PROJECT TITLE:

Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

D7.2 New Policy Approaches and Solutions (including research priorities)

Lead beneficiary: Enquirya

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## Revision history

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</table>
CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................. 4

1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 5
  1.1 The IECEU-Project ................................................................................................... 5
  1.2 The Policy Dialogues ............................................................................................... 7

2 NEW POLICY APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS ......................................................... 9
  2.1 Planning ..................................................................................................................... 9
  2.2 Interoperability ........................................................................................................ 12
  2.3 Competences ............................................................................................................ 16
  2.4 Comprehensiveness ................................................................................................. 17
  2.5 Technology ................................................................................................................ 18
  2.6 Operational capacity ............................................................................................... 20

3 CONCLUDING REMARKS ........................................................................................... 22

4 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 23

List of tables

Table 1-1: Overview of Research Areas
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CSDP missions and operations have undergone significant changes over the last decades. Whereas in the early days of CSDP engagement, the focus was on police/rule of law missions and military operations, nowadays the EU has conducted or is conducting 34 missions and operations on three continents encompassing a broad range of types of missions and instruments that are being deployed. The change of the security environment in which the EU operates as well as the emergence of new actors requires new policy approaches and solutions, also in the context of the EU’s CSDP.

Based on the 8 case studies and 12 missions/operations analysed within IECEU as well as three policy dialogues with relevant stakeholders and institutions, the deliverable aims to provide new policy approaches and solutions as well as recommendations for further steps to enhance the effectiveness of the CSDP crisis management operations. By focusing on the six capabilities as defined in the methodology of the IECEU project, the deliverable provides 14 recommendations that will be further analysed and tested in deliverable 7.3.
1 INTRODUCTION

This report summarises new policy approaches and solutions as well as recommendations for further steps to enhance the effectiveness of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) crisis management operations. The summary is based on an analysis of the lessons learned document of a previous work package WP 7.1, as well as the interaction with various EU stakeholders at policy level during policy dialogues held in March, April and May 2017 within the framework of the IECEU-project.

In this introduction, a specific paragraph is dedicated to explain the project and its methodology as well as the aim and goal of the policy dialogues. Chapter 2 will summarise new policy approaches and solutions and making recommendations for further steps. The concluding chapter 3 will explore possible conclusions and the way ahead for testing the recommendations which will be done in IECEU – project deliverable D7.3.

1.1 The IECEU-Project

Researching the effectiveness of military and civilian crisis management operations implemented within the framework of the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been the core focus of the Horizon 2020 funded IECEU-project. This research has been carried out using a conceptual framework, that defined for CSDP crisis management operations six core capabilities, common data collection methods, unified questionnaires as well as criteria to measure effectiveness. The following six core capabilities have been identified and used, to research the crisis management operations:\1:

- Planning
- Operational
- Interoperability
- Competences
- Comprehensiveness
- Technology
- Operational

The main data collection methods have been desk study research, active observation and interviews of personnel representing the EU CSDP operation, local authorities, other international organizations, local population and various EU institutions (HQ level). The effectiveness or success

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1 More details can be found in Deliverable 1.5, IECEU Conceptual Framework, accessible http://www.ieceu-project.com/?page_id=197
has been defined as when a mission/operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner, seen from the perspective of the EU and the specific conflict in which it intervenes (at least in part) to prevent (further) violent conflict. According to this definition, corresponding criteria should consider and combine perspectives both internal and external to the European Union to evaluate its effectiveness.\(^2\) Over a time span of 33 months, 8 case studies in Europe, Africa, Middle East and Asia have been reviewed, covering 12 CSDP crisis management operations. Additionally, research has been implemented within the EU’s institutions to review the effectiveness of the concepts pooling and sharing, civilian-military synergies and interoperability. A list of the crisis management operations that have been reviewed is shown in the table below:

