

PROJECT TITLE:**Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention****2.4 Round table discussion of experts**

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFBiH	Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina
CBSD	Capacity Building in support of security and development
CivCom	Committee for civilian aspects of crisis management
CoS	Chief of Staff
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EUFOR Althea	European Union Force Althea
EULEX	The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUPT	European Union Planning Team
EUROPOL	The European Police Office
EUROJUST	The European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit
EUSG	European Union Staff Group
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
FRONTEX	<i>Frontières extérieures</i> (French for External border); EU Agency
HQ	Headquarters
HoM	Head of Mission
HUMIT	Human Intelligence Team
IECEU	Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention
LOT	The Liaison and Observation Team
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIP	Mission Implementation Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SAA	Stabilisation and Association Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
SSR	Security Sector Reforms
UNMIK	The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
USA	United States of America



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Ms. Ivana Boštjančič Pulko completed International Relations studies at the University of Ljubljana. She has worked for the Centre for European Perspective since 2008, implementing projects in the field of security sector reform in the Western Balkans, mainly in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Montenegro, which were delivered as official development assistance by the Republic of Slovenia or in other frameworks. All these years she has led several capacity building and evaluation activities in the field of crisis management and conflict prevention, with special focus on CSDP missions and Kosovo, also as part of the ENTRi project.

Ms. Meliha Muherina holds a B.A. degree in International Relations and is currently pursuing her master's degree in Defence Studies at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences. She has developed a special interest in CSDP missions and the Balkans, while Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina will be her focus in her master thesis. She has been part of Centre for European perspective since 2015, gaining relevant work experience and putting her knowledge into practice.

FINCENT

Ms Johanna Suhonen holds a M.Sc in Political Science from the University of Turku, Finland. She has worked as a researcher for the Finnish Defence Research Agency and Crisis Management Centre Finland. Prior to this, she served in KFOR, Kosovo, and worked with NGOs in the field of development in Europe and Latin America. Currently, she is on her second tour in KFOR, serving as a Liaison Officer. She is also employed as an expert and part-time researcher at the Finnish Defence Forces International Centre.

Mr Kari Sainio, Lieutenant Colonel G.S. (ret), has a long and versatile experience and knowledge of complex military crisis management. He has served five missions abroad; 1987-1988 in UNDOF in Damascus and on



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the Golan Heights, 1999-2000 as a Battalion Commander in KFOR (Kosovo), 2005-2006 as a Chief Liaison Officer in HQ EUFOR Althea (Sarajevo), 2010-2011 as a Deputy Chief of Joint Effects Coordination in KFOR and 2012-2013 as Mentor/Advisor in ISAF (Mazar-e-Sarif, Afghanistan). He has also participated in several crisis management (PSO) courses and exercises abroad. Currently he works as a senior instructor at FINCENT. As a part of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEF) he is also an instructor in SWEDINT. His specialties are staff work, military advisory/mentoring and operational planning process.

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1 INTRODUCTION

The **main objective** of this discussion report (D2.4) is to collect findings from the roundtable, organized by three consortium partners in the IECEU project (University of Ljubljana, FINCENT, Centre for European Perspectives – CEP) on 24 May 2016 at Jable Castle, Slovenia. The round table was organized in the framework of WP2 ‘The Balkans’, as envisaged in the Grant Agreement. Several experts working in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and other European countries were invited to the roundtable to assess the findings the IECEU researchers had collected during their field work in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in February-March 2016. In addition to that, the representatives of security-enforcement institutions (Slovenian Armed Forces and Slovenian Police), Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, think tanks and academia also participated, so as to evaluate the IECEU researchers’ findings from various perspectives.

The round table consisted of two parts (see Annex 1 – Invitation to the round table). The IECEU researchers and a selected number of invited experts well informed on one or both of the two CSDP missions/operations (EULEX and ALTHEA) took part in the morning (internal) discussion, which was **intended to scrutinize the IECEU researchers’ preliminary findings from the perspective of non-IECEU experts** in order to receive external feedback from the competent people.¹ The internal discussion was followed by the afternoon round table. Its aim was **to reach wider audience** by elaborating on the preliminary findings from the field trips and, at the same time, **to foster a debate on the wider framework of conflict prevention capabilities of the EU and so contribute to the awareness-raising on these topics.**² The round table discussion was organized according to the Chatham House rules.

Based on the previously established methodological framework in WP1 (D1.4 – *Success indicators*; D1.5 – *Conceptual framework*) and analytical desk studies and field-work in WP2 (D2.1 – *Kosovo review: desk study*, D2.2 – *Bosnia and Herzegovina review: desk study*, and D2.3 – *Primary field research and analysis: study report* – see Figure 1 on the next page), **the methodological approach undertaken in this deliverable allowed identification of the lessons-learned from both EULEX and ALTHEA on the basis of the round table discussion**, in line with the six capabilities of the IECEU project.³ The relations between the two crucial deliverables of WP1 titled ‘The Current EU Capabilities: civilian and military efforts’ and the deliverables of WP2 are presented in Figure 1.

¹ The list of experts at the round table and participants is attached in Annex 3.


² For the list of participants at the round table see Annex 3.

³ Six capabilities of the IECEU project – Strategic Capacity, Operational Capacity, Interoperability, Comprehensiveness, Competences, and Technology – are explained in detail in D1.5 (see: IECEU, 2015, *D1.5 – Conceptual Framework*, http://www.ieceu-project.com/?page_id=197)




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Figure 1: The inter-connectedness of deliverables in WP1 and WP2



The deliverable D2.4 – *Round table (discussion of experts)*, in combination with D2.1, D2.2, and D2.3, serves as one of the four supporting pillars for the final deliverable D2.5 (*Conclusion report*), on the one hand aiming to validate the findings, and at the same time offering supplementary considerations that should be taken into account, when discussing the EU conflict prevention capabilities.

Figure 2: The workflow in WP2



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Prior to the round table, the invited experts received the document written by the IECEU researchers. The document consisted of the crucial findings from the field trips to Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the data collection took place (see Annex 2). The findings primarily revolve around the six capabilities (themes of the IECEU project) established in WP1:

- *Planning capacity (PC)*
- *Operational capacity (OC)*
- *Interoperability (I)*
- *Comprehensiveness (CH)*
- *Competences (C)*
- *Technology (T).*

Figure 3: Perspectives, analytical levels and themes in WP2



Scrutinizing the six capabilities in the IECEU project at the round table was followed by the evaluation of the success/effectiveness of EULEX and ALTHEA, which is built on the success indicators established in D1.4. The effectiveness of EULEX and ALTHEA, as perceived by the invited experts, was the second objective of the round table. However, the observations provided by the invited experts at the round table on this specific topic are not included in this deliverable, but are analysed in detail in D2.3 (*Study report*), which is in line with the internal agreement between the consortium partners and the coordinator.

The deliverable D2.4 proceeds in a way that each of the six capabilities is scrutinized from both missions'/operations' perspectives (EULEX and ALTHEA), beginning with Strategic planning (capability 1), and continuing with Operational capacity (capability 2), Interoperability (capability 3), Competences (capability 4), Comprehensiveness (capability 5), and ending with Technology (capability 6). The concluding chapter wraps up the round table discussion and establishes a basis for further work in D2.5 (Conclusion report), which is the last deliverable of WP2.



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2 THE EXPERTS' OPINION ON SIX CAPABILITIES IN IECEU

For the preliminary findings on each of the six capabilities that were sent to the experts prior to the round table and are discussed in this chapter, please consult the Annex 2 of this deliverable, as this chapter shall be read inclusively with it. Hence, the preliminary findings (from Annex 2) sent to the experts beforehand are not repeated in this chapter as a whole, so as to avoid duplication and make this deliverable as succinct as possible.

2.1 STRATEGIC PLANNING

2.1.1 EULEX

CSDP missions and operations are **present in countries with no clear EU policy**, which contributes to difficulties in their planning at a starting point. Due to the lack of political unity in the EU and the fact that several EU member states still do not recognize Kosovo as an independent state, the mandate, capacity of the mission, and strategic planning are often at the core of the troubles EULEX is facing. Hence, the unresolved **status issue** is at core of many EULEX challenges, both internal and external ones, making adequate strategic planning difficult. However, as experts believe, the issue of Kosovo's unresolved 'status' is something the EU has to live with. Experts have noted that the status issue requires a lot of cooperation and negotiations with other stakeholders, which is understandable, since the EU works by the principle of compromise. However, they have also emphasized that cooperation changes in relation to the different settings in Kosovo and outside of Kosovo, where official stakeholders' positions have to be followed. Even the non-recognizers must be included in the talks and the search for solutions.

Due to the lack of political unity regarding the status issue, the mandate and capacity of the mission, strategic planning and political guidance are sometimes not as clear and direct as desired, and consequently, bound to compromises, which often result in vagueness. There was a huge difference between the last document of the EU Planning Team Kosovo (EUPT), when its representatives were planning the mission, and the first OPLAN. The reason behind was the fact that the mission served as a substitute for political aims beyond the mission's mandate. As argued by the invited experts, the mandate is always a translated political will of the member states, which often does not reflect the needs on the ground.

All round table experts have agreed that **CSDP missions are very low on political agendas of member states**, and EULEX is not an exception to the rule. Further on it has been argued that CSDP missions and operations are often used as a safe option for member states to act and "wave their flag" on the ground, when no other instruments are available. While CSDP missions and operations are meant to be a short-term response to the action on the ground when the crisis emerges, they are currently used as long-term engagements (state-building processes). This creates discrepancies in their work. CSDP is nowadays a



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political, not a technical tool and it is not used to reach some actual end state, which often contributes to frustrations on the ground. CSDP in the Balkans is more connected to state-building than conflict prevention; conflict prevention activities are in fact very limited. Experts argued that CSDP presents a rare EU foreign policy instrument and a tool for engaging in the security sector reform prior to the country's accession to the EU. Further on it has been noted that reports from the mission, which could have influenced the strategic planning, are only rarely acknowledged and read, and do not have a necessary impact.

Furthermore, experts tackled the issue of **situational awareness in Brussels, namely Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC)**, which is the issue of utmost importance for the strategic planning. CPCC is very understaffed and has difficulties covering all issues related to the CSDP missions. Especially with the mission the size of EULEX, when the same CPCC structure in EEAS applies to all civilian CSDP missions, it is difficult to implement all the work the mission requires with only two persons in CPCC responsible for it. There is an on-going problem with the EEAS structure but the EU member states do not want to increase the funds and carry additional financial burdens.

