

PROJECT TITLE:

Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

7.1 The improvement of the effectiveness of EU capabilities

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ACRONYMS

CAR	Central African Republic
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMPD	Crisis Management Planning Directorate
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civilian Strategic Option
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EEAS	European External Action Service
EU	European Union
EUBAM	European Union Border Assistance Mission
EUFOR	European Union Force
EUFOR RCA	RCA European Union Force Republic of Central Africa
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMM	European Union Monitoring Mission
EUPOL	European Police Mission (Afghanistan)
EUPOL COPPS	EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
EUPT	EU Planning Team
EUSR	European Union Special Representative
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
KFOR	Kosovo Force (NATO)
MIP	Mission Implementation Plan
MPCC	Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OSCE	Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe
PFCA	Political Framework for Crisis Response
PSC	Political and Security Committee
SFOR	Stabilisation Force
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
UK	United Kingdom



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report aims to find practical, achievable policy recommendations for improving the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention in terms of capabilities in CSDP operations. It consolidates the main lessons identified in the IECEU and ensures that the findings are applicable as policy recommendations. These findings are presented here as a lessons-learned document, which compiles analysis of EU mission effectiveness, more general lessons learned as well identify potential conclusions and recommendations about the effectiveness. The policy recommendations have been created through a series of consortium debate, and has been reviewed by the advisory board, the steering committee and other experts. The deliverable is structured around the six capabilities identified in D1.5. These six are: planning capacity, operational capacity, interoperability, competences, comprehensiveness and technology. All together 19 policy recommendations are presented, which are discussed in more detail in the deliverable itself. These policy recommendations for EU CSDP crisis management and peacebuilding are to:

1. increase resources in planning
2. combine civilian and military elements of crisis management where possible
3. encourage and strengthen local ownership in the planning of a mission or operation.
4. clarify a desired end-state, purpose and strategic objective to reflect appropriate action
5. create an enhanced information sharing framework
6. consider developing an interoperable capability for better intelligence gathering and sharing tools
7. strengthen third country participation
8. develop a shared platform for lessons identified should be continued
9. improve soft skills assessment and testing
10. prioritize hand-over processes
11. create and implement comprehensive communication strategies
12. reinforce the planning phase of crisis management by a technical needs assessment
13. strengthen competence-based learning objectives in current training curricula
14. use the technology local partners should use or will use in training
15. pursue further development of centralized technological capabilities to support field activities
16. extend deployments wherever possible
17. strengthen lessons learned processes
18. continue fact-finding throughout the mission or operation
19. establish secure communication between EU actors from the very beginning of the operation.



1 INTRODUCTION

Translating research results into practical, achievable policy recommendations is not a straightforward process. The main asset of a good researcher is to be keenly interested and involved in their own research project, but creating policy recommendations requires both broader perspective and broader understanding. It also requires debate to choose between various alternatives with the understanding that prioritisation is necessary so that institutions can absorb the recommendations given to them. Practicality requires some understanding of how the institutions function.

The aim here is to find practical and achievable policy recommendations for improving the effectiveness of EU capabilities. The policy recommendations stem from research and study reports created in the IECEU project. The division into six capabilities, which together form a complete picture of the functions of the mission/operation, is based on D1.5 Conceptual Framework.¹ In terms of capabilities, the material was richest in the case studies vis-à-vis planning capacity, operational capacity, comprehensiveness and competences, whereas interoperability and technology were less explored in the case studies² but explored in detail in WP6 *Potential for pooling and sharing the EU capabilities*. In addition to the conducted research and the submitted deliverables, the partners in IECEU also gained new understandings through discussions, interviews and debate. This expertise is also incorporated into the creation of these policy recommendations.

Table 1: Composition of the Working Groups

	LAU	SG	UNILju	CMC	ENQ	AIES	RDDC	NUIM	FINCENT
<u>WG 1 Interop</u>									Lead
<u>WG2 Tech</u>	Lead								
<u>WG3 Planning</u>								Lead	
<u>WG 4 Operational</u>			Lead						
<u>WG 5 Competences</u>				Lead					
<u>WG6 Comprehensiveness</u>							Lead		

The policy recommendations were found through the creation of six working groups. Each working group had both its own leader chosen according to their expertise in the different capabilities. Their main tasks were to ensure timekeeping and that tasks were completed. The leaders also had the main responsibility for drafting the chapter on that capability in this deliverable. These six groups each had a member of a three institution leadership team consisting of SaferGlobe, WP7 Leader AIES, and Enquirya. The leadership team ensured that the process of finding the policy

¹ D1.5 Conceptual Framework. 2015. IECEU, 653371.

² See: D5.1 The Effectiveness of EU capabilities and the Current Situation in Pooling and Sharing. IECEU, 2017, 653371.



recommendations proceeded according to plan and that each of the working groups had the information they needed. The leadership team also debated different mechanisms of achieving the formulation of policy recommendations and created the mechanism formulated here, which is based on working groups.

The working groups each conducted four skype meetings: i) initial session to set up the tasks ii) review of the findings from IECEU on the capability in question iii) formulation of the policy recommendations iv) final review and the way forward. In addition, the working groups themselves organized the review of the material and the drafting of the chapter between the sessions. The working groups were also encouraged to find policy recommendations that were legally, politically and financially feasible. The aim was to find fewer, stronger, more considered and more viable policy recommendations rather than to offer all the knowledge encompassed within the EU. The process here acted as a mechanism of prioritization, selection and refinement.

Furthermore, the partners were invited to share their own knowledge to pave the way for successful policy dialogues, where the policy recommendations would be further discussed with policymakers to ensure practical applicability but also to encourage sharing of the ideas created in the IECEU. In this deliverable, the partners have also listed discussion points for the dialogues, listed key stake holders and created PowerPoint slides for use in the policy dialogues. The cross-cutting themes of human rights and gender have been considered in the formulation of the policy recommendations. As the cross-cutting themes are included in all of EUs activities, they are not separately analysed here. However, further consideration of the cross-cutting themes is needed in the potential application of the policy recommendations presented. In the analysis in D5.1, the cross-cutting themes are separately discussed, where it was found that especially initiatives linked with gender have been successful.³

The policy recommendations were presented to the consortium, the steering committee and the advisory board. They have also already been discussed in IECEU's policy dialogues. There is general agreement on the value of these recommendations, and indeed many of the policy recommendations presented here are already included in strategic thinking within the EU. However, implementation of policies and