**Table 1-1. Overview of Research Areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case Study Region</th>
<th>Crisis Management Operation(s)</th>
<th>Research completed by</th>
<th>Year of the field study</th>
<th>Number of interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>University of Ljubljana, Slovenia</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>EUFOR Althea</td>
<td>National Defence University, Finland</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo, EUPOL Congo, Operation Artemis</td>
<td>Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC), Denmark</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>EUAVSEC, South Sudan</td>
<td>Austrian Institute for European and Security Policy, Austria</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>EUFOR Tchad/RCA, EUPOL CAR</td>
<td>National Defence University, Finland</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td>Crisis Management Centre, Finland</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
<td>National University of Ireland, Maynooth—Kennedy Institute, Ireland</td>
<td>2016-2017</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>Crisis Management Centre Finland</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>265 interviews</strong></td>
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<td><strong>8 case study regions</strong></td>
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\(^2\) More details can be found in Deliverable 1.4, Identifying the success factors, accessible http://www.ieceu-project.com/?page_id=197
A review of these crisis management operations leads to two caveats. Firstly, concerning the 8 case studies of the project, most of these CSDP missions and operations already ended or are in the process of ending, which will affect the possibility to reach valid conclusions. Secondly, during the timeframe of the project (2015-2017) significant policy developments at strategic level have taken place, that also do affect the CSDP, such as the Brexit and the publication of the new strategy (A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign And Security Policy)\(^3\)

### 1.2 The Policy Dialogues

The research findings for all these case studies have been compiled into a lessons learned document, where all case studies results have been related to the six capabilities and compiled into findings for each capability. These findings have been discussed in three policy dialogues, held on 27 March 2017 and 27 April 2017 in Brussels and on 2 May 2017 in Helsinki.

The first policy dialogue of the IECEU-project managed to engage 24 participants, representing the EEAS (CPCC), EUMS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representations from Austria and Germany as well as representatives from academia and think tanks and from the partner project WOSCAP. The meeting was held on 27 March 2017 in Brussels at the premises of the ESDC.

The second policy dialogue managed to engage 25 participants, representing the EEAS (PRISM, CPCC, EU Delegations, EU missions), EUMS, the European Commission (DG ECHO, DG DEVCO), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Representations from the Czech Republic, Germany, Ireland, The Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, United Kingdom as well as representatives from academia and one NGO (European Peacebuilding Liaison Office). The meeting was held on 27 April 2017 in Brussels at the premises of the ESDC.

The third policy dialogue managed to engage 28 participants, from members states peace keeping training centres, academia, embassies, United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as well as NGO’s and companies. The meeting was held on 2 May 2017 en marge of the annual EAPTC meeting 2017 in Helsinki.

The aim of these events has been to analyse the aforementioned findings and enabling various EU and national stakeholders at policy level to define new policy approaches and priorities for EU crisis management operations. The dialogues attracted actors from a variety of organisations, including

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European institutions, international organisations (UN, NATO, OSCE), NGO’s and academia, both civilian and military.
2 NEW POLICY APPROACHES AND SOLUTIONS

The new policy approaches and solutions will be presented along the lines of the methodological framework of the project and the identified six core capabilities used to research the crisis management operations. For each capability a brief review is done of the findings, an overview of the ensuing discussion of new policy approaches and solutions during the policy dialogues and last but not least the identified recommendations for further steps.

2.1 Planning

The IECEU-project researched the planning of CSDP-crisis management operations, both military and civilian planning and has defined in DL6.2 ‘Identification of the Overlap’ a number of main findings. Three key findings have been identified by the research, and discussed with key stakeholders:

Point 1: Civilian Military Interoperability in CSDP Planning

Civil-military interaction is guided by a broad concept that is reflected through a number of specific doctrines, models and guidelines and policy approaches. There are several concepts or tools that are used by the EU and other international organizations such as UN and NATO to describe relations between civilian and military sides. CivMil planning frameworks in the EU have developed positively since the inception of ESDP/CSDP. However, at the same time, there is still some work left to be done to overcome the different planning ‘stove-pipes’ and financing procedures for crisis management operations. The decision to setting up a Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) has to be evaluated positively and should further contribute to strengthen the Civ>Mil interface.