Cooperation and communication between the mission and HQ in Brussels often depends on a specific person working on a specific position. If there is a spirit of cooperation present between the people responsible, communication that has an impact on the strategic planning works well, but if there is a lack of cooperation on any of the sides, information sharing can be obstructed. If this cooperation is weak, the mission does not feel valued in Brussels. CPCC needs also to present the mission activities to the member states and the European Commission and then take into consideration the member states' positions. It is not appropriate to share those positions with the middle management of the mission, which sometimes feels neglected in the whole process. One of the ways for improvement of this shortcoming is the **reporting cycle**, which should be improved. It is often that the monthly reports coming from the mission are not read by member states, or they are only read by CIVCOM and a person in the MFA, who lacks knowledge on Kosovo and the mission itself. Reporting is often mismatched with the discussions in Brussels. If reporting and communication are to have an effect and being able to hold Head of Mission accountable for results, reporting cycle should be well connected from the bottom (staff) to line manager, Head of Mission and finally to Brussels. It has been also repeatedly stressed during the round table discussion that the role of the member states is overestimated, as the conduct of the mission is missions' responsibility and that they should be put in charge more. The communication between the mission and Brussels should definitely be improved.

Lack of basic methodological guidelines for planning in the mission has been stressed as a weakness but experts are not unanimous whether that should be attributed to the mission itself or to CPCC in Brussels. They all agree that flexibility is good to a certain extent but some key guidelines should be described since each mission is handling their planning in their own way due to the lack of SOPs for planning. It is a bit unclear whether the issue of the mission planning office and its position in the mission (low hierarchical level, below HoM, CoS, Operations) contributes to that problem, since the office has been positioned under the office of



the Chief of Staff after the last restructuring. If the reporting cycle is clear and serves its function that should not be a problem. It has also been mentioned that lack of planning framework, which applies to the EU in many areas, is not only a limitation but can also be an advantage, as it enables flexibility.

The unresolved issue of **Northern Kosovo** presents a huge challenge for the EU and the strategic planning of the mission at the moment. The status issue also impacts the EULEX cooperation and interoperability with other international actors in Kosovo. EULEX is supposed to be status-neutral, but it *de facto* supports the functioning of the Kosovo government. Taking into consideration the realities in which the mission operates, many parties agree that it is actually quite impressive what EULEX managed to achieve in those circumstances. All sides (international as well as local) commented that there is too much 'flirting' with the Kosovar political elites from the side of the mission. It was also mentioned that the needs of Kosovo were conceptualized wrongly, that there is a lot of demand for the rule of law present on the ground but the mission focuses too much on the war crimes. It was argued that due to the so called 'stability mantra', EULEX is many times perceived as a tool for strengthening the political elites and that Kosovo failed to build a functioning state due to that fact. The local population seems to be disappointed that EULEX was so involved in the politics of the country. Also impunity of politicians is perceived as highly problematic – this argument is often heard among the Kosovo citizens, who believe that this problem could be attributed to the EULEX's poor performance.

Some of the experts argue that **executive function** was not well planned and strategic. Hence, a lesson learnt is never to deploy judges with executive function to a CSDP mission again. Due to the judicial independence, the judges will supposedly never follow the political guidelines. There's a framework how they will deal with cases but there is no common approach of doing that. Consequently, they often feel like they are not part of the mission. The experts added that a judge and a prosecutor can be independent while in court but the mission has a lot to do with wider EU interests and member states' own interests. Prosecutors also 'promised' publically to go after the big fish, so it does not come as a surprise that the public had high expectations which the mission could not attain. This contributed to the wider disappointment with the mission itself.

Last, but not least, the strategic planning seems to be problematic also because there was no open discussion on the **exit strategy or phasing out of the mission**: what milestones should be reached for the mission to be able to end? The end state, which would involve more than just some vague statements, is missing. It is not known what the milestones to be reached are. However, there is a designed end state – described in vague terms – to be reached but it is overly ambitious. Member states are on a political level leading some sort of an EU policy *vis-a-vis* Kosovo, so the end or the continuation of the mission will always be a political decision. There should be clear set of the success indicators defined, which would allow to "measure" if the mission is successful or not. Any other conditionality-driven processes, such as visa liberalisation process, would have helped the mission to achieve its objectives, and this could have worked better, if these deliberations had been better used in the strategic planning of the mission and a general approach of the EU to Kosovo.



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2.1.2 ALTHEA

During the round table discussion **the role of NATO and Berlin Plus arrangement** and its implications to planning of the EUFOR Althea was discussed. Althea is a unique operation in comparison to the other European Union forces namely due to its joint arrangements. Since the operation was deployed in 2004, Althea has greatly benefitted from the access to NATO planning assets and structures, and NATO is the main counterpart for EUFOR. Due to this joint nature, the operation planning of EUFOR Althea has been very much connected to the NATO's planning procedures and when the Althea was launched the operation was basically based on the NATO's Operational Plan. Today, this system based on NATO assets is still perceived functional and the planning process takes all the necessary factors into account. **This joint planning and conduct structure is seen as a best practise, as it enables EUFOR to have an access to NATO's assets, facilitate the information sharing, and strategic planning between the organisations.**

In terms of strategic planning receiving adequate, reliable and timely information is crucial. **Situational awareness** is the critical information required to allow timely intervention in case of a security situation deteriorates. There are 17 LOT houses, which are an important tool to sense the atmosphere and collect timely information from the civil society. Nevertheless, the operation planning is hampered by insufficient intelligence gathering, and thus having well-qualified **Human Intelligence Team (HUMIT) with local languages** within the operation would be a way to improve the situational awareness and the planning capacity. It was suggested during the round-table discussion that another way to improve the effectiveness of the LOT houses in the information gathering would be to **put emphasis on composing a better mix of staff** with more females and more experienced personnel. Currently, the LOT houses are often composed of rather Junior Officer with little previous experience in intelligence gathering, and in general working in a post-conflict setting.

The interview material suggested that a major challenge to Althea's strategic planning is related to the fact that **CSDP missions are very low on political agendas of member states**. As a result, a continuing problem is lack of priority within the national to deploy the best staff to the operation. It was raised during the round table discussion that some contributing nations have used Althea **as a training mission for their staff rather than deploying a real capability of skill sets for the purposes of the operation**. The quality of the deployed staff has a direct impact on all the functions of the operation. As the planning of the operation is dependable on the assets of the contributing countries, the strategic planning done in the European Union Staff Group (EUSG) in Operation Headquarters is often not implemented accordingly due to the difficulties in appropriate manning.

The challenges related to strategic planning is also connected to a fact that there is **no clear end-state or exit strategy for the operation**. It was discussed, that the operation is not politically sustainable. Without a clear end-state or exit strategy, the nations are becoming less and less willing to maintain or make new contributions. The coalition of willing among the states is holding for now, but may state to falter over extended time. The issue is what the nations expect out of the operation? Without clear milestones, host government ownership



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and end-state, the factual impacts of the training of AFBiH to security still remains to be seen. It was however mentioned that some improvements are expected to take place in training aspect, as the NATO and EUFOR are currently conducting **a capability assessment of AFBiH**. The assessment is to provide an overall picture of the current needs of the AFBiH in terms of training and equipment, thereby enabling the EUFOR to redirect their training efforts where needed. This roadmap, however, does not address the question of what is the desired end-state of the AFBiH.

All the round table experts stressed that **CSDP is foremost a political tool**, which is also reflected to the strategic planning of the EUFOR Althea. It was highlighted during the discussions that the Althea operation is in place for the political reasons. It still has an executive mandate although there has not been major violence for many years, because it is still **the will of the international community** through the Security Council. Furthermore, there is no end state because it is there to implement the Dayton agreement and the Dayton Agreement does not have an end state.

The member states' interests and commitment play the key role in the scale of the operation. It was mentioned several times during the discussions, that the member states seem to have lost interest in Bosnia which is directly reflected to the reluctance to contribute means to the Althea operation. At the same time several non-EU countries are willing to support the capacity building process of AFBiH by offering training, and donating military material and equipment to the country. Nevertheless, these efforts are often not in-line with the EUFOR's training efforts. It was agreed by the round table experts that **the strategic planning is hampered by the lack of commitment by the member states and lack of shared understanding among the international community on what the nations wish to achieve in Bosnia**. Until today the host nation has not been able to provide a roadmap to the international community on how they wish the armed forces to be developed. That has made planning of the effective capacity building of AFBiH challenging.

2.2 OPERATIONAL CAPACITY

2.2.1 EULEX

Experts seconded to EULEX by member states are often sent to Kosovo for short periods (6 months or one year), which makes it hard for newcomers to catch up with the missions' specifics. **Short duration of deployments significantly affects the operational capacity of the mission**. It has been argued by some of the invited experts that a member state seconded expert sent to the mission for 12 months is actually effective for 5 or 6 months only (after the pre-deployment trainings, an orientation period, all the preparations and absences are taken into consideration). Experts at the round table agreed that it is important to differentiate between international contracted staff and seconded staff in terms of operational capacity, as an internationally contracted staff member is exposed to a different regime and her/his deployment is generally longer than the



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one of the seconded expert. Within seconded staff there is also a difference among positions. For example police usually rotate on a six months basis, which does not impair operational capacities. On the other side, any leave of judges and prosecutors creates a problem. It is one of the constraints the mission has, which is especially evident in the case of local staff, which constantly needs to build relations with the newcoming international staff. For example the investigation process in Kosovo – which is an important part of EULEX's work – takes two years and is not compatible with the concept of CSDP mission at all. Investigation process, taking into account everything before and after the official investigation process, can take years and is not compatible with the secondment idea at all. Additionally, the duration of the assignment has an important impact. To strengthen the whole CSDP concept with regard to operational capacities, further commitments by the governments should be done, also in order to deploy the well-trained experts. This is not always the case, since member states prefer to retain their best personnel at home. It also has to be emphasized that short-term secondments are not only about the political will of the state but also about their national legal framework. For example some states do not even have the legal framework to replace the personnel deployed to a CSDP mission, and this affects operational capacity of the mission.

In the past **OPLANs** were prepared by the Head of Mission. However in the last two years the responsibility has been shifted to the HQ in Brussels and it is drafted by CPCC, while the inclusion of the mission staff in the process that influences the operational capacity of EULEX in the field is rather small. The experts have expressed their belief that HoMs should be more involved in the process, and be part of the drafting of the OPLANs. This has improved, and the experts at the round table came to the conclusion that the last revision of EULEX OPLAN has been done in close contact with the mission. Experts agreed that there are no guidelines on how an OPLAN should be turned into a Mission Implementation Plan (MIP). Mission has internal guidelines, but generally there is no single framework on how the whole benchmarking cycle is conducted; differences within the mission and HQ appear regarding who should benchmark and to which level (HoM/member states/HQ). Not only benchmarking but also synchronization, when a certain task is given, is problematic. Currently the process in the EU missions goes backward; most of the times the mission does not know the baseline or needs to reconstruct the baseline after the work has already started in order to be able to do the benchmarking. When PSC agrees to a certain task and the line of operation, which has to be measurable and in line with the benchmark, it should first do the baseline, know exactly what the end state is, and establish the milestones based on that.

