing Guidelines for the EU Policy on Training for CSDP (as of 30 June 2016).

[30] Tommaso De Zan, Paola Tessari and Bernardo Venturi (2016) “Procedures, Personnel and Technologies for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: An Assessment of EU Member States’ Capabilities” EU-CIVCAP Report DL2.1, available from: http://www.eucivcap.net/files/2016/11/Procedures_Personnel_Technologies_Conflict_Prevention_Peacebuilding-Assessment_EU_Member_States_Capabilities.pdf.

[31] Korski, D. and Gowen, R. “Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe’s Civilian Capacities,” European Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed December 6, 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR18_-_Can_the_EU_rebuild_failing_States_-_a_Review_of_Europes_Civilian_Capacities.pdf

[32] Gauthier Jacob. “EU Training for Civilian CSDP - Which coherence?,” Security Policy Brief 28 (2011), accessed December 3, 2016. http://aei.pitt.edu/33467/1/SPB28-Jacob.pdf

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Security Sector Reform pool of experts managed by the CMPD and a Civilian Response Teams expert pool managed by the CPCC. The deployment of these experts is subject to national secondment. In addition, training remains essentially a member states' prerogative".[33] As noted by Tardy attempts to establish national rosters of experts have up until now mostly failed or not been sufficient (2016).[34]

Training for CSDP missions happens on different levels and in different periods of deployment (e.g. basic training, advanced training, pre-deployment training and in-mission training).[35] This chapter will more closely look into pre-deployment and in-mission training as those types of training are most closely related to staff interoperability.

#### 2.2.2.1 Pre-mission/deployment training

As noted by Taitto "*pre-deployment training is part of the employer's duty of care towards its employees*".[36] Pre-deployment training closely relates to the mission induction training and jointly they aim to equip seconded staff with necessary knowledge for smooth integration to the CSDP mission.[37] In terms of interoperability, although training is already currently useful in enhancing skills and creating a joint mind-set, it could be even more so if curriculum were standardized, if training was more tailored for specific needs, and finally, if training possibilities included the potential to disqualify or override national selection processes if serious problems or unsuitability for the position is evident

The current "trends" of pre-mission training are that the ESDC is trying to act as the coordinating body, and organises pre-mission trainings at a regular pace. The difficulty is that the member states have not been keen on sending participants to these courses; both for reasons of cost as well as potentially incompatible training schedules and deployment states.

Some member states (e.g. Finland, Sweden) provide PDT-training to all of their deployed experts, even if this may be costly since some times the PDTs are only attended by one person.[38] Standards for the trainings (establishing the annual ESDC programme, outlining curricula for all ESDC training activities and developing detailed curricula for all training activities) are set by the Steering Committee and the Executive Academic Board consisting of member organisations, with a focus on quality and coherence.[39]

In terms of practical interoperability, ESDC trainings include common courses covering broad topics, including civilian and military coordination.[40] The ENTRi network has begun standardizing PDT training and has organized PDTs in the second phase of the project (which was a welcomed initiative as some member

33 Ibid.

34 Tardy, Thierry. "Civilian CSDP: what next?," EU Institute for Security Studies Brief 32 (2016), accessed December 6, 2016. http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_32_Civilian_CSDP.pdf

35 Petteri Taitto. "Training for the CSDP missions". In Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations ed. Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume. (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014).

36 Ibid.

37 Draft implementing guidelines for the EU Policy on Training for CSDP (as of 30 June 2016).

38 Comments by Civilian CSDP mission staff member [online corespondece], 13. December 2016.

39 Jochen Rehrl. 2015. The European Security and Defence College. In Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations ed. Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume. (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014).

40 Comments by Civilian CSDP mission staff member [online corespondece], 13. December 2016.

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states within the ENTRi network could coordinate their PDT activities) but has given up on those in the current phase and "handed over the responsibility to the ESDC".[41]

Member states do not provide (equally adequate) training for their staff even though it is their responsibility to do so. In fact, in 2015 CPCC conducted a survey in CSDP missions relating to pre-mission training. The results indicated that 43 % of mission staff had never received pre-mission training: out of these 43 % of respondents that had not received pre-deployment training (520 respondents out of 1400 mission members in total) 72 % were contracted, meaning that the problem is not just the member states but also those mission members that are directly contracted by the missions. Further, 26 % of contracted staff not only lacked PDT-training but any other type of CSDP training or previous CSDP experience as well.[42]

The draft implementation guidelines (as of 30 June 2016) note that:

> *"all CSDP mission personnel shall receive pre-deployment training of an equivalent standard after recruitment and before taking up duty".*[43]

However, as a consequence of the lack of unified, EU-wide, criteria for staff selection as well as the lack of unified model for pre-deployment training, staff readiness may for their specific mission tasks may vary greatly.[44] As noted by the staff member from the mission in South Sudan:

> *"Some people were operational without supervision, whereas some people needed more assistance", and, as one mission member said, "some of the staff members should not have been on the mission, because they were not in a best possible physical shape, which created potential risks."* [45]

Even in high risks situations, such as the EUBAM mission in Libya, where HEAT-training is mandatory for all staff, it seems that some members may not have had the training.[46]

Although training provided was considered useful, some case studies found that training programs were considered too generalized for specific mission needs. Staff from EUAVSEC noted, the one week pre-deployment ENTRi training which according to the interviewed personnel was interesting, but it would have been much more valuable if it had dealt more with the specific mission needs and on geographical, historical

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.

43 Draft Implementing Guidelines for the EU Policy on Training for CSDP (as of 30 June 2016).

44 Noted for example by case studies on EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUBAM Libya, EUPOL COPPS, EULEX Kosovo, etc

45 Interview (P10) with EUBAM Libya staff member 19 April 2016, in D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

46 Interview (P3) with EUBAM Libya staff member, 16 February 2016, in D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

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and cultural information on South Sudan.[47] The need for more tailored training programs that better prepare the staff for specific mission tasks was made also in EULEX.[48]

#### 2.2.2.2 In-mission training / induction training

For new staff members, the missions organise so called induction trainings which aims to familiarize newcomers with the mission, enable a smooth integration and introduce them to missions work rhythm and daily organisational routine. In mission training is a responsibility of the CSDP-mission and can be supported by other training actors.

It is observed that smaller missions organize training less frequently (as smaller number of new people arrives at the same time). The level of training varies as well, with larger missions organising 5 days training, with specialised units to deal with these tasks (e.g. EULEX Kosovo). In smaller missions trainings are coordinated by one person alone, and the trainings are much shorter.

As such it seems that induction trainings are not unified in this regard, however, they still are a way to ensure that all staff members have a minimum, standardised level of knowledge of the region, culture, mission goals and working procedures, etc.[49]

A positive example of in-mission training is provided by the EUPOL COPPS mission. It organized the HEAT training for their staff members, and invited EU delegation staff to participate. This example of joint training is both cost effective and also enhances the in-field interoperability of EU-staff from different institutions. However, the case studies also reveal that the perception lives that not all CSDP-missions are open to the idea of organising joint training. This potential for interoperability and pooling and sharing has to be further explored in the future.[50]

### 2.2.3 Staff capabilities

The case studies results show that staff capabilities also have a potential effect on interoperability. Staff members from several missions have noted that there is lack of unified understanding of some of the concepts that the mission is using.

It is noted that rather than relying on common pool of best practices, the national best practices of the participating staff (countries) were often presented. Divergence in the information presented can lead to confusion, particularly on the side of the receiving nation, as it may receive different, unclear or, in exceptional cases, even conflicting instructions and guidance by the mission staff.

Interviews of EUBAM Libya staff, for example, indicate that mission members had different understandings of "Integrated Border Management" that the mission was trying to convey to the beneficiary. These different

47 Interview (P12) with EUBAM Libya staff member, 2 May 2016, in D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

48 Interview (no. 1) with EULEX official, Pristina, 8 March, 2016; Interview (no. 4) with EU official, Brussels. 30. March, 2016, in D2.3 Study report of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

49 Petteri Taitto. "Training for the CSDP missions". In Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations ed. Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume. (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014).; Comments by Civilian CSDP mission staff member [online corespondece], 13. December 2016.

50 Interview (P2) with 2 EUPOL COPPS international staff members, 7 March 2016; Interview (P5) with EUPOL COPPS international staff member, 7 March 2016; and Interview (P25) with 2 EEAS Officials, 17 March 2016 in D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan.

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understandings, according to one interviewee, led to confusing situation as the Libyan beneficiary was given conflicting information.[51]

Challenges occasionally arise due to a relatively short rotations of the mission staff (which itself present an operational but to a certain extent also interoperability challenge).[52] EULEX staff member noted that with every rotation of a substantial part of the personnel (approximately every 12 months), the lack of continuity among the so-called EU best practices was identified and contradictions may arise.[53] Some similar observations have been noted also by EUPOL Afghanistan field study. While the issue of lack of unified practices is important for operational capabilities of any given mission, it may also have negative implications on interoperability of the mission's staff.

## 2.3 Shared Services

In the context of shared services, interoperability is specifically relevant to the material support and management tasks related to setting up civilian crisis management missions and their operational support. Particular areas of interest are human resources and procurement. As stated in the EEAS Lessons Learned report of 2013[54], the establishment of a new civilian crisis management mission is a clear area of improvement as the EU is lacking standard procedures, SOPs and processes for doing his.

In the absence of these guidelines the establishment of new missions happens ad hoc, particularly due to lacking common and efficient HR, procurement and IT systems. The roles of the EU, participating countries or the host country are neither clearly outlined nor standard for each operation. Procurement has specifically been an issue, as the set-up of a functioning mission has been slow at times due to lacking equipment and services. Most obvious examples of this are from EULEX Kosovo and EUBAM Libya, where some staff members lacked computers for almost for a year.[55]

Although services were not specifically discussed in the field studies, relevant points to interoperability were made on the establishment of mission headquarters. Previous experiences of cooperation between EU and other international actors in this regard have been discouraging, as in the case of setting up the headquarters for the EU aviation security mission (EUAVSEC) in South Sudan. In this case, the plans for setting up the missions' headquarters within the UN compound were thwarted, forcing the mission to rent a private hotel.[56]

51 Interview (P6) with EUBAM Libya staff member, 10 March 2016, in D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

52 Both international employees and locals warn about negative implications of relatively short term deployments of staff, which effect the operational capacities (and efficiency) of the mission. While staff contracted by Brussels usually stays in mission for a number of years, staff seconded by member states is often deployed for relatively short periods of time, usually for one year or even less, with limited opportunity for contract renewal. Due to relatively short deployments, there is not enough time for newcomers to "catch up with the speed" of the mission, and when they do, their turn is already coming to an end.

53 Interview (no. 1) with EULEX official, Pristina, 8 March, 2016, in D2.3 Study report of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

54 European Union External Action Service. "Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report". Accessed December 12, 2016. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/annual_2013_csdp_lessons_report_en.pdf.

55 Discussed in D2.1: The Kosovo Review.

56 Discussed in D1.3.

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Nevertheless, examples of existing interoperability in services can be found, with the most advanced ones related to civil-military cooperation and procurement. These include the EU Satellite Communications market, a joint project between the EDA and Airbus Defence and Space, covering the installation and transfer of satellite communications as well as relevant training. Since 2013 EDA has functioned as a central purchaser in the market for a group of member states and CSDP operations. The market functions as a 'pay-per-use' model, in which the members pay for those services that they use, instead of regular fees. While previously CSDP operations have used the market, starting from 2016 civilian CSDP missions have also joined it, with current membership including EUCAP nestor, EUCAP SAHEL Niger & Mali, EUAM Ukraine and EUMM Georgia.[57]

The need for more standardized procedures in the establishment and servicing of civilian crisis management missions has been voiced by the European Council in 2012.[58] Based on a feasibility study presented to the Council in 2014, the EEAS proposed the creation of a Shared Services Centre, which would bring together elements of CPCC and FPI in a centralized mission support organization, covering both civilian CSDP missions and EUSR offices.

Since consensus on developing the Centre has been difficult to reach, negotiations moved to a Mission Support Platform (MSP), which began functioning in April 2016 (Council conclusion 18/4/2016. In this option, management staff from missions and EUSR offices will be pulled to the CPCC and FPI, which would remain as separate entities.[59] In its first year, the MSP is focusing on developing common IT infrastructure for civilian missions and creating applications for them as well as providing a helpdesk.[60] In the longer term, the MSP is to have four main objectives:

(1) Harmonize starting up of missions and create standard protocols on how new missions are established.
(2) Improve the efficiency of support services to missions through a standardized central provider of recruitment and procurement.
(3) Create flexibility in services, by providing a central services provider for missions instead of every mission acting alone.
(4) Improve on economies of scale by centralizing services, thus cutting back on needed staff and making common procurement possible.

To facilitate speedier procurement particularly in setting up a crisis management mission, the feasibility study also suggested a "crisis" category to procuring equipment and services, which would allow faster and more flexible tendering processes.[61] This has not been implemented as of 2016.

57 European Defence Agency. "EU Satellite Communications Market." Accessed December 7, 2016. https://eda.europa.eu/docs/default-source/eda-factsheets/2015-11-12_factsheet_eu_satcom_market43A40121093C.

58 Council of the European Union. "Press release: 3183rd council meeting." Accessed December 2, 2016. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/131990.pdf.

59 Drent, M. Et al. "Defence Matters: More Urgent Than Ever." Netherlands Institute for International Relations. The Hague, Netherlands (2015): 16- 19.

60 Interview with a CSDP Mission staff member. Email interview. 12.12.2016.

61 European Union External Action Service. "Annual 2013 CSDP Lessons Report". Accessed December 12, 2016. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/annual_2013_csdp_lessons_report_en.pdf.

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## 2.4. Command Systems and Information Sharing

In this heading the current systems and procedures relating to civilian CSDP mission command and management are reviewed in terms of interoperability. This will be done by looking more closely into how the current civilian CSDP systems of command and control operate and what implications they (potentially) have on various aspects of interoperability. Also, the interoperability of information sharing will be assessed, both from the perspective of internal mission structures and in relation to the "outsiders" (e.g. other organizations, local institutions, etc.). According to the definition of interoperability by Rubinstein, Keller and Scherger we can talk about vertical and horizontal interoperability where the first defines the interaction among actors participating in the mission while the second defines interaction of mission staff with local institutions.[62]

### 2.4.1 Command and Control Systems

When assessing the **command and control systems** of civilian CSDP missions we may generally speak about three levels: political, strategic and operational, defined in the Guidelines for Command and Control (C2) Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management.[63] While the council has overall responsibility over CSDP, its political control over civilian crisis management is exercised by The Political and Security Committee (PSC), advised by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). Strategic command of all civilian mission is performed by the CPCC Director who is the Civilian Operation Commander (CivOpsCdr). Establishment of the role of CivOpsCdr in 2006 has greatly enhanced direct control over civilian missions.

The operational command of the mission is in hand of the Head of the Mission (HoM), who has the responsibility to exercise command and control at the field level and, as such, shall issue instructions for the effective conduct of the mission while being directly responsible to the CivOpsCdr. The guidelines for command and control also mention the EU Special Representative (EUSR). The EUSR is not part of the chain of command and cannot give operational instructions, but is expected to offer political guidance to the HoM.

The aim of clarifying command and control structures in civilian CSDP is to establish a clear flow of operational guidance from the highest political level to the tactical level, as well as support feedback and lessons learned. In terms of interoperability, the guidelines also set out C2 practices when cooperating with other international organisations, making it possible for EU missions to have operational command over external components. These developments have made structures in civilian CSDP missions more comparable to those of military operations, so as to foster better civil/military-interoperability both in the HQ level as well as in the field.[64]

A specific development in the establishment of interoperable command systems and information sharing is the activation of the EU Operations Centre in March 2012 to support coordination among the three CSDP

62 Robert A. Rubinstein , Diana M. Keller & Michael E. Scherger. "Culture and Interoperability in Integrated Missions," International Peacekeeping, 15:4 (2008): 540-555, DOI: 10.1080/13533310802239857

63 Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management, Brussels 23 May 2007. Accessed December 2, 2016. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209919%202007%20EXT%202.

64 Wolfgang Wosolsobe. "The Challenges of CSDP Command and Control" in Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations - The common security and defence policy of the European Union," ed. Jochen Rehrl & Galia Glume (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2015), 276 - 279.

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missions in the Horn of Africa (EUNAVFOR ATALANTA, EUTM Somalia, and EUCAP NESTOR).[65] In December 2014 the mandate of the EU Operations Centre was widened to cover the Sahel and the three missions operating there (EUTM Mali, EUCAP SAHEL Mali & Niger). The aim of the operations centre is to advance civil-military cooperation, with personnel from the EU military staff and the EEAS, including CMPD & CPCC. To do this, the centre functions as an information sharing and planning body, but notably lacks any command authority, leaving this to existing mechanisms. Currently the mandate of the operations centre is set to expire at the end of 2016.

### 2.4.2 Information sharing

There are several dimensions of **information sharing** that can be taken in consideration when assessing interoperability, ranging from more technical to administrative issues, including information systems, access to information, information security (including cyber security of civilian CSDP missions), internal and external sharing of information, etc. This section will try to assess several aspects of information sharing in the realm of civilian CSDP mission and consider its relevance to interoperability.

The first aspect is technical in nature and relates to the sole existence of the necessary systems that are precondition for effective information sharing. Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management (9919/07) recognize the need for the mission to be provided with *equipment that will guarantee the required secure, reliable and adequate Communications and Information Systems (CIS)*. These means should be in place in theatre of operations as early as possible. While the technical dimension of the information sharing is indeed a very relevant one, it will be assessed more in details in the equipment chapter.

When it comes to the access to information, the head of the mission manages the policy of classification and release of the documents within the mission. These decisions should be made in accordance with security principles and minimum standards established by EEAS (e.g. Security rules for the European External Action Service) and applicable EU rules (e.g. Security rules for protecting EU classified information).

The mission's communication and information system (CIS) has to be accredited. The EEAS Security Accreditation Authority is responsible for accreditation of information system security in relation mission – Brussels, while the HoM is mission security accreditation authority.[66] It is also important to note that in order for the mission to be able to share any classified information with non-EU countries, special security arrangements and agreements (a framework participation agreement, an ad hoc participation agreement, or in the absence of either of the above, an ad hoc administrative arrangement) have to be made.[67]

In distinction to the military CSDP operations, the maximum classification level of EU classified information (EUCI) which may be exchanged with third states and international organization in civilian CSDP missions is EU Restricted, unless otherwise laid down in the decision establishing CSDP mission.[68]

65 European External Action Service. "EU Operations Center Factsheet." Accessed November 29, 2016. http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-operations-centre/docs/factsheet_eu_opcen_23_06_2015.pdf..

66 Decision Of The High Representative Of The Union For Foreign Affairs And Security Policy of 19 April 2013 on Security rules for the European External Action Service. Accessed November 11, 2016. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D0629(03)&from=EN

67 Official Journal of the European Union. "Security rules for protecting EU classified information" (2013/488/EU), accessed December 15, 2016. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D0488&from=EN

68 For military CSDP operations the level is EU Confidential.

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From the perspective of interoperability, it is also worth noting that in accordance with Security rules for protecting EU classified information, no exchange of EUCI by electronic means shall be permitted under a framework participation agreement, ad hoc participation agreement or ad hoc administrative arrangement with a third State or international organisation, unless explicitly provided for in the agreement or arrangement in question.[69] This can add a specific operational barrier and challenge for interoperability when working with 3rd states.

Cyber security and cyber threats are relatively new security dimension that directly and indirectly correlate also to the (civilian) CSDP information sharing through the need to maintain the functionality and security of CSDP communication and information networks. With rapid development of CIS and their deployment in the framework of civilian missions, the necessity for awareness and understanding of potential cyber threats and preparedness for their mitigation is increasing as the missions systems become a potential targets of attacks.[70]

The Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union (6225/13) notes the necessary development of cyberdefence policy and capabilities related to the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy. It specifically notes the need for resilience of the communication and information systems. The necessity of the EU to provide cyber protection for missions and operations was reinforced by the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (15585/14) which acknowledges and recommends the actions to protect national capabilities available for CSDP missions and operations and the EEAS communication and information networks relevant to CSDP. It further notes the need to develop adequate training for different audiences in the CSDP chain of command.

While the documents still focus more on the military CSDP operations and military aspects of cyber security, civilian CSDP missions are taken in consideration. That is reinforced by the proposed measures to develop civil-military cooperation and synergies with wider EU cyber policies. The framework notes the need for a unified cyber defence concept for CSDP military operations and civilian missions, recognizing that cyber threats are not limited just to military realm but increasingly relevant also for civilian CSDP missions.

While the framework of cooperation in the cyber domain and especially in relation to civilian CSDP missions is still developing, it seems reasonable to assume that due to rapid development of CIS and missions reliance on state-of-the-art communication systems, the need for interoperable equipment, common security standards and well trained cyber specialists in civilian CSDP missions will only increase in the upcoming years.

When assessing the external information sharing, field studies have noted examples of good practices as well as some obstacles originating both from CSDP missions and their partners including both other international organizations and local institutions. Revised draft list of generic civilian CSDP tasks (7656/2/15) identifies two tasks in relation to sharing of information (tasks 2.2.1 and 2.2.2). Task 2.2.1 relates to ensuring the coordination with EU actors (e.g. other CSDP missions/operations, EU Delegations, EUSRs, EU agencies and/or member states) while task 2.2.2. relates to ensuring the coordination with other IC actors and partners (e.g. international organisations and bilateral partners).[71]

69 "Council Decision of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified information." Accessed November 21, 2016. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D0488&from=EN

70 Wolfgang Röhrig. "Cyber security and defence." In Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations ed. Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume. (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2015).

71 Revised draft list of generic civilian CSDP tasks, Brussels, 8 May 2015, Accessed 8. November 2016, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-7656-2015-REV-2/en/pdf

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The information sharing between CSDP mission and other EU agencies (e.g. Frontex, Europol and Eurojust) can present a mutual benefit for organizations involved as they are mostly dealing with common threats and challenges but from different perspectives (e.g. related to internal and external security of the EU). Various EU documents note the indivisible connection between internal and external aspects of security (e.g. EU Global Strategy, European Security Strategy, Internal Security Strategy, etc.).[72]

Common threats that can particularly be tackled more comprehensively through cooperation are among others organised crime, terrorism, mass migration, etc. Narojek notes some concrete examples of such cooperation: *Frontex contribution to the strategic and operational planning of the EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM); cooperation between Europol and EULEX based on an agreed procedure which defines details of the information exchange and identifies member states which volunteered to facilitate communication*; etc.[73]

The case studies conducted in the framework of IECEU project note consultations between EUBAM Libya and Frontex[74] as well as EULEX Kosovo information sharing with Europol and Frontex and its role in facilitating the communication between those agencies and Kosovo actors. Van der Laan et. al. comment that efforts have been taken recently to increase such cooperation. The possibility to establish a cooperation framework between CSDP and Eurojust is also being explored.[75] From the perspective of EU comprehensive approach and need for better situational awareness, further reinforcement of information sharing and cooperation seems to be beneficial for all actors involved.

The general observation of the conducted field studies in the framework of the IECEU project is that external cooperation (i.e. with other actors in the area of the mission) still occasionally suffers from poor information exchange. Reports indicate that both EU and non-EU actors often blame the other side for the poor communication. As noted, this may (when speaking about interoperability with other international actors) lead to overlapping, repeating of same tasks or contradictory engagements with local actors which potentially have negative implications (e.g. noted to some extent in cases of EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUBAM Libya, etc.).

A more detailed framework for cooperation with international partners is described in the heading on third states participation in crisis management operations. However the information sharing aspect of it is equally important and often lies in the foundation of such cooperation. Cooperation, coordination as well as at least certain level of interoperability seems especially important in missions which tasks and goals particularly and directly envision such cooperation, as for example EUBAM Libya which was expected to serve as a facilitator and a coordinator amongst different donors in Libya, especially in relation to border affairs (though as certain interviewees noted not all parties were willing to share the information[76]). On this note, it is mentioned that cooperation and information sharing with local institutions, while only partially referring to interoperability as defined by this report, is often of high importance for successful and efficient execution of the EU civilian CSDP missions' tasks. Communication and inclusion of local institutions has thus been pointed out as an important aspect by majority of the analysed cases of civilian missions.

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72 Michał Narojek. "CSDP/FSJ link." In Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations ed. Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume. (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2015).