Civilian and military elements within the EU should combine at the initial planning phase on future missions deploying to a crisis situation and remain in close partnership thereafter. Advanced communications between the heads of the MPCC and CPCC at Brussels level and between the mission commanders in joint or adjacent theatres on all aspects of the missions should be further developed. In order to support this communication, consideration should be given to a programme of staff exchanges and expanded purposeful training between the military and civilian institutions in order to raise common awareness and to allow for a better understanding of the different “worlds”.

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4 The methodological framework can be found in DL1.5, which can be accessed online: [http://www.ieceu-project.com/?page_id=2978](http://www.ieceu-project.com/?page_id=2978) (last accessed: June 2017).

5 The deliverable DL6.2 can be found here: [http://www.ieceu-project.com/?page_id=3050](http://www.ieceu-project.com/?page_id=3050) (last accessed in June 2017).

The political will to strengthen CivMil is not always coupled with realistic levels of ambition. Consideration should be given to creation of dedicated CIV Mil Development Units that should function as a link between both, the classical civilian and military structures.

During the discussions in the policy dialogues it became clear that not all participants were aware of the current initiatives in this area, which raises questions about existing dissemination strategies and how integrated the current planning process currently is. The participants agreed on that joint exercises and staff exchanges can be beneficial tools to strengthen the understanding and integration of the planning process. As such, the upcoming Viking 2018 exercise, simulating crisis management operations, was mentioned as an opportunity to engage in diverse teams. Ideally, also UN and NATO should be invited, as these organisations also have a key role in planning for crisis management operations.

Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is being defined, to be further investigated:

**Civilian and military elements within the EU should combine at the initial planning phase on future missions deploying to a crisis situation and remain in close partnership thereafter. Advanced communications between the heads of the MPCC and CPCC at Brussels level and between the mission commanders in joint or adjacent theatres on all aspects of the missions should be further developed. In order to support this communication, consideration should be given to a programme of staff exchanges and expanded purposeful training between the military and civilian institutions.**

**Point 2: Desired End-State**

Given the political origins of CSDP missions, their duration is a political decision in the hands of 28 member states. As a result, the mission end state can be vague in some areas and unrealistic in others. According to the analysis, some mission planning lacked clear goals and related exit strategy. This created uncertainty and a challenge, not just for EU staff, but also for other actors. That led to EU staff having an unclear understanding of what the EU mission was ultimately about and its future role in the host country.

The discussion with key stakeholders led to a consensus that the exit strategy of a crisis management operation should be part of the early planning phase and involve key actors on the ground, such as DG ECHO, DG DEVCO and the EU Delegation. The discussions also identified that
there is a mismatch between mission expectations and what can be delivered. Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is being defined to be further investigated:

The desired end-state, purpose or overarching strategic objective of the mission should reflect an appropriate action relevant to the needs of the nation it is operating in, at that juncture. Invariably, this may be to stabilise the territory and make it safe for its people.

**Point 3: Involvement of local and international actors**

A recurring phenomenon of most theatres studied, is that local host nation actors were consulted unsystematically and it is unclear to the extent regarding the nature of consultation regarding other actors alongside the EU deployment. This was reported as a wider issue than just EU deployments and some IECEU reports mentioned marginal or completely exclusion from the wider international planning process. The question is how the EU CSDP missions could ensure that all their activities are based on local ownership and inclusiveness? One possible approach is an increased strategic level coordination, to facilitate information sharing with other international actors on the ground.

The participants to the policy dialogues identified that EU Delegation is key in involving the local community in the planning. They are familiar with the (sometimes rapidly changing) situation on the ground, have the contacts and should ideally facilitate this. One challenge identified with this is that not all EU Delegations have a system in place to exchange classified information. Contact points are required for civil society not just the operational level, but also in the political section. In terms of planning, the ideal would be to make a conflict analysis in advance, involving the broad spectrum of civil society, before even a mission is undertaken. Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is be defined to be further investigated:

Local actors should be involved in the planning phase, particularly at the start. The same applies to partner agencies. In the same vein, the mission should have more influence on the MIP. A core planning team with accurate equipment should be immediately established on the ground in order to report political developments and to adjust the strategic and planning documents accordingly.
2.2 Interoperability

The IECEU-project research analysed interoperability in the context of CSDP crisis management by using the definition of the Council (8009/03)\(^7\), stating:

"The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together."