Throughout the analyses it has been concluded that one of the biggest challenges in conducting CSDP mission is the **non-existence of EU best practices**, which makes it impossible to pass them on to the host country. Mission experts come from several countries and have different backgrounds, but best practices should be identified through the years of work in Kosovo (e.g. monitoring, mentoring and advising). The EULEX representatives serving longer periods in the mission know local and EU laws, institutions and government representatives and are able to identify best practices, which all of them agree are beneficial to draw upon.



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Experts have also noted one should be careful when proposing certain best practices, which require specific IT or other capabilities that are not yet available in Kosovo.

According to the assessments of the research and interviews, **Kosovo Police and Customs seem to be fully operational** and can be considered as one of the biggest success stories of the mission, while the same cannot be claimed for judiciary. It has been argued that judiciary is not in its full operational capacity. General local perception of EULEX is that not enough has been done in field of the rule of law and its reform. Experts have agreed that police sector has been developed more than the judiciary but one should be careful when making quick conclusions. They have argued that statistical data can be misleading, especially when it comes to judging timelines. EULEX has been there for years now, but the prosecutions take time. Local population wishes for certain people to be prosecuted, but official cases are often not filled, which means prosecutors cannot act on them. Even when the prosecution does start it can take years before it is finalized. Many times prosecutors face the lack of proofs, which leads to the failure of imprisoning certain people who face serious allegations of being involved in criminal activities. EULEX judges issue a verdict every four days but statistical data makes it impossible to prove the quality of judges' and prosecutors' performance. Further on, the experts argued that nothing has been preventing local Kosovo judges and prosecutors from taking on and processing certain 'difficult cases', but the Kosovo judiciary is often reluctant to act due to several reasons, and rather tries to rely on EULEX for doing it.

Through the interviews it has been concluded **EULEX does not have a central role in in SSR** but only indirectly affects it, first and foremost through Kosovo police. Experts at the round table have agreed that there are some elements of EULEX capacity building that are related to SSR in the broader sense, and that there are some supportive actions that relate indirectly, but it cannot be said that the whole sector of SSR applies to EULEX actions. EULEX does not implement SSR as such, but parts of its capacity building can be described as influential for that area.

The **ability of local institutions to take over responsibility from EULEX, and thus contribute to operational capacity**, varies from sector to sector and from task to task. The experts have noted that the presence of an executive mandate is very convenient for the locals, who are using it as an excuse for non-actions and unresponsiveness. This is especially notable in the field of organized crime and corruption, where the expectations from the local population are the highest, but these crimes fall within the exclusive competence of the special prosecution office of Kosovo, and not under the jurisdiction of EULEX. Anyhow, as the experts pointed out, local prosecutors could have been engaged more. Experts claimed that Kosovo would not collapse if the mission left, since many things are under the responsibility of the local institutions and EU has other instruments to support them (IPA, bilateral assistance, etc.)



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2.2.2 ALTHEA

EUFOR Althea's current mandate is two-fold - executive and non-executive. Its executive part is derived from the UNSCR supporting the BiH authorities in maintaining a safe and secure environment and a non-executive part is about capacity building and training for the AFBiH. Currently, **the training aspect is the main effort**. The material collected during the interviews demonstrated that important progress within the AFBiH has been made in this respect, and large part of AFBiH is well trained. In addition, according to the local counter partners the gender equality and human rights has been well developed throughout the liaison between EUFOR Althea and AFBiH. However, an expert participating at the round table highlighted that a continuing problem in conducting training is connected to **funding**. There is no sound equipment or materials procurement budget, and problems regarding the training arise when AFBiH does not have the equipment or basic assets to train with. **ATHENA mechanism cannot be used to fund military equipment**, and the country's own defence budget is only 250 000 mill. €. In the absence of the appropriate equipment the trainings are often cancelled. In addition, the lack of funding for materials makes any real-time activities such as disaster relief almost impossible.

Besides the funding issue a major barrier to consistent reform process has been connected to the **lack of a nationally owned strategy** over the defence sector. It was discussed that the political framework in BiH makes the reform process challenging; a collective presidency directs the BiH Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces, but the country's three ethnicities have differing views and vision of the development of the defence sector. As a consequence, until today, the government has been unable to provide a defence strategy, which has also hampered the effectiveness of the EUFOR's capacity building activities.

The issue of Althea's capability to act in the crisis situation was raised during the round table discussion. At the moment, Althea is lacking two battalions from its mandated capability. It was agreed by the round table experts that **the current capabilities are not enough to ensure the safety and security of the whole region**. If serious security challenges broke out in several locations simultaneously Althea would not be able to react significantly with immediacy. It was however also pointed out that if major crises broke, even two more battalions would be insufficient. Recent war gaming exercises have raised serious questions about the Althea's ability to respond. Among many others, the key logistic enablers are not in place and the EU does not know where those capabilities could be raised from in a short timeframe if needed. **The lack of political will and commitment** to truly contribute to the operation are evident and the politicians seem to simply accept levels of risk with the current configuration and contributions.

The issue of **the frequent rotation of personnel** was also discussed. It was highlighted by one participant that the rotation policies are not geared to the types of operation like Althea. The Staff officers' short duration of tours, usually six months or even less is a significant challenge in terms of institutional memory, continuity and general effectiveness of the operation. **Lots of vital information and liaison capabilities are lost due to the short rotations**. This reflects not only to the operation itself but also to the local counter partners. It



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came out during the interviews that that the liaison with local suffers when the liaison officers are changing too often and there is no time to create and develop a relationship of trust with them.

It was agreed among the round table experts that there are **shortfalls in EUFOR Althea's Human Intelligence (HUMINT) assets**, which hinders efficient and effective intelligence gathering. Filling such a capability is difficult because the contributing nations are not willing or able to deploy HUMINT teams. Many nations also have restrictions and limitations on that. Therefore, EUFOR Althea does not have realistic HUMINT capabilities in the field.

The challenges related to multi-ethnicity and its implications to the reform process were also raised during the discussions. It was mentioned by one participant, that the multi-ethnicity is the core reason why EUFOR is still present in the country, and it characterizes the underlying problem. Always having to consider ethnicity and its balance creates and perpetuates the division in society as a whole and means the vested political interests will continue to use it as a tool to avoid fundamental change and progress in the country as a whole. Solving this challenge is however beyond control of EUFOR Althea, yet has strong implications to the effectiveness of its activities.

The issue of scarce resources and insufficient capabilities was also discussed as a hindrance to the operational capability of the operation. Limited means to maintain up-to-date situational awareness combined with lack of reserves may be a mission critical deficiency for EUFOR Althea. This has also an effect on EUFOR Althea's capability to protect and evacuate the personnel of the international community if needed.

Finally, the in regards of the operational effectiveness the issue of the **national caveats** together with non-EU participating states was discussed. Due to the caveats and unwillingness to share the information flow of information is not working effectively within the Althea. This is reflected to all the levels of the operation from the strategic planning to liaison and training activities.

2.3 INTEROPERABILITY

2.3.1 EULEX

Many times EULEX serves as a **platform to support EU initiatives**, like visa liberalisation process, SAA and others, which would be difficult to implement without the mission on the ground. EULEX, together with other international actors, has therefore achieved **progress in the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue**, acting in the process as a middle man, perceived by the experts in both, positive and negative way. On the one side things have been moving in the right direction (and away from the status quo), while on the other side it is questionable if the cooperation would be sustained in case EULEX left Kosovo. Experts have agreed there are certain improvements even in the direct contact between Kosovar and Serbian institutions; for example, mutual legal



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assistance programme has been restarted and now operates without the help of EULEX. What would become troublesome in case EULEX withdrew, are the joint formal meetings between the institutions of the government of Serbia and the institutions of the Kosovar government (for example between police or customs), which are politically still very sensitive.

It has been observed that various international actors are conducting different **trainings and education projects** in Kosovo. Experts have stated they are extremely satisfied with the cooperation between EULEX and KFOR, where pooling and sharing of capabilities has been emphasized and a liaison officer has been appointed. Cooperation with the USA has been increasing, which is probably connected with the fact that the current special advisor to EULEX is a USA diplomat. EULEX has an on-going cooperation and weekly meetings established with the EU office in Kosovo. EU office also acts as a coordination hub between EULEX and different embassies, where they cover a variety of topics, not only the rule of law. Experts have agreed there is a limited cooperation with OSCE, which is due to the fact that their mandates are different, but they have cooperated in fields such as assistance with election organization etc.

Certain **programmes in Kosovo overlap**, as there are so many international actors active, but it would be hard to resolve this issue. Also political instruments by embassies and EULEX overlap and a better coordination could be achieved. Coordination is becoming more complicated with long term development instruments, which have a five year planning cycle.

Information sharing between different international actors on the ground in Kosovo varies greatly from case to case. It has been noted many times this is not related to a certain established official practice, but more to the person in charge and willing (or not) to cooperate with others. Currently there is no managing agreement with FRONTEX, although experts have been put in charge to resolve it. Communication and cooperation with EUROJUST is non-existent due to the mandate differences and EUROPOL does not cooperate with Kosovo because of the unresolved status of Kosovo. When it comes to HQ in Brussels, the communication depends greatly on a specific person in charge to further communicate the information received. With the Dialogue process a pool of people from the Brussels-based institutions and the EU institutions in Kosovo has been created, which has greatly increased the communication and exchange of information between Brussels and EULEX.

2.3.2 ALTHEA

In the context of Althea the interoperability is to be approached from **technical, skills-related and resources-related perspectives**.

In regards to technical interoperability it was agreed during the round table discussion that **the lack of common equipment** considerably reduces Althea's ability to cross-train and equip the AFBiH. All the



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contributing nations come with their own equipment and trainings. As a result there is lack of consistency in the training of AFBiH depending greatly on the capabilities provided by the various contributing nations, thereby making the training efforts often useless.

In regards to the skills-related interoperability **the lack of language skills, absence of common pre-deployment training requirements, as well as the national caveats** all hampers the interoperability of the Althea's troops, which is also reflected to the capacity building activities. Especially, having a several non-EU countries, such as Turkey, contributing on Althea has created challenges in terms of interoperability.