73 Ibid.

74 D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

75 Franca van der Laan. "The Future of Police Missions." Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael (2016). Accessed December 5, 2016. https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/future-police-missions

76 Interview (P10) with EUBAM Libya staff member, 19 April 2016, in D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

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Some obstacles in sharing of sensitive information with local institutions have been noted in the case studies. This is understandable due to information security and regulations related to access to information. Nevertheless, in general, the case studies did not identify any major challenges from the perspective of information sharing among mission and local institutions. In addition to the administrative and technical dimensions, however, the studies noted human dimension in the framework of cooperation and information sharing as equally important by emphasizing the importance of good local knowledge and cultural awareness (as previously already discussed in the staff section of this chapter) as it may facilitate or limit the willingness on the side of the local institutions/organizations staff to openly discuss and exchange information with CSDP mission members.

## 2.5 Equipment

Civilian mission in general are less equipment-intense than military operations.[77] Nevertheless, there are certain aspects of the interoperability of equipment that are also relevant for civilian missions, especially police missions. The sourcing of equipment relates to procurement procedures, general EU rules as well as the overall budget at use. The material at use in a mission, be it computers or cars is also central to enabling or hampering interoperability on the field-operational level.

Due to their objectives and nature of work, police missions among civilian CSDP missions, are most exposed to the challenges related to the (technical) aspects of interoperability. This is noted in objective 4 of the Göteborg Police Action Plan. It foresees in the development and validation of arrangements necessary to ensure the interoperability of police forces participating in EU police operations, including those for common equipment, administration and logistical support).[78]

The 2002 comprehensive concept for police substitution missions (8655/4/02) defines the:

> *"necessity for operational and administrative interoperability while noting logistics and equipment perspectives of interoperability as specifically important to consider. The document further notes that well established interoperability (technological and other dimensions already discussed above) is necessary precondition for rapid deployment and reduction of possible delays."*

The discussion paper on arrangements for Common Equipment for EU police operations (11839/1/02) lists the following equipment and technology as specifically relevant from perspective of the civilian (police) missions: vehicles, communication and information systems, information technology, special devices (e.g. encryption), etc.

While the list is certainly not all inclusive and several pieces of equipment could be added, it offers relevant insight into the main types of equipment that could be interoperable in civilian CSDP missions. The 2004

[77] Hylke Dijkstra, Petar Petrov, and Ewa Mahr (2016), "Reacting to Conflict: Civilian Capabilities in the EU, UN and OSCE," EU-CIVCAP Report, DL4.1, available from: http://www.eu-civcap.net/files/2016/11/Reacting_Conflict-Civilian_Capabilities_EU_UN_OSCE.pdf

[78] "Presidency report to the Göteborg European Council on European Security and Defence Policy (9526/1/01), 2001." Accessed December 13, 2016. http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-9526-2001-REV-1/en/pdf

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guidelines for rapid deployment of Integrated Police Units (15956/04) proposes a framework and lead nation concept which derives from military CSDP operations, as possible (logistic) concepts also in civilian (police) missions.[79]

Nevertheless, the more recent documents no longer mention the concept of framework or lead nations in the framework of civilian missions. Possible cooperation with EU military structures, where present, may also create additional synergies, especially in the area of logistical capabilities, strategic transportation and maintenance of specific capabilities (e.g. specialized vehicles).

In general, the civilian CSDP missions are responsible for the acquisition of the necessary equipment themselves, in accordance with established EU procurement procedures and EU financial rules and regulations.[80] The specific procedure applicable to procurement of certain equipment is determined based on the substance (e.g. services, supplies or works) and total expense in accordance to EU procurement regulations.[81] Equipment can also be transferred from another CSDP mission (e.g. when another missions is downsizing or closing).[82] In addition there is a civilian CSDP warehouse which could be seen as a combination of the abovementioned procedures.

The warehouse concept is an example of EU efforts to address issues of rapid deployment and consequently importantly relates to the issue of interoperability.[83] While the EU civilian CSDP warehouse concept is rather recent innovation, the concept itself has previously been realized through temporary solution for the storage of assets required for civilian crisis management missions. The temporary storage of surplus equipment has been established within the premises of EUPM Bosnia and Herzegovina already in January 2010. The temporary warehouse stored assets which allowed 200 staff to deploy in a new mission.[84]

Council Decision 2012/698/CFSP, establishing a common warehouse, refers to a study conducted by the Commission, confirming the feasibility of warehousing as an effective tool for establishing the means of rapid deployment of physical assets required by civilian crisis management missions. As no member state volunteered to host and manages the warehouse, a public tender was issued and a private contractor was selected to provide the warehouse services in accordance with the Council Decision.[85] The warehouse buys

79 The concept could be relevant in relation to, for example, communications, where according to the lead nation concept, the lead nation would ensure the necessary interoperability of communication equipment.

80 Francesco Giumelli and Eugenio Cusumano. "Normative Power under Contract? Commercial Support to European Crisis Management Operations," International Peacekeeping 21:1 (2014): 37-55.

81 European Commission. "PRAG 2016." Accessed November 21, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/prag/?header_description=DEVCO+Prag+to+financial+and+contractual+procedures+applicable+to+external+actions+financed+from+the+general+budget+of+the+EU+and+from+the+11th+EDF&header_keywords=ePrag%2C+europa

82 E.g. Best practice guidelines - Coordination and cooperation between CSDP missions/operations, EU Delegations and EU Special Representatives (12052/16) notes as a best practice a possible transfer of surplus equipment to local EU actors taking into account the operational needs of other CSDP missions/operations.

83 Hylke Dijkstra, Petar Petrov, and Ewa Mahr (2016), "Reacting to Conflict: Civilian Capabilities in the EU, UN and OSCE," EU-CIVCAP Report, DL4.1, available from: http://www.eu-civcap.net/files/2016/11/Reacting_Conflict-Civilian_Capabilities_EU_UN_OSCE.pdf

84 Draft Council Decision on the establishment of a warehouse for civilian crisis management missions. Accessed, November 20, 2016. http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-13742-2012-INIT/en/pdf

85 Contract award notice: B-Brussels: Warehouse services to enable rapid deployment of a medium-sized CSDP mission — common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and Instrument for Stability 2013/S 045-071204 Accessed October 28, 2016. http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:71204-2013:TEXT:EN:HTML

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and stocks the equipment (e.g. ICT equipment, security equipment, off-road vehicles, etc.).[86] This equipment is the property of the EC, not the contractor.[87] The concept of warehousing is currently under review and may be expanded e.g. to serve also the on-going missions.

While the warehouse concept seems as a reasonable framework (considering also e.g. concepts and services developed by the UN[88]) for providing highly interoperable and rapidly deployable equipment for civilian CSDP missions, some of the responses from the case studies seem to suggest that some of the on-going challenges within the concept still have to be addressed. One challenge relates to the speed of providing equipment. In the current set-up, limited equipment is ready at launch of the mission. Usually, additional procurement needs to be organised, taking between 1 and 6 months.[89]

Also, the warehouse is seen as too rigid, handing out already out-dated devices, which raises the question of how usable they are for the mission. The logic of stockpiling items that are out-dated rapidly, such as computers, was questioned. As noted by one of the interviewees at EUBAM Libya:

> *"When I arrived the mission had no computers. Everyone was working from his own computer. No servers. People were storing documents on DropBox. Finally we managed to get computers from the warehouse and by that time they were already out-dated and they came without software. One year on and there were still mission members without computers"* [90]

Some interviewees noted that the warehouse did not have the items that the mission would have required badly, such as armoured cars, and the location was inconvenient.[91] Other examples relate to equipment provided by the warehouse that is not usable for the mission requesting it (e.g. a mission in a francophone country, getting computers with German keyboards).[92]

A further point relating to equipment is information systems. Currently, missions have to develop their own information systems, which is a time-consuming and complex undertaking especially for larger missions or those missions that require more advanced information systems. The need for standardized information systems that could be used and applied by all missions was identified by several missions (e.g. EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL COPPS, and EUPOL Afghanistan).

86 Hylke Dijkstra, Petar Petrov, and Ewa Mahr (2016), "Reacting to Conflict: Civilian Capabilities in the EU, UN and OSCE," EU-CIVCAP Report, DL4.1, available from: http://www.eu-civcap.net/files/2016/11/Reacting_Conflict-Civilian_Capabilities_EU_UN_OSCE.pdf

87 Interview with EASS official. Phone interview. 2. December 2016.

88 The United Nations Global Service Centre (UNGSC). "About." Accessed December 6, 2016. http://www.unlb.org/Home/About

89 Interview with EASS official. Phone interview. 2. December 2016.

90 Interview (P11) with EUBAM Libya staff member, 30 April 2016, in D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

91 Interview (P6) with EUBAM Libya staff member, 10 March 2016 in D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

92 Interview with EASS official. Phone interview. 2. December 2016.

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As noted for example by the interviewees at EUPOL COPPS, a major challenge for mission members and to the Mission Support in particular is that CSDP lacks an integrated management system that would be readily available to all CSDP missions. EUPOL COPPS has developed its own human resources and logistics management system that at first served the mission's needs well. However, in recent years EUPOL COPPS noted had difficulties in recruiting software developers who would update the system and further develop it. Giumelli and Cusumano note that due to the lack of standardized information and communication systems for civilian CSDP missions, the EU operations have also relied on commercial providers of IT services, such as phone communication, Internet provision and website maintenance. As these sectors have security and strategic implications, outsourcing of these capabilities should be carefully considered.[93] According to the interview with EASS official, there are currently efforts to develop a standardized system that could be applied by CSDP missions. The process is supported by the Mission Support Platform which is discussed more in details in Shared services section of this chapter.[94]

As noted by the case study EULEX Kosovo, in the assessment of technology and its usefulness, the harmonization of technology and people is truly vital. Staff capabilities and the ability to use different tools, as well as the willingness to do so (mind-set), requires on-going support. As one of the interviewees at EUPOL Afghanistan stated:

> *"I did not see anything technical or technological that would have made a difference. IT and software were not the answer. It did no deal with the Taliban or remedy corruption. Of course, it can support certain activities, but technology is not part of the solution. We needed to tackle mindsets /.../."*

By that the interviewee was more particularly referring to the work and interoperability with local forces. He further notes that simple solutions often worked best:

> *"Focus on what they already had – smart phones. We looked at developing different Apps for this."*[95]

93 Francesco Giumelli and Eugenio Cusumano. "Normative Power under Contract? Commercial Support to European Crisis Management Operations," International Peacekeeping 21:1 (2014): 37-55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2014.885709

94 Interview with EASS official, 28. November 2016.

95 Interview (A32) with Former mission member – Afghanistan (Skype interview), August 2016, in D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan

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## 2.6 Third Parties Participation in CSDP Missions

The CSDP missions allow for third states contributions as stated by the Civilian Headline goal 2010:

> *"Contributions of non-EU actors are to be considered as supplementary to the overall EU capacity rather than as an integral part thereof."*[96]

Third states making contributions to a CSDP mission have in principle the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the mission as member states contributing to the mission. An important distinction however arises in their inclusion in the planning process, where they are included only in the final stages of the planning process, while decision making is conducted by the EU members.[97]

A non-EU country that wishes to contribute and participate in the EU (civilian) CSDP mission has a possibility to sign a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU, which provides the legal and political basis for such cooperation. FPA includes provisions on participation in both civilian and military crisis missions/operations[98] (e.g. regulating the personnel, chain of command, financial aspects and agreements regarding the status of personnel and information sharing etc.).[99]

While the agreement does not specifically mention the word "interoperability" some of the provisions (e.g. on classified information, chain of command and status of personnel and forces) do directly and indirectly address the issues of interoperability and thus contribute to higher interoperability among non-EU and EU personnel.

The main documents defining a contribution of non-EU states to specific EU CSDP civilian mission according to the FPA agreements are: (1) the relevant Council Decision to establish the EU crisis management mission and its subsequent amendments; (2) the Operation Plan (OPLAN); (3) any applicable implementing arrangements. In theory, third states thus have same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as EU member states. However any contribution of third states is without prejudice to the decision making autonomy of the Union.

Among the already concluded civilian CSDP missions, we can for example note the first EU civilian CSDP mission – Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) which in 2003 benefited from the contribution of 15 third states (among which several later joined the EU in 2004 and 2007).[100] Bosnia and Herzegovina is on

96 "Civilian Headline Goals 2010" (2007). Accessed December 8, 2016, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/Civilian_Headline_Goal_2010.pdf

97 Thierry Tardy. "CSDP: getting third states on board." EU Institute for Security Studies Brief 6 (2014) Accessed October 25, 2016, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_6_CSDP_and_third_states.pdf

98 Additional concept and potential channel for contribution of third states is through the framework of visiting experts. Visiting Expert is defined by the Council guidelines (7896/3/1) as an expert, seconded by member states or by Contributing Third States, with a qualification not permanently required and/or sufficiently available in general within a CSDP Mission. A Visiting Expert is only deployed during a defined time period that must not exceed three months in a single deployment.

99 Example of such Framework Participation Agreement: Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Korea establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Korea in European Union crisis management operations. Accessed October 27, 2016. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22014A0605(01)&from=EN

100 Thierry Tardy. "CSDP: getting third states on board." EU Institute for Security Studies Brief 6 (2014) Accessed October 25, 2016, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_6_CSDP_and_third_states.pdf

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the other hand the latest partner to sign the FPA with the EU (On 15 September 2015), becoming eligible to participate in EU civilian and military missions/operations. In total there are today 18 non-EU countries[101] that have signed FPA with the EU (the newest countries which signed the agreement in 2015 are Australia and Bosnia and Herzegovina); while several countries (now EU member states) have prior to their accession to the EU also cooperated in this framework (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria).

While the political interest for participation in EU CSDP missions from third countries seems to exist to a certain extent, the analysis of contributions to EU civilian CSDP missions shows that the share of third countries staff in the analysed missions is rather marginal. In general, third countries staff (seconded and contracted) percentage never exceeds significantly over 1% of the total mission staff. Majority of the third countries staff is seconded, with currently (as of 31/08/2016) only one case of contracted third country staff member in EULEX Kosovo. EULEX Kosovo seems to be a bit specific in regards to both the total number of staff (more than the other analysed civilian missions combined) and the number of third country staff members, but even in the case of EULEX Kosovo, the total percentage of third countries staff in relation to the total number of staff is only 0,975%.[102] [103]

| | EULEX Kosovo | EUBAM Rafah | EUPOL COPPS | EUPOL Afghanistan | EUBAM Libya | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Seconded | 375 | 2 | 41 | 52 | 10 | 480 |
| Contracted | 196 | 1 | 15 | 63 | 2 | 277 |
| 3rd countries seconded | 12 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 13 |
| 3rd countries contracted | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Local contracted staff | 749 | 7 | 42 | 141 | 2 | 941 |
| Total | 1333 | 10 | 99 | 256 | 14 | 1712 |
| % of seconded staff | 0,900% | 0,000% | 1,010% | 0,000% | 0,000% | 0,759% |
| % of contracted staff | 0,075% | 0,000% | 0,000% | 0,000% | 0,000% | 0,058% |
| % Total | 0,975% | 0,000% | 1,010% | 0,000% | 0,000% | 0,818% |

Table 1 Proportion of third countries staff in civilian CSDP-missions

The number of local contracted staff is relatively high in all of the analysed cases, thus if we compare the number of third countries staff only to international staff (seconded and contracted), the percentage is slightly higher. In that case the percentage of third countries staff (as share of total international staff) in the case of EULEX Kosovo is 2,226% while the total percentage of third countries staff in analysed civilian CSDP missions is 1,816%.

| | EULEX Kosovo | EUBAM Rafah | EUPOL COPPS | EUPOL Afghanistan | EUBAM Libya | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total international staff | 584 | 3 | 57 | 115 | 12 | 771 |
| % of third states staff | 2,226% | 0,000% | 1,754% | 0,000% | 0,000% | 1,816% |

Table 2 Proportion third countries staff of total international in civilian missions

101 Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, Columbia, FYRO Macedonia, Georgia, Iceland, Montenegro, Moldova, New Zeeland, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, United States of America and Norway.

102 CPCC Personnel Figures of the Civilian CSDP Missions (as of 31/08/2016).

103 The report refers to the staff numbers as of as of 31/08/2016. Researchers have analysed the staffing numbers for first half of the year 2016 and haven't noted drastically changes in proportions, however we acknowledge the possibility that the numbers may change by the time this report is published.

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The majority of the (limited) amount of 3rd countries staff is coming from just a few contributing 3rd countries, i.e. the United States (currently 10 seconded experts in EULEX Kosovo), while other countries, which in average (currently) contribute 1-3 seconded/contracted staff, are Canada, Switzerland and Turkey.

While the possibility to cooperate in civilian CSDP missions is relatively open and quite a few countries have signed the FPA with the EU, in practice only a handful of countries participate in the EU civilian CSDP mission, and typically in only one specific civilian CSDP mission – EULEX Kosovo.

**Working with international partners**

Interoperability is most evident in cooperation in the field-operational level as to how they relate to specific missions/operations or their segments. The most formalized and developed relationship in the field, is the one with United Nations (UN) which is reasonable as EU (civilian) CSDP missions and operations are often deployed to countries with a UN peacekeeping or peace-building presence.[104]

The EU and the UN issued their first Joint Declaration on EU-UN cooperation in Crisis Management in 2003 (it notes for example the handover of responsibilities from the United Nations International Police Task Force to EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a first practical example of cooperation and sets the framework for formal and practical cooperation in the field of crisis management).[105]

The 2007 Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management confirms the commitment to cooperation and mentions some new concrete examples (e.g. exchanges between UN and EU Situation Centres and cooperation with the EU Satellite Centre).[106] Further measures and documents covering specific aspects of cooperation[107] have been put in place.[108]

As noted by the EU Global Strategy, the 'CSDP could assist further and complement UN peacekeeping through bridging, stabilisation or other operations. The EU will also enhance synergy with UN peacebuilding efforts, through greater coordination in the planning, evolution and withdrawal of CSDP capacity-building missions in fragile settings'. [109]

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest regional security organization and as such a relevant partner for the EU.[110] All EU member states are participating states in the OSCE. While the relations between the organizations were already established (though on a more ad-

104 Thierry Tardy. 2013. "Partnering in crisis management: Ten years of UN-EU cooperation." European Union Institute for Security Studies Brief 30 (2013). Accessed November 15, 2016, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_30.pdf

105 Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management. Accessed November 11, 2016, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st12730.en03.pdf

106 Joint Statement on UN-EU cooperation in Crisis Management. Accessed November 11, 2016, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/EU-UNstatmntoncrsmngmnt.pdf

107 E.g. EU developed Guidelines on the Implementation of the Joint statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management (13609/07) which acknowledges the cooperation of UN and EU on the mission level and offers some concrete examples of positive steps towards higher interoperability.

108 European Parliamentary Research Service. "EU-UN cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management." Accessed November 12, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/572783/EPRS_BRI(2015)572783_EN.pdf

109 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy. 2016. Accessed December 7, 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf

110 The Council draft conclusion on EU-OSCE cooperation from 2003 (14572/1/03/Rev1) notes that "the EU and the OSCE share the same principles and values as well as important responsibilities in conflict prevention, crisis-management and post-conflict rehabilitation, the promotion of democracy and human rights and institution building".

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hoc basis[111]) before the creation of the CSDP, the cooperation deepened afterwards, especially with EU engagements in civilian crisis management.[112]

From the operational perspective, civilian CSDP missions quite often operate in the same country as OSCE missions. Perhaps most evident in the region of Western Balkans where both organizations have or have had a relatively strong field presence (e.g. Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc.).[113] While, as noted by Stewart, there might have been some indicators of overlap of goals and responsibilities between the EU and the OSCE, the relationship and coordination are developing through the years into a mutual reinforcing.[114]

As several civilian CSDP missions take place on the African continent, the relation and partnership EU-AU is also relevant. The cooperation is developed in the broader framework of EU-Africa Partnership. While the EU support to AU in the realm of security cooperation is mostly financial and advisory, primarily through establishment and funding (financed through the European Development Fund) of African Peace Facility (APF), there are also limited elements of on the ground mission cooperation that have elements relevant from the perspective of interoperability (e.g. provisions for exchange of relevant restricted information between EU CSDP missions and AU, etc.).

While NATO is indeed one of the most important EU partners, the cooperation between EU and NATO is particularly relevant for its military operations, thus the partnership will be more closely analysed in chapter 3 (while acknowledging the cases such as Kosovo which confirm that NATO-EU cooperation is relevant also in civilian CSDP)

The overview of concept papers of various types of civilian CSDP mission shows that cooperation with other international partners is mostly acknowledged and taken in consideration. As stated for example in the EU concept for CSDP Justice Missions (within the Rule of Law framework) (18173/10), the EU already has a long experience of cooperation and coordination with the UN, AU, OSCE and NATO. Close co-ordination and co-operation with other International Community actors is crucial in order to avoid overlapping and ensure coherence of efforts between all actors/donors.[115] Thus coordination mechanisms may be established within the area of responsibility.

The comprehensive Concept for Police Substitution Missions (8655/5/02) has a chapter dedicated to cooperation with other international organizations in which it states that 'the EU may carry out police substitution missions in cooperation with international organizations such as UN and OSCE. In such cases different (mission) functions could be assigned separately to the cooperating organization'.

In accordance with decisions taken in Göteborg, the EU can provide a whole component (e.g. police) in operation under the overall lead of other international organization. Comprehensive concept for ESDP Police Strengthening Missions (15031/09) also recognizes the importance of coordination and working with other international organizations in the area of the mission. For that purpose the concept recommends the setting up of coordinating mechanisms (e.g. steering committee) and deployment of liaison officers from EU mission

111 Emma J. Stewart Restoring EU–OSCE Cooperation for Pan European Conflict Prevention, Contemporary Security Policy, 29:2 (2008): 266-284, DOI:10.1080/13523260802284126

112 Dimitar Paunov. "Assessing the Success of EU-OSCE Co-operation: A Case of Mutualism?" In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014 (Baden-Baden 2015):339-352.

113 Ibid.

114 Emma J. Stewart Restoring EU–OSCE Cooperation for Pan European Conflict Prevention, Contemporary Security Policy, 29:2 (2008): 266-284, DOI:10.1080/13523260802284126

115 It is noted that in the majority of cases, CSDP justice missions will be combined with other CSDP tools and other EU instruments, member states activities as well as with other international organisations.

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to other relevant international organizations (and host country institutions) in order to reinforce cooperation and coordination, consequently raising the level of interoperability of actions and projects while avoiding duplications.

The analysis of the gathered information from IECEU case studies indicates to some good examples of cooperation with international partners while also addressing some persistent challenges. While the cooperation between civilian CSDP missions and deployments/representations of other international organizations were in general assessed as relatively positive, certain cases indicate that further improvements are possible.

For example, the case study EUPOL Afghanistan suggested that 'there is no clear division of labour within Afghan SSR'.[116]It was considered that the international community "*works in silos*"[117], which can lead to duplications of project and initiatives or contradictions, the finding that was shared also by interviewees at some other missions (e.g. EUPOL COPPS, EULEX Kosovo).

The reviewed civilian CSDP missions cooperate on the ground with wide array of international actors, ranging from major international organizations to smaller NGO's and other actors. An interesting comment that was shared by some case studies is that successfulness of coordination efforts on the ground was often much more dependent on personalities and personal contacts then on formal structures (e.g. referred to in certain interviews at EUPOL COPPS and EULEX Kosovo).[118] The case studies were able to identify some examples of good practices of cooperation. For example, EUPOL COPPS developed a Code of Conduct for the PCP through the joint program with UNDP in 2012-2014. This is a good practice on how two organizations can cooperate by bringing together their respective strengths. The UNDP and EUPOL COPPS have a Memorandum of Understanding highlighting the areas of cooperation, and both organisations perceive each other as main partners. [119] Another positive example was identified through the study of EUBAM Libya where the mission together with the United Nations planned and organized joint training trips with the UN.[120]

There are several mechanisms in the field to foster closer cooperation and coordination. EUPOL COPPS for example has a Technical Advisor role in two working groups (working groups on justice and security) at Local Development Forum (LDF) which is part of aid coordination system Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC).[121]

EULEX Kosovo established a mostly well working cooperation and coordination with other international actors (e.g. OSCE, UN, and NATO KFOR). Its cooperation with KFOR can be assessed as mostly working civ-mil relations based on the Joint operation procedures developed in cooperation with both organizations. While certain challenges in communications were identified when it comes to rapid response and authority and responsibility over Kosovo counterparts in situations where both police and military units are

116 Interview (A8) with Senior Mission Member EUPOL Afghanistan, June 2016 in D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan.

117 Interview (A1) with EUPOL Mission member, Afghanistan, June 2016 in D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan.

118 D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan; D2.3 Study report of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

119 "UNDP/EUPOL COPPS Joint Programme: Strengthening Police Accountability, Anti-Corruption and Civilian Oversight, independent evaluation report." Accessed on 1 July 2016. https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/evaluations/detail/7143,; in D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan.