In terms of research, interoperability has been reviewed from three angles, i.e. civilian-civilian, military-military and civilian-military. For the civilian-civilian research, 8 CSDP missions were reviewed, with 173 interviews leading to the key finding that there is a large variety among the missions, which leads to a varied interoperability needs and challenges.

For the military-military research, 4 CSDP operations were reviewed, with 42 interviews, leading to the main finding that for interoperability the role of NATO is key, with the lack of consensus in EU defense integration. As for the research on civilian-military interoperability; an additional online survey was held (24 respondents) as well as interviews (24), generating a list of 19 potentials for interoperability, of which 3 were highlighted, relating to information sharing and review systems. These can be summarised as follows: (i) reinforcing the jointly initiated crisis management concept with more integrated, structured civilian/military operationalization; (ii) creating a centralised system of mandatory pre-mission training, linked to job descriptions and selection procedures; (iii) discouraging national (re)interpretation of the ‘Statement of recruitment’ used in CSDP military operations to enhance interoperability of military staff; (iv) support joint civilian-military in-mission trainings where both types of personnel are present; (v) harmonize “working” versions of capacity building concepts such as ‘Integrated Border Management’.

Beyond these mechanisms to enhance interoperability, three main challenges for interoperability are identified by the IECEU-research, that were also discussed with stakeholders.

**Point 1: Divergent, non-standardised and sometimes contradictory national practices**

The analysis from the case studies points to a weak interoperability mindset both within civilian missions and military operations but more significantly between actors involved in CSDP crisis management operations. Competition for resources, position, and general lack of willingness to cooperate or work towards common goals hamper the realisation of interoperability potentials even...
where there are benefits that could be gained from greater interoperability. The need for such a mind-set becomes evident namely in relation to willingness to share information within CSDP missions and operations. Difficulties in creating a common mission-related intelligence gathering and sharing culture still prevail, which has become evident in several civilian and military CSDP missions/operations.

The political will to pursue interoperability as expressed in numerous Council Conclusions and Decisions seems not be sufficient to really make it happen at tactical and operational level. The main obstacle is a mind-set where interoperability is a priority and sought after horizontally, in every action that is being taken both at headquarters level as in the field. For creating such a mind-set it is necessary that all parties involved in CSDP crisis management operations have an internalised understanding of working together towards a common goal and act upon it in their daily business, by identifying obstacles, creating dialogues and common standards. Such actions over time will be one of the founding principles for a common CSDP-crisis management operations culture, which integrates the national CSDP cultures. Ideally, over the coming years platforms should be created to discuss interoperability in different fields, fostering the dialogue needed to build the mind-set and culture.

During the policy dialogues discussions a key general remark was made, i.e. that the debate about interoperability is based on bias, as for most Brussels respondents this usually means tanks and capabilities. However, in reality it is much broader than that, as there is a changing nature of the concept of interoperability with: (i) a widening web of activities/tasks; (ii) proliferation of actors; (iii) proliferation of concepts. Also, what changes is what is defined as civilian and military and the actors involved (the example was given that the EC’s DG Home now also plays an important part in CMO’s such as operation Sophia).

These different actors come with different mind-sets, which are difficult to reconcile. In addition, the number of 3rd states and partners are also proliferating, adding to the complexity in terms of achieving interoperability. All these partners have different views on planning and operations and setting standards is challenging as the CMO's have different nature and needs.