The resource-related military-military challenges have manifested themselves as **lack of coordination and financial instruments**. Once more the challenges are related to **inadequate or lack of appropriate equipment** meaning that the existing equipment is not very sophisticated and the AFBiH does not have resources to procure new. In addition, **the uncoordinated donating of equipment** performed by several nations has undermined the efficiency of the CSDP operation since it has bound human and financial resources of EUFOR Althea and NATO in training the AFBiH on every acquired element. **Currently, developing long-term policy is rather challenging as the circumstances change rapidly**. It was stated by one of the experts that the Defence Reform is essential to lay down long-term objectives which can then be developed in a coordinated manner.

In regards to **the inter-agency cooperation in BiH**, European Union Special Representative (EUSR)/ EU Delegation has the coordinating role in terms of EU instruments. It was discussed, that the coordination and information sharing within the EU agencies seem to be at a good level. The roles between the EU's agencies seem to be clear and **the agencies benefit from one another**. While Althea can have no input into the political development of BiH, the use of AFBiH to demonstrate the benefits to be achieved by integrating all ethnicities under one organization is one tool which EUSR/ EU Delegation can use. According to one participant bringing this principle into the complex law enforcement area could have significant benefits. Until the population has trust in its political elite to make a difference to the individual prosperity the risk of tension will remain.

What it comes to **the intra-organizational cooperation and coordination the role of the Berlin Plus arrangement** was highlighted as an important operational enabler. The framework has been an important element for the coordination of the EU's and NATO's Defence Reform efforts in the country. As a whole the cooperation between EUFOR and NATO is currently working rather well and important steps have been taken in order to **ensure complementary approach to support the security sector reform in BiH**. Nevertheless, it was also mentioned during the round table discussion that this intra-organizational cooperation is not organizationally owned but it rather **depends on the individuals and their willingness to cooperate**.



2.4 COMPETENCES

2.4.1 EULEX

When it comes to the **recruitment and selection of CSDP staff**, there is a general lack of standardized procedures, since the procedures differ from country to country. This fact leads to a differentiation in the quality of the selected staff and consequently their performance in the mission. Experts have agreed that recruitment process represents one of the most crucial issues, since most of the mission's budget is spent on personnel. The problem of recruitment arises in both, the seconded and the local contracted staff, since inadequate people are selected and their salary in the mission is often their biggest motivation. It is difficult to assess whether EULEX is a cost effective mission. According to the observation made by an EULEX expert, similar goals would be fulfilled even if EULEX had 50 % of current personnel, it is thus the prevailing opinion that the mission personnel is paid too much and their output is hardly measurable and rather limited.

Member states are not interested to second their personnel to the CSDP missions nor do they second the best people they have. Stakeholders in the member states often are not interested in what is happening in the mission, which is very disappointing for some personnel.

Cultural awareness has been analysed as an important element of personnel skills and competences. Each employee should study Kosovo society, history and culture before taking up a role on the ground. Additionally, a person should also have personal motivation, enthusiasm and willingness to learn. Experts have agreed that cultural awareness should be part of the **pre-deployment training**, which is a responsibility of the sending member state. More should be done at the level of EU member states to send qualified and well-trained staff. There is a **training process in the mission**, but most of the staff do not receive any further training. Around half of the staff in EULEX are locally contracted and have received their induction training years ago (and most of the times it is their only training), which can become problematic with the constant change of the working environment or technology. The experts agreed it is hard to match the non-career aspect of CSDP – which means personnel should constantly change – with constant trainings of those that are there for years. On a more positive note, member countries do tend to match the mandatory training, which is a legal obligation (for example driving license, first aid, software training, hostile environment training), but more could be done in that field.

Related to the **code of conduct** it has been concluded in the interviews that problems within the mission arise when non-EU states contribute their personnel to high ranking positions due to some political motives and then those experts fail to follow the EU values and standards. On the other side, experts from the round table agreed that no big discrepancies regarding values have been noted by themselves, although opinions might differ. According to them a lot depends on the power of the Head of the Mission over the rest of the personnel.



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2.4.2 ALTHEA

Lack of personnel with required expertise combined with frequent rotations are seen to be the major challenges reducing the effectiveness of the Althea significantly. Out of a six-month rotation in most cases at its best only two months are actually effective if the staff possess the required expertise and skills to do the job. Too often generalists are deployed when specialists were needed, and **the pre-deployment training is generally insufficient to prepare the individuals for the tasks**. The issue of the quality of the deployed individuals is tricky because the participating nations provide personnel, equipment, and resources to EUFOR Althea on voluntary basis. "Force generation" is the procedure that should ensure that a given operation has the manpower (i.e. skills and knowledge) and materiel required to achieve the set objectives. However, in reality the contributing nations have the right to choose whom to deploy and often the sent individual do not meet the set requirements. Commander of the EUFOR Althea has practically no means to influence these decisions and practices.

Through the interview it has been understood that the operation should put emphases on **the in-mission training and the staff members' handover/takeovers**. In case performed properly they can significantly increase the effectiveness of the individuals. As pointed out by an expert during the round table discussion instead of simply explaining the duties of the predecessor, also the policy and expected outcomes should be explained to help a newcomer better orientate to the operation. In addition, **cultural awareness and overall understanding of the incoming operational environment** were highlighted to be utmost important, and thus those aspects should be extensively covered during the in-mission training.

The issue of **cultural differences and lack of language skills**- both English and local languages were also highlighted to decrease the effectiveness of the operation activities during the interviews. Especially the capacity-building and liaison activities require language competency, and thus often these activities are hampered due to language barriers.

2.5 COMPREHENSIVENESS

2.5.1 EULEX

With its executive mandate EULEX has raised **high expectations** amongst the international and especially local population. High ambitions encompassed within the largest CSDP mission have backfired when the results were not achieved in the first couple of years. Especially troublesome in the eyes of local population was the lack of success by EULEX on delivering the final rulings in the cases of corruption and organized crime, allegedly involving the local political elite. The locals perceive EULEX as the actor responsible for jailing the people. Local experts have argued that the planning of the mission in this regard was wrong from the



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beginning. It had not taken into account the actual needs on the ground, as it was acting from the security point of view, which created wrong conceptualization and consequently wrong expectations. Locals argue that 1000 police personnel, deployed at the beginning, were not needed at all. With the UN on the ground and the establishment of a fairly operational Kosovo police this became even clearer. Locals have been surprised by the amount of the money spent on the police pillar, while much less has been assigned to judiciary and customs. Further on expectations of the locals have not been met when there was too much emphasis on the war crimes (which is clearly very important), and much less on the fight against corruption. Within the first years of arrival of the EULEX, the locals were thrilled that finally something would move in the field of the rule of law, especially with regards to the imprisoning of the political elite. However, the locals currently feel that EULEX is building the impunity of local politicians, which was inherited from UNMIK. Further on they argue too much politics is involved in the work of EULEX. According to them the mission has failed to build a functional state based on the rule of law, mainly due to the fact they are too preoccupied trying to maintain the stability in the country. On the other side, experts from the mission argue local judges are not interested in processing high profile cases, as they are assured EULEX will handle them. They believe that enough is done by EULEX (although more judges could be deployed), while on the Kosovo side there seems to be no interest for handling the cases (courts are extremely non-active).

Through the conduct of the interviews it has been analysed that **duplications and double investments into similar projects are happening**, which local actors often abuse of for their own personal gain. Actions, perception, aims and interests of certain states are not aligned with EU standards and efforts, which leads to wasted work and advices. The experts agreed that due to a great number of international organizations present in Kosovo, duplications are common and very hard to monitor and prevent. It has been emphasized that it is impossible to repair things on the ground, when they had been planned inappropriately in the planning cycle. It is also useless to try to adjust something that was agreed four years ago in different political circumstances. Some duplication is not necessarily negative, for example in capabilities, while in advisory role it does create more trouble. What is challenging is to avoid situations where advisors from different organizations or countries give different advice on the same issue, and locals can thus freely choose the one that suits them more. Some of the participants at the round table believe the locals became experts in handling international community the way it suits their personal interests. The same issue has been reported within the EU itself, when a mission has researchers working on an issue for years and then the EU sends a special rapporteur, who after a couple of months issues a report that locals gladly accept, if it works in their favour.

On a more positive side, **Belgrade-Pristina dialogue** has been identified as a positive example of comprehensive approach. Each of the institutions brought in something valuable and the result was very positive. Situation on the ground and analyses of the interviews have shown that **Kosovo Serbs have never accepted EULEX as a replacement for UNMIK**. Despite the fact EULEX is officially following a status-neutral policy, both sides, Serbs and Albanians, have found the actions of EULEX as contrary to the policy of neutrality. In the past EULEX was prevented from traveling to the northern part of Kosovo, which made strengthening of



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the rule of law there more difficult (hence, we cannot say this was comprehensive), but in recent years the situation has improved. The experts at the round table agreed that the majority of **Kosovo Serbs** do not feel part of the Kosovo society, which has a significant negative impact on both sides. They stated that security concerns still exist, despite the fact that no major incident occurred in the last years. The last Head of Mission of EULEX established reliable relations with authorities and community in the **North of Kosovo**, but the political game still prevails. The problem with the North proves to be problematic for both sides. Kosovo Serbs have difficulties in accepting EULEX intentions to normalize the relations, while the Kosovo Albanians perceive the cooperation of the mission with local government in the North as problematic, since the mission should be status-neutral.

Through the interviews it has been understood that EULEX lacks a clearly defined and measurable end state, which consequently means the lack of **exit strategy** of the mission. This, apart from the complicated measuring of success of the mission, also poses a challenge to local actors in understanding and defining the future role of EULEX in Kosovo. At the round table the experts agreed that the desired end state does exist and it has been even officially recorded. However, it seems to be too ambitious to be achieved (at least in a short to mid-term period), which again causes problems when trying to create an exit strategy. The desired end state aims to achieve a multi-ethnic country, the sustainable rule of law, accountable institutions based on the rule of law, a functional society, protection of minorities, etc. Experts believe such a state has not even been achieved in some EU countries, let alone could it be achieved in Kosovo. Such overly ambitious **end state** creates too high expectations on all sides. All sides seem to be unsatisfied with the outcome, which is hardly measurable, while it is impossible to predict when the end state could be achieved.

2.5.2 ALTHEA

EUFOR Althea has been present in BiH for nearly 12 years. Although there has not been recurrence of violence the operation still has an executive mandate. The purpose of Althea still being present in the country with Chapter VII mandate has raised lots of questions among the international community. It is widely agreed that the **Althea is present in BiH for political reasons**. Thus, rather than having a clear strategy or reform agenda it seems that **by maintaining its presence in the BiH the operation serves its purpose**. Nevertheless, during the interviews it became clear that the local population still perceived **Althea as an important security provider** and they are afraid that Althea exiting the country the existing tensions would escalate to a new ethnic conflict. Thus, in this regard declaring the operation complete would be a major success for the EU. The operation must leave behind a functioning state, which can be a successful member of the EU and NATO without need for further engagement in maintaining the Safe and Secure Environment. To do that the local security providers must be able to contain any disruption of the environment and inter-ethnic faction in a harmonious manner. This cannot naturally be achieved solely by efforts of a military operation, but require



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among other, strong political commitment, local ownership, economic development and functional state institutions.