120 Interview (P8) EUBAM Libya staff member, 29 March 2016, in D3.5 The Study of South Sudan, CAR and Libya.

121 D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan.

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necessary,[122] the overall cooperation was assessed as mostly positive, reinforced also through the deployment of liaison officers.[123]

EUAVSEC South Sudan tried to ensure coordination and cooperation with other international actors through regular meetings and training sessions. While some challenges in relations between EU and UN were noted on political and strategic level (e.g. The proposal to build the headquarters of EUAVSEC within the UN compound close to Juba International Airport did not work out which lead to EUAVSEC having to rent a hotel) nevertheless the cooperation on the ground was assessed as positive (e.g. UNMISS offered logistical support, provided when necessary its aircrafts for air-shuttling, etc.).[124]

## 2.7 Review Systems

In the context of reviewing civilian crisis management missions, interoperability can be thought of referring to the co-operation and collaboration in reporting and reviewing missions as well as to the way lessons from these processes are shared and implemented. As such, participation and contribution to reporting and review processes are central for analysis of interoperability in review systems.

The review and lessons learned processes related to civilian CSDP have developed significantly in the 2000s as EU-led missions have grown in size and scope. During the initial years of EU CSDP, review and lessons learned standards were modelled after existing examples from the military and other international organizations, particularly OSCE and the UN[125]. The first EU review processes were outlined in the Comprehensive Concept for Missions in the Field of Rule of Law in Crisis Management[126], and have since developed. In 2008 the practices were formalized, with the Guidelines for identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian ESDP missions[127], instituting the current review system.

There is potential for the development of informal practices of reporting and review including discussions, cooperation within individual projects etc. These informal practices can allow for more flexible responses that are more mission specific and efficient[128]. Enhancing these informal practices is, however, difficult, as the practices are ad hoc and dependant on the individuals

The core material for reviewing civilian crisis management missions come from their formal reporting practices. On the field-level, civilian CSDP missions report to the CPCC in three time intervals, all of which contribute towards lessons learnt[129]:

122 EULEX Kosovo serves as a second responder while KFOR is third responder.

123 Interview (no. 6) with KFOR official, 7 March, 2016 and Interview (no. 20) with EULEX official, 8 March, 2016, in D2.3 Study report of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

124 Interview (no. 10) with Senior Official UNMISS, 12 April 2016; Interview (no. 12) [Skype] with Senior EUAVSEC Official, 5 May 2016 Interview (no. 15) [Telephone] with Senior EUAVSEC Official, 6 June 2016, in D3.5 The Study of South Sudan, CAR and Libya.

125 European Parliament. 2012. CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons Learned Processes. Brussels

126 Council Document 14513/02.

127 Council Document 15897/08.

128 European Parliament. 2012. CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons Learned Processes. Brussels.

129 Yves de Kermabon. 2014. Crisis Management Procedures. In Handbook for Decision Makers. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union ed. Jochen Rehrl. Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria: Vienna.

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- The shortest of these are the weekly operational summaries, consisting of a compilation of mission activities and major political and security developments. These are sent from all the missions every Friday and are compiled for the member states on Mondays.
- More analytical monthly reports are sent by the 5th working day of the month, focusing on progress in the current Mission Implementation Plan (MIP).
- Finally, the most important report is the six-monthly report, which focuses on assessing the implementation of the missions mandate against its MIP.

This last one is the most in-depth of the three reports and includes a review and possible changes to the missions' current MIP, its contributors and indicators, through a strategic review process. The report also includes a section on lessons learned, contributing directly to the broad CSDP lessons learned process. The six-monthly report is presented to the member states by the head of mission personally in the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM).

The reporting practices of CSDP missions are strictly internal and as such do not include external contributors, although the reporting can include material from outside of the mission. Within the missions, all departments, units and offices typically take part in contributing material to the reports on MIPs they are charged with, or contributing to. In addition to this reporting practice, missions can also conduct internal assessments, which do not have a set form, falling more to the informal category[130]. Notably, there is no specific guidance on format or structure to the way missions include lessons identified in their reporting, leaving decisions on this to the missions and their heads[131].

To facilitate gathering lessons from missions, a Civilian Lessons Management Application (CiLMA) has been in development, based on the military ELMA-system for lessons learned processes.[132] Due to the systems cumbersome nature and lack of access by mission personnel, it has been left unused for the most part, forcing the use of ad hoc measures in gathering identified lessons[133].

The main civilian CSDP review is conducted in a yearly cycle. On the HQ-level, the formal review systems in CSDP are standardized for the most part, with different CSDP structures focusing on particular areas of review. CMPD is tasked with gathering lessons from the political-strategic planning of civilian missions, while CPCC focuses on lessons on operational planning, conduct and support of the missions. Combined with lessons gathered by the EUMS from military operations, these lessons are discussed in a two-level CSDP Lessons Management Group, composed of the heads of EU bodies relevant to developing best practices. As a subsidiary body, a Lessons Working Group consists of experts from these bodies, tasked with discussing the details of lessons and producing joint recommendations[134].

The results of the yearly lessons learned processes are collected into a formal lessons learned report, submitted to the PSC in combination with input from EU delegations in the field. This report identifies five key lessons and includes specific recommendations on how to respond to these lessons. The PSC consults with its working groups on the report and in line with this advice endorses it, beginning the implementation of the recommendations.

130 Ibid.

131 Interview with an EEAS official, 28.11.2016.

132 Interview with a CSDP mission member. Email interview. 12.12.2016.

133 Interview with a EEAS official, 28.11.2016.

134 Giovanni Cremonini. 2015. Lessons learnt and best practices. In Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations ed. Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume. (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014).

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Although the lessons learned process is strictly intra-EU, participation in the process is broad, as it includes representatives from any EU body deemed a CSDP stakeholder as well as member states. Interoperability with external partners is complicated by limits of information sharing including the confidentiality or classification of documents and report related to it are confidential and classified[135].

According to a European parliament study in 2012, current issues in the review and lessons learned processes are not in gathering and analysing information, but sharing the lessons learned and acting on them[136]. The yearly lessons learned reports have consistently flagged similar areas for improvement, highlighting the lack of action on them. Other significant obstacles for the lessons learned process have been the double-hatting of staff working on review and the formats of reports, which do not always serve the interests of distributing lessons.

[135] European Parliament. 2012. CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons Learned Processes. Brussels.

[136] Ibid.

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# 3 Interoperability in the context of Military CSDP Operations

Attempts to move towards common defence have been part of the European project since its inception. The idea of a common defence policy for Europe dates back to 1948 when the UK, France, and the Benelux signed the Treaty of Brussels. Nevertheless, since then the development of the EU's defence capabilities has been dependent upon political will and the convergence of competing national interests among the EU member states, in particular the UK, France and Germany. Furthermore, despite the aspirations towards development of the European common peacekeeping capabilities expressed formally in 'Petersberg Tasks[137]' and adopted already in Maastricht Treaty in 1992, now almost 25 years later the EU member states are still lacking consensus on the European defence integration. The political disputes reflect to the planning and conduct of the CSDP military operations.

Two competing views have dominated the debate of the EU's defence related matters. The ideological split is between the proponents of a Carolingian Europe[138] and those of an Atlantic Europe. In the view of the Carolingians, Europe should fully develop its military sphere, with the aim of eventually being able to conduct the full range of military missions. Such a move requires the creation of structures found in sovereign states, including permanent military forces, as well as military academies and headquarters. The Atlantists argue that Europe already has its military organization in the form of NATO. Any military structure created outside of NATO would be a waste of resources while weaken a transatlantic link, which was the key of the victory in the Cold War. Some critics claim that NATO should lead all defence planning in Europe, ensuring that the U.S. will have the amount of influence relative to the level of resources it has committed to Europe.[139] The current discussion about creating an EU military headquarters (HQ), proposed by the 'Big Five' group of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Poland in 2011 but since then vetoed by Great Britain, is an example of the current debate.

The CSDP was on the agenda of the December 2013 European Council meeting when the heads of states discussed how to enhance defence capabilities, strengthen the defence industry and improve the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP. In 'Council Conclusions on Common Security and Defence Policy'[140] the member states outlined the direction for the future action as well as the areas where CSDP should be strengthened. In the conclusions the Council called for enhanced development of military capabilities across the member states and make them available for the EU. The Council encouraged also the member states to deliver key capabilities through cooperative projects and to make best use of the EU Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing[141] in their national defence planning processes, with the support of the European Defence Agency (EDA).[142] Furthermore, the Council called for further policy guidance to support

137 The Petersberg tasks formed an integral part of the then European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) - now Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) - and defined the spectrum of military actions/functions that the European Union can undertake in its crisis management operations. including humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping, and peace-making. Source: European Union External Action. 2016. Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy, 8 July, 2016.

138 Referring to Emperor Charlemagne who unified most of Europe during the IXth century.

139 See for example: Luke Coffey. 2013. EU Defense Integration: Undermining NATO, Transatlantic Relations, and Europe's Security, The Heritage Foundation – Leadership for America, no. 2806 | June 6, 2013, 1 -16.

140 Council Conclusions on CSDP, (8971/15), The Council of the European Union.

141 The objective of this Code of Conduct is to support cooperative efforts of EU member states to develop defence capabilities. The actions herein are aimed at mainstreaming Pooling & Sharing in Member States' planning and decision-making processes. They are to be implemented on a national and voluntary basis, in line with defence policies of member states. Source: European Defence Agency. 2016. 'Code of conduct on pooling & sharing', accessed 10 October 2016, at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/docs/news/code-of-conduct.pdf.

142 Ibid.

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systematic and long-term defence cooperation, focusing on closing identified capability gaps within CSDP, including by examining the idea of a strategic defence roadmap. These actions are central for the military interoperability both; in terms of EU wide defence capabilities and CSDP military engagement. Despite these aspirations outlined the Council's Conclusions only few attempts have been taken towards the practical implementation of the systematic cooperation, namely in relation to CSDP operations, and NATO still serves as a primary Defence cooperation platform for most of the EU member states.

Nevertheless, the Brexit as well as formulation of EU's Global Strategy seem to have created momentum for strengthening the Common Security and Defence Policy. The discussion on enhancing European own military capabilities are currently flourishing. Consequently, France, Germany, Italy and Spain have joined forces to plead for a common European defence policy. The discussion has comprised on how the 27 remaining governments would share assets and deepen cooperation in EU missions. However, the plan is not to establish a European army nor challenge NATO, yet rather to fulfill the 'gaps' in relation to external actions. The ministers of the countries seek to strengthen the EU's ability to respond autonomously to external threats without a help from United States, underlying the potential need for the EU to launch a mission in regions where NATO does not consider taking action.

Despite these political aspirations what really matters is the practical implementation of the defence cooperation and capability development. As a result, although collectively, Europe is the world's second largest military spender but it is far from being the second largest military power – a clear consequence of inefficiency in spending and a lack of interoperability.[143] For the CSDP and Peace Support operations', interoperability is a key ingredient for the effectiveness of the joint actions at the HQ and field level, and hence requires closer attention.

In order to gain a better picture of the state of play of the military interoperability within CSDP in this chapter we will discuss how the EU has sought to enhance the interoperability within the CSDP military capabilities; to what extend NATO Standard Agreements (STANAGs) are/can be implemented in the CSDP framework, and what are the areas where the effectiveness of the CSDP military activities could benefit from enhanced interoperability. The studies generated as part of WP 1- WP 3 are used as the reference material for the analysis of the HQ and field level interoperability considerations.

### 3.1.1 NATO and implications for CSDP

Since its inception in 2003, the EU-NATO partnership has evolved over the years. The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty that introduced peace and security as one of the EU's foreign policy objectives changed the attitude of the United States to the EU's common security and defence. The return of France to NATO's military structures, as well as the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), a permanent counterpart to the NATO International Staff, has all also contributed to this evolution.

In terms of capability development, since 2003 EU and NATO have sought to address common capability shortfalls and to ensure the coherence and mutual reinforcement of NATO and EU capability development efforts.[144] Although the EU and NATO are organizations with different mandates, memberships and toolboxes of instruments, they promote the same principles and values – the commitment to freedom and

[143] European Political Strategy Centre. 2015. In Defence of Europe Defence Integration as a Response to Europe's Strategic Moment, EPSC Strategic Notes, Issue 4/2015, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/strategic-notes/defence-europe_en.

[144] Oliver Đajić. 2015. 'The state of play of the EU – NATO partnership.' European Leadership Network, published 28 August 2015, accessed at: http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/the-state-of-play-of-the-eunato-partnership_3076.html.

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democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Hence, the main difference between the NATO and EU crisis management is rather political than technical and division of labor between EU and NATO has reflected to the development of the EU's military capabilities.

In the beginning of the 21st Century the pre-condition for developing the EU's own military crisis management capabilities was that it would not weaken NATO. Additionally, the Berlin Plus agreement signed in 2001 decreased the need to continue the development of EU's independent military capabilities. Maintaining NATO as the major international military player was in the interest of EU member states that were also a part of the Allies, as well as of the United States, who wanted to ensure that it would have a strong voice on European Security issues. Consequently, in order to avoid competition between the institutions both of the organizations has focused rather on their strengths. Whereas NATO is better capable of threatening and projecting force the European Union is more into the humanitarian, civil-economic, crisis prevention, and post-conflict stabilization - also referred as 'soft security'. All in all, this division of labor has been at the heart of cooperation in the Western Balkans. Whereas the EU seems to concentrate it's planning on peacekeeping, humanitarian relief and post-conflict stabilization, NATO has followed the impetus of the United States, shifting its attention to operations involving quick deployment, high-intensity combat, with the threats envisaged generally being international terrorism and a weapon of mass destruction (WMD).[145]

These fundamental differences have had some implications to the development of the interoperability requirements within these organisations. For example, unlike NATO or traditional nation states, the EU does not have a formal military doctrine[146] and there is no jointly agreed framework under which countries contributing to the CSDP operations shall ensure their technical interoperability. Furthermore, it seems that EU has largely avoided separate interoperability standards that would replace those of NATO due to constrain amongst several member states. NATO member states and Partners have ratified (with some national restrictions) the NATO standards and directives into their national military structures, procedures and practises.[147] The national implementation can cover the technical, tactical and procedural perspective, training and education, and command and control structures. Hence, the implications of the NATO STANGAs and directives can be deducted from the national research and development initiatives, acquisition, military strategy, doctrine, tactics, training, and combined exercises.[148] Therefore, there has not been need or space for the development of the EU specific military standards for the member states.

Consequently, within the EU the interoperability related discussion has mainly circulated around civil-military cooperation and coordination rather than military-military aspect. In order to ensure some degree of interoperability the EU has established procedures[149] for international crisis management, which comprehends the whole mission cycle for both - civilian and military crisis management missions. Although, this civilian aspect and thereby EU's Comprehensive Approach is the EU's competitive advantage in comparison to other institutions, the military interoperability cannot be completely neglected.

145 Martin Reichard. 2016. The EU-NATO Relationship: A Legal and Political Perspective. (New York, Routledge: 2006).

146 Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. AAP-6(2016) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

147 Interview no. 3.

148 Ibid.

149 The new crisis management procedures were adapted in 2014. The revision process of crisis management procedures in the EU was stimulated by the contemporary reflection on lessons learned from the 24 CSDP missions and operations conducted by the EU over the last 10 years and is driven by three main purposes: (1) to enable a comprehensive approach to crisis management; (2) to align civilian and military planning process; and (3) to rebalance responsibilities between EU institutions, notably by the EEAS and member states. Nicoletta Pirozzi. 2013. 'The EU's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management', EU Crisis Management Papers Series, DCAF Brussels, (2013), 13.

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Having that said, promoting coherence between the EU and NATO capabilities can also be seen to be one way how the EU seeks to ensure the interoperability of its multinational military forces. In relation to military capability development, the EDA aims to support the Council and the member states in their effort to improve the Union's defence capabilities in the field of crisis management. EDA acts as a catalyst, promotes collaborations, launches new initiatives and introduces solutions to improve unions' defence capabilities. Pooling and Sharing (P&S) initiative is one tool how EDA seeks to enhance interoperability and deployability of member states' capabilities. The P&S aims at making more capabilities available for member states to deploy for EU, NATO, multinational or national purposes. Well-developed national capabilities along with established interoperability and avoidance of duplications are expected to result in CSDP missions' success.

EDA's P&S concept echo's NATO's concept of smart defence[150] which is a cooperative way of thinking about generating the modern defence capabilities that the Alliance needs for the future. Although one can suspect a potential for competition between the EU and NATO in relation to military capability development, there seems to be an implicit understanding between NATO and the EDA that advancing defense capabilities. On contrary, the EU and NATO seeks to build 'close and mutually reinforcing co-operation in areas of shared interest in crisis management as well as on military capability development where requirements overlap, and continue to seek further synergies and complementarity'. [151] For example, to address the mutual helicopter availability problems the two organisations are harmonising their work with member states by developing additional airlift capabilities for future missions. Hence, the EDA doesn't seek to reinvent the wheel if the Alliance has applicable military standards and concepts that are transferable. Instead of implementing its own standardization and harmonization process, the EU tries to find a balance between the collaboration with NATO and capability to act autonomously when needed. [152]

### 3.1.2 Relevance of interoperability in operations

A broad interoperability concept was introduced in the EU Headline goal 2010, which defines it as 'the ability of armed forces to operate together and act in conjunction with other civilian instruments.' Although, the NATO and EU generated capability initiatives had similar starting points and remain interlinked, NATO's Allied Command Transformation (ACT) process, initiated at the 2002 Prague Summit, is committed to a US transformation model that indiscriminately imposes the same set of standards on every Member State.[153]

The EU has been more open to diversifying tasks between the member states, and looking into ways to reform systems and procedures for defence acquisitions and production. As the process has moved along, a clearer understanding of the kind of tasks that the EU member states are expected to carry out under the CSDP has also emerged, although this remains subject to continuous political controversy.

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150 Smart Defence is a cooperative way of generating modern defence capabilities that the Alliance needs, in a more cost-efficient, effective and coherent manner. Allies are encouraged to work together to develop, acquire, operate and maintain military capabilities to undertake the Alliance's core tasks. Projects cover a wide range of efforts addressing the most critical capability requirements such as precision-guided munitions, cyber defence, ballistic missile defence, and Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance to name a few. Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2015. 'Smart Defence', last modified 1 September 2015, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm.

151 Council Conclusions on CSDP, (8971/15)

152 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. NATO and the European Defence Agency - not a zero-sum game. NATO Review. Accessed 12 October 2016, at: http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2010/lisbon-summit/NATO-EDA/EN/index.htm.

153 Per M. Norheim-Martinsen. 2012. The European Union and Military Force: Governance and Strategy, (Campridge University Press, 2012), 108.

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Initially, NATO's policies, funding guidance, doctrine and planning process were created to fight the Soviets with little thought or intent to deploying anywhere. The primary goal was to defend Europe from Soviet aggression onto NATO member territory. However, what started as a strong political action with nuclear-capable forces to stop the Communist advancement across the European States has now grown into an Alliance, complete with operational headquarters and dedicated forces standing by to respond rapidly in response to world crisis or political aims.

As a result, today NATO has 28 members, and 22[154] of the countries are also members of the European Union. In addition, 22 countries are in the NATO's Partnership of Peace Programme[155] extending NATO's influence to almost 50 country's forces.

Due to the shift of focus from territorial defence to multinational expeditionary missions and the challenges encountered executing them has highlighted the role of interoperability. Even after many years of emphasizing interoperability and NATO STANAGs to foster it, recent missions (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya) have shown the limits of interoperability.

When studying the applicability of the NATO STANAGs to CSDP operations, it is also worth knowing the interoperability challenges that the NATO has faced while implementing its multinational peace support operations. Those include information sharing, language skills of the staff, command and control, force capability and readiness to act as a part of multinational force.[156] The case studies carried out during the IECEU-project have also projected many of the same challenges. These challenges will be further discussed in the chapter 3.4.

The key strategic- level challenges are often related to the access restrictions, changing political objectives, Command and Control (C2), decision-making capabilities, as well as the force structure requirements.[157] The disparities in technological capabilities, sovereignty concerns, differing national interests, cuts in defence spending are political in nature and can only be resolved by politicians at the strategic level. There are limits to what extend the nations are willing to trust another. These limits constrain openness and system interdependencies (i.e. intelligence, communications) which in turn affect interoperability.[158] Nevertheless, these challenges tend to reverberate throughout the operational and tactical levels. Furthermore, when political motives are misaligned, no amount of interoperability, technological or otherwise, can mitigate the problem.

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154 Of the six EU member states that are not member of NATO, five (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Malta and Sweden) are countries which have adopted a strict position of neutrality when it comes to armed conflicts.

155 The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic partner countries and NATO. It allows partners to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. Partner countries choose individual activities according to their ambitions and abilities. These are put forward to NATO in what is called a Presentation Document. An Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme is then jointly developed and agreed between NATO and each partner country. These two-year programmes are drawn up from an extensive menu of activities, according to each country's specific interests and needs. Following implementation of the decisions taken at the Lisbon Summit, all partners will have access to the new Partnership and Cooperation Menu, which comprises some 1,600 activities. Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. 'Partnership for Peace programme', last modified 7 April, 2016, accessed at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm.

156 Interview no. 3.

157 See for example; Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, Daniell M. Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin M. O'Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, Lewis Jamison. 2000. Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations- A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations. (RAND Project Airforce, 2000), 17-19.

158 Ibid.

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Operational level interoperability challenges are often related to force planning, C2, and battle management namely in terms of information exchange and security issues. In addition, some nations are likely to continue to maintain direct national control of their national assets rather than contribute them to a larger, shared pool under direct control of the Peace Support Operation Commander. These challenges concern commanders and political leaders who may face challenges in balancing each nation's political needs against the military requirements of the operation. This is particularly important when political guidance changes in the course of an operation. Such tensions can complicate both C2 (the vertical dimension) and coordination (the horizontal dimension).[159]

The tactical- level interoperability challenges relate often to performance capabilities referring to the capability of the humans and technology to operate as intended. They may include challenges related to logistics, information sharing; command, control and communication (C3); Doctrinal differences, and resource gaps[160]. Furthermore, sharing of the information in the field is seen to be challenging as a result of over classification of information. Also change or hand-over of information between the troop rotations and shift changes hampers the interoperability.[161] In relation to the resource gaps there is a need to enhance capability development in the area of so called niche capabilities'. These include the following capabilities[162]:

(1) Appropriate medical units for crisis management/response;
(2) Company-level engineering units for crisis management/response, in particular a horizontal construction capability;
(3) Medical and Medevac capabilities;
(4) EOD and Counter-IED;
(5) Special Operations Forces;
(6) Info Ops/Strategic Communications;
(7) Deepened geospatial interoperability.[163]

All in all, in a multinational environment, the same factors that determine how forces operate can determine their interoperability shortfalls. Tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), National interpretations of rules of engagement (ROE), National customs, Culture, understanding of tasks and expectations, including in the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements, equivalent to the EU's Statement of Requirements (SoR), are all affecting on the interoperability of the multinational force in the peace support operations.

As mentioned above in this chapter, the multinational European force shares lots of similarities with the NATO. Based on the studies conducted on EUFOR Althea and EUFOR RCA, many of the interoperability challenges outlined above are the same. Teaching the doctrine and procedures used by one organisation,

159 See for example; Ibid; NATO, Partnerships and cooperative security committee (PCSC) in interoperability platform - staff mapping study on how NATO interoperability tools help partners contribute to international crisis management. AC/340-N(2016)0010, 29 January 2016.

160 James Derleth. 2013. Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations. NATO Review, published 25 September 2013, available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm.

161 Interview no. 3.

162 NATO, Partnerships and cooperative security committee (PCSC) in interoperability platform, 2016.

163 Geospatial Interoperability is the ability for two different software systems to interact with geospatial information. Interoperability between heterogeneous computer systems is essential to providing geospatial data, maps, cartographic and decision support services, and analytical functions. Geospatial interoperability is dependent on voluntary, consensus-based standards. These geospatial standards are essential to advancing data access and collaborations in crisis management, natural hazards, weather and climate, exploration, and global earth observation. Source: Mapping European Seabed Habitats. 2005. 'Geospatial interoperability', accessed 15 October 2016, at: http://www.emodnet-seabedhabitats.eu/default.aspx?page=1897.

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whether it is EU, NATO, can improve initial understanding and help ease the interoperability challenges when working as part of a multinational force. The troop contributing countries play the key role in the implementation process, and the EU and NATO need to ensure that the procedures and concepts employed by each organization do not contradict, or cause incoherence within the member states.