In addition, there is proliferation of concepts, e.g. comprehensive approach versus integrated approach and new hot trending topics such as ‘resilience’, where it is not clear what does that mean and what are its consequences for interoperability. Military tasks are updated, on top of peacekeeping, new tasks are added such as policing of high seas. These new needs affect interoperability and standards. Also, it was pointed out by the stakeholders that military and civilian personnel in CSDP mission and operations do not share the same view on what interoperability should or should not be; and that the proliferation of actors, but especially tasks expected of the EU is influencing the need for interoperability in CSDP.
Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is being defined to be further investigated:

**Combined civilian and military platforms should be created to discuss interoperability in different fields, fostering the dialogue needed to build the mind-set and culture**

**Point 2: Need for better intelligence gathering and sharing tools.**

The IECEU-research found that current capabilities to collect, analyse, store and share CSDP-related intelligence is experienced as inadequate. The shortfalls range from proper means in terms of services and equipment, skills, staff, procedures, common intelligence policy and intelligence sharing culture. There is no policy or guidance on early warning, situation assessments and legal aspects of the Computer Network Operations.

All these domains are strongly interlinked to intelligence capabilities and further requirement work is needed to develop a capability that is interoperable, i.e. that enables the development of a common operational picture. Furthermore, there is an absence of a common CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tool. Currently, the different organisations have their own systems which are often not compatible with the systems used by other EU missions or institutions. During the debate, an enhanced information sharing network was depicted as a capability that needs to be strengthened further because it enables interoperability, but at the same time also various challenges, in both technical and human aspects were identified.

Especially concerning the latter, a crucial point is what kind of information can be shared with third parties in an EU mission or operation. There are strict policies and it is often the case that different units in the same mission or operation do not have the same information at their disposal in order to operate successfully on the ground. Therefore, in order to utilize the human aspect properly, more training is necessary. Nowadays, there is no common understanding between the EU member states as to what information can be shared with whom and a lack of trust mostly due to short rotations is clearly visible. EU missions and operations are not able to force a participating nation to share information and here the problems usually begin. Information sharing often happens ad hoc and cannot be documented due to the nature of the content, which makes it a very sensitive issue and therefore it was suggested that a doctrine and a common language could be the right steps forward.

Additionally, one should also be aware that information sharing does not equal intelligence sharing. Thus, the second capability mentioned, was a CSDP civil-military intelligence analysis tool which would clarify how intelligence should be collected and with whom it can be shared. Common
international standards that fit in the global context would be of paramount importance. Finally, a third capability mentioned is a shared platform for lessons learned.

Moving on, it was stated that although pre-deployment training in order to create common standards is now mandatory, it is still problematic especially concerning internationally contracted staff. It is the EU member states that are responsible for the financing of pre-deployment trainings and therefore political will is of great importance. As a final remark, the participants agreed that EUFOR ALTHEA as well as the EU Satellite Centre can be regarded as good examples of interoperability and it should be acknowledged that a lot has already been done in this field. The main problem identified was financing- projects often fail due to budgetary constraints.

Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is being defined to be further investigated:

**Tools to collect, analyse, store and share CSDP-related intelligence should be further developed and enhanced and interoperable, i.e. supporting a common operational picture for the crisis management operation (civilian and military).**

**Point 3: Need for better mechanisms to support organizational learning**

It seems that the utilization of lessons identified from the past or on-going missions/operations in the planning and conduct of the CSDP operations/missions needs strengthened monitoring and follow-up. Despite the standardized process of collecting and distributing the lessons, the current challenge to the EEAS is to ensure that the lessons identified are learned at appropriate levels. The implementation of the lessons at the planning of a new CSDP operations and missions has been inadequate, as often there is no time to conduct lessons cycles or consult lessons learned documents. Therefore, the mechanism to ensure that Lessons are incorporated into CSDP Planning and Conduct of Activities should be strengthened.

The recommendation made is that the EEAS should continue development of a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations, and strengthen the mechanisms to monitor the lesson implementation process. This can be strengthened by continue sharing the information with external parties conducting research and external evaluations. The discussions during the policy dialogues agreed on the finding that the deployment and rotation cycles are experienced as short, with a institutional memory which could enhance the interoperability that can be strengthened.
Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is be defined to be further investigated:

Continue the development of a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations, and strengthen the mechanisms to monitor the lesson implementation process.