The issue of EU's visibility was also raised during the round table discussion. From the interviews it was understood that **NATO is considered to be a more credible actor than EU/EUFOR by the local population**, mostly due to concrete hard power capabilities and real measures taken compared to EU's soft power. According to several interviewees the activities of many of the bi-lateral actors are more known to an average man than those of EU. Bilateral material support brings more visibility to the locals. It was mentioned by one participant that without concrete results it is difficult to demonstrate the average population what the EU has done or can do in BiH. Both the **EU and EUFOR lack of appropriate communication capability**. Unless, the EU has a coherent information strategy, the intentions and activities of the EU and EUFOR remain unclear to the population.

Currently, the EU tries to implement its comprehensive approach to BiH by employing its development, security and political instruments to the country. The research material suggests that **EUFOR Althea largely fits in the overall EU strategy on BiH** and the region in its role as a security provider – by providing deterrence and contributing to capacity building in support of security and development. EUFOR Althea closely cooperates and follows the political guidance coming from the EUSR/Head of EU Delegation. EU Delegation is also in charge of the overall coordination of the EU efforts in the country, thereby enhancing the coherence of the EU engagement. It was mentioned by one of the participants that whilst the cooperation between the EU actors is improving, the work is still in progress. Till today **the comprehensiveness suffers from strong national agendas and lack of political commitment**. EU's ability to implement its activities in BiH comprehensively is hampered by the **vested national interest, unwillingness to commit resources and lack of ability to push the BiH authorities to take the lead of the reform process**. These all are reflected to the Althea's effectiveness.

One of the experts mentioned that recent activities by Public Affairs Office have shown what can be achieved by relatively simple measures when properly integrated. **It is vital that the international community speaks with one common voice**. Otherwise there will be too many agendas and thus lack of cohesive effect. The absence of a common voice enables the politicians to seize on the differences to suit their own agendas and thereby dilute the possible comprehensive approach. Common voice could make real progress by sending a clear message to the locals and to the international community as to what must be done in BiH to move forward into both EU and NATO.

Through the interviews it has been understood that EUFOR Althea suffers from **the lack of clear end state or exit strategy**. This, apart from complicated measuring of success of the mission, also poses a challenge to local actors as well as the international community in understanding and defining future role of Althea in Bosnia. The mandate has evolved and shifted to capacity building and training since the main elements of the post-Dayton mandate have largely been fulfilled. In regards to the success of the operation, when reflected its



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achievements to its initial mandate to ensure the safe and secure environment it must be noted that **there has been no recurrence of the inter-ethnic fighting and the deterrent effect of EUFOR has been proven.** Nevertheless, when looking at the operation's achievements in the EU's wider political- strategic context, which is to prepare BiH to join EU and NATO, there still is a long way to go. Unless there are decisive conditions set for the membership of the EU which relate to EUFOR's continued presence, it will still be a political decision taken by the Security Council, as to when the operation will be able to exit. If the training is considered viable and effective, then clear roadmap will need to be agreed and implemented in line with a major reconstruction of the BiH defence sector's budgetary procedures and funding to achieve the desired self-sustainable capabilities.

2.6 TECHNOLOGIES

2.6.1 EULEX

Round table experts agree that **technology does not play a crucial role** in achieving the EULEX mandate and its success. Member countries should focus more on providing proper trainings to their staff in order for them to be able to use the equipment at hand. One of the mentioned technical limitations was the lack of specialized equipment, which decreases the investigation capabilities, as well as the lack of data sharing equipment. Another limitation is that executive mandate of EULEX sometimes requires the use of complicated IT technology, which the Kosovar infrastructure is not yet capable of providing. Experts have agreed that the situation is sufficiently resolved on the ground.

One of the mentioned positive sides was good cooperation with KFOR, where **pooling and sharing** has been the established good practice. Pooling and sharing is used in many fields, especially in education and training of staff, specialized equipment and airlift capabilities.

2.6.2 ALTHEA

Round table experts agreed that **there is little technical interoperability within the EUFOR** which makes up the training problem. One nation will train the AFBiH on one type of equipment but the problem is that AFBiH does not actually have the equipment they are trained on, since the equipment is collected and removed at the completion of the training. **The lack of adequate equipment finally makes the training useless and leads to the waste of effort.** On the other hand, the challenge with donated equipment is that there is often no maintenance package to support it, which renders it obsolete in a short time. Furthermore, recent decision does not allow **Capacity building in support of security and development (CBSD) funding** for ATHENA



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Mechanism to be used for military equipment, and thus there is no funding to support the sustainability of the training of AFBiH. It was agreed by the participants that the lack of common equipment reduces the ability to cross train and equip the AFBiH, thus making the trainings rather a unique nation-by-nation requirement.

With regards to the pooling and sharing of **resources, the cooperation between NATO and EUFOR is a great example of effective pooling and sharing**. Althea considerably benefits from the access to the NATO planning assets, structures and capabilities under the “Berlin Plus” arrangements. Besides the use of the NATO planning experience and capabilities, the possibility to use the NATO Communication and Information System, the NATO secured networks and intelligence systems, as well as the NATO intelligence database, has provided an efficient and cost-effective mechanism for EUFOR Althea since the beginning of the operation.

3 CONCLUSION

Kosovo and BiH are countries in the immediate proximity of the EU member states, so it is not surprising that two of the most robust and intensive CSDP missions and operations - EULEX and EUFOR Althea - have been launched and are still present there. The needs for the deployment of EULEX and ALTHEA stem from the failure of a *peaceful* disintegration of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, which resulted in devastating wars. Consequently, when the armed phase of the conflicts ended, it triggered a significant commitment of the EU. Both Kosovo and BiH, as the missing pieces of the Western Balkans puzzle, became potential candidates for the EU membership. Such a stance of the EU was reaffirmed on several occasions (the Feira European Council - 2000; the Thessaloniki Declaration - 2003). These facts serve as the points of departure for the round table discussion on EULEX and EUFOR Althea, which was organized in the framework of the IECEU's WP2 – the Balkans on 24 May 2016 at Jable Castle, Slovenia.

The invited experts were asked to comment on the preliminary findings acquired by the researchers (University of Ljubljana, FINCENT, and CEP) during their field trips to Kosovo and BiH in February-March 2016. The findings sent to the experts a few days prior to the round table concern the *six capabilities* of the IECEU project: planning capacity, operational capacity, interoperability, competences, comprehensiveness, and technology (see D1.5 for details). As the six capabilities are closely intertwined and often overlapping, it is difficult to separate them for analytical purposes. Hence, it should be emphasized that each of the six *capabilities* were unintentionally discussed also in the framework of the debate on other *capabilities*, and the thoughts the experts expressed, were later on categorized into another *capacity*.

With regard to the planning capacity concerning EULEX and EUFOR Althea, there are several issues highlighted by the invited experts, but the following loom the most. First of all, the experts agreed it is very difficult to compare EULEX and EUFOR Althea from the perspective of planning capacity, as the two CSDP



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instruments in question are different by their nature: EULEX is a civilian mission, while EUFOR Althea is a military operation. However, the experts agreed that it **would be wise for both EULEX and EUFOR Althea to have a clear and exact exit strategy** (or the so called phasing out of the mission envisaged), which would significantly help the planning of the mission/operation. Secondly, EULEX and EUFOR differ from the planning perspective, as EUFOR Althea relies on a non-EU planning expertise – the NATO planning process – while EULEX mostly has to rely on its own (and other missions’) planning experiences only. This also has to do with the fact that military operations might be easier to plan due to the character of military organizations, in which commanding chains are clear, as the soldiers better understand the processes of subordination. The latter might not always be the case in civilian missions, esp. not in the missions such as EULEX, where civilian experts from several ‘walks of life’ (policemen, customs officers, judges, prosecutors etc.) are engaged. The next thing common to both missions with regard to the planning capacity is the fact that it is difficult to attract competent personnel to work for the mission/operation. This should not be confused with the fact that a lot of people apply when a new position is opened; the challenge is to find out how many of them are actually well-trained and well-prepared for competent work in such environment. This is also linked to the last point in this concluding chapter concerning the planning, which is **the lack of commitment (or fatigue) by the EU member states to send the best staff to CSDP missions and operations in the Balkans.**

The second capability addressed at the round table was the operational capability. When comparing EULEX and EUFOR Althea, there are quite a few things in common that affect the operational capability. **Frequent rotation of personnel** is problematic for both of them, in terms of retaining institutional memory, continuity and effectiveness in general. Secondly, the **‘main beneficiaries’ of the EU’s support that are analysed in the IECEU project – the BiH armed forces and Kosovo customs officials and police – have been trained relatively** well compared to the state of their professionalism prior to the deployment of missions (of course, there is still much to be done). EULEX and EUFOR Althea also share **the problem of staffing**, which affects their operational capability: the first of the two has been facing the lack of competent judges and prosecutors from the EULEX contributing countries who would be ready to come and work in Kosovo, while EUFOR Althea’s operational capability is affected by the fact that there is a lack of human intelligence officers. Last, but not least, the available resources should be put in a comparative perspective when the operational capability is discussed: **experts at the round table were of the opinion that EULEX has more than enough resources, while there are some resources lacking in EUFOR Althea** (lack of money available for training, equipment and materials procurement etc.).

Regarding interoperability, the experts believe that **the interoperability and cooperation between the EU and NATO** is generally good in both cases (KFOR and EULEX in Kosovo; NATO and EUFOR Althea in BiH). Certain improvement was reached in the last couple of years, e. g. introducing a KFOR-EULEX liaison officer, regular meetings between organizations at different levels etc. **When interoperability is discussed from the technological viewpoint, it must be said that this concerns EUFOR Althea much more than EULEX**, as the soldiers in EUFOR Althea come from different countries, which means they deal with various types of



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military technology and equipment, have different approaches, levels of professionalism etc., while the case of EULEX is easier in this regard, as the equipment used by EULEX staff is not that sophisticated; this means that it can be easily used by almost everyone arriving to Kosovo to work for EULEX. Another issue linked to interoperability is the **quality of pre-deployment training**; in this regard, another similarity appears between both CSDP missions, as there were several complaints that pre-deployment training was missing or was insufficient in some cases for both EULEX and EUFOR Althea. Last, but not least, some experts believe that at the final point the quality and level of interoperability is also linked to **personal characteristics of individuals**: if the individuals from two different organizations strive for interoperability and cooperation in order to achieve better results, they can find a way to do so. On the contrary, individuals not interested in reaching progress by mutual cooperation will always find a reason why cooperation cannot take place.