### 3.1.3 Use of NATO Stanags to enhance CSDP operations interoperability

The interoperability in at the heart of a debate over the viability and relevance of the NATO Alliance is a new security environment. According to ACT 'interoperable solutions can only be achieved through the effective employment of standardization, training, exercises, lessons learned, demonstrations, tests and trials'[164].

To mitigate the interoperability related challenges within its Peace Support Operations, NATO has enacted the 'Connected Forces Initiative' (CFI). The goal of the CFI is to increase readiness and combat effectiveness by improving interoperability through expanded education and training, increased exercises, and better use of technology. The purpose is to ensure NATO formations can communicate, train, and operate together effectively.[165] Furthermore, the NATO has a number of tools and programmes designed to enhance the interoperability between the Allies and its partners. For example Planning and Review Process (PARP) and Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC) Evaluation and Feedback (E&F) mechanism are considered as the most effective partnership tools for developing interoperable capabilities, in particular with regard to crisis management capabilities.[166] In addition, NATO's Lessons Learned (LL) Process is a fundamental pillar of the interoperability enhancement (it is discussed in heading 3.7).

NATO doctrine establishes the fundamentals and guidance for employing NATO assets to achieve strategic aims. In regards to the peace support activities Directive for Allied joint doctrine for the military contribution to peace support (AJP-3.4.1) serves as an overarching framework within NATO, with Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, and with other nations and organisations. It is a framework, reflecting shared beliefs and experiences as a way to enhance the success of the Peace Support Operations. The directive provides insight and guidance for commanders when planning for and conducting peace support. According to the directive, the impartial implementation of a political strategy is the fundamental difference separating peace support from other types of operational-level themes. Closest to this directive would be 'European Union Concept for EU-led Military Operations and Missions' (17107/14) which gives the military commanders, military staffs, EU civilian staffs, external actors etc., an overarching conceptual framework for EU-led Military Operations and Missions.

In addition, to support the interoperability of the processes, technical and humans, NATO seeks to standardize its activities and capabilities. Standardization Agreements (STANAG) defines processes, procedures, terms, and conditions for common military or technical procedures or equipment between the member countries of the alliance. Each NATO state ratifies a STANAG and implements it within its own military. The purpose is to provide common operational and administrative procedures and logistics, so one member nation's military may use the stores and support of another member's military. STANAGs also form

[164] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2012. Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces, last updated 11 May 2012, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/topics_84112.htm?selectedLocale=en.

[165] James Derleth. 2013. Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations, NATO Review, published 25 September, 2013, available at: http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm.

[166] NATO, Partnerships and cooperative security committee (PCSC) in interoperability platform, 2016.

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the basis for technical interoperability between a wide variety of Communication and Information Systems (CIS) essential for NATO and Allied operations.

Since 22 member states are also NATO members, most of them share the same procedures, and have got used to operate as part of a multinational force in accordance to NATO standards. In order to avoid over standardization and harmonization of the member states defence capabilities it is in the interest in the both organizations to work in close cooperation. According to 'Staff mapping study on how NATO interoperability tools help partners contribute to international crisis management'[167] the partners perceived that participation in NATO tools and programmes has significantly contributed to partners' ability to take part not only in NATO-led operations but also in international crisis management efforts in the context of the UN, EU and coalitions. Indeed, NATO standards are generally the default interoperability standard applied in EU-led missions. Hence, the integration of NATO standards at the Member State's national level creates a system-wide effect increasing the countries' ability to operate alongside NATO or partner forces in the future crisis management operations. A number of partners highlighted how they use PARP to develop capabilities that have been used or deployed in the context of EU-led missions or battlegroups.

An example of the benefits for using NATO tools to enhance interoperability of the forces in EU operation was exemplified during the EUFOR RCA, where OCC-evaluated troops were deployed in EU-led operations in Central African Republic. Indeed, through participation in NATO's operations and NATO partnership interoperability tools, NATO and its partners form a unique community of practices and expertise on a range of issues that are central to effective crisis management. Partners already use the synergies inherent in this set-up to contribute more effectively even outside NATO contexts, hence affecting also to the CSDP operations.

**EU Military concepts**

Despite the primacy of the NATO in standardization of the member states' defence activities and capabilities, the EU has developed its own military concepts primarily in support of CSDP. These concepts are ought to be implemented in the planning and conduct of the CSDP military operations and missions. These concepts do not address the individual contributing states' national capabilities or procedures but rather provide guidance on how to structure and operate as part of CSDP military operation or mission. Consequently, they can be seen as complimentary to the NATO STANAGs and national procedures. These concepts can be divided into five categories;[168]

(1) **Military Concepts – Framework (MF):** This category includes capstone documents which are corresponding to the following criteria: provide the framework for and apply to the entire range of EU military actions. These could be described as parent documents and provide the foundation for other military concepts that are more specific.
(2) **Military Concepts – Operations (MO):** This category comprises of concepts that describe specific types of military activities, conducted under the EU flag, in relation to both civilian missions and military operations. These are related to and/ or complementary to Framework Military Concepts.
(3) **Military Concepts – Enabling (ME):** This category comprises of those concepts that describe different aspects of military actions or functions which are essential to enable military operations, thus demanding specific conceptual and capacity development. It encompasses a wide range of concepts which, normally, relate to Military concepts – Operations.

[167] Ibid.

[168] EU Military Concept Development Implementation Programme 2015-2016 (CDIP 15-16) (7422/15), Council of the European Union.

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(4) **SOPs & Guides (SG):** The work for this category is mainly conducted at EUMS Operations Directorate level.

(5) **Conceptual development at EEAS (CMPD) and EDA level (CD):** This category of concepts reflects the conceptual developments under the CSDP umbrella. These projects are conducted mainly at EEAS (CMPD) and EDA level, requiring support from the EUMS.

## 3.2 CSDP Operations Analysed

As in chapter 2, interoperability in military CSDP operations will be analysed by focusing on seven mission components: planning, staff, shared services and equipment, command systems & information sharing, third states participation in crisis management operations and review systems. Shared services and equipment will be discussed jointly in one heading, due to their closeness in the military domain. This chapter draws from the findings case studies of the IECEU-project and relies on other sources and additional research in order to provide a comprehensive analysis.

### 3.2.1 Planning

The Crisis Management Procedures describe the process of EU CSDP engagement in a crisis, and form the framework for planning CSDP missions and operations between the member states, the Commission and the EEAS. The Procedures outline key phases for planning, deployment and conduct of a CSDP mission/operation.[169] The overall process and the roles of different institutions in it is further discussed in D1.3 Review on civil-military synergies. One should bear in mind that the EU military planning is very much based on NATO standards. NATO is the reference and norm for the EU military functions.

Key documents in the military planning are:

- Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA)[170]
- Crisis Management Concept (CMC)
- Military Strategic Option (MSO)
- Initiating Military Directive (IMD)
- Concept of Operation (CONOPS)
- Statement of Forces Requirement[171] (SOR)
- Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
- Operation Plan (OPLAN)

The following phases can be distinguished at military level:

[169] Yves de Kermabon, " Crisis Management Procedures" in Handbook for decision makers- The common security and defence policy of the European Union, ed. Jochen Rehrl, (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014), 43 - 47.

[170] The political context – articulating what the crisis is – why the EU should act – EU's interests and objectives – what instruments are best suited to act.

[171] Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) – an agreement whereby the States parties to the agreement define in advance the rights and obligations, privileges, immunities and facilities which the forces and their members will enjoy when present on the territory(ies) of another State(s), party(ies) to the Agreement.

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**Phase 1: Reaction to crisis**

The EU follows the security related situation globally through Early Warning System[172] that analyses and connects relevant actors across the EU and member states in order to be able to respond to conflicts in a proactive and preventive manner. Based on the situation picture a conflict situation detected could trigger the development of an EU-wide document, articulating what the crisis is, and what could be the potential EU levers of power to address its root causes (as opposed to its symptoms), namely the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA). The relevant European External Action Service (EEAS) geographical desk, supported by all services and the respective EU delegation, is in charge of preparing a PFCA, which proposes a broad range of options available to the EU.

**Phase 2: Development of the Crisis Management Concept and establishment of the operation[173]**

Presented to the Political and Security Committee (PSC) for information purposes, this PFCA would support an orientation debate on the political willingness to utilize the CSDP lever of power, across the wider range of EU levers of power. Once the PSC has decided that action is appropriate the EEAS is tasked to frame the Crisis Management Concept (CMC). This starts the planning process.

The CMC depicts a CSDP political-strategic option of the CSDP military and the CSDP civilian instruments, précising inter alia the level of ambition (direct or indirect engagement, duration of the CSDP action, volume of personnel) and the synergies (supported-supporting relationship, synchronisation, military and civilian strategic objectives, synergies and lines of engagement).[174]

**Phase 3: Operation planning of the CSDP operation and decision to launch**

On the military side, the CMC would normally be translated into military direction and guidance through the development of a Military Strategic Option (MSO).[175] This MSO details the military strategic objectives related to the CSDP end-state as well as the military strategic effects, to be understood as the successive intended changes of the unacceptable conditions into acceptable ones. The military strategic tasks would flow from these military strategic effects. Hence, the MSO constitutes a key planning stage to match the political words and the military deeds.

In order to facilitate the development of MSO(s), member states and third countries give preliminary indications to the EUMS on their intention to contribute to a potential operation. This "force sensing' often results the lead nation and selection of the OHQ. The designated OHQ prepares the Provisional Statement Of Requirements (PSOR) which defines the means and resources that are needed in order to be able to fulfil the mission, as basis to the upcoming Force Generation and other capability requirements. The EUMC evaluates the prioritized MSO(s) and forwards them to the PSC. The PSC identifies the future military Operational Headquarters and future Operation Commander, on the recommendation of EUMC.

172 The instrument is further discussed in D1.1. Review: from short- term stabilization to long- term peacebuilding.

173 De Kermabon, Crisis Management Procedures, 43 - 47.

174 Francois-Regis Dabas. 2013. Turning Political Words into Military Deeds, in Magazine of the EU Military Staff, EEAS, Autumn /Winter 2013 Issue #16, 6-7, available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-military-staff/documents/eums_impetus_magazine_nov_13.pdf.

175 Developed and prioritized MSO(s) should include an assessment of feasibility and risk, a Command and Control (C2) structure including recommendations regarding an Operation Commander, an Operation Headquarters, a Force Commander, a Force Headquarters, force capability requirements and an indication of forces that might be made available by contributing states.

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The Council then adopts a Decision establishing the mission/operation. At this point the mission/ operation objectives and mandate are set out, Operation Commander (OpCdr) becomes active and an Operation Headquarter (OHQ) for the military operation is designated and OpCdr can start the Force Generation process involving member states and invite third states when applicable.[176]

Towards the Operation Commander, the Initiating Military Directive (IMD) translates the political guidance contained in the CMC and the MSO into military direction and guidance to commence the planning of the operation. Based on CMC and PSC tasking, the Military Operations Commander prepares a draft Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operational Plan (OPLAN) and presented to the PSC who receive advice from EUMC and CIVCOM, and subsequently for the Council, for approval.[177] While presenting the CONOPS and OPLAN to the PSC the OpCdr stands in a position to advise on the decision of launching the operation, based on the fulfilment of all key preconditions, such as the provision of required assets and means (finance, logistics, manpower, and equipment).[178]

The Council approves the OPLAN and the Rules of Engagement (ROE), designates the Force Commander (FCdr), the Force Headquarters (FHQ) and the Component Commands (CC), and decides to launch the operation once all preconditions are complete and, where appropriate, approves the Status of Forces Agreement[179] (SOFA). The Chairman of European Union Military Committee (CEUMC), supported by the Operation Commander (OpCdr), attends the Council meeting acting as the spokesman of the EUMC.

In order to maintain a level of flexibility and to enable a rapid deployment of a mission or operation, the above described process can be circumvented with the so called fast track process. The minimum decision-making process for the establishment of a mission or operation includes the approval of the CMC, developing the IMD (for a military operation), the adoption of the Council decision that establishes the mission/operation, and the approval of the OPLAN. [180]

**Phase 5: Deployment of the CSDP operation[181]**

Under the authority of the Council and High Representative, the Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises political control and strategic direction of the crisis management operation as well as supervises the implementation of all the measures taken and assesses their effect, recommending adjustments as necessary.

The European Union Military Committee (EUMC), supported by the European Union Military Staff monitors the proper execution of military operations, reports regularly to the PSC on the military implementation of the operation and provides, in co-ordination with the Operation Commander (OpCdr), information and assessments to the PSC. The OpCdr is responsible for the conduct of the military operation and reports to the EUMC on its progress.

176 Silva Lauffer and Johannes Hamacher eds. 2014. In Control – A practical guide for civilian experts working in crisis management missions, (Berlin: ENTRi, 2014),75-76.

177 Ibid 77.

178 European Union External Action. 2016. 'CSDP structure, instruments, and agencies,' last modified 8 July, 2016, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en,; Francois-Regis Dabas, 'Turning Political Words into Military Deeds', 6 -7.

179 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) – an agreement whereby the States parties to the agreement define in advance the rights and obligations, privileges, immunities and facilities which the forces and their members will enjoy when present on the territory(ies) of another State(s), party(ies) to the Agreement.

180 De Kermabon, "Crisis Management Procedures", 47.

181 Ibid. and Lauffer and Hamacher, In Control, 75 – 76.

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The EU OpCdr is a Commander nominated by the Council or the PSC to conduct a defined military operation and authorised to exercise operational command or operational control over assigned forces. Force Commander operates under the authorization of the OpCdr and is the key actor for the military operation at the Operational level in the area of operation including the on-site planning of the operation. The tactical level command and control and planning is exercised by the Component Commanders. They are responsible for planning and running of the individual missions authorized by the Force Commander.

**(6) Refocusing of the European Union action and termination of operations**

When a given CSDP action needs to be refocused, a strategic review can be triggered. This is conducted when the strategic context of the mission/operation changes, half way through the mandate, or when the mandate is nearing the end. In the light of the findings of the strategic review the HR proposes to the PSC a set of measures aimed at refocusing or finishing the EU action. The PSC agrees and forwards the measures to the Council. The Council decides, as appropriate, to refocus the EU action, including possible termination, or decides to launch any further action needed at this stage.

### 3.2.2 Staffing

**EU HQ Manning Guide** (297/116), which is currently under revision, provides the general principles and procedures for the designation, structure and composition of EU HQs, which apply generically at the military-strategic and operational level, and in some cases at the tactical level. As outlined in the document 'Manning' should be considered as distinct from the 'Force Generation process'. Consequently, there is a separate concept titled '**EU Concept for Force Generation**' (10690/08), which sets out the principles and procedures for the generation of military forces and capabilities for EU-led military operations. Hence, two distinct but inseparable elements are taken into consideration when discussing the human resources for CSDP military operations:

(1) **Staff at HQ-level:** Manning concept outlines the key principles and structure for the EU HQ including the Command and Control options, manning, planning, issuing directives, monitoring, evaluating and ensuring that the necessary corrective measures are implemented in line with political and military objectives. The commanders of both OHQ[182] and FHQ[183] are responsible for the manning of their HQ and will adopt a mission-tailored approach to meet the requirements of the operation. **Multinationalisation of the HQ is the overarching principle.** However, manning will be driven by functional requirements of the operation, rather than to facilitate the participation from member states. Nevertheless, wherever possible the EU HQ structure should allow for participation by all MS. The Manning concept includes reference to the HQ job descriptions, thereby providing basic guidance for the performance objectives for the HQ staff. Nevertheless, the commander has the key role in the manning of the HQ staff.

(2) **Staff at the field level:** In line with the Force Generation concept the troops or forces are recruited on the basis of the **Provisional Statement of Recruitments (PSOR)** set by the designated Operational Commander (OpCdr.) The SOR indicates the type and amount of forces required for the implementation of the military objectives. The member states commitments of assets and capabilities are the basis of the whole Force Generation process.

[182] OHQ options include; OHQs offered by member states (DE, EL, FR, IT and UK) or the EU OPSCEN or EU-led military operation with recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities, through the establishment of an EU OHQ at SHAPE) .

[183] HQ at the area of operations.

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Ideally, the forces for an operation should be committed without caveats. Nevertheless, member states are ultimately responsible for the conditions upon which their committed forces are made available to the EU. Thereby, **there are no interoperability criteria for the forces, or for the individuals**. Furthermore, the individuals selected to participate to the operation is subject to the member states own recruitment procedures and requirements. Also, the member states transfer operational control (Transfer of Authority) in accordance with national restrictions and caveats, of their personnel, teams and units to the Force Commander.

#### 3.2.1.1 Staffing interoperability gaps

Based on the case studies conducted in the EUFOR Althea and EUFOR RCA the interoperability challenge related to the humans can be divided into two categories:

(1) Human resource gaps, and;

(2) National differences (doctrine, procedures and rules of engagement).

**'Human resource gaps'**

A considerable challenge lying behind the recruitment systems is that in recent years, member states have provided fewer personnel to CSDP operations. This is due to the financial constraints, engagements in the NATO peace support operations and capability gaps in member states' national defence forces, all impacting on their willingness to contribute to the CSDP operations. The tricky part is that the EU does not have its own standing force to be deployed to CSDP missions/operations and needs to rely essentially on seconded personnel from member states. Consequently, the final composition of the operation relies on their contributions.[184]

The force generation process follows a standard procedure and is directly related to the development of the CONOPS and the OPLAN. For a given operation or mission, the Operational Commander outlines his requirements in terms of equipment, manpower and resources. It is then passed to EU member states and, in some cases, third states.

While the Operational Commander is responsible for the Force Generation, the final decision on contributions is taken by national capitals. If the requirements are not fully met, yet the operation is to be deployed/ or remains on the ground, will that has implications to the interoperability.

For example, in the case of EUFOR Althea the operation suffers from the lack of Human Intelligence capabilities and lack of staff who knows local languages. Althea is lacking two battalions from its mandated capability, which significantly impacts on its ability fulfill its SASE mandate. In the case of EUFOR RCA, the EU faced considerable force generation challenges, and it took six force generation conferences before the minimum contributions were gathered. The second biggest contributor was a non-EU member states, Georgia, which highlight the issue related to the member states' reluctance to contribute capabilities to CSDP operations.[185]

[184] See for example D1.3 Civil-military synergies.

[185] See for example D.2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH

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**National differences (doctrine, procedures and rules of engagement)**

National caveat restrictions have a major impact on the interoperability of the multinational forces. Ideally, the troops would be deployed to the operation without national caveats in order to ensure their usability during the operation. These caveats can be numerous including among many, restrictions on the place of duty, length of deployment, and use of forces. For example in the EUFOR RCA, due to the caveats and unwillingness to share the intelligence the flow of information was not sufficient within the operation. This was reflected to all the levels of the operation from the strategic planning to liaison and training activities.

The individuals deployed to the military operations often do not meet the official requirements set in the PSOR or they have not been expressed there. For example in the case of EUFOR RCA, for the CIMIC officers, communication with the locals is an essential part of their duties. Nevertheless, having enough French speaking officers available has been a challenge, and thus many officers deployed to the Central African Republic do not speak French.

Although the official language within the EUFOR RCA was English, France being the framework nation, the operation was dominated by French, and thus the language barrier also reflected to the internal information sharing. Furthermore, due to the reluctance to send the best individuals to the EU operations – at least in the case EUFOR RCA and currently in EUFOR Althea, the contributing states tend to deploy inexperienced officers to perform duties that would require lots of professional experience and good interpersonal skills. At times, the deployed individuals are unmotivated which is also reflecting on their actions on the ground. [186]

Related to the human interoperability the issue of the frequent rotation of personnel is also a central concern. The staff officers' short duration of tours, usually six months or even less is a significant challenge in terms of institutional memory, building the local social networks, continuity and general effectiveness of the operation. Both vital information and liaison capabilities are lost due to the short rotations.[187]

The multinational aspect of the EU operations cause also some challenges for the interoperability of the operation. In terms of the culture, military is based on a hierarchical structure with a clear chain of command. The structures, terminology and procedures are more or less the same across the member states. The officers deployed to EU Operations have often gone through their national military training and, in principle, have knowledge of how to act as part of a multinational military operation. Nevertheless, the language barriers, doctrinal and cultural differences cause incoherence in the field. Among others, the national differences in administrative procedures are visible in terms of military discipline and punishment which are subject to the national legislation and principles. Having a several non-EU countries contributing on the CSDP operations have also create additional challenges in terms of interoperability. For example, in the case of EUFOR RCA, Georgia contributed 150 troops to the operation. The country is not an EU or NATO member, which placed some additional restrictions to the intelligence sharing within the operation.[188]

In conclusion, the fundamental challenges of human interoperability are related to the doctrinal differences[189] between the staff members, cultural differences, language barriers, national caveats, and gaps in human resources. All these elements have implications to the interoperability at the HQ and field level. NATO has sought to address these challenges listed above through joint training and education programmes, and the adoption of common terminology.

186 D2.5 Conclusion Report, 2016.

187 D2.4 Round-table discussion Report, 2016.

188 See for example D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya. 2016.

189 Military doctrine is what we believe about the best way to conduct military affairs

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For example, in order to overcome the major language barriers NATO has set out in STANAG 6001' Language proficiency levels', which defines language requirements for international staff appointments. English is NATO's common operational language; therefore, adequate English language skills are a prerequisite for personnel participating in operations and exercises and/or working in multinational NATO HQs. In order to ensure the language proficiency of the staff from partner countries NATO job descriptions also provide the language requirements for all Operational Capability Concept staff assigned to the NATO Command Structure. These language requirements could benefit also the CSDP operations.

#### 3.2.1.2 Training, education and exercises

Education and training of military staff, units and forces are predominantly national responsibilities, but applying a comprehensive approach to peace support requires coherent education and training beyond traditional national and military boundaries.

There are several aspects that help to lower these boundaries between the nationalities. First, the personnel deployed to operations are usually professional from national defence forces. Second, the officers participate in international exercises and trainings that are part of an officer's normal career. Three, protocol, procedures and terminology across the member states are more or less the same, potentially with some doctrinal differences.

Despite these aspects, crisis management operation related trainings, and namely the pre-deployment training is important for the coherence among the multinational force or HQ. Such a training does not only help the individuals to prepare to the upcoming operation in terms of the host culture, operation specific procedures or humanitarian law and gender aspect, but it can also be the key effort to enhance cooperation and coordination within the military staff, helping them to work together both at strategic and field levels.

One of the key challenges related to CSDP training is its incoherence. Some of the member states do not provide any pre-deployment training to their personnel, and some of the member states have established comprehensive training and education paths for the deployed personnel. In regards to the skills-related interoperability, absence of common pre-deployment training requirements has been identified to hamper the interoperability of the EUFOR Althea's troops, which is also reflected to the capacity building activities of the BiH's armed forces (AFBiH).[190]

To address the incoherence the EU is currently revising its 'Training Concept in CSDP'. The EU Training Concept in CSDP dates back in 2004 and, with the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty, does not properly reflect the realities of the current environment. Another concept addressing the training aspect of the CSDP operations is EU HQ Training Guide (11506/093 30 Apr 2009). In addition, the EU has attempted to tackle the challenge of fragmented trainings by obligating the missions to conduct induction training for the operation staff. Nevertheless, these trainings only provide an introduction to the host country and general CSDP matters, and thus do not overcome the issue of uniform training. Furthermore, the quality of mission induction training varies as widely as do the member state commitments to pre-deployment training. This is a pity, since a common foundation of pre-deployment training can enhance operation effectiveness and coherence by ensuring that operation personnel have a solid understanding of the operational environment and standard operating procedures when serving as a part of a CSDP operation.

Nevertheless, some good practises from CSDP related trainings can be identified. For example, in the EUFOR Althea, the officers deployed in "key positions" in HQ EUFOR have approximately one week Key Leader Training in Bosnia & Herzegovina. The training has enabled the people to get to know one another

[190] D2.5 Conclusion Report. 2016.

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while being assimilated to the operation context. In addition, EDA has also played a part in terms of CSDP related training. The agency, for example, conducted cyber awareness training event in Larissa Operational Headquarters for the EUFOR RCA.

Alongside training and education, for multinational military operation joint exercises prior and in-mission are also essential for the enhanced interoperability. Exercise Policy of the EU under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (ST 8909/14 14 Apr 2014) sets the basic framework for the joint exercises. An example of the EU crisis management exercise is the Multi-Layer Crisis Management Exercise, which tests the EU's capacity to react to an international crisis by utilizing its CSDP toolbox. The exercise provided a unique opportunity to EU to test and train its comprehensive approach in practise.[191]

**Training and education to NATO-led peace support operations**

Despite the limited CSDP operation related training, NATO's training and education standards have an important contribution to the EU-led operations. To many contributing nations NATO trainings serve as a preparatory training also for the CSDP operations.