## 2.3 Competences

The everyday definition for competencies is that it is the ability to perform a particular task well. The IECEU Deliverable 1.5 defined competences as knowledge and skills, and as resources put into action, which is in itself a very broad and contestable definition. The actions that the definition refers to are understood by us as collective (social) interactions that part of the organisation can perform proficiently and repeatedly. They are contextualised social routines based in explicit and tacit knowledge. Therefore the scope of competences is very broad. One key finding has been identified by the research and discussed with stakeholders:

### Point 1: Improvement of Soft Skills Assessment

In the reviewed case studies there are repeating mentioning relating to (lacking) soft skills competences. These are defined not as cultural awareness in its superficial meaning of learning things such as history, habits and cultural norms, but rather a "dignity" oriented mind-set, which would allow the personnel to function in multiple various theatres and would also have the flexibility in situations when the mission focus might change radically. Based on further discussion and research, it seems that mapping of the soft skills in the recruitment process is superficial, for example, it only plays a marginal role for these questions is given in the interview of a recruit. At the same time there exists clear EU guidelines on soft skills.

The Planning Guide for Member States Seconding Authorities is, on a policy level, to enable early force sensing, improve recruitment procedures and increase transparency, and, on a practical level, to assist Member States with their own forward planning in terms of providing personnel to the Missions. The planning guide provides information on how to conduct the selection process, the interview in particular, but it does not provide detailed information on how to assess soft skills. The essential requirements define that the candidates “must have excellent interpersonal and

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8 D7.1 The improvement of the effectiveness of EU capabilities, IECEU, 653371.
communication skills, both written and oral”. Furthermore the future mission member “must have the ability to work professionally as a member of a team, in task forces and working groups with mixed composition (e.g. civilian and military staff)”. However, the recruitment process to the point of when the candidates are being presented to operation is owned by the Member States, which might have different priorities.

The recommendation discussed during the policy dialogues related to having at least on the management level of missions a separate test of soft skills. In a broader sense the existing guidelines on soft skills should be more closely followed, so that vital competences from the perspective of the overall effectiveness of the mission are not missed. The discussions during the policy dialogues agreed on the need for better soft skills integration in the selection procedure for crisis management operations staff, especially in cases where military staff is engaged to perform civilian positions as the military and civilian cultures differ. Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is be defined to be further investigated:

At management level of crisis management operations a separate test of soft skills could be beneficial, implemented in a standardized way.

2.4 Comprehensiveness

Comprehensiveness, as it is defined in the IECEU project and therefore in this deliverable, encompasses cooperation and coordination activities conducted by CSDP missions and operations – with both EU and non-EU actors. One key finding has been identified by the research and discussed with stakeholders:

Point 1: Country coordination platform

Across all the CSDP missions and operations appraised in the IECEU-project, there is evidence of efforts made to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other EU actors in the field. In particular, efforts have been made in countries, where one or more CSDP missions/operations have been deployed alongside another EU actor(s). In particular, a country coordination platform could be set up. This could also ensure better partnership with local actors. Information should be available in local languages.

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9 D7.1 The improvement of the effectiveness of EU capabilities, IECEU, 653371..
D7.2 New Policy Approaches and Solutions

Dissemination level: Public

IECEU CSA project: 653371
Start date: 01/05/2015
Duration: 33 months

The discussions during the policy dialogues agreed on the desirability of such a platform but added that mission staff also plays a key role. Participants mentioned that mission staff needs to understand that there are other ‘EU’s’ in the field. If a mission has the mandate to do the SSR, then it needs to also know that DEVCO is key player in the country, with usually managing 40+ SSR EU funded projects through the EU Delegation. Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is be defined to be further investigated:

Review ways in which to strengthen both competences of mission and operations staff as well as creating or augmenting existing platforms in order to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other EU actors in the field.

2.5 Technology

The working group has identified three key lessons based on eight (8) IECEU Case Study research findings in different regions (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DR Congo, Central African Republic, Libya, South Sudan, Afghanistan and Palestine Territories).

These key finding have been identified by the research and discussed with key stakeholders

Point 1: CMO/User Centric technologies, including the local dimension.