A human resources department is at the heart of every CSDP mission and operation. Hence the fourth capability, the competences, is primarily linked to this department. For both EULEX and EUFOR Althea the experts mentioned that **cultural awareness of the deployed personnel from the non-Balkan countries should be improved**. This could be achieved by a better pre-deployment and also in-mission trainings. Also the **language skills** should be checked beforehand. Another challenge for both missions is related to the fact, that it is often rather **difficult to attract competent experts** to the mission. The reasons for this are different: some countries that do have competent experts are reluctant to deploy them to either Kosovo or Bosnia and Herzegovina, as they are needed back home, or they – earning high salaries – do not even consider being deployed to the CSDP missions and operations (e.g. it is difficulties to attract good judges to work for EULEX). In reality, the contributing nations have the right to choose whom to deploy, and occasionally the experts that do not meet the set requirements are sent to the mission, and the human resources department at EULEX, EULEX HoM or the commander of EUFOR Althea have practically no means to influence these practices.

The next capability that we addressed was comprehensiveness. **None of the analysed CSDP missions/operations in the Balkans has a comprehensive mandate for doing an overall reform of the country**, although both of them **share a part of responsibility for the maintenance of the safe and secure environment**. In both cases, there are other actors responsible for one or more aspects of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and security sector reform – NATO being the most important in both Kosovo and BiH. **Both EULEX and EUFOR Althea still have an executive mandate**, in addition to ‘monitoring, mentoring, and advising’ mandate in the case of EULEX, or providing support in capacity-building and training in the case of EUFOR Althea. From the **territorial viewpoint of comprehensiveness**, EUFOR Althea is comprehensive in this regard, as it ‘covers’ the whole territory of BiH, while the territorial comprehensiveness of EULEX has been seriously hampered due to its inability to access Northern Kosovo (although it has to be noted that the situation for EULEX has improved in this regard as a consequence of the improved Prishtina–Belgrade dialogue, which has to do more with the comprehensive approach of the EU to the country, and less with the good performance of EULEX; hence, it has to be reiterated that a CSDP mission/operation alone cannot have any success in the



country, if it is not supported by other conflict prevention and/or peacebuilding initiatives undertaken by international community).

The last capability analysed in the IECEU project is technology. **In the case of EULEX the experts at the round table agreed that technology** – compared to the importance of the quality and competences of staff – **does not play a crucial role** in achieving the objectives of EULEX mandate, while **technology has a rather important role for EUFOR Althea**. Especially problematic is the fact that armed forces of one nation train the armed forces of BiH on one type of equipment, while the armed forces of BiH do not actually have the equipment they are trained on. This is due to the fact that equipment is collected and removed at the completion of the training, which makes training quite useless and leads to a waste of effort.

Last, but not least, it should be noted that there were several other findings at the round table relevant for both EUFOR Althea and EULEX. However, as “other-than-capability discussion” was not envisaged within the scope of this deliverable, as defined in the Grant Agreement, the IECEU team decided that some other relevant issues discussed at the round table will be scrutinized in D2.5, which is the final deliverable of WP2.



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ANNEX 1: INVITATION TO THE ROUND TABLE**INVITATION**

We are pleased to invite you to the IECEU Round Table discussion of experts, which will be held on 24th May 2016 at Centre for European Perspective (CEP), Jable castle, Mengeš, Slovenia

The project *Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention (IECEU)* aims at enhancing conflict prevention capabilities of the EU. This project has received funding from the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation HORIZON 2020. The consortium consists of 11 participants from 7 different European countries, a diverse group of civilian, research and military organizations. The project is coordinated by Laurea University of Applied Sciences from Finland.

By analyzing the civilian conflict prevention and peace building capabilities of the EU, the IECEU project will try to identify the best practices and lessons learned in CSDP missions and operations, so as to provide a catalogue of best practices, new solutions and approaches, which will be at the end of the project presented to the relevant institutions of the EU. As part of the project several field research trips have been organized to the Balkans, Africa and Middle East/Asia. The objective of the field trips was to conduct a thorough analysis of the existing CSDP missions and operations, based on the methodological framework established as the first major goal of the project (completed in 2015). The researchers conducted several interviews with the personnel of CSDP missions and operations, representatives of the local authorities, NGOs, academia etc.

The preliminary findings from field research trips will be known in May 2016. In order to assess their quality, we are organizing the round table on **24th May 2016**, where also your presence is appreciated. At this round table, only two CSDP missions/operations will be discussed: EULEX (Kosovo) and ALTHEA (Bosnia and Herzegovina). It is expected that various experts from Kosovo, BiH, and EU will attend. The objective of discussion is to confront the views and opinions from all sides in a constructive manner, which will enable to identify lessons learned, best practices and drawbacks regarding EULEX and ALTHEA. A discussion report, which will be used for further dissemination, will be prepared after the round table.

We sincerely hope you will be able to participate at the round table.

Preliminary agenda

9.00. - 12.30 internal review of research findings

12.30 - 13.30 lunch

13.30 - 15.00 open discussion

*Discussions will be held according to Chatham House rule

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ANNEX 2: GUIDELINES SENT TO THE EXPERTS PRIOR TO THE ROUND TABLE

**IECEU project: Round table (discussion of experts): primary findings from field research
Jable, Slovenia, 24th May 2016**

Dear Sir or Madam,

Thank you for accepting our invitation to participate at the round table in the framework of the project 'Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities in EU Conflict Prevention – IECEU', which has received funding from the EU Framework Programme for Research and Innovation HORIZON 2020. As you know, the IECEU project aims at enhancing conflict prevention capabilities of the EU. By analysing the civilian conflict prevention and peace building capabilities of the EU, the project tries to identify the best practices and lessons learned in CSDP missions and operations, so as to provide a catalogue of best practices, new solutions and approaches, which will be at the end of the project presented to the relevant institutions of the EU.

In February and March 2016, the researchers from University of Ljubljana, FINCENT and Centre for European Perspectives (CEP) conducted study trips to Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. We conducted several interviews with the personnel of EULEX and ALTHEA representatives, representatives of the local authorities, NGOs, academia etc., so as to gather various perspectives on both CSDP missions/operations.

Hereby we would like to present you the main findings from both field trips, so as to get familiar with them prior to the round table. According to the methodological framework established on the consortium level, these topics will serve as the main focus of the round table. We hope you will be able to read the findings before your arrival to Slovenia and prepare comments on our findings. The morning round table (internal discussion) will be held according to the Chatham House rules; we expect it to be a lively discussion, in which the IECEU experts will elaborate on the findings a bit further, and you will be able to criticize the findings, present some new perspectives (information) that have been overlooked or not appropriately interpreted by the IECEU experts. As there are quite a few findings we would like to be discussed, you might want to prepare notes in a written form prior to the round table.

First and foremost, the invitees, based on their expertise, are expected to comment on the findings relevant for either EULEX or ALTHEA at the round table. However, as you might have knowledge on the other CSDP



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
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mission/operation, we would, of course, very much welcome to hear the comments on the other mission/operation.

The methodological framework of IECEU focuses on six themes (capabilities) relevant for the CSDP mission/operation, each of them from the EU and non-EU (local) perspective:

1. *Planning capacity*
2. *Operational capacity*
3. *Interoperability*
4. *Competences*
5. *Comprehensiveness*
6. *Technologies*

Figure 1: Capabilities (themes) analysed in the IECEU project



Last, but not least, we would like to hear from you **what do you think about the success (effectiveness) of EULEX and ALTHEA**. The success indicators have been developed with regard to the four effectiveness criteria:

- **Internal goal attainment:** fulfilment of politico-strategic goals and operational objectives of the mission/operation;
- **Internal appropriateness:** timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness in implementation
- **External goal attainment:** initiation, continuation, diffusion, escalation & intensification of violence
- **External appropriateness:** proportional prevention i.e. more good (positive and sustainable contribution to preventing violent conflict) than harm (force, coercion and other negative effects)


Figure 2: Effectiveness criteria in the IECEU project



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Main findings from field trips

I. Planning capacity (PC)

EULEX

- ✓ **CSDP is very low on political agendas of some MS** (they are not interested who do they second nor about reports what is happening in the mission, which is very disappointing for some personnel).
- ✓ **Lack of basic methodological guidelines for planning in the mission** (flexibility, is good but certain key guidelines should be described); also the mission planning office is not logically put in the organigram of the mission (low hierarchical level, below HoM, CoS, Operations).
- ✓ **Lack of SOPs for planning**: each mission has a very different approach to solving this. Weak structure at the strategic level, tactical level is then making decisions (2,5 people in Brussels in CPCC is not enough for a mission that is large as EULEX but the process of planning should be a priority, not just the number of people).
- ✓ **"Planning driven by persons, and not necessarily by professional and cooperative standards"**: Quoting unnamed person: *"The whole system of planning in Brussels is stuck in a complete manner of egos and a person gets very tired of that. I.../ Our planning system, the whole approach of launching a*



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mission is a weakness. Planning is a military process and the planners do not seem to understand the reality on the ground."

- ✓ **Status issue is at core of many EULEX issues, both internal and external, which causes problems for planning.** Due to the lack of EU political unity (several EU states still do not recognize Kosovo statehood), the mandate and capacity of the mission, strategic planning and political leadership is sometimes not as clear and direct as desired and bound to compromises. The status issue is also impacting EULEX cooperation and interoperability with other international actors in Kosovo.
- ✓ **Executive function was not well planned and strategic.** American and EU approach for judges. There's a framework how they will deal with cases but no common approach. Judicial independence – they always refer to that. They feel like they're not part of the organization. You're independent while you're in court. It has a lot to do with wider EU interests. MS have their own interests. They always talk about big fish.
- ✓ **Need for improved situational awareness on strategic level.** Several interviewees noted that "the Brussels" is not well-informed about the challenges in Kosovo, which has a negative impact on the mission planning. It is true that the experts working in EULEX are occasionally invited to short seminars/workshops to Brussels to contribute to the planning and execution of the mission from their "Kosovo perspective", but these recommendations are only rarely taken into consideration in further planning. Last, but not least, there is also a lot of information on local developments that 'the Brussels' should be aware of, but many of these relevant information never reach Brussels (certain important issues that were identified on the ground and should be raised on political/diplomatic level have not been addresses properly due to lack of situational awareness)
- ✓ **No open discussion on the exit strategy:** what milestones should be reached that the mission would close down; the end state, which would involve more than just some vague statements, is missing.