Within NATO member states and its partners, education, training, exercises and evaluations are considered as the key elements for enhanced interoperability. STANAG 6023 provides the framework for the training and education standards within NATO-led peace support operations.

The aim of the STANAG is to enhance interoperability and operational effectiveness by ensuring a common training standard and therefore a common knowledge about tactics, techniques and procedures. The STANAG also aims to ensure a common base for combined operation, and to reduce fractions in multinational headquarters and duplication of effort among NATO nations and operational partners in peace support operations.[192] To ensure the implementation of the standards the participating nations have agreed to ratify them into their national training systems with some national restrictions.

Alongside STANAG 6023, AJP-3.4.1193 outlines principles related to education, training and exercises. In accordance to the document, NATO calls the contributing states to address the following aspects during the training for the enhanced interoperability in Peace support operations:

> *Special attention should be paid to the required shift in mind set for individuals trained for combat to operate within an environment in which the use of force is more restrained. Forces should be trained not only to a common basic level of military skills but also in peace support tactics, techniques and procedures.*

**NATO Training Architecture**

NATO has a multinational military education and training architecture combined by its own courses and training tools, which are designed to serve it members and partners to develop capabilities and competencies used in international crisis management. The drivers for all NATO's education and training efforts come from the operational requirements defined in NATO's strategic documents, and global

191 European Union External Action. 2016. 'Launch of the 3rd EU Multi-Layer Crisis Management Exercise', published 8 September 2016, accessed: https://eeas.europa.eu/node/9570_en.

192 STANAG 6023, Training and Education for peace support operations, edition 3. 2013.

193 NATO Standard, AJP-3.4.1 Allied Joint Doctrine for the military contribution to peace support, 2014.

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programming instigated by Allied Command Transformation (ACT). ACT aims to ensure cohesiveness throughout all education and training activities.[194] It was established in 2002 and it has created the opportunity to align education and individual training with collective training and exercises, while improving readiness and interoperability to crisis management operations. In theory, for the EU, ESDC would be echo to ACT, yet its scale, and way it functions differs greatly, and hence cannot fairly be compared to ACT.

NATO has extensive training and education architecture which comprises of education enhancement programme[195], NATO's education and training facilities[196], a wide range of NATO- related education and training institutions[197]; courses, seminars and workshops, and advice and expertise support functions. The NATO training architecture tries to draw together the efforts of its allies and partners in order to ensure the accuracy and effectiveness of the training and education. Ultimately, the training and education are seen to be the key tools to enhance interoperability within the crisis management community.

**Implications for CSDP training**

Although, the EU does not have its own military training structures nor extensive training and education support functions, the CSDP benefits from the NATO's training architecture. Since many of the aspects relevant to CSDP operations are also relevant to NATO-led peace support operations, all the opportunities where the potential contributing states are brought together to train, test and network can help to overcome some of the interoperability challenges in the field. The military staff can benefit greatly from the NATO-led trainings especially in terms of tactics and techniques. Especially, for the staff of Operation Althea, NATO specific training can help to liaise with the NATO counter partners at the HQ and field level. All in all, as the findings from the Operation Althea and EUFOR RCA indicates, joint trainings and exercises can help to increase the effectiveness and interoperability of the multinational forces and staff.

The general peace support exercises and pre-deployment trainings should be conducted at all levels, with a focus on multinational and multi-agency activities. However, the NATO training cannot solve the need for the CSDP operation specific pre-deployment training. There is a need to address the issues related to CSDP operations specific procedures and structures. Modules related to operation specific agencies, decision-making structures and the overall crisis context could enhance the overall interoperability of the staff.

To sum it up, the NATO training and education standards play an important role for the CSDP military staff interoperability. Since most of the participating nations are NATO members or belong to the Partnership for

194 ACT has a process in place to ensure that appropriate education and training is developed: starting from the requirements, consequent analyses identify and develop the most appropriate education and training solution for every discipline. Annual conferences then keep the disciplines aligned with the ever-evolving requirements, and guarantee responsive and flexible education and training cycles. Once the solutions are defined, delivery of courses, training and exercises is synchronised with all stakeholders. Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. 'Education and training', last modified 25 May, 2016, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49206.htm#.

195 Through the Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP), the Alliance advises partners on how to build, develop and reform educational institutions in the defence and military domain. DEEP provides a platform to connect experts to defence education institutions in countries that seek to become intellectually interoperable with NATO and to contribute to capacity building. Although the programme was set up to meet the requirements of partners, Allies can benefit from it too.

196 There are seven facilities; The NATO Defense College (NDC) in Rome, Italy; The NATO School in Oberammergau (NSO), Germany; The NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre (NMIOTC) in Souda Bay, Greece; The NATO Communications and Information Systems School (NCISS) in Latina, Italy; The Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) in Stavanger, Norway, The Joint Force Training Centre (JFTC) in Bydgoszcz, Poland; The Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) in Lisbon, Portuga.

197 Centres of Excellence, Partnership Training and Education Centres, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes.

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Peace programme, the personnel are, in principle, interoperable. Nevertheless, knowledge gaps in relation to the conflict, area of operations, social and cultural aspects of the host nation, key partners, and organisation specific structures and procedures cannot be filled with the NATO training and education standards. Hence, the military interoperability would benefit from the coherent and tailor-made training and education programs preparing individuals and units to EU-led operations.

## 3.3 Shared Services and Equipment

The complex financing rules governing crisis-management operations, deployed under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), affect the Union's ability to respond efficiently to crises. While civilian missions fall under the EU budget, the costs of military operations are borne by the participating states. Distinction is then made between expenses directly supported by the contributing member states and the 'common costs' of an operation, which are covered by the so-called Athena mechanism[198].

Common costs include headquarters, some transport costs, medical services and facilities, barracks and accommodation/infrastructure, and are estimated to account for between 10 and 15% of the total cost of an operation. This is hard to verify, because of the difficulty in determining the total costs of a military operation (i.e. all common costs and participating nations' expenses). In 2014, the Athena budget (for five military operations) was estimated at around €78 million. [199] Although it provides a permanent collective mechanism for burden-sharing, the impact of Athena has been assessed as limited: because member states bear the largest share of the costs, CSDP military operations remain dependent on their willingness to engage and to provide the necessary capabilities. Everything else, including the transport of forces to the theatre of operations and lodging remains costs for contributing states.

The fragmentation and complexity of the rules and mechanisms governing financing of CSDP missions and operations have hindered the functioning of CSDP, by preventing rapid reaction, failing to ensure sufficient funding for CSDP operations and representing a source of inter-institutional conflict. Moreover, in regards to the enhanced interoperability there is a need for the Athena mechanism to cover more of the common costs of military operations, including extending it to cover the deployment of the EU Battlegroups. EU Battlegroup has never been used. This is not just because of the military inadequacy of the concept. Above all else, this is a logical consequence of the way military operations are financed, namely on a "costs lie where they fall" basis. Rather than fostering European solidarity, this mechanism promotes an uneven distribution of costs which has led to operational 'paralysis'. The NATO Response Force[200] (NRF) - which is comparable to EU

198 In order to ensure some solidarity between participating and non-participating states, it was decided to finance some costs of military operations in common. Since March 2004, when it was established, the Athena financing mechanism funds certain common costs of EU military operations. The member states (except Denmark which has opted out of military CSDP activities) contribute to the mechanism, with an annual share based on their gross national income.

199 European Parliament. 2016. Financing of CSDP missions and operations, accessed 16 October 2016, at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2016/577958/EPRS_ATA(2016)577958_EN.pdf.

200 NATO Response Force is a highly ready and technologically advanced, multinational force made up of land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces (SOF) components that the Alliance can deploy quickly, wherever needed. In addition to its operational role, the NRF can be used for greater cooperation in education and training, increased exercises and better use of technology. Source: North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2016. 'NATO Response Force', last modified 23 June 2016, available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49755.htm. Following the 2002 NATO Prague Summit, NATO committed to the formation of a NATO Response Force (NRF) that could be utilized not only in support of Article V collective defense operations but also in non-Article V operations. This NRF may include forces from countries that are not part of the twenty-eight-nation NATO Alliance but are partners under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative. Source: Brad J. Eungard. 2010. Improving the agility of the NATO Response

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Battlegroup, is no different in this regard, and this lack of dedicated multinational funding limits also the agility of the NRF.[201] According to the analysts a different funding system could benefit the Battlegroups, which are currently suffering from an inconvenient funding arrangement that completely differs from the UN financing system.[202] Higher contributions through the ATHENA mechanism or through the EU common budget could be considered to increase member states' willingness to invest in such a project, [203] which would then also have implications to the interoperability of the EU Forces.

The inflexible funding system has also implications to the technical interoperability of the CSDP operations. For example in EUFOR RCA, the lack of common equipment limited considerably the activities of the different units, and huge differences in equipment levels between national contingents were reported. While some had everything they needed, others faced a lack of equipment that hindered soldiers' capacity to do their job efficiently. The NATO STANAGs defines processes, procedures, terms, and conditions for common military or technical procedures or equipment among the Troop Contributing Nations, although each country largely relies on its national support element. Consequently, both in the NATO and EU operations the national platoons are heavily dependent on home support in terms of equipping and maintenance. In the absence of the common funding mechanism, if the home country does not provide appropriate equipment to execute the tasks required during the operation, a considerable security and efficiency problem results for the whole operation.[204]

Examples of technical interoperability deficiencies can be identified form the EUFOR Althea which have reduces its ability to cross-train and equip AFBiH. The equipment is poor, and the AFBiH does not have the resources to purchase new equipment. One contributing nation will train the AFBiH on one type of equipment based on nation-by-nation requirement. The problem is that AFBiH does not actually have the equipment they are trained on, since the equipment is collected and removed at the completion of the training. The lack of adequate equipment finally makes the training useless and leads to the waste of effort. On the other hand, the challenge with donated equipment is that there is often no maintenance package to support it, which renders it obsolete in a short time.[205] Overall, the shortages of equipment have hampered the effectiveness of CSDP training missions. Examples abound of units lacking the most basic where- withal (uniforms, boots, etc.), let alone weapons. To address this shortfall the idea of providing equipment to partner countries and international organisations so as to enhance their own performance has been raised. However, some EU instruments include specific restrictions on the financing of military-related equipment or activities.[206] A key element of this debate is the distinction between lethal and non-lethal equipment. While the supply of non-

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Force (NRF), (Norfolk: Joint forces staff college, 2010.) Available at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a530256.pdf.

201 Thierry Tardy. 2013. Funding peace operations: Better value for EU money, Brief Issue no. 38 (2013), European Union Institute for Security Studies, , available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_38_Funding_peace_operations.pdf.

202 The UN has no military forces of its own, and member states provide, on a voluntary basis, the military and police personnel required for each peacekeeping operation. The UN also reimburses states for providing equipment, personnel and support services to military or police contingents. Source: United Nations Peacekeeping. 2016. 'Financing peacekeeping', accessed 16 October 2016, at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml.

203 See for example Anna Barcikowska. 2013. 'EU Battlegroups – ready to go?, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief Issue n°40, November( 2013).

204 D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

205 The Conclusion Report. 2016.

206 Thierry Tardy. 2015. Enabling partners to manage crises: From 'train and equip' to capacity-building, Brief Issue no. 18 (2015), European Union Institute for Security Studies, , available at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_18_Train_and_Equip.pdf

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lethal equipment is, under certain conditions, legally and practically possible, providing lethal equipment raises fierce opposition.

In European Commission's 'Joint staff working document- impact assessment Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (5.7.2016)', the issues of lack of comprehensive and flexible EU support to capacity building (especially training and equipment) of security actors, including the military, in third countries was addressed. Some CSDP missions have reported that the personnel they have trained cannot manoeuvre and operate in the field because of a lack of essential equipment. In particular, the transport, medical, command and control (communications and the operationalization of command and leadership) and logistic functions remain areas where equipment is deficient or non-existent in many countries where CSDP training missions are active.[207] CSDP missions and their budgets are not designed to provide equipment to security sector actors of partner countries; the expenditure for military operations to be financed pursuant to Article 41(2) TEU by the Athena mechanism, concerns expenditure arising out of the functioning and the equipment of the EU CSDP missions/operations. CSDP missions provide training to military and civilian security forces of third countries. However, due to how the Athena mechanism is designed today, they cannot provide the equipment and help ensure its sustainability for training purposes or to follow up on the operationalization of the defence units they have trained.

More flexible funding mechanism would also enable the implementation of the Quick Impact Projects (QIPs). As the examples from the CSDP operations have shown, allocating funds for short reconstructions projects, such as repairing buildings, roads, and networks, would have benefit both the forces" core activities and the confidence-building towards the local population. Now many of the QIPs are financed by the individual contributing states, hence affecting on their scale and implementation. It was suggested by interviewees that one option would be to include CIMIC affairs under the common fund financed by the Athena mechanism. Another would consist of increasing peace operations' access to the DEVCO budget: even if an operation's actions are motivated by force acceptability, CIMIC projects are not military ones and contribute to countries' development. Some kind of common funding is quite logical since CIMIC actions benefit the whole European force and the EU needs procedures that are compatible with short-term operations such as EUFOR RCA.[208]

## LOGISTICS

The success of CSDP operations is highly dependent on the capacity to generate, deploy, sustain and redeploy EU-led Forces. Adequate military logistics complemented and reinforced with civilian capabilities and resources are necessary to flexibly meet the broad range of operational requirements that CSDP operations may involve.

The EU Concept for Logistic Support to EU-led Military Operations (8641/11) establishes the overarching concept for logistic support for the entire spectrum of EU-led military operations. EU HQs and Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) have a collective responsibility for logistic support of EU-led military operations. As outlined in the concept, logistic resources should be used effectively and as efficiently as possible, mindful of the primacy of operational requirements. Hence, co-operation over all functions of Logistic Support among EU military Cdrs, member states, non-EU troop contributing nations and third states as well as other organizations is essential for an efficient/best use of limited resources. Thus, interoperability, co-operation and standardization of procedures build together across the member states' and partners' militaries forms basis for flexible and efficient use of logistic support thereby contributing to operational success.[209] According

[207] European Commission's 'Joint staff working document- impact assessment Capacity Building in support of Security and Development (5.7.2016), SWD(2016) 222 final, p. 13.

[208] The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

[209] EU Concept for Logistic Support to EU-led Military Operations (8641/11)

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to the concept, standardization of material, resources, services and procedures should be encouraged as far as possible, and NATO standards should be used by the member states concerned whenever appropriate.

In multinational operations, the responsibility for the provision of resources and for planning the support of national forces remains ultimately with the TCNs. TCNs retain full command over their own logistic forces, and the Transfer of Authority (TOA) arrangement specifies the command relationship of such forces to the OpCdr. Even though National Support Elements (NSEs)[210] come under the command of their own national authorities and are not part of the EU-led military force, they should cooperate with the FHQ. However, TCNs are ultimately responsible for obtaining transportation resources and for planning and coordinating the movement to deploy, sustain and redeploy their forces and other forces if applicable. In addition, contributing nations are ultimately responsible for the provision of Health and Medical Support to their forces involved in EU-led military operations or missions. Nevertheless, although logistic support to EU-led military operations is a national responsibility there is a requirement to coordinate and synchronize this function at the operational level.

Depending on the nature of the operation, all the available resources should be considered. The EU has multinational support arrangements such as multinational logistic organizations, Host Nation Support (HNS) and Contracting[211], which can help to reduce costs, eliminate duplication of logistic effort and improve the overall quality of support. Contracting has become an increasingly important tool to balance a lack of HNS and shortfalls in the military logistic support. Furthermore, supplies and services provided by Nations, where appropriate, may be augmented by HNS, contracting and/or by multinational co- ordinated provision as agreed among TCNs.

Due to the degree of flexibility that can be applied to the operations, different arrangements have been applied to CSDP operations. For example in the case of EUFOR RCA due to the lack of the Host Nation Support, the operation utilized the option of Contracting in the operation. The operation also relied on the resources of the other military operations such as the operation Sangaris. For example, Sangaris offered medical capabilities and a rapid-response force for EUFOR RCA, capabilities which could not be collected through National contributions. In addition, Germany offered strategic airlift capability for EUFOR RCA although it did not contribute troops. Furthermore, as previously discussed in heading 3.2, the access to NATO assets in EUFOR Althea is another practical example of the coordination and cooperation with the partners in order to achieve operational requirements in effective and resource efficient manner.

The interoperability challenges resulted from the numerous arrangements can have enormous impact on the operation. This has been evident especially in the naval operations. An example of such challenges is related to different navy ships. Whereas ships contributed by some countries can be refuelled at the sea, the ships contributed by other countries do not have this capability. The challenges also arise when the fuel provided by one party is not suitable for all the vehicle brought to the operation theatre. These are only some of the concrete examples of the challenges which may occur due to deviancies.

## EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY - ADDRESSING THE CAPABILITY SHORTFALLS

All in all, a key aspect regarding the financing of the EU and NATO operations is that neither of the organization have significant capabilities (personnel or equipment) of their own but they rely on the national capabilities of the member states. Common organizational capabilities are limited and consist primarily of

[210] NSEs assist the in-theatre logistic function in the withdrawal and recovery of EU-led military forces, equipment and supplies.

[211] EU Concept for Contractor Support to EU-led military operations (8628/14)

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assets, which cannot be reasonable charged to any individual member state. Within NATO in order to ensure both the availability and interoperability of these capabilities member states have agreed to capability targets on the organizational level, whereupon individual member states have made national commitments to develop personnel and equipment capabilities to meet these targets.

The Lisbon Treaty introduced the possibility for certain EU countries to strengthen their cooperation in military matters by creating Protocol on Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (Articles 42(6) and 46 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU)). It allows for groups of member states who are military able and politically willing to enhance their military capabilities including the ability to contribute to a Battlegroup.[212] The PSCD should encourage the member states to move from defence sovereignty towards pooled defence resources. EDA plays an important role in supporting the operationalization of the PSCD.[213]

Furthermore, the EU the Headline Goal 2010 and later Capability Development Plan (CDP)[214] is aimed at assisting the member states in their national defence planning and programmes. The CDP is an important element in a comprehensive capability development process, and it provides the basis of the EDA's capability-driven approach. The CDP provides an analysis of capability needs, capability trends and potential capability shortfalls as well as a database of national plans and priorities. It helps member states to develop their national capability plans and to identify and exploit areas of common interest. [215] These plans are based on the member states voluntary contributions, and hence some of the problems facing the EDA also relate to the issue of political will and particularly to two of the key divisions among the member states: defence sovereignty vs. pooled defence resources; Europeanist vs. Atlanticist approaches to security and defence.

Nevertheless, EDA has an important role in addressing the capability shortfalls of CSDP operations. The agency supports CSDP operations and missions to meet their operational needs by contracting commercial solutions to alleviate capability shortfall.[216] Based on the combination of industry knowledge, in-house technical expertise and experience in procurement, the EDA helps operations to optimize procurement procedures in order to save resources. The EDA offers its existing projects as well as ready-to-use contracted solutions. 2014, the EDA developed a structured and comprehensive approach to supporting EU Operations. Such projects have addressed the areas where EU faces critical capability shortfalls. Examples of the EDA-led projects aiming at filling these gaps are the Helicopter Training Programme (HTP); the European Satellite Communications Procurement Cell (ESCPC); Multinational Modular Medical Units; Air to Air Refuelling (AAR): C-IED training; Cyber Defence, and pooling of maritime capacities in support of CSDP operations.[217] Examples of the implementation of this approach can be found from the EUFOR Althea and the CSDP initiatives in the Central African Republic.

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212 The Treaty of Lisbon. 2007.

213 European Union External Action. 2016. 'Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy'

214 The ongoing and future development of EU military capabilities that are robust, deployable, sustainable, interoperable and usable is taken forward through the Capability Development Plan (CDP), which is produced in close cooperation between member states, the European Defence Agency (EDA), Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) and the European Union Military Staff (EUMS).

215 The CDP takes the following factors into consideration: (1) Prioritised military capability shortfalls and their associated risks as identified within the framework of the Headline Goal Process; (2) An estimate of capability requirements for 2025 based on global strategic research, available technology and potential threats; (3) Current plans and programmes of member states; (4) Lessons Learned from operations regarding capabilities.

216 EU Concept for Contractor Support to EU-led Military Operations (00754/14), provides a concept for Contractor Support to EU-led military operations. The document provides guidance on CSO to the Troop Contributing Nations (TCN), to Headquarters (HQs) offered for EU-led military operations and to civilian or state-owned companies and service providers (contractors) potentially offering services in support of an EU-led military operation.

217 European Defence Agency. 2016. 'What we do', accessed 19 October 2016, at: https://eda.europa.eu/what-we-do.

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EUFOR RCA served as a test case of the approach, where EDA provided cyber awareness seminars to 150 members of EUFOR RCA's operational headquarters in Larissa, as well as an EDA- developed human resources management software (J1FAS).[218] In March 2015, the EDA gave to EUMAM RCA ad-hoc contract support for the procurement of armoured vehicles. In 2014, the EDA provided assistance for the contracting of Air-to-Ground Surveillance (AGSR) services for the EUFOR Althea. This was the first time EDA has signed a procurement arrangement directly with an EU mission. A procurement arrangement was signed with the Operation Commander and allowed the Agency to assume the lead role in administering the procurement procedure. As the procurement regarded common costs, the Operation Commander was authorised by the Athena administrator to sign the arrangement on behalf of Athena. [219] The assistance in the field of procurement has important implications to the operational effectiveness, since the process is bureaucratic and heavy and requires lots of in-house experience.

Furthermore, in 2015 EDA signed a Cooperation Arrangement with Athena. Under this arrangement, the Agency has supported several CSDP missions and operations to assist *inter alia* procurement of special and armored vehicles, medical equipment or to analyse cost-benefit of outsourcing camp management. EDA also offers a web-based Contractor Support to Operations (CSO) Platform, to serve as a forum for interaction between contracting authorities and economic operators. In addition, as part of ongoing efforts to improve the procurement process of the different operations EU SatCom Market brings together the Athena and all EU CSDP military operations pool the purchase of satellite communications and related services with other member states. Moreover, EDA is also supporting relevant EU bodies in exploring how other areas could benefit from similar contracted services solutions, in particular in-theatre medical evacuation, field hospitals or camp management.

## 3.4 Command Systems and Information Sharing

The EU does not have a permanent military Command and Control (C2) structure, therefore clear and effective C2 arrangements are needed to ensure the successful planning and conduct of the operations and missions. 'EU Concept for Military Command and Control' (02021/7/14) sets out the arrangements for delivering C2, from the Political Strategic level to those military elements conducting an EU-led military operation or mission. Since the military operations do not have a permanent C2 function, and, therefore, there are four options that can be used to command and control CSDP. The military OHQ is chosen by PSC decision. A lack of a permanent military C2 function has been identified to limit military operations' efficiency.[220] Additionally, it is a clear barrier to civil- military cooperation/coordination, as the absence of a military counterpart for a civilian OHQ, exacerbates inter alia joint planning and information sharing across the civilian and military functions.[221] In accordance to the concept EU will establish the chain of command for EU-led military operations on a case-by-case basis. In principle, the EU has two basic Command Options: (1) autonomous EU-led military operations and missions[222], or (2) EU-led military operation with recourse to

218 European Defence Agency. 2016. 'Operation Support'

219 https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-news/2014/05/21/eda-sign-procurement-arrangement-with-eufor-althea

220 Panel of Experts (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, EEAS Official and a former OPCEN Official); Interview with a former EUBAM Libya Official 11 September 2015 in D1.3 Review on Civil-Military Synergies.

221 Interview with a EUMC Official 4 September 2015 and Interview with a EEAS official 13 August 2015.

222 One of the Member States' national OHQs, or other ad hoc national OHQs (preferably in line with the principles of the EU Framework Nation Concept, or the EU OPSCEN ,which can be activated for EU BG – size military operations, in particular, where a joint civil / military response is required and where no national HQ is identified. Source: 'EU Concept for Military Command and Control' (02021/7/14)

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NATO common assets and capabilities through the establishment of an EU OHQ at SHAPE. For the case of EUFOR Althea the option of using NATO Common Assets and Capabilities was used. Greece offered an OHQ in Larissa to be activated for the EUFOR RCA.