The first key lesson is that the missions and operations mentioned that the technological solutions have been experienced as much technology –driven, instead of human, needs driven. A recommendation made was to consider strengthen the planning phase of the crisis management operation by implementing a technological needs assessment before the start of the mission/operation. Such a needs assessment should be linked to the mandate of the mission/operation, tasks to be accomplished by international and local staff, levels of technological proficiency of identified users and existing local technological infrastructure. It can be preventive and an ongoing process, facilitated by EU delegations and implemented in areas where there a not yet missions/operations.

During the policy dialogues this point was extensively discussed. The concept of ‘user centric’ was perceived with mixed feelings by some participants. It is feared that this means customized per mission, which can be difficult to maintain, scale and train. Ideally, it should be centralised. Also, it was mentioned that in the field systems are used/ being paid for that are experienced as ineffective. The development of the mission support platform is seen key to deliver systems that work. As such it should be strengthened and financed. In this context the EDA has a similar role for military systems.
It is their role to centralise and procure, both actions that could save a lot of money in the field of hardware, software and training.

Also, it was mentioned that technology is a very broad concept, that in the field encompasses infrastructure (e.g. generators to run computers/ servers), hardware (laptops, servers), software. This should be acknowledged in the development and deployment of technology. Finally, it was noted that technology is seen as key in a crisis management operation, as next to staff it is the core component of an operation. It was also noted by the participants that bigger budgets for technology and support could be beneficial. Technology is very useful and exists but funding to buy technology lacks. Low level technological equipment is experienced and more resources are needed to sort this. Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is be defined to be further investigated:

**Strengthen the technological component of missions in terms of having technologies that deliver in the field, with a key role for the mission support platform and sufficient funding to buy appropriate technological tools.**

**Point 2: Need for training**

A second finding is that tailored training is needed and it should be linked to existing technological resources. Staff and contractors in crisis management operations as well as beneficiaries should be trained to use technology, which requires tailored training programs and education. It is unclear how well are technological point of views (use of technology, technology available in the field, protocols) currently embedded in the curricula design at ESDC level and local level. The recommendation made is to include the competence-based learning objectives to current training curricula and link them strongly with the current ICT infrastructure in the field (since one fits all –solution is not existing). The discussions during the policy dialogue confirmed that for CSDP-staff, induction training that includes technology and equipment in the field is seen as beneficial to solve the training needs.

Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is be defined to be further investigated:

**Include in Pre Deployment Training (PDT) training on available technology and equipment in the field.**
**Point 3: Relevance of local ownership**

Thirdly, the relevancy of local ownership is seen high as it is key in terms of technology adoption. Local representatives in the crisis area are observed to be trained with equipment/technologies which they (locals) normally do not have in use. As a result no real capability has been established.

Based on this the recommendation is made that the operation and personnel should always take into account that the local perspective that the country representatives (target audience) are trained with the similar technological equipment that they have in use in practice. This recommendation was reiterated during the policy dialogues as it was mentioned that key are the recipients of the technological systems. It is important to tailor make the technology and look at sustainability. One key comment was: 'Do not push money but define the best solution for the recipient’. Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is be defined to be further investigated:

> **In CSDP crisis management operations, the starting point for selecting technologies for local capacity building should be sustainability.**

### 2.6 Operational capacity

The organisational capacity of a CSDP missions and operations consists of various factors that are both internal and external to the mission. The research focused on those factors that lie within the sphere of influence of the EU, i.e. EU-internal factors, which can be adjusted and developed. Three key findings have been identified by the research and discussed with key stakeholders:

**Point 1: Management of Human Resources**

In terms of human resources/staffing, the research has identified one main area that has been experienced as an area where improvements are necessary, i.e. the perception that deployments cycles of personnel are experienced too short and that hand-over procedures could be optimized.