ALTHEA

- ✓ Today **situational awareness suffers** because of the reduced number of troops and the low number of LOT-houses in the field (Liaison and Observation Teams). This may also pose a risk to security in case of a flare-up
- ✓ When it comes to **training missions, a certain amount of budget should be allocated to purchase of equipment.** Efficiency is questionable if the trained personnel have the skills and knowledge but no means to deliver
- ✓ There is **no open discussion on the exit strategy** on the politico-strategic level.



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II. Operational capacity (OC)

EULEX

- ✓ **Short durations of deployments that affects the operational capacity.** Experts seconded to EULEX by member states is often sent to Kosovo for too short periods, usually for one year (or less), with limited opportunity for the renewal of contract. By having short mandates, there is not enough time for newcomers to catch up with the mission specifics, and when he or she does, the term is already coming to an end. This is especially worrisome when assessing the strategic level, where long term guidance and leadership is needed. It takes time to get the trust of the staff and local counterparts in order to have, for example, constructive bilateral meetings and negotiations. These short-term jobs are also more attractive to younger and less experienced professionals, which compound the lack of expertise and "the necessary capacity building skills".
- ✓ **Challenge of OPLANs:** operational level from the mission is included and it takes too much time, they get into too much details. If you have people in Brussels with mission experience, they understand, but often *"it is the MFA and bureaucrats who prepare OPLANs, and they don't understand the reality of a mission and directly invite the operational level" /.../They are then happy to be considered but cause problems for the whole process*. *OPLAN should be prepared under the HOM, but in reality it's the bureaucrats in Brussels and then they're inviting experts from the field (tactical level) and then it doesn't work. OPLAN is the bible and you would need guidelines... It should be up to the mission.*
No guidelines how an OPLAN could be turned into a MIP: *"Simple 7 bullet points would be enough, where you put something straight."*
- ✓ **(Non-existence of) EU best practices.** The problem that arises from the very beginning of the mission is how to define EU best practices and what those actually are. As learned from the interviews with several staff members at EULEX, the perception of best practices has often been defined on the level of *national best practice* from which the EULEX staff is coming from rather than from a common pool of the (non-existing) EU best practices. It was noted that different employees coming from different countries brought to the mission different set of experience, practices and knowledge, which affected continuity. With employees being differently trained and prepared, mission is put in front of the difficult challenge of how to MMA Kosovo counterparts, while having its internal differences in perception and understanding of common practices (or the lack of it). Most of the interviewees agreed that this is one of the most fundamental issues in the field of competences that needs to be addressed.
- ✓ **(Improper) operational focus of mission.** According to our assessment and responses from interviews, Kosovo Police, including border police, and the Customs are operational and can be listed among biggest successes of the mission, while for the judiciary, on the contrary, cannot be said that it is operating functionally. Although the analysis of judiciary's effectiveness does not come within the main scope of the IECEU project, it must be noted that local actors often bring up the judiciary part of EULEX's work when discussing EULEX, arguing that EULEX spends too much time examining alleged war crimes while not giving enough attention to organized crime and corruption. This goes in line with general public dissatisfaction with EULEX judiciary role and rule of law reform process.



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- ✓ **"Focal point in Brussels (CPCC) is a military person"**: it's a cultural & civili/military discrepancy, which take a lot of time and energy, clashes occur over minor issues (it would not be an issue in a military operation, but civilian mission is different).
- ✓ **EULEX role in security sector reform**. As evident from its mandate, EULEX possible area of SSR engagement is judiciary and law enforcement, including customs services. Our interviewees however noted that while EULEX is dealing with specific elements playing a role in SSR, EULEX does not have the central role in the process nor it is mandated for this role. The role of EULEX in SSR can be thus seen as indirect, especially when understanding SSR in its more narrow meaning of defence sector. Nevertheless, the indirect impact of EULEX on SSR in its broader meaning has been generally assessed as positive, especially from perspective of MMA of Kosovo police.
- ✓ **EULEX serving as a link between Serbian and Kosovo authorities**. EULEX has been directly and indirectly involved in serving as a link between Serbian and Kosovo authorities, which has been in line with a broader EU engagement in the region and the Belgrade – Pristina dialogues. Its role of a "middle man" has been identified as both positive and negative for the development in Kosovo. On a positive side, there have been important steps made in a direction of bringing services from both sides at the same table, establishing exchange of information, coordination and cooperation. On the negative, current contacts and exchange are only possible in EULEX presence. Without it, meetings often get cancelled or postponed. Serbia now prefers to talk only through EULEX, which is remaining a "bridge" between two countries. The question that remains is thus what will happen when EULEX eventually closes down.
- ✓ **Transfer of responsibilities to national actors**. The ability of local institutions to take over responsibility from EULEX varies from sector to sector and from task to task. Majority of our correspondents have pointed out Kosovo police as an example of best practice in a sense of training and capacity to independently take over responsibilities. This is also due to good long-term focus of EULEX (and before it UNMIK as well as OMIK) on establishment and development of Kosovo police capability. The transfer of tasks to local institutions after years of strong international presence and ownership (especially in country that had been established under strong international presence) is challenging but necessary for long term sustainability. While the transfer of responsibilities to local institutions may expose some structural issues of Kosovo actors, this has been identified as the only way to effectively test and address those challenges which often did not show when EULEX retained executive mandate.

ALTHEA

- ✓ Due to **lack of member states contributions** EUFOR Althea is short of two battalions which presents a serious challenge if the security situation deteriorates.
- ✓ Many interviewees brought up the **6-months rotation cycle which is a problem** in terms of institutional memory and general effectiveness of the operation.
- ✓ Due to **lack of personnel with right expertise** there are shortcomings, for example, in HUMINT capabilities.



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- ✓ **The multi-ethnic character of the security institutions and political structures poses challenges** for operational capacity (requires balancing, time consuming).
- ✓ BiH MOD exclusively mentions that cooperation with EUFOR/EU on gender equality and human rights is very good.

III. Interoperability (I)

EULEX

- ✓ **Coordination and cooperation on training and education.** Several international actors (including IGO and NGO) are working on various training and enhance efficiency of engaged actors while also benefiting their comprehensiveness capacity. Positive example of cooperation is between EULEX and OSCE in the field of police training, where EULEX is continuing the process of police education started at Kosovo police academy managed by OSCE and assisting KP in implementing that knowledge in their work on the ground. Nevertheless, several of our interviewees have pointed out that organizations are not very keen on sharing on this matter, at least not on the levels desired. This is resulting in overlapping, but also in not fulfilling desired levels of interoperability. It was noted that due to lack of coordination, certain areas of education and training are sometimes not sufficiently covered. Steps to avoid such overlaps have been taken by EULEX through inclusion of KFOR and US liaison officers at EULEX HQ (as those organizations have the biggest potential for overlapping with EULEX).
- ✓ **Coordination and exchange of information among international actors.** The quality and quantity of exchange of information among international actors varies from very good to less efficient. Some of the interviewees have noted that coordination among actors is sometimes relying too much on informal, personal contacts rather than formally structured communication processes. An interesting point that was found during our interviews is that culture matters also in relations between international organizations as some of our interviewees have pointed out that they feel more confident in communicating with someone of same nationality. Cooperation between EULEX and KFOR has been pointed out as good practice. Counterparts from both missions assessed it as clear and comprehensive based on jointly prepared and coordinated plan. There is however some lack of coordination when it comes to authority and responsibility over Kosovo counterparts, in situations where both police and military units find themselves in a same field of operation. EULEX, as a second responder, is a link between Kosovo Police and KFOR (3rd responder). That implies that the quality of communication between KFOR and Kosovo Police can be only as good as the communication between EULEX – KFOR and EULEX – KP for which the response time has been criticized as too long for effective crisis response.
- ✓ **Sharing of information with Kosovo institutions (NON-EU level).** Certain restraints in sharing sensitive information have been noted by our interviewees from both EULEX and Kosovo institutions. Both have referred to cases, where they perceived that communication and sharing of information has not been on the desired level, especially on more higher, strategic levels, while the cooperation and sharing of information on tactical level is generally better. The communication flow and the intermediary role of EULEX in the communications between Kosovo actors and other is not always as sufficient, clear



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and timely as needed for day-to-day operations. Limitations have also been pointed out in cases where more sensitive information has been discussed (such as communication with Europol, Frontex, Eurojust, etc.) as Kosovo actors have indicated that they were not receiving sufficient information.

ALTHEA

- ✓ EUSR/EUD has the coordinating role in terms of EU instruments. From EUFOR Althea and EUD points of view **the cooperation and information sharing are at a good level.**
- ✓ Cooperation between EUFOR and NATO is also working (at the beginning of the operation this cooperation was poor or inexistent on the field level despite the Berlin Plus arrangements) and has been strengthened (joint discussions on what EUFOR and NATO want to achieve as missions) particularly during the last year.
- ✓ There are challenges in Mil-Mil coordination (e.g. equipment donations to BiHAF).

IV. Competences (C)

EULEX

- ✓ **Recruitment and selection of EULEX staff.** In general, the recruitment process for civilian CSDP missions is more complex than on the military side. Several of our interviewees have pointed out lack of standardized procedure on a national level, when proceeding with selection for seconded staff. Due to non-standardized procedures the quality and qualifications of the selected seconded staff may vary significantly. Challenges originating in recruitment and selection process may subsequently affect the long term operability of the mission. People sent to the mission should have sufficient language skills and motivation for work, which is not always the case. The responsibility is partly at the level of Member States and partly the interview panel at the mission which chooses the people. Problems are identified also in the selection of local contracted staff. Certain interviewees have complained that the qualifications of local contracted staff are not adequate in various cases. Due to economic and internal human resources reasons, member states were not sending their best judges or faced challenge to send sufficient number of judges at all in a timely matter. They have been trying to solve this issue by seconding (often) less qualified but cheaper judges and prosecutors from certain not so economically developed countries of the EU, etc. where financial remuneration for staff deployed has been (in comparison to their home pay) much bigger than in countries of the western part of the EU. While this does not automatically imply that these judges have been in any sense less qualified for the job, it does point at important issue faced by the mission and possible reason for questionable qualifications, motivation of some staff (that resulted as well in several well-known public corruption scandals).

Compared to the UN and NGOs, enormous amount of money is spent on EULEX staff, so the output should go dramatically up. Key issue is a senior management capacity.

- ✓ **Cultural awareness.** An important element of personnel skills and competences is cultural awareness and knowledge on historical and other local specifics. Personality, motivation, enthusiasm, willingness,



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professionalism, etc. are further emphasized as important personal competences that while hard to measure formally, have an important impact on individual staff performance and efficiency and have been recognized as highly significant skill by majority of our correspondents.

Local ownership and cultural awareness should go hand in hand; nevertheless, certain interviews pointed out that cultural awareness should not be an excuse for not changing specific laws and customs that are not in accordance with EU best practices and are harmful for the future of Kosovo. There should be a "healthy balance" of cultural awareness, respect for local customs and imported solutions, best practices and knowledge.