As discussed in heading 3.3, enhancing interoperability in operation Command and Control is a central yet challenging for the coherent running of the military operation. Too often, units are deployed without knowledge of their allies' systems or an understanding of what type of information is sent over to them. This lack of interoperability makes it difficult for units to communicate and manoeuvre effectively. These challenges are shared across the multinational forces within NATO, EU and bi-lateral partners. [223]

For the CSDP operations, absence of a permanent military C2 function creates additional challenges to the interoperability. Hence, to limit the potential challenges in advance, the EU has emphasized in its 'Command and Control concept' that every effort should be made to evaluate and assure the interoperability of forces that could be assigned to an EU-led military operation. To do so, one of the early tasks of commanders, at all levels, is to assess the degree of interoperability between the HQs and forces and to integrate all participating units. Furthermore, in accordance to the concept, sstandardization of material, resources, services and procedures across the HQs should be encouraged. Furthermore, there are ten principles which also should be considered in all the C2 functions. Those include; (1) EU Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management, (2) EU Military Command Options,(3) Simultaneous Build-Up, (4) Multinationality, (5) Transfer of Authority, (6) Unity of Command, (7) Continuity of Command, (8) Clear Chain of Command, (9) Unity of Effort and (10) Flexibility.[224]

Nevertheless, partly due to the ad-hoc nature of the HQs set-up the 'CSDP operation related HQ routines' vary from operation to another, and the C2 structure can seem complicated and ineffective. For example, in EUFOR Althea and EUFOR RCA there are several 'layers' of political and military actors in the C2, and the fragmented structures make the decision-making process slow even at times when rapid decisions should be made. For the EUFOR RCA multilayered Command and Control structure was perceived too heavy and bureaucratic by the operation staff to serve its purpose.

Due to political constrains, the option of establishing permanent EU military structures has been neglected during the past decade. Alongside the Brexit, and EU's aspirations to build strong and autonomous EU defence capabilities now this option is being reassessed. Upon writing the report, the discussion on establishing a permanent military headquarter is flourishing. Germany and France both support the creation of an EU military force with headquarters in Brussels, which would unarguably be a big step towards stronger EU defence. [225] It would also help to overcome many of the interoperability challenges caused by the current ad-hoc C2 arrangements.

As announced by the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker on 14 September 2016, the EU should move towards common military assets, in some cases owned by the EU. This move should be in full complementarity with NATO.226 The Lisbon treaty enables EU member states to pool their defence capabilities in the form of a permanent structured cooperation, yet this option has not yet fully been utilized.

223 See for example James Derleth. 2016. 'Enhancing interoperability'

224 EU Concept for Military Command and Control' (02021/7/14)

225 Janosch Delcker. 2016. ' Germany: EU military command should be based in Brussels', Politico, published 18 September 2016, available at: http://www.politico.eu/article/germany-eu-military-command-should-be-based-in-brussels/.

226 Martin Banks. 2016. 'State of the union: Juncker calls for EU military HQ', The Parliament, published 14 September 2016, available at: https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/state-union-juncker-calls-eu-military-hq.

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Objections to the EU's permanent military structure include arguments such as the EU creating wasteful new military structures that merely duplicate what already exists in NATO. Avoiding duplications of the efforts and ensuring the complimentary roles of these two can become challenging.[227] Another concern is related to national sovereignty, raising the question on what will be left of national independence if defence budgets and defence policy are controlled from Brussels.

The latest update related to the EU defence is from 14th of November, when 56 EU foreign and defence ministers endorsed a plan to create a mini military HQ and to have joint rapid-reaction forces. Accordingly, the EU foreign services will create the HQ, called "a permanent operational planning and conduct capability", which will command "non-executive military missions", such as training the Libyan or Iraqi military, but not combat operations. [228] Although, this new HQ will help to overcome many of the challenges related to fragmented and ad hoc command system for the CSDP military missions, the issues for the CSDP military operations still remain.

## COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEM (CIS)

This implies that each level of command is responsible for establishing the necessary links to the immediate subordinate level. To allow an EU-led military operation or mission to be conducted effectively and efficiently, C2 arrangements should enable the passage of information in a timely manner throughout the chain of command. Compatibility with NATO STANAGs and Allied Publications (AP) should be sought to the extent possible for all member states, fully utilising the provisions of the Article 5b of the agreement between the EU and NATO on security information. Nevertheless the established rules for the exchange of classified information and the principle of inclusiveness must be respected, although that would challenge the interoperability.[229]

As outlined in the case studies, the operations' Communications and information Systems need to be improved. Due to number of technical, procedural and human related reasons information sharing within the CSDP operation is seen insufficient in the field and between the FHQ and OHQ. To address the CIS related challenges, several concepts and requirements have been developed.[230] Associated with CIS architecture, cyber security is also a key issue in the EU operations. The EU Concept for Cyber Defence for EU-led military operations (18060/12) defines the Cyber Defence terminology, responsibilities and principles for EU-led military operations within CSDP crisis management operations. It offers member states, institutions and agencies guidance for the development of military capability requirements for use on EU missions. Nevertheless, it seems that there is a need for further requirement work as well as practical implementation of the concepts to overcome the on-going challenges.

One best practise related to information sharing capability can be found from the Horn of African and Sahel Region. On 23 March 2012 the Foreign Affairs Council activated the EU Operations Centre with a view to improve coordination and strengthen civil-military synergies between the three CSDP actions in the Horn of Africa: the military operation EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA; the EU Training Mission Somalia (EUTM Somalia) and the planned civilian mission (with military expertise) on EU CAPACITY NESTOR (EUCAP

227 Julian E. Barnes. 2016. 'Time for a New EU Military HQ? The U.S. Says No', The Wallstreet Journal, published 20 July 2016, available at: http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2016/07/20/time-for-a-new-eu-military-hq-the-u-s-says-no/.

228 Andrew Rettman and Eszter Zalan. 2016. 'EU crafts defence plan in Trump's shadow', EUobserver, published 15 November 2016, available at: https://euobserver.com/foreign/135905.

229 'EU Concept for Military Command and Control' (02021/7/14)

230 EU Concept for CIS for EU-led Military Operations (9971/12)

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NESTOR, formerly Regional Maritime Capacity Building - RMCB).[231] To ensure the efficient information sharing and coordination between the missions, the EU Command and Control Information System (EUCCIS) was put in place. EUCCIS is the comprehensive information management and exploitation capability for the EU OPSCEN to enable an operation commander to effectively plan, monitor and conduct EU-led civilian and military crisis management operations.

The responsibilities, planning factors and options for CIS for EU-led military operations are described in the 'EU Concept for CIS for EU-led Military Operations'. In the absence of the permanent C2 structure, it means that a unique CIS solution is developed for each operation. The challenges related to CIS differ greatly between the operations. For example, in the case of EUFOR RCA, the lack of local infrastructure and lack of skilled labour on the ground partly slowed down the establishment of the secured connection between the FHQ and OHQ. In addition, it took months before the staff on the ground received basic IT equipment. Consequently, the lack of secured networks upon establishment of the operation significantly hampered the information sharing, information management and overall communication between the field office and OHQ.[232] Lots of valuable information, contacts and intelligence, which could have been used by latter EU missions was lost after EUFOR RCA was terminated. To address these challenges in November 2015 the EEAS started a review of the EU Concept for Communication and Information Systems (CIS) for EU-led military operations and missions with the involvement of all stakeholders (member states and EU institutions). Many important aspects will be reviewed including support for deployed field HQs/mission HQs in the absence of a lead/framework nation.

Another major challenge related to CIS is related to releasability and the access to the operation information. For examples, national caveats can hamper the sharing of information among the staff members. Having third countries participating in the operation, such as Georgia, make the releasability of documents even more difficult, as some of the information can be circulated only among the member states. Also the difficulties related to information sharing between different military operations hampered the overall effectiveness of the operation. For example in the Central African Republic, there was no formal agreement in place between the EUFOR RCA and UN Mission allowing sharing of intelligence information although the operations were otherwise working closely together.

In addition, so called 'unofficial parallel command lines' are seen to challenge the interoperability of the multinational command and control in the crisis management operations. Although armed forces would operate under the banner of a nominally unified command chain they often receive simultaneous instructions via unofficial communication channels from the home country. At times they would also collect intelligence for the purposes of their own national forces, and that information would not necessarily be shared among the operation. Hence, alongside fragmented C2, also national caveats and national agendas are seen to cause incoherence and thus hamper effective running of the operation. Furthermore, information sharing within the staff is also challenging due to language and cultural barriers.[233]

In general, the communications - both in terms of procedures and CIS, is an area where further work should be done for enhanced interoperability. Some good practises are already in place. For example, in the case of EUFOR Althea, the role of NATO and access to its capabilities has been an important advantage for the operation also in terms of interoperability. The possibility to use the NATO Communication and Information

231 European Union External Action. 2015. EU OPERATIONS CENTRE Horn of Africa & Sahel (EU OPCEN), last modified June 2015, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/eu-operations-centre/docs/factsheet_eu_opcen_23_06_2015.pdf.

232 EU Concept for Cyber Defence for EU-led military operations (18060/12); Military Information Security Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (6630/05).

233 D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya. 2016.; The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH, 2016.

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System, the NATO secured networks and intelligence systems, as well as the NATO intelligence database, has provided an efficient and cost-effective mechanism for EUFOR Althea since the beginning of the operation.

In addition, EDA tries to support CSDP operations with the CIS related solutions. For example, EDA has taken over the provision of Satellite Communications (SatCom) services for the EU Training Mission (EUTM) in Somalia. EUTM Somalia is the first CSDP military mission to draw on the option of the Agency to cover its requirement for SatCom services.[234] Within the EU SatCom Market project, the EDA acts as the central purchasing body on behalf of the contributing members. It purchases the services from a commercial provider.[235]

Although, the rules related to sharing of classified information or intelligence for example between NATO and non-NATO countries cannot be overcome with EU specific procedures, the issues related to 'culture' of information sharing within the operation can be developed. In fact, EU has sought to address this issue in the EU Concept for Military Command and Control, where it states, that to support the work of the HQ the EU concepts and procedures must be applied. Nevertheless, due to the lack of training, experience and insufficient implementation of the SOPs and concepts, the fragmented practises still prevail. All in all, it seems that in regards to the military interoperability significant gaps remain in the realms of information-sharing and communications, styles of command, cultural understanding, standard equipment, and complex intelligence sharing policies. Standardised training and education programmes could be one way to address these challenges.

As the lessons from the EUFOR Althea and EUFOR RCA indicated there is a need for more flexibility in the EU's financial rules, in order to support its ability to respond to crises and for the implementation of those Lisbon Treaty provisions that could increase flexibility such as Article 41(3) TEU. When the member states defence budgets are scarce the improved Athena mechanism could be a key element for enhanced interoperability within the CSDP military sphere.

The enhanced cooperation between EDA and Athena has already shown some positive advancement in support to defeat some capability challenges. These initiatives can increase the interoperability within the CSDP operation by fulfilling the capability gaps or decreasing incoherence among the contributing nations by making capabilities available which would traditionally be at the responsibility of the troop contributing nations. Projects such as joint trainings, Satellite communication, and Medical Support[236] can significantly increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the CSDP operations. The EDA's ongoing project on Medical Support can serve as a good practice, and once tested and verified, perhaps a replicable model to defeat other interoperability challenges within the military operations. Furthermore, under the framework of the EDA's Medical Support project, the agency is working on greater interoperability of equipment, expertise and training in Medical Support to CSDP Operations.

234 European Defence Agency. 2016. 'Contractor Support to Operations (CSO) Pltaform., publsihed 19 Octover 2015, available at: http://cso.eda.europa.eu/Lists/News/DispForm.aspx?ID=17.

235 European Defence Agency. 2016. ' EDA and CSDP civilian missions develop cooperation', published 20 June 2016, available at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/press-centre/latest-press-releases/2016/06/20/eda-and-csdp-civilian-missions-develop-cooperation.

236 Health and Medical support is a national responsibility, therefore financed by the contributing member states or non-EU third contributing nations themselves. In smaller missions there is often a lack of medical support at the appropriate level.

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## 3.5 Third Parties Participation in CSDP Operations

Cooperation and sharing of responsibility have been emphasized throughout the CSDP from its very beginning. This cooperation can be understood as an inter-organizational cooperation (e.g. cooperation with UN, NATO, OSCE, AU, ASEAN) and bilateral cooperation with non-EU countries which are interested in cooperating and contributing to the shared efforts of tackling security challenges through framework of EU CSDP. The EU's impact on the other security providers can be divided into five categories[237]

(1) EU member states who deploy personnel, capabilities and assets and finance them- without whom there would be no CSDP;
(2) International security organisations (UN, NATO) with whom the EU cooperate/ coordinates to help to prevent and end conflict and engage in post- conflict stabilization;
(3) Other international organisations (such as UNCHR, UNOHA) with whom the EU cooperates and coordinates to enhance human security and welfare;
(4) Regional international organisations (ASEAN, OSCE, AU) with whom the EU cooperates and coordinates to enhance security in specific region;
(5) Non-member states who participate in CSDP operations (i.e. Canada, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey.) or whose national security interests are affected by such operations (Kenya by the EU counter-piracy operation, Russia by EU monitors in Georgia and Serbia by the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo.).

In this chapter the focus is on describing how the third parties have contributed to the CSDP military operations. The EU's cooperation with the third parties is discussed more in detail in D1.3, Review on civil-military synergies.

### WORKING WITH THIRD NATIONS

Having the third nations on board is beneficial for the EU for several reasons: First, there is a capacity-related one, meaning that partner countries bring personnel, assets and expertise that the EU may possibly lack. The EU occasionally struggles to staff its operations so the partnerships make it possible for the Union to broaden the pool of potential contributors. The EU Concept for Force Generation (14000/15, 11 November 2015) sets out the principles and procedures for the generation of military assets/forces/capabilities for EU-led military operations/missions including the participation of the third-nations.

The second dimension is the political one, which is arguably the more important one of the two. Whether a CSDP operation is considered effective and visible enough or not, partly relies on if the EU can attract non-EU members and institutionalize its relationships with them.238 As concluded by Tardy (2014) 'to some extent, a wide network of partners attests to the growing importance of the EU's role in a 'market' where other institutions (such as the UN, NATO or the OSCE) also operate. By nature, non-member states' participation in EU operations requires a certain degree of acceptance of EU practices as well as a degree of subordination'.[239]

237 Roy H. Ginsberg and Susan E Penska. 2012. The European Union in Global Security, the politics of impact, (Great Britain: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2012), 140.

238 Thierry Tardy. 2014. CSDP: getting third states on board, Brief Issue, European Union Institute for Security Studies, 6 (2014), available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_6_CSDP_and_third_states.pdf.

239 Ibid.

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Especially, the capacity- related need for getting the third-nations on board was highlighted during the interviews conducted for the case studies. For example, due to the force generation challenges faced upon deployment of EUFOR RCA, the contributions from Georgia (approximately 150 troops), was critical for the operation to reach its operational capability. Furthermore, in the case of EUFOR Althea, Turkey has been one the major contributors during the past years (274 troops deployed in the autumn of 2013).[240]

According to Tardy (2014) approximately forty-five non-EU states have participated in CSDP operations since the first mission CSDP operations.[241] These countries have all signed a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU, which provides the legal and political basis for such cooperation. FPA includes provisions on participation in civilian and military crisis missions/operations (e.g. regulating the personnel, chain of command, financial aspects and agreements regarding the status of personnel and information sharing etc.). The main documents defining a contribution of non-EU countries to specific EU CSDP military operation according to the FPA agreements are: (1) the relevant Council Decision to establish the EU crisis management mission and its subsequent amendments; (2) the Operation Plan (OPLAN); (3) any applicable implementing arrangements. The Force Generation process is the key in terms identifying the need for the third-nation contributions. If decided by the Council, the third nations are invited to participate in the Force Generation conference. However, in case of competing bids between member states and non-EU troop contributing nations, the member states should have the primacy, but it could be examined on a case by case basis for those adjudications that may have political repercussions.

Many of the challenges related to interoperability of the troops contributed by the third-nations are similar to those of the multinational forces in general including the cultural and language barriers, doctrinal differences and technological differences. In theory, third states have same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as the EU member states. However, any contribution of third states is without prejudice to the decision making autonomy of the Union. In addition, one key aspect which effects on the use of third-nations' capabilities is that they are not officially involved in the drafting of the concept of operations (CONOPS) or the operation plan (OPLAN) nor do they participate in force generation conferences. They are invited to contribute – in most cases to fill gaps – but are required to accept the EU's timeline and procedures. Even once the operation is launched, the various mechanisms in place (such as the Committee of Contributors) limits the involvement of partners, effectively reducing them to second-class stakeholders.[242]

NATO has made more effort in including partner countries in its operation. As discussed in the previous chapters, it has several different programmes dedicated to enhance the partners capabilities to ensure their interoperability to the NATO operations.

## WORKING WITH INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

Cooperation with other security providers is an important element for many CSDP missions/operations. Roughly half of the operations have been requested by host nations or other international organisations. Several CSDP operations were deployed to replace troops of police from- or to fill in temporarily for. NATO (Macedonia and BiH) and the UN (i.e. DRC, BiH) In several operations, the EU cooperates or coordinates with other international institutions, primarily NATO (BiH and Kosovo) and UN (CAR, DRC, Chad, Somalia), the AU (Sudan), ASEAN (Indonesia) and OSCE (Kosovo, Georgia and Ukraine).243 Examples from the

240 Ibid.

241 Ibid.

242 Ibid.

243 See for example D1.3 Review on civil-military synergies

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practical cooperation and interoperability between the CSDP operation and their international partners can be identified from both- EUFOR Althea and EUFOR RCA.

As discussed above, the Operation EUFOR Althea operates under the "Berlin-Plus" arrangements, drawing on NATO planning expertise and on other Alliance assets and capabilities. The NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe is the Commander of Operation Althea. There is also an EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) located at SHAPE. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) as a whole provides the Operation Headquarters (OHQ), and the EU Staff Group (EUSG) is the core, liaising with all SHAPE's Directorate's Branches, particularly through the Strategic Operations Centre, allowing a total interface in all areas.[244] A close relationship with EEAS and EUMS is maintained by the EUSG, with recourse to all SHAPE's assets as OHQ when needed, in accordance with CSDP. [245] This arrangement has been identified as a best practice for the effective and efficient running of the EUFOR Althea, as well as, coordination of the tasks between the EU and NATO in the field.

The practical cooperation between the EU and NATO has expanded over the past few years, within the agreed framework of their strategic partnership and respecting the decision-making autonomy of each organisation. Apart from the already on-going operational cooperation and coordination (e.g. in Kosovo, Horn of Africa, Afghanistan), there is potential for strengthened interaction of maritime security, defence and security capacity building and cyber security. The "intertwining summits" – from December 2013 (European Council discussion on CSDP), through the NATO Summit in Wales in 2014, the June 2015 European Council up to the 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw – bring additional dynamics, fostering further complementary and mutually reinforcing actions, for example, on military capability development. Both the EU and NATO share the assessment that the crisis in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods significantly altered the security reality for Europe and the broader transatlantic community. Since the beginning of the Ukrainian crisis, the good cooperation and coordination with NATO and the OSCE has proved invaluable.[246]

In the case of EUFOR RCA, since it was planned as a transition operation with a view to handover to either African Union or United Nations operation the close cooperation between the organisations was maintained throughout the planning and closing of the operation. Practical co-ordination on the ground was performed daily, ensuring that the activities would not overlap[247]. A lot of the joint planning was done at the political level before EUFOR RCA was deployed, rendering collaboration on the ground systematic. Prior the deployment, the AU and UN were actively consulted when planning of the operation. The co-ordination in the field was done mainly through regular meetings between the key actors. In addition, the EU delegation had an important role in the field-level co-ordination among the AU, the UN, the EU and France[248]. According to a

244 Interview with a former SHAPE Officer, 7 September 2015 in D1.3 Review on civil-military synergies.

245 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2014. 'Operation ALTHEA', published 9 April 2014, available at: http://www.aco.nato.int/page39511625.aspx. European Union Command Element (EUCE), which is located at NATO Joint Force Command (JFC) at Naples, provides the necessary coordination for ensuring a Balkans regional approach and regarding the use of reserve, which are not covered under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements. The EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC) exercises the political control and strategic direction of the operation, under the responsibility of the Council of the EU.

246 Helena Bogusławska, "CSDP and Partners" in the Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations, eds. Jochen Rehrl and Galia Glume, (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014).

247 Ibid.

248 Interview with EUMS official, Brussels, 27 January, 2016, in D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

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non-EU official, there were also constant consultations between the EU and AU. The various branches of the effort, from military to civilian, worked together, and information was shared between actors[249].

The primary reason for increasing EU-UN cooperation primarily in military crisis management was based on mutual interest: the UN, faced by increasingly challenging peacekeeping operations, needed the support of regional organisations such as the EU. In turn, the EU that was in the course of developing its crisis management capabilities could now offer not just financial support to UN peacekeeping operations but also military capabilities that the UN lacked. The UN also provided legality and legitimacy for EU crisis management activities.[250] EU, or rather European, support to UN peacekeeping efforts has been in the core of EU-UN cooperation since the beginning.

Whilst the EU member states have provided significant funding to UN peacekeeping operations, the amount of European troops at UN operations has remained relatively low for the past decades. Also, an example of EU component within UN operation, as envisioned in the EU Plan of Action, yet remains to be seen as the EU has opted to support the UN has been through its own missions and operations. In regard to the EU military capabilities, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has submitted the EU a "capabilities list" in which the preferred EU support is outlined as provision of "strategic enablers" such as the EU Battlegroups, logistical assets or high-tech equipment.

| Country | CSDP CMO | UN Mission |
|---|---|---|
| Afghanistan | EUPOL Afghanistan | UNAMA |
| Central African Republic | EUMAM RCA | MINUSCA |
| Democratic Republic of Congo | EUSEC RD Congo | MONUSCO |
| Israel/Palestinian Territories | EUBAM Rafah | UNSCO |
| | EUPOL COPPS | UNTSO |
| Kosovo | EULEX Kosovo | UNMIK |
| Libya | EUBAM Libya | UNSMIL |
| Mali | EUTM Mali | MINUSMA |
| | EUCAP Sahel Mali | |
| Somalia | EUNAVSEC Somalia | UNSOM |
| | EUTM Somalia | |

Table 3 EU/UN crisis management operations deployed in parallel

Since the deployment of the first CSDP mission in 2003, the member states have desired to enhance overall coordination among the many actors involved in peace- and crisis management operations. This is not least for the reason that most of the EU member states are also donors for the peacekeeping operations conducted by NATO and UN. Efficient coordination and cooperation could help to avoid unnecessary overlaps, inter- institutional competition and help to build synergies between the organisations. In addition, whatever the resources made available, however, in most theatres, as exemplified in the case studies, CSDP can only succeed if it works in close partnership with third-nations and other major crisis management

249 Interview with AU representative, Nairobi, 29 November, 2015 in D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

250 Thierry Tardy. 2009. 'UN-EU relations in military crisis management: institutionalization and key constraints', in Military Crisis Management: the Challenge of Inter-organisationalism, ed. Joachim A. Koops, Studia Diplomatica: The Brussels Journal of International Relations, Vol. LXII, n:o 3 (2009), 43-45; Claudia Major, "EU-UN cooperation in military crisis management: the experience of EUFOR RD Congo in 2006," The European Union Institute for Security Studies: Occasional Paper n:o 72, (September 2008), 9-10.

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actors. Aside from clear benefits at the political, operational and tactical level, good cooperation and coordination with these actors is also a key dimension of the EU support to effective multilateralism.

## 3.6 Review Systems

Lessons learned [251] processes attempt to assess most aspects of CSDP missions and operations. This process is an important instrument to improve the planning and conduct of CSDP missions/operation. Various actors are involved in the CSDP learning processes, EUMS, being the headliner for the CSDP military related lessons. This process is discussed more in detail in 'D1.3 Review on civil-military synergies'.

EUMS collects the lessons from CSDP military operation. EUMS has collected and registered Lessons Identified (LI) and Lessons Learned (LL) in practice from its birth.[252] Since then this process, software database tool (EUMS Lessons Management Application – ELMA), has captured lessons from a variety of CSDP Military Operations and Exercises. The Figure 2. outlines the EU Military LL Process as defined in the EU Military Lessons Learned (LL) Concept (12322/1/11,). The document provides an overarching concept, the core of which is a revised process which describes how EU military lessons (and, where appropriate, civilian lessons) can be learned, in order to develop and improve the military contribution to CSDP.

FIGURE 2 - EU MILITARY LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS.




Figure 2 EU Military LL Process

251 European Union External Action defines lessons as "any occurrence or finding that has an impact on operational output, which requires further development or monitoring."