During the policy dialogues it was mentioned that in terms of sustainability, the EU Delegation on-site should have a role in this; a hand-over procedure should be in place for allocating for instance development resources. This also means that the EU delegation should have resources to deal with this, however often this is not the case for delegations in difficult areas such as Afghanistan or Bangladesh, where it is challenging to find staff to be posted there as these are not family postings. In this context it was mentioned that it could be useful to consider transitional structures along the model the UN uses in its peacekeeping operations, where a CSDP-crisis management operation
can support the EU Delegation on site also at the hand-over phase. Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is be defined to be further investigated:

**Deployment cycles should be managed in such a way that the proper execution of the mission is not endangered with the replacement of staff.**

**Point 2: Dynamic Conflict Analysis**

The lack of appropriate and timely fact-finding prior to the deployment of the mission has been mentioned as area for improvement. Fact-finding is a continued process through-out the planning stage and continues after the initial, broader fact-finding reporting with a core team that can update the EU on political developments and liaise with other actors in the field could benefit the efforts on the ground. Such an approach would prevent an inaccurate picture of the situation on the ground by the deployed mission before the arrival to the country. This point was also confirmed during the policy dialogue, where stakeholders suggested that improvements in conflict analysis in advance of deployment can be made, involving the broad spectrum of civil society, before even a mission is undertaken. Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is be defined to be further investigated:

**Improvements in conflict analysis in advance of deployment should be made by involving the broad spectrum of civil society in order to have an accurate and timely local operational picture.**

**Point 3: Communications from the field**

A further point identified by the research is that there are perceptions that the communication between Brussels (HQ) and the field can be enhanced. A secure channel of communication between the actors on the ground and Brussels, using information technology could be beneficial.

The stakeholders in the policy dialogues with mission experience did underwrite this finding and mentioned that not all EU Delegations have a system in place to exchange classified information. This is an area where the effectiveness can be enhanced by putting into place such systems. Based on the discussions, the following priority and new approach is be defined to be further investigated:

**All EU delegations and CSDP crisis management operations should have systems in place enabling the exchange of classified information.**
3 CONCLUDING REMARKS

In 2001, the European Council of Laeken declared the Common Security and Defence Policy operational. Two years later, starting in January 2003 with EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the first European missions and operations were deployed within the framework of CSDP. Since then, the EU has conducted, or is conducting 34 missions and operations under CSDP out of which 12 are military operations/missions and the remainder civilian missions.

Currently, the EU is undertaking 15 missions and operations under CSDP (6 military missions and operations and 9 civilian missions). So far, the EU engagement was geographically concentrated on the Western Balkans, the Caucasus region, Middle East and Africa and Asia. the scope of CSDP engagement has significantly broadened and encompasses not only classical rule of law, police and SSR missions as well as military operations, but has also moved into aviation security, maritime security and most importantly into the issue of training missions in the frame of capacity building. Still, the new security environment and the new type of actors dealing with international security require from the EU a sound understanding of the environment in which it operates, requiring new policy approaches and solutions.

The aim of this deliverable was to summarize those new policy approaches and solutions as well as recommendations for further steps to enhance the effectiveness of the CSDP crisis management operations. It has identified 14 key findings and recommendations out of the six capabilities that are at the core of the IECEU project. The findings are based on the case studies conducted within IECEU and a series of policy dialogues in which the findings were further elaborated. The report has also taken note, that while drafting it, further work has been carried out within the EU framework in order to strengthen CSDP and the effectiveness of its crisis management operations. Thus, some of the recommendations that are stated within this deliverable, also as an outcome of the policy dialogues held in the first half of the year, are currently in the process of being implemented. As the analysis has shown, there are some overlapping findings that can be found in a majority of the analysed case studies. Others are more mission/environment specific findings. The deliverable has also shown that there has been good progress and lessons learnt in the 14 years of CSDP missions and operations that has impacted on the overall positive attitude towards EU engagement in the context of CSDP.

Therefore, within the logic of Work Package 7, the 14 recommendations will be further analysed in IECEU –project deliverable D7.3. where an assessment will be made which of those recommendations have already been taken into consideration and are currently in the process of being implemented. This will be accompanied by a series of polls that will be conducted using social media and email. It will then finally test the key recommendations and overall assess of how to best improve the effectiveness of EU capabilities in conflict prevention.
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