- ✓ **Code of conduct, procedures (and the EU values):** Different participating states in EULEX – and their representatives – have different levels of the understanding of the EU values, as well as different approach and standards when it comes to the implementation of the mission's tasks in the field. The problem usually arises especially when non-EU participating states contribute staff to higher, strategic levels of the mission. This staff may not be the most appropriate for such positions from the perspective of EU values and best practices as they are coming from a different environment (for example staff from USA, Turkey, etc. has been exposed as lacking common EU values and best practice experience).
- ✓ **Structure and harmonization of pre-deployment training.** The pre-deployment training is not harmonized between countries joining the mission and can vary from very well trained specialists to just generally trained and experienced staff. This is a result of uncoordinated training procedures that are mostly left to the authority and responsibility of the specific contributing country. Some limited joined pre-deployment training is available for EULEX staff, usually an introduction and briefing program mainly focused on CSDP mission procedures held in Brussels. When considering training of the EU personnel, the balance of quality and quantity should be considered. While our interviews have noted that in their perception the sole amount of the training is sufficient, the content and quality of the training can sometimes be questionable from the perspective of appropriate specialized training for specific positions. Some of the answers from our survey suggest that a lot of the training received by the EU officials deployed is rather general, not necessarily closely related to the specific post or responsibility. Gender training has been exposed as well-improved and mainstreamed.

ALTHEA

- ✓ EUFOR Althea **lacks personnel with required expertise** (e.g. J2).
- ✓ **Language skills** are still a clear problem.
- ✓ In principle, **local counterparts seem to be satisfied with EUFOR competences.**

V. Comprehensiveness (CH)

EULEX

- ✓ **Setting high expectations.** Based on its comprehensive mandate as a rule-of-law mission, EULEX has made a mistake of setting too high expectations to the local population, which were not met (in particular



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fighting corruption and organized crime). The high ambitions backfired later on when the mission was exposed to various critics of inefficiency and failure to deliver promised results. Even though there are quite a few positive results and improvements from EULEX work, the majority of people believe it has failed. Especially troublesome in the eyes of local population was the fact that EULEX was not successful in delivering on final court rulings in the cases of corruption and organized crime, in which high state officials were involved.

- ✓ **Lack of synchronized conflict prevention/peace building strategies with other actors.** Among other international actors, the USA and American investments, including development assistance money, has to be specially considered, as the USA is among the biggest stakeholders in the country. This leads to duplications, double investment in the same or similar projects and, consequently, improper spending of human and financial resources. Local actors are often abusing those duplications for their own personal gain. There is a need for better coordination mechanisms among all actors operating in Kosovo in order to prevent this. There are also other international actors, whose conflict prevention/peacebuilding strategies should be aligned with the EU efforts (certain European states, Japan, Turkey etc. with their particular interests and individual approaches to Kosovo, other international organizations, NGOs etc.).
- ✓ **EULEX role in the north of Kosovo.** Kosovo Serbs never accepted EULEX as a replacement of UNMIK. They see it as biased actor that is following certain policy of supporting independent Kosovo, even though EULEX has been trying to portray itself as a neutral actor. EULEX has faced severe difficulties in travelling to northern Kosovo, and this has prevented the mission from realizing its objective of strengthening the rule of law. It has to be emphasized that inability of EULEX to access northern Kosovo has decreased in the last couple of years, in particular as a result of the Prishtina-Belgrade dialogue. Today, when EULEX role is divided into executive and strengthening division, its engagement in the North can be characterized as primarily executive, while for the rest of Kosovo it could be argued that EULEX's function is primarily of a strengthening character.
- ✓ **Perception of EULEX contribution from Kosovo counterparts.** While the local population and politicians often criticize the mission, the actors on the ground generally expressed positive experience working with EULEX staff. This is especially true for the Kosovo police and border control staff, which is also one of the fields where EULEX succeeded to make progress. Some of our interviewees have noted that EULEX is still often identified as a foreign element of higher (intrusive) authority, which was imposed on the local population. Further, EULEX presence and engagement might not be needed any longer (especially when considering the work of Kosovo Police) as national capabilities are perceived strong enough to take over and work independently. Fewer identified judiciary as sufficient, so assistance or moreover, transformation of this sector is still considered by many as important task of EULEX.
- ✓ **Comprehensiveness of exit strategy (end state).** Many of our interviewees have exposed the lack of clearly defined and measurable end goals (benchmarks) and, based on that, exit strategy of the mission. Lack of clear goals has been noted by both international and local contracted staff on the part of EULEX as well as among local actors. It further poses a challenge to local actors to comprehend and define EULEX future role in Kosovo due to this uncertainty and lack of a clear exit strategy. Interviewees also note that end states are not very realistic and that's why it's difficult to define and subsequently implement any kind of exit strategy.



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ALTHEA

- ✓ Cooperation/information sharing mechanisms have existed since the beginning and according to the interviewees have been working without significant shortcomings. **Coordination of all EU instruments is still a challenge but cooperation between EUFOR and EUSR/EUD is considered to be on a good level** by several FOEU representatives.
 - ✓ **NATO is considered to be a more credible actor than EU/EUFOR by the local population**, mostly due to concrete hard power capabilities and real measures taken compared to EU soft power. Bilateral material support (by other actors than EU) brings more visibility according to local and also some international interviewees.
 - ✓ **EUFOR and EU as a whole lack strategic communication**; the CSDP operation could more actively convey a "EU message" (if there was one).
 - ✓ **Comprehensiveness on the level of a CSDP operation suffers from strong MS national agendas** – EU is not behaving comprehensively as a whole.
-

VI. Technology (T)**EULEX**

- ✓ **Kosovo police technologies.** Some of our interviewees have mentioned that Kosovo police is lacking specialized equipment, required for advanced investigations and data sharing which can be considered as technical limitation. In order for Kosovo police to be able to take full responsibility and ownership for their work, additional efforts should be made to equip them sufficiently and train them to use this technology. The majority of our correspondents, however, have agreed that the donated equipment and technologies by international community are big improvement for local actors, and provide technical capability for their operations. On the other hand, border police and customs are sometimes equipped with the most sophisticated technology donated by international donors, but the problem arises when the person who succeeds the trained policeman or customs official doesn't receive proper training.

The following shortcomings have also been noted:

- Lack of knowledge for intelligence based policing (improved by EU best practices)
 - Local IT systems are not connected with Europol system.
- ✓ **Compatibility with EULEX technologies.** EULEX executive mandate requires a complicated IT infrastructure and wide spread network throughout the country. The technology among others comprises that for secure transmission and communication, handling of criminal intelligence files, forensic activities, interceptions and other investigative tasks. The size and complexity represents a certain challenge but technology on a tactical (unit) level has been mostly assessed as sufficient. When accessing technology it's important to note that perhaps even more than technology itself, it is the harmonization of technology and people that is important.



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- ✓ **Pooling and sharing.** Pooling and sharing of rotor-wing transportation and airlift capabilities has been exposed as good practice between EULEX and KFOR. It was however noted that due to limited needs of EULEX for such capabilities, inter-mission transport pooling and sharing is in decrease. Specialized equipment such as imagery detection, analysis and support has also been noted as technical capabilities that are pooled and shared between the missions (for example for mapping possible mass grave locations). On the other hand pooling and sharing of exercises and education of staff has been emphasized as important tool for increasing interoperability, achieving rational financial results.

The IT system established in EULEX is good (OPLAN & MIPs): it's working well, but most probably it won't be shared among other CSDP missions/operations.

ALTHEA

- ✓ When EUFOR Althea was established there was **no technical interoperability** at the field level.
- ✓ **Pooling and sharing still almost inexistent.**

SUCCESS INDICATORS (based on DL1.4)

- I. **Internal goal attainment of the CSDP mission/operation:** fulfilment of politico-strategic goals and operational objectives of the mission/operation

EULEX:

ALTHEA:

- II. **Internal appropriateness:** timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness in implementation



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EULEX:
ALTHEA:

III. External goal attainment: initiation, continuation, diffusion, escalation & intensification of violence

EULEX:
ALTHEA:

IV. External appropriateness: proportional prevention i.e. more good (positive and sustainable contribution to preventing violent conflict) than harm (force, coercion and other negative effects)

EULEX:
ALTHEA:

Figure 3: Success (effectiveness) criteria

Internal goal attainment: extent to which EU achieves what it set out to do

	Success	Partial success	Failure
Politico-strategic aims			
Operational objectives			

Internal appropriateness: extent to which implementation goes according to EU p

	Success	Partial success	Failure
Timeliness			
Efficiency			
Cost-effectiveness			

External goal attainment: extent to which (further) violent conflict is prevented

	Success	Partial success	Failure
Initiation			
Continuation			
Diffusion			
Escalation			
Intensification			

External appropriateness: extent of proportionality in prevention effort & effect

	Success	Partial success	Failure
More good than harm done			



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ANNEX 3: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS AT THE ROUND TABLE

<i>Title</i>	<i>Surname</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Institution</i>
Mr	Bassuener	Kurt	Democratization Policy Council
Ms	Boštjančič Pulko	Ivana	Centre for European Perspective
Ms	Čepon	Nina	Centre for European Perspective
Mr	Flessenkemper	Tobias	CIFE – Centre International de Formation Europeenne
Ms	Gorenc	Pavlina	Ministry of Defence, Republic of Slovenia
Mr	Grilj	Blaž	University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences
Mr	Guerrini	Simone	Participated in his personal capacity (former EULEX, seconded expert from Italian MFA)
Dr	Justinek	Gorazd	Centre for European Perspective
Dr	Juvan	Jelena	University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences
Ms	Kačar	Jelena	Ministry of the Interior, Republic of Slovenia
Mr	Knific	Peter	University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences
Ms	Muherina	Meliha	Centre for European Perspective
Ms	Norvanto	Elisa	FINCENT
Ms	Omahna	Ingrid	Centre for European Perspective
Mr	Palmer	David	CIV. SHAPE EU/EUSG, Op ALTHEA, EU OHQ at SHAPE
Lieut.Colonel	Petek	Robert	Slovenian Armed Forces
Mr	Pipenbaher	Bojan	Ministry of Defence, Republic of Slovenia
Mr	Pocsek	Vladimir	Head of the Department for International Police Operations
Ms	Qosja	Ariana	Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development – KIPRED
Mr	Ramet	Christian	European External Action Service, EULEX Kosovo desk
Mr	Salonen	Jari	FINCENT
Dr	Udovič	Boštjan	University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences
Amb	Volk	Vojko	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Slovenia
Dr	Zupančič	Rok	University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences



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