252 Current EUMS Lessons Process (ELPRO) was agreed by the EUMC on 26 November 2007.

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LI/LLs are normally collected from the EUMS, member states, operations, missions and from other institutions engaged with the EUMS during operations and exercises. Lessons have been grouped thematically: Early Warning and Advance Planning; Situation Assessment; Strategic Planning.

The following principles have been set to support the effective LL process; (1) Effective leadership, (2) Committed stakeholder involvement, (3) Quality information assurances, (4) Robust LL structures at OHQ/FHQ level, (5) Appropriate level of lesson observations, (6) Capturing Best Practices, (7) Transparency and LL sharing.

Despite the standardized process of collecting and distributing the lessons, the current challenge to the EUMS is to ensure that the lessons identified are learned at appropriate levels. The implementation of the lessons at the planning of a new CSDP operation has been inadequate, as often there is no time to conduct lessons cycles or consult lessons learned documents. Therefore, the mechanism to ensure that Lessons are incorporated into CSDP Planning and Conduct of Activities should be strengthened.

For example in the case of EUFOR RCA and EUFOR Althea, the lessons learned (LL) process is based on a standard operating procedure (SOP). However, in the case of Althea, it has been shown that, because of a range of factors – chief among them the temporary nature of HQ EUFOR, the frequent rotation of personnel, and lack of trained personnel – this sometimes is not achieved to anywhere near the greatest possible extent or even at all. In fact, it seems that in very rare cases, the 'field-level' (e.g., EUFOR Althea) observations go through the EU Military LL Process (ELPRO) and that those observations eventually become official best practices.

The key lessons and best practices listed in the EEAS Annual Reports are very general in nature and seem to be perceived of little importance at field level. It may take a very long time for an observation to be approved for learning and finally propagated as a best practice. Furthermore, there seem to be widespread use of informal best practices and mechanisms, such as information-sharing within personal networks, for learning and improving various phases also within EUFOR Althea. However, the informal mechanisms are highly dependent on personal relationships, leaving doubts about reliability and reach. Sometimes national interests and political constraints may also limit the observations getting through the official process.[253]

In the case of EUFOR RCA the review process included the Political and Security Committee (PSC) conducted strategic review three months after the operation was deployed. In addition, six- months reports and other strategic reviews were used to inform the member states of the progress of the operation. Nevertheless, since EUFOR RCA was a short operation, these documents did not have significant impact on the political- strategic planning of the operation.

In terms of internal lessons process, feedback was collected from the units three times during the operation. The first one was done during the operation. Feedback was written down and it was discussed in the unit, but it was not passed forward to the higher levels. The second time was a debriefing in limited scale, but this feedback apparently did not go forward either. The third one was also a debriefing which was held in home country after the individuals had repatriated from the operation. In this debriefing the members of the unit wrote down their feedback anonymously, and this feedback which was passed forward at national and Brussels level. This internal feedback procedure was perceived ineffective. Experiences from those actually doing the work in the field were not shared or passed forward within the chain of command. As a result, only limited improvements were made to the operational aspects of the operation during the life-cycle of EUFOR RCA. [254]

[253] D.2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH, 2016.

[254] D3.5 The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

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Currently, a central challenge regarding the CSDP military review process is rather related to the implementation than collection of the lessons. In order to ensure the implementation of the Lessons identified, the EUMS have tried to link the EU Military LL output with a number of EU related projects such as Capability Development Plan (CDP), Concept Development Implementation Programme (CDIP).[255] The writers of this report did not have further information to what extent the LL collected from CSDP operations have impacted on these programs.

NATO LL Process is based on Bi-SC Directive 80-6. In regards to the NATO peace support operations, the Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC) plays a central role. The JALLC supports the exchange of Lessons Learned (LL) and facilitates the development of Lessons Learned Capabilities, reinforcing the continuous transformation and modernization of NATO's forces and capabilities.[256]

When comparing to the NATO LL Process, EU could also benefit from a more targeted evaluation system. A notable feature of the NATO's system in comparison to EU is the role of trainings and exercises and experiments for the process, which also serve as a platform to test and validate the lessons identified before they are learned and disseminated. In addition, the NATO seeks to share the information generated during the LL process throughout the process.[257] All in all, NATO seems to put the emphases on the stakeholder involvement and application of LLs rather than the collection of lessons.

[255] EU Military LL Process as defined in the EU Military Lessons Learned (LL) Concept (12322/1/11)

[256] North Atlantic Treaty Organization Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre. 2016. 'Mission, Role and Tasks', accessed 26 October 2016, at:

http://www.jallc.nato.int/organization/mission_role_tasks.asp.

[257] North Atlantic Treaty Organization Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre. 2016. 'NATO Lessons Learned Process', accessed 26 October 2016, at: http://www.jallc.nato.int/activities/nllprocess.asp.

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## FIGURE 3 – NATO LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS




Figure 3 NATO LL Process




Figure 4 Interoperability Approach in Practice

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# 4. Comparative analysis and recommendations

The previous chapters looked in depth at key components of respectively the CSDP civilian missions and the CSDP military operation and analysed, on the basis of the findings of the case studies, additional research and the regulatory/policy framework, what practices there This chapter adds an additional analytical dimension to this deliverable by comparing the findings from civilian and military CSDP missions and operations and looking more closely at the interoperability challenges for each and identifying whether these are similar or different.

The rationale for such an analysis lies in partly the changing security landscape in which CSDP missions and operations are (to be) deployed, requiring an increasing the need for more integrated civil-military crisis management operations. Terrorism, hybrid threats, cyber security, energy security and organised crime are just some of the complex modern threats that require for multidimensional approach. As recognized by the EU Global Strategy, in light of this changing security environment "we must strengthen operational planning and conduct structures, and build closer connections between civilian and military structures and missions, bearing in mind that these may be deployed in the same theatre".[258]

With increasing security risks for civilian missions, it is not excluded that the military capability is needed to achieve the missions' goals. On the other hand as noted by the concept of broad interoperability, as defined already in EU military Headline Goal 2010, interoperability should also be understood as "the ability of armed forces to operate together and act in conjunction with other civilian instruments".[259] Military operations could benefit from a stronger civilian component in terms of civilian expertise (e.g. rule of law, civilian policing, etc.), building the dialogue with civil society and the access to funding instruments for capacity building projects and development, to list just some of the reasons. The cooperative civil-military response to new security challenges is also in line with the EU comprehensive approach to conflict and crises which further dissolute the traditional borders between civilian and military crisis management approaches.[260]

Secondly, by comparing both approaches (i.e. civilian and military), the intention of this deliverable is to identify good practices which to benefit a wide-range of stakeholders. These practices will also inform the planned policy dialogue meeting in Q1 of 2017 in Brussels in the framework of the IECEU project.

This chapter follows the structure of the mission life cycle also used in Ch. 2 and Ch. 3. as well as using their findings for further analysis to find practical potentials for enhancing interoperability . These practical potentials are concentrated on the field-operational level.

## 4.1 Planning

The CSDP crisis management operation planning process is quite similar for civilian and military deployments. At political-strategic level it is initiated by the same organ, the PSC, which decides whether 'EU-action is appropriate'.

258 European Union Global Strategy. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. Accessed 5. December 2016, https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf

259 Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, "EU capabilities for a comprehensive approach: Broad interoperability as comparative advantage," Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (2009). accessed December 15, 2016. https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/09-01300.pdf

260 Isabelle Ioannides. EU Civilian Capabilities and Cooperation with Military Sector. In Eu Crisis Management: Institutions And Capabilities In The Making, eds. E. Greco, N. Pirozzi, and S. Silvestri, Quaderni (IAI, 2010), 29-54.

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Divergence starts at tactical and operational level, where the main observed divergence is procedural, i.e. the order in which steps are taken differ. For civilian missions, the CONOPS (Concept of Operations) is developed before the Council Decision is taken to establish a mission, whereas in military operations the Council Decision is first taken and then the CONOPS is developed on the basis of the initiating military directive. The drafting authorities for the CONOPS are also different, CPCC for the civilian side and the operational commander for the military side.

It is unclear how these differences impacts cooperation in the field, as the the case studies did not look at the planning aspect, as this is mostly done at headquarter level in Brussels. However, it is noted that aside from the joint development of the crisis management concept at PSC level, there are no standing civilian-military coordination structures at operational, field level. Civil-military coordination at the operational level needs to be arranged on a case-by-case basis'.[261] Basically, the jointly initiated crisis management concept, is developed in separate civilian and military pipelines, where only ad-hoc coordination is initiated.

Herein lies also the potential for further development of interoperability, i.e. the closer integration of the two civilian and military pipelines at planning phase. Once a crisis management operation is initiatied, regardless whether it is civilian or military, both expertises should be structurally used in the planning, as this can lead to synergies, comprehensiveness and ultimately better planning.

**Interoperability potential:**

Reinforce the jointly initiated crisis management concept with a more integrated, structured civilian/military operationalisation.

## 4.2 Staffing

Crisis management operations rely heavily on human resources to achieve their goals. To understand potential interoperability challenges in mixed crisis management operations, four aspects are analysed:

(1) pre-mission training of staff;
(2) selection of staff;
(3) in mission training and language skills;
(4) staff capabilities.

### 4.2.1 Pre-mission training of CSDP-CMO staff

When comparing the **pre-mission training** of staff in CSDP-missions and operations, a number of commonalities arise, negatively affecting the interoperability of field staff. In both civilian missions and military operations, the training of mission´s staff is a national responsibility, mainly implemented by national training institutes.

This set-up leads to field staff in the same mission joining the mission with either no pre-mission training at all or, on the other end of the spectrum, sufficient pre-mission training, depending on the sending member state does or does not provide this training. The amount of training given differs considerably, as for instance

[261] Mattelaer, Alexander (2010): The CSDP Mission Planning Process of the European Union: Innovations and shortfalls. EioP, Special Issue 1, Vol. 14, p. 7.

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in civilian missions only 43% receives pre-mission training. In the case studies this has been identified as hampering the interoperability of staff.

In addition, such as set up does also affect the content of the pre-mission training, as due to the lack of standardised curricula and certification processes at European level it vary among member states. The larger the number of training institutes that give pre-mission trainings, without a common established standard, the larger the risk for divergence and subsequent issues of interoperability.

In this area there is a large potential for strengthening interoperability, by developing a centralised pre-mission training system, with basic curricula linked to job descriptions within crisis management operations. Such as system should be informed by relevant experiences of missions and operations, and be mandatory before deployment.

**Interoperability potential:**

Set up a centralised system of mandatory pre-mission training, linked to job descriptions.

The system can be decentralised in its implementation, with courses held by existing training institutes, but should be centralised in terms of defining the terms of reference for the courses, attendees and and include quality assurance system. The current training system of the Civil Protection Mechanism could serve as a source of inspiration, as it incorporates many elements that enhance interoperability of teams in the field.

### 4.2.2 Selection of CSDP CMO Staff

When comparing the civilian and military procedures for the selection of staff for CSDP crisis management operations, commonalities and differences can be observed. The main commonality is that both use selection criteria to select staff, but the selection processes differ fundamentally, leading to the military recruitement procedure scoring less in terms of interoperability than the civilian procedures.

In civilian missions, the basis for the selection is formally the job description, with the mission having a final say on the selection process and engaging the applicant staff member. Such a process enhances interoperability in the field, as the mission staff makes the assessment on whether the applicant is a fit with the mission environment, its goals and existing staff.

**Interoperability potential:**

Discourage national (re)interpretation of the 'Statement of recruitment' used in CSDP military operations.

In CSDP operations, the process is more complex, with a differentiation between HQ and field level. At HQ level, the 'EU concept of force generation' is quite similar to missions, where job descriptions are drafted and the commander of the operation has the final say.

However, on the field level, the situation is slightly different, as member states do recruit individuals participating to the operation themselves, based on own requirements (that are based on the 'Statement of recruitment' set by the operational commander, but intepreted by the member states themselves).

In practice this means that member states introduce national caveat restrictions (i.e. what a mission member can and cannot do), which is observed to have a major impact on missions and the ability of forces working together. Basically, in the same operation, staff is selected on the basis of different rule books and this is continued in the field, as these rule books affect what they can and cannot do.

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The potential of interoperability here lies in narrowing down the opportunities for member states to develop own requirements. Ideally, for operations, the Statement of recruitment' set by the operational commander should be copied 1:1 by the participating member states, with no 'time-out' or caveats for member states.

### 4.2.3 In-mission training

The comparison of the in-mission training facilities for staff involved in CSDP crisis management operations leads to the observation that a number of commonalities exist between civilian and military practices. Both in mission and operations organise induction training for newcomers/incoming staff. Another point in common is that these trainings vary per crisis management operation size and there seems not to be one format for content of the training.

Training typically covers both the host nation and context of the crisis management operation, but a common curriculum for such training does not seem to be adopted and depending on the size of the mission, less or more training is given.

Unfortunately, the case studies did not provide data to answer the question whether missions and operations in the same country did have joint in-mission trainings or use a common curriculum. Such information would support further analysis in terms of interoperability in the field. In any case, the potential of interoperability here lies in developing joint in-mission trainings, as this has the potential to enhance on site cooperation, joint understanding and economies of scale.

**Interoperability potential:**

Support joint civilian-military in-mission training where possible.

### 4.2.4 Staff Capabilities

In terms of staff capabilities, the comparison of civilian missions and military operations leads to the observation that both mention two similar interoperability challenges, i.e. one relating to a common operations doctrine and another relating to the institutional memory of a mission.

As for the first point, a lack of unified understanding of fundamental missions concepts, relates to the finding that rather than relying on common pool of best practices, staff members often rely on their national best practices. For example, within one mission, different concepts of 'Integrated Border Management' were conveyed to local authorities. In terms of interoperability, the potential negative impact of different conceptual understandings are confusion as to tasks and priorities, competition over the correct interpretation of a concept, and diversion of resources from the tasks at hand to more foundational discussions as well as confusion at beneficiaries level.

**Interoperability potential:**

1. Aim to harmonize "working" versions of key capacity building concepts (e.g. 'Integrated Border Management')
2. Create mechanisms to create and enforce institutional memory
    a. Through training
    b. Through standardized or near-standardized tools and ways of working
    c. Through creating mechanisms for frequent, brief, and focused updates and hand-over notes

The potential for interoperability here lies in creating unified "working" versions of these concepts at Brussels level, in order to be mainstreamed over different missions in a uniform way. Ideally, these "working" concepts, would focus not on "What is integrated border management?" but rather on "What are the key

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elements that EU focuses on in promoting in CSDP integrated border management?". In other words, translating these core concepts to the unique challenges of the CSDP-context and mainstreaming them into CSDP-staff trainings.

The second point relates to the currently existing rotation system (civilian missions: around 12 months, military operations: even as brief as 6 months), that hinders the interoperability of staff, as it leads to lack of continuity and negatively affects the 'institutional memory' of crisis management operations.

Ideally, the institutional memory should be incorporated in the pre-mission and in-mission trainings, strong standardised mission specific standardised operating procedures, information sharing mechanisms and compulsory hand-over notes, that are detailed and followed up by new staff.

## 4.3 Shared Services

When comparing the development of shared services in the civilian and military CSDP crisis management operations, a number of observations can be made in terms of interoperability. Firstly, it seems that the civilian side is more advanced in terms of putting the shared services concept into practice, with the establishment of the Mission Support Platform for civilian CSDP missions in April 2016.[262] This platform is being developed, and aims to speed up the process of starting a mission, deployment and hand-over by defining standards for mission services, developing the mission capabilities such as common IT-systems and enabling the transfer of services,

At military side, no such mission support platform exists, only capability development initiatives by the EDA and intergovernmental funding mechanisms, covering common operational costs, through which participating member states can cover common costs like barracks or transportation. The impact hereof is that no common standards are developed and economies of scale are not reached.

The second observation is that in CSDP crisis management operations, an integrated civilian-military shared services platform does not exist. However, the EDA has taken several steps to develop such an integrated platform. One example is the procurement of commercial satellite communications services and the project 'EU SatCom Market'. It pools and shares commercial satellite communications services for both military operations and civilian missions (lastly in EUTM Somalia). The EDA acts as a central purchasing body, managing framework contracts and related orders with a service provider on behalf of the contributing members.

**Interoperability potential:**

Develop common standards for civilian and military shared services.

Another example is the EU Contractor Support to Operations Platform (CSO),[263] which now serves the procurement-related needs of the military operations and mission, but could also serve the needs of the

[262] Council conclusions on the Mission Support Platform. 18 April 2016. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/04/18-fac-mission-support/ Accessed 7 December 2016.

[263] The platform serves as a forum for interaction between experts from national authorities and potential or actual contractors, suppliers or service providers (economic operators) to exchange information in order to support the identification of commercial solutions for operational needs. The platform was launched by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in November 2013 as a successor of the Third Party Logistic Support (TPLS) Platform and consists of a publicly accessible and a restricted domain for registered governmental experts and economic operators. European Defence Agency. 2016. 'EU Contractor Support to Operations Platform', accessed 03 November 2016,

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civilian missions and help to enhance the efficiency of the heavy procurement processes faced especially at the beginning of the civilian missions.

Furthermore, coordination of the civilian and military operation acquisition could help to identify new areas where dual-use capabilities could be developed, increase the cost-efficiency through better contracts, and shorten the acquisition processes for civilian missions.

The potential of interoperability for shared services lies in the further development of this concept, where the main focus should be the development of common standards for civilian and military shared services, as this enhances intra-mission interoperability and builds economies of scale. Such a standard should take into account the differences between both types of missions and their specific needs.

## 4.4 Equipment

Civilian mission and military operations differ in the ways in which it is ensured that equipment is interoperable. There are key differences in terms of availability of (a) equipment, (b) logistics and; (c) communication and information systems architecture.

### AVAILABILITY OF THE EQUIPMENT

The CSDP missions and operations share challenges related to generating sufficient resources to fulfil the key objectives. The permanent warehouse concept for the civilian missions[264] is a recent innovation, addressing the challenges related to availability of the equipment needed in the missions. It is observed that such a concept does not exist in military CSDP operations. There is no joint logistics centre or warehouse, and the common equipment such as computer hardware, communication equipment, and safety equipment is acquired separately for each CSDP-operation by the countries contributing to the operations.

**Interoperability potential:**

Develop a common warehouse for military operations and consider to building synergies with the existing civilian warehouse.

However, such a permanent warehouse developed for the civilian missions could also be beneficial for military CSDP operations, as it helps them to overcome many of the shortages faced upon deployment and termination of the operation.

In addition, if it synergies are sought with the civilian warehouse, the additional benefit of economies of scale can be achieved, though this might be complex to pursue due to the different funding mechanisms and type of equipment needed.

at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/procurement-gateway/opportunites/if-you-are-industry-or-rto/eu-contractor-support-to-operations-platform

[264] The strategic CSDP warehouse for civilian crisis management missions was established with Council Decision 2012/698/CFSP of 13 November 2012.

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## LOGISTICS

Both civilian missions and military operations do face the same logistical challenges when mobilising and deploying abroad. However, currently, the civilian and military domains have remained separated and developed their own solutions. For civilian missions, these capabilities are usually acquired through contracting. For military operations, there are different institutional arrangements for setting-up an adequate logistics architecture (e.g. framework nation, multinational support arrangements, Host Nation Support) as well as contracting.

However, the logistics task is identical in civilian civilian and military operations, as it is about planning, acquiring and testing mission movement and transport requirements, including infrastructure, organisation, facilities and equipment necessary for the deployment and movement of mission staff and assets. However, the interoperability between civilian and military domains remains limited, with only a few examples from shared logistics. For example, in the Horn of Africa, EU NAVFOR Atlanta transported EUCAP Nestor vehicles to Djibouti.[265] In Somalia, the EU integrated compound in Mogadishu providing facilities for civilian and military mission operating parallel in the area. Furthermore, limited medical support is provided from the military mission to civilian mission in Somalia.[266]

This is an area where further interoperabilities between the civilian and military sides should be explored, as it has potential benefits in economies of scale and efficiencies. In this regards, the concept Framework Nation or a Logistic Lead Nation (LLN) [267], used both in military operations and civilian missions[268] could be useful as it not only enhances economies of scale but is also a facilitator for the civil-military interoperability in the areas where for instance a police unit and a military force are deployed in parallel.

However, the major challenge is to have a nation to want or capable to assume this role. Within military operation, to be a LLN requires the nation to have the political will, the financial resources and the competence to organize and coordinate the spectrum of logistic capability or/ and services for the multinational force.[269]

As such it raises the question, whether not a pan-European logistical solution should be sought, with a comprehensive CSDP logistics strategic framework. This framework would need to take into account the different functions and solutions seeking to improve cooperation between EU institutions, national governments and contracting companies with a view to ensure cost-efficiency, flexibility, and coherence of the CSDP logistics solutions. In the future, this strategy could be implemented through jointly developed doctrine fostering greater interoperability between the civilian and military

**Interoperability potential:**

Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP logistics strategic framework, addressing in a cost effective way the logistical challenges of CSDP crisis management operations.

265 Interview with a former EUVAVFOR Atalanta Officer, 31 July 2015, in D1.3 Review on Civil-Military Synergies

266 Interview with a former EEAS official, 8 September 2015, in D1.3 Review on Civil-Military Synergies.

267 The Lead Nation is the nation with the will and capability, resources, competence, and influences to organize and coordinate an agreed spectrum of logistic capability and/or service for all or part of the multinational force, including headquarters, within a defined geographical area for a defined period of time. The LLN could concurrently provide capabilities as Logistic Role Specialized Nation (LRSN).

268 LLN concept exists also for the EU police mission, (see 15956/04) and enables logistics to be managed by one nation.

269 'EU Concept for Logistic Support for EU-led military operations, (8641/11), Council of the European Union.

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sides, shared logistics and maintenance facilities, training and education establishments, and perhaps sometime far out in the future, through joint command and control structure.

### COMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURE

Communication and information systems need to be interoperable as they support the ability of the field units and agencies to talk and share data in real time, when needed and authorised. Such real-time data exchange is critical for the situational awareness and safety of CSDP-operatives in the field.

The case studies results indicate that field officers experience an inadequate CIS architecture in the field. Despite several concepts developed in the military and civilian sides (lead nation, private contractors), the divergences in communication and information systems still remains an issue. Identified challenges are the rapid setting up of the secure and protected communications networks, availability, maintenance as well as, overall compatibility of computers and communication equipment. For instance, different mission, and nationalities tend to use radios that operate in various frequency bands.

Also, the equipment is often incompatible between the different CSDP missions and operations and there is no standard for an integrated civilian-military operation as both civilian missions and military operations have their own CIS-architecture.

**Interoperability potential:**

Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP CIS architecture

The identified potential for interoperability here is defining a civilian and military CIS architecture with common procedures and standards that is addresses these issues, but at the same time takes into account the different civilian and military approaches in terms of security and access. An integrated CIS architecture could set standards in terms of type of equipment, frequencies, communication protocols, security, access control, thus creating interoperability as well as efficiencies and economies of scale as it would cover a larger spectrum of CSDP.

## 4.5 Command Systems and Information Sharing

This heading will explore the interoperability challenges in CSDP crisis management operations relating to command systems and information sharing. Within information sharing a number of different aspects are looked at: information sharing, cybersecurity and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR).

### CSDP COMMAND SYSTEMS

The key difference between command and control (C2) structures of civilian missions and military operations is that civilian C2 structures for missions are defined, whereas the military C2 structures are not.

The Guidelines for Command and Control (C2) Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management[270] establishes identical command structures for all civilian missions, with the CPCC director as the Civilian Operations Commander having operational command over all missions and each mission with their own Head of Mission.

[270] Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management, Brussels 23 May 2007. http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%209919%202007%20EXT%202. Accessed 2 December 2016.

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For military operations, there is no structure, but only a concept. The EU Concept for Military Command and Control[271] sets out various options for setting up C2 structures, including autonomous EU operations as well as joint operations with NATO, with the possibility of national and ad-hoc headquarters. Basically, there is no standing military C2 structure as the establishment of command for military operations is done on a case-by-case basis.

**Interoperability potential:**

Develop a CSDP specific military command and control (C2) that caters both for synergies with the civilian C2 systems in use and is compatible with NATO structures.

The potential for interoperability here is that also the military side develops C2 structures for CSDP-operations, which ideally foresee in formal links with the civilian C2 structure at operational, tactical and strategic level. An additional challenge in developing such C2 structure is the relationship with NATO and the potential danger of duplication of efforts between the EU and NATO military structures. However, this is a design issue that can be solved, by ensuring that the C2 structure is also compatible with NATO.

## INFORMATION SHARING

In the case of information sharing the regulatory base is more standardized, as both missions and operations are subject to rules for protecting EU classified information. There is also substantive variation in communication practices in the field, as in practice all missions and operations develop their own communication systems, based on their needs. As such, the current state of CIS does not favour interoperable systems, but is rapidly changing.

In recent years, specific advances have been made in developing common practices for communication in the EU civilian and military crisis management. The EDA-administered satellite communications market offers secure communications solutions to both civilian missions and military operations, creating common procurement and standards for communication. Further strengthening civil-military cooperation, the establishment and development of the EU Operations Centre concept for missions and operations in Africa brings together both sides in a joint information sharing and planning organization.

Information sharing practices with partner organisations have been varied and problematic for both missions and operations, ranging from non-existent to functioning. While on the civilian side, the list of generic civilian CSDP tasks includes both information sharing with EU actors and external parties, it is unclear to what degree this is the case for the military. In practice, both the civilian and military review identified different case-specific issues in the sharing of information with other EU actors as well as external partners like the UN, hampering a comprehensive approach. It seems that there is a lack of clear common standards and their enforcement in the field level.

**Interoperability potential:**

Develop a CSDP specific information sharing doctrine and that details what information, is shared with whom, under with conditions and when.

The role of unofficial communication channels have been identified as possible issues for both civilian

[271] EU Concept for Military Command and Control, Brussels 5 January 2015. http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-5008-2015-INIT/en/pdf. Accessed 28 November 2016.

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missions and military operations. This is particularly the case in CSDP operations, where nominal command and control and relevant communication are centred on the operation, but parallel national communication channels also exist. Deployed units are funded and supplied by their national authorities and usually also report back to them. In addition, national agendas have been observed influencing the work of deployed units. The same is true to a lesser degree in civilian missions, where deployed staff is usually formed into national contingents, tasked with management and support of their national staff members. These structures usually also include a reporting element, where staff report to their seconding institutions on mission conditions. In both cases there is variation in practices between different participating countries.

In conclusion, clear gaps exist in CIS and information sharing in both in the civilian missions and military operations, and particularly between them.

## CYBER SECURITY

Cyber security has become an increasingly important part of CIS in recent years, both for the military and civilian sides. From a regulatory point of view there exists high potential interoperability between civilian missions and military operations in this regard, as both the EU:s Cybersecurity Strategy[272] and Cyberdefence Policy Framework[273] highlight the importance of developing secure communications systems for both military and civilian actors.

Specifically, they highlight civil-military cooperation. Additionally, military operations have a specific Cyberdefence Concept, which the civilian missions lack. On the practical level, the various initiatives, including the satellite communications market and the operations centre concept can also support common cybersecurity approaches, but are still in their infancy. The establishment of the Mission Support Platform in April 2016 and its focus on developing common IT infrastructure for civilian missions can support the establishment of a common approach to cybersecurity, though questions on common civil-military standards still remain. While this work continues, CSDP missions have also already began developing the cybersecurity capabilities of their host nations.

**Interoperability potential:**

Strengthen the EDA's role in developing cyberdefence for CSDP crisis management operations and invest in building synergies with NATO.

Cyberspace is often described as the fifth domain of military activity, equally critical to CSDP implementation as the domains of land, sea, air, and space. Nevertheless, given that the cyber threats are multifaceted, synergies between civilian and military approaches in protecting critical cyber assets should be enhanced. The Cyber Defence Policy Framework identifies priority areas for CSDP cyber defence and clarifies the roles of the different European actors. Its main objective is the development of cyber defence capabilities, made available by member states for the purposes of the CSDP as well as the protection of the European External Action Service (EEAS) communication and information networks relevant to CSDP.

272 Improving Cyber Security across the EU. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-security/ Accessed 22 November 2016.

273 EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede160315eucyberdefencepolicyframework_/sede160315eucyberdefencepolicyframework_en.pdf Accessed 22 November 2016.

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The Framework was intended to support the implementation of the Cybersecurity Strategy[274], particularly regarding the development of training programmes, enhancement of cyber-defence capabilities and increased cooperation both within the EU and with external partners (i.e. NATO).

As stated in the framework, the civil-military cooperation in the cyber domain will benefit from R&T, exchange of best practices, information exchange and early warning mechanisms, incident response risk assessments and awareness raising.

The objective is to establish a comprehensive and cooperative European approach. The EDA has plays the key role in promoting the development of EU cyberdefence capabilities and technologies to address all aspects of capability development - including doctrine, leadership, organisation, personnel, training, technology, infrastructure, logistics and interoperability. The EDA activities, based on the recently adopted cyber strategy, focus on realistic deliverables within its remit and expertise: training and exercises, protection of headquarters, and Cyber Defence Research Agenda (focusing on dual use technologies).[275]

In addition, cyber defence is a domain where further cooperation with NATO should be done to avoid duplications of effort in times of budgetary constraint. The EU should explore possibilities on how the EU and NATO can complement their efforts to heighten the resilience of critical governmental, defence and other information infrastructures on which the members of both organisations depend.

## INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)

An important part of information sharing is intelligence sharing. Although, intelligence is usually associated with the military operations, also the civilian missions need to maintain an adequate situational awareness throughout the mission. During the case studies, the need to strengthen the interoperability of intelligence capabilities was highlighted several times.

A current challenge is that there is no policy or guidance on early warning, situation assessments and legal aspects of the Computer Network Operations[276]. All these domains are strongly interlinked to intelligence capabilities and further requirement work is needed to develop a capability that is interoperable, i.e. that enables the development of a common operational picture.

**Interoperability potential:**

1. Consider developing a CSDP concept for so called CNO's, enhancing the common operational picture and interoperabilities in the field.
2. Consider developing a CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tools on top of existing information sharing tools.

274 Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace, Brussels, 7.2.2013 JOIN(2013) 1 final, Joint communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions.

275 Final Report by the High Representative/Head of the EDA on the Common Security and Defence Policy, Brussels, 15 October 2013, accessed 20 November 2016, at: https://eeas.europa.eu/statements/docs/2013/131015_02_en.pdf.

276 Within the United States military domain, CNO is considered one of five core capabilities under Information Operations (IO) Information Warfare. The other capabilities are Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Military Deception (MILDEC), Operations Security (OPSEC) and Electronic Warfare (EW). Clay Wilson. 2007. Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues. Congressional Research Service, accessed 29 November 2016, at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL31787.pdf.

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The European Union Satellite Centre (SatCen)[277] is one example how the EU seeks to address these capability shortfalls. The SatCen provides products and services based on exploiting space assets and collateral data, including satellite imagery and aerial imagery, and related services. It caters for the needs of both civilian and military operations. However, the case study findings indicate that there might be the need to have a robust geospatial capability in the operational headquarters, as from start of operations. In the case of EUFOR RCA, the importance of having timely geospatial intelligence readily available was highlighted. [278]

Another current interoperability challenge that is not yet addressed is the absence of a common CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tool.[279] Currently, the different organisations have their own systems which are often not compatible with the systems used by other EU missions or institutions. So far, perhaps the best example of a shared information platform exits in EU OPCEN, where the EU Command and Control Information System (EUCCIS) is put in place.[280] EUCCIS is designed to be interoperable with the EU's Goalkeeper Platform, which is non-classified software environment that serves member states, headquarters and CSDP civilian missions by supporting training, recruitment, capability development and institutional memory of EU crisis management.[281]

If utilized appropriately, these platforms can facilitate information sharing across the EU civilian and military missions. However, it will not solve the issue of intelligence sharing, since Goalkeeper is non-classified software. Yet, it can still be an important technological solution for tactical level civil-military information sharing.

Nevertheless, the EEAS currently seeks to address the challenges related to managing and distributing the intelligence by replacing the various stand-alone classified systems it inherited from the EU Council and EU Commission, and replace them with one integrated platform, the EEAS Corporate Classified Communication and Information system (EC3IS). According to the EEAS this platform will take into account the technical constraints enforced by the member states about classified information, and make the process of passing of EU classified information between the different systems run more effectively.[282] The platform is planned to be extended to also cover the CSDP missions and operations.

277 Council Decision (2014/401/CFSP) of 26 June 2014 on the European Union Satellite Centre and repealing Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre. Official Journal of the European Union.

278 Interview no. 2.

279 See for example D2.5 The Conclusion Report. 2016; D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016.

280 EUCCIS is an information system composed of centralised applications, deployed on a network, accessible from the EU military and civilian staff user workstations and it is composed by a stable instance located in Brussels with the flexibility to be deployed everywhere in the world within a subordinated deployed Headquarter.Defence Aerospace.com. 2009. SELEX Sistemi Integrati: Completion of Increment 1 of the EUCCIS (European Union Command and Control Information System), accessed at: http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/release/3/106678/eu-accepts-increment-1-of-euccis-project.html.

281 Goalkeeper. 2016. 'What is goalkeeper?' accessed 19 November 2016 at: https://goalkeeper.eeas.europa.eu/.

282 Progress Report on the implementation of the EU's Comprehensive Approach to external conflicts and crises Action Plan 2015 (11409/16), Joint staff working document.

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## 4.6 Third Party Contribution to CSDP CMO's

The EU CSDP missions and operations often operate in complex environments alongside with other international actors. The EU established partnerships and cooperation with other organizations (both on political and mission level) e.g. with UN, NATO, OSCE, AU, ASEAN, etc. The levels of cooperation with various organizations differ and they have been assessed more closely in chapters 2 and 3. In addition to inter-organizational cooperation, the EU also cooperates with non-EU partners by including 3rd countries in both its civilian and military missions and operations. The contribution of third, non-EU countries to CSDP-missions and operations adds an additional dimension to the interoperability i.e. that of third countries (staff) being interoperable with CSDP missions and operations. A comparison will be made from two perspectives:

- The regulatory framework regulating the third countries participation in CSDP-crisis management operations;
- The crisis management operations.

The analysis in terms of institutional framework shows that for missions and operations the same framework exists, i.e. a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA)[283] that is applicable to the broad spectrum of crisis management operations. The FPA is to be signed between the third country and the EU. The European External Action Service is the one who leads the negotiations after receiving its mandate from the Council, who keeps the final say.[284] A template has been agreed at PSC level, that is in-turn negotiated with the third state.

While the FPA does not specifically mention the word "interoperability", some of the provisions (e.g. on classified information, chain of command and status of personnel and forces) do directly and indirectly address the issues of interoperability and contribute to ensuring higher interoperability among non-EU and EU personnel. It is important to notice that third states are not involved throughout the planning level, i.e. establishing the EU crisis management mission and its subsequent amendments and the Operation Plan (OPLAN); but are involved in the process of establishing the mission only in only at a later phase, so they do not have important impact on the decision making process. This might affect interoperability, as at planning stage specific standard operating procedures or requirements of third states are not taken into account.

As for the in-crisis operations/missions interoperability, is seems that this is currently not an urgent issue as chapters 2 and 3 indicate that the share of third countries personnel in the analysed missions and operations is rather marginal. However, even this low third states staff count does lead to certain mission interoperability challenges. As chapter 2 noted, knowledge on the EU values and procedures should be important to consider when non-EU countries contribute staff, especially for higher levels of the mission. Chapter 3 noted that

**Interoperability potential:**

Strengthen third country participation in CSDP crisis management operations by including them in the early planning stages and develop standard operating procedures that address doctrinal, procedural and technological differences/interoperability.

283 Draft Agreement between the European Union and some third states establishing a framework for the participation of some third states in the European Union crisis management operations (framework participation agreement). 2004. Accessed 13. December 2016, http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%206040%202004%20INIT

284 Pierre Minard. 2014. THE EU, JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA: Mutual Recognition between Different Partners. Available at: http://www.grip.org/sites/grip.org/files/NOTES_ANALYSE/2014/NA_2014-09-18_EN_P-MINARD.pdf (10. November 2016).

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many of the challenges related to interoperability of troops contributed by the third states are similar to those of the multinational forces in general including the cultural and language barriers, doctrinal differences and technological differences.

Tackling these interoperability challenges at operational level and better incorporating third states in CSDP crisis management operations is important as it has economic benefits, force generation benefits and gives political legitimacy. Especially, the political aspects of such cooperation should not be overlooked as having third states participating in CSDP crisis management operations does give a stronger credibility and legitimacy to the EU CSDP missions and operations.

## 4.7 Review Systems

It is observed that existing CSDP civilian and military review systems are highly similar, with the civilian review process incorporated many practices from how the military and particularly NATO reviews its operations and conducts lessons learned processes.[285]

However, while both the civilian and the military lessons learned come together in the yearly CSDP lessons learned reports, the actual information gathering and analysis is siloed. Also, it is observed that the EUMS and CPCC use different IT-systems to report and manage lessons learned. The EUMS uses the European Lessons Management Application (ELMA), whereas its civilian counterpart, the Civilian Lessons Management Application (CILMA) is underutilized.[286] In terms of interoperability, ideally, civilian and military platforms work together in the knowledge management of best practices through a joint database as this builds synergies and enhances the learning process of crisis management operations.

Also, the implementation of lessons identified is siloed as well. Noticeably, there does not seem to be any kind of standardized reporting for both sides on how the different actors have responded to the key lessons and recommendations presented in the yearly report. Instead, the actors report to the lessons management group based on the specific lesson/recommendation, which in turn reports to the PSC in the next lessons learned report. As lessons become learned only after implementation, it should be clarified as to what degree this review cycle reaches the missions and operations, or is just limited to the political-strategic level.

**Interoperability potential:**

Continue working on a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations.

Analysis of the review systems in the military and civilian spheres of CSDP have shown that both lessons learned processes have also faced similar issues, with sources highlighting particularly access of information and implementation of lessons learned as specific obstacles.[287] Further study is required to pinpoint underlying causes and their links. This study has not looked further into why this is the case.

In conclusion, there is a high degree of interoperability in review systems within the EU CSDP, as the processes, reporting practices and working methods for both civilian missions and military operations are broadly similar and contribute to a common lessons learned process. The development of a common

285 Interview with an EEAS official, 28.11.2016.

286 Interview with a CSDP mission staff member, 12.12.2016.

287 European Parliament. 2012. CSDP Missions and Operations: Lessons Learned Processes. Brussels.p. 27-30.

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lessons learned application will further enhance this interoperability. Both also face similar issues due to access to information and perceived lack of implementation of lessons.

## 4.8. Concluding Remarks

A review of interoperability challenges within CSDP crisis management operations leads to the observation that although substantial work has been done and is ongoing to address them, there are still challenges left. This deliverable has identified 18 potential points that could benefit from additional work, as listed in the table below, of which some are minor and some are more substantial.

| PLANNING | STAFFING | SHARED SERVICES | EQUIPMENT | COMMAND SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION SHARING | THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT | REVIEW SYSTEMS |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reinforce the jointly initiated crisis management concept with a more integrated, structured civilian/military operationalisation | Set up a centralised system of mandatory pre-mission training, linked to job descriptions | Develop common standards for civilian and military shared services | Develop a common warehouse for military operations and consider to building synergies with the existing civilian warehouse | Develop a CSDP specific military command and control (C2) that caters both for synergies with the civilian C2 systems in use and is compatible with NATO structures | Include third country participation in the early planning stages | Continue working on a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations. |
| | Discourage national (re)interpretation of the 'Statement of recruitement' used in CSDP military operations | | Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP logistics strategic framework, addressing in a cost effective way the logistical challenges | Develop a CSDP specific information sharing doctrine and that details what information, is shared with whom, under with conditions and when | Develop standard operating procedures for third countries, that address doctrinal, procedural and technological differences/ interoperability | |
| | Support joint civilian-military in-mission training where possible | | Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP CIS architecture | Strengthen the EDA's role in developing cyberdefense for CSDP operations and invest in building synergies with NATO | | |
| | Aim to harmonize "working" versions of key capacity building concepts | | | Consider developing a CSDP concept for CNO's, enhancing the common operational picture and field interoperabilities | | |
| | Create mechanisms to enforce institutional memory through training, standardized or near-standardized tools and ways of working and by creating mechanisms for frequent, brief, and focused updates | | | Consider developing a CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tools on top of existing information sharing tools | | |

Figure 5 18 Interoperability potentials

The relevance of investing in enhancing interoperability is not entirely theoretical, as the findings from the case studies show that interoperability challenges do affect the efficiency and effectiveness of crisis management operations. In addition, as for civilian-military interoperability, future integrated/hybrid/joint missions are increasing in relevance, with the dissolution of traditional borders between civilian and military threats. A cooperative civil-military response to new security environment can mirror these challenges by

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adapted and integrated crisis management approaches.[288] In such a context, closer integration of various stages of civilian and military crisis management (e.g. planning, equipment procurement, logistics, information sharing, etc.) makes sense.

Military operations for example can benefit from a stronger civilian component in terms of civilian expertise (e.g. rule of law, civilian policing, etc.), building the dialogue with civil society and access to funding instruments for capacity building projects and development, to list just some of the reasons that go beyond the military oriented CIMIC[289] concept. On the other hand, civilian missions can also benefit from closer integration with military elements (e.g. through provisions of security, logistics, strategic planning, etc.). Integration can thus support both civilian and military actors in achieving their objectives. Integrated approach also makes sense from the perspective of pooling and sharing of equipment between the civilian and military and potential for further exploration of dual use capabilities.[290]

However, there are still several significant obstacles or limitations, both on strategic/political and operational level that need to be addressed if the EU wishes to pursue a more integrated approach to security. One of the first limitations lies in different financial instruments[291] that are used for financing civilian and military CSDP missions.[292] Furthermore while significant progress was achieved in bringing together civilian and military planning (e.g. by establishing CMPD), the planning and command aspects of CSDP still seem to represent an important limitation for possible integrated missions. This is visible both on strategic planning and operational level (e.g. the issue of whether the possible integrated mission should be led by civilian or military commander[293]). Obstacles for integrated chain of command face both institutional challenges on the level of EU (e.g. “stove pipe approach”) and barriers on member states level (e.g. constitutions of some states do not allow deployment of civilian staff in operations under military command).[294]

Harnessing the potential of integrated/hybrid/joint crisis management operations does require the development of a common strategic vision that not only goes beyond the traditional civilian and military demarcation lines, but also includes the power of other EU instruments (development aid, trade, etc.).

288 Isabelle Ioannides. EU Civilian Capabilities and Cooperation with Military Sector. In EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making. Ed. Ettore Greco, Nicoletta Pirozzi and Stefano Silvestri. Istituto Affari Internazionali

289 Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) is the co-ordination and co-operation at operational and tactical levels between military components of EU-led military operations and civil actors including the local population and authorities, as well as international, national and nongovernmental organisations and agencies - in support of the achievement of the military; Nik Hynek. ”Consolidating The Eu’s Crisis Management Structures: Civil-Military Coordination And The Future Of The EU OHQ.” Directorate-General For External Policies Of The Union Standard Briefing (Belgium: European Parliament, 2010).

290 E.g. noted in the interview with former EUBAM Libya official, 11 September, in D1.3 Review: Civil-Military Synergies

291 Civilian missions are mostly funded from common CFSP budget while military operations are mostly burdens of participating members states.

292 Pirozzi Nicoletta. ”The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management,” Brussels: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2013.

293 Ibid.

294 Ibid.

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# 5 Conclusions and discussion points

Interoperability challenges affect the efficiency and effectiveness of current crisis management operations. These interoperability challenges are likely to become even greater in the near future due to new security environment, closer civil-military cooperation, greater participation of 3rd states and future integrated/hybrid/joint missions. Moreover, in terms of efficiency, EUs military operations can benefit from a stronger civilian component in terms of civilian expertise (e.g. rule of law, civilian policing, etc.) and building the dialogue with civil society. Civilian missions can also benefit from closer integration with military elements through, for example, provisions of security, logistics, strategic planning. Integration can thus support both civilian and military actors in achieving their objectives as well as strengthen pooling and sharing.

The previous chapters explored in-depth how interoperability is experienced at field level in current CSDP crisis management operations for civilian missions (chapter 2), and military operations (chapter.3). A comparative analysis on missions and operations was made in chapter 4, which also found 18 potentials for increasing interoperability in the field.

Through this discussion, underlying key challenges for interoperability emerge, which are:

Three central challenges for interoperability

(1) Divergent national practices and lack of implementation in the field
(2) Weak Interoperability mindset
(3) EUs Institutional CSDP-framework and its fragmentation

.

## DIVERGENT PRACTICES

First, divergent national practices, especially in terms of civilian missions, lead to more divergence in the field. Some standardization of national practices may be politically sensitive but much of the more practice-oriented, technical interoperability seems less so and would offer an easy beginning point for strengthening interoperability. However, political sensitivity can also be overestimated and thus processes of interoperability can be retarded even before it begins properly.

NATO has managed to create interoperable systems in the military realm, which extend to member states own armies and equipment, and even non-NATO EU member states; greater interoperability should certainly be possible within the EU. Moreover, although there are a number of policy initiatives to extend interoperability and rule books, the implementation of interoperability remains challenging. Certainly, common doctrine can also be strengthened, but the main focus should be on the implementation and mainstreaming of existing initiatives.

## INTEROPERABILITY MINDSET

Secondly, the analysis from the case studies points to a weak interoperability mindset both *within* civilian missions and military operations but more significantly *between* actors involved in CSDP crisis management operations. Competition for resources, position, and general lack of willingness to cooperate or work towards common goals hamper the realisation of interoperability potentials even where there are benefits that could be gained from greater interoperability.

The political will to pursue interoperability as expressed in numerous Council Conclusions and Decisions seems not be sufficient to make it really happen at tactical and operational level. The main obstacle is a mind-set where interoperability is a priority and sought after horizontally, in every action that is being taken both at headquarters level as in the field. For creating such a mindset it is necessary that all parties involved in CSDP crisis management operations have an internalised understanding of working together towards a common goal and act upon it in their daily business, by identifying obstacles, creating dialogues and common standards.

Such actions over time will be one of the founding principles for a common CSDP-crisis management operations culture, which integrates the national CSDP cultures. Ideally, over the coming years platforms should be created to discuss interoperability in different fields, fostering the dialogue needed to build the mindset and culture.

## INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Thirdly, the CSDP crisis management operations complex institutional framework does cause challenges for interoperability. In essence, the CSDP is an intergovernmental form of cooperation, with Council, member states and Commission steering the same ship. This makes it difficult to navigate, as depending on the type of operation, there are very different procedures to follow, with multiple actors involved (e.g. funding of equipment). Also, it does affect the creating of a common culture, as for instance staff is mainly trained nationally and seconded.

This fragmentation is ingrained in the Lisbon Treaty, and will influence the level of interoperability that can be achieved in CSDP crisis management operations in the long term, as no changes are foreseeable in the next 5 to 10 years. The recommendation is made that proposals aiming at enhancing interoperability should always include a paragraph with an analysis on what can be achieved in the current framework and what needs a modified institutional framework. Such an analysis can inform in the long run the cost-benefit analysis needed to justify modifications of the legal set-up.

## DISCUSSION POINTS

Below specific discussion points are listed, that will inform the policy dialogue planning in Q1 of 2017, with key CSDP-actors. Ideally, these discussions will lead to an even better understanding of interoperability and how to enhance it in the next years. The discussion points are categorized along the lines of the identified three underlying interoperability challenges and groups them in short-term, medium-term and long-term potentials.

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## DIVERGENT PRACTICES AND STRENGTHENING IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMON DOCTRINE

Q1) How can standardization of national practices, especially those related to mission/ operation support services be encouraged?

- In the short-term?
- In the medium-term?
- In the long-term?

Q2) How can the implementation of common doctrines be strengthened in the field?

- In the short-term?
- In the medium-term?
- In the long-term?

## INTEROPERABILITY MINDSET: WORKING TOWARDS COMMON GOALS

Q3) How can a pro-interoperability mindset and an understanding of working towards common goals be strengthened?

- In the short-term?
- In the medium-term?
- In the long-term?

## INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND FRAGMENTATION

Q4) How can interoperability be strengthened within the limits of the present institutional context?

- In the short-term?
- In the medium-term?
- In the long-term?

Q5) What are potentials for institutional development for encouraging interoperability?

- In the short-term?
- In the medium-term?
- In the long-term?

## CONCLUDING

This review of the interoperability aims to analyse in depth how the concept of interoperability works with CSDP crisis management operations. By reviewing the findings of the case studies, covering civilian missions and military operations, a number of observations have been made about how interoperability works in the field.

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This is a snapshot in time, as almost all case studies relate to CSDP crisis management operations that are finalised. However, this seems not to affect the validity of the observations as interviews with staff members in on-going missions and operations, literature analysis and document analysis confirm these observations.

Recently, a number of initiatives have been launched to strengthen interoperability and these are welcomed as it will affect positively the effectiveness of the 'boots on the ground'. However, much work is still needed, as symbolised by the 18 potentials this study has identified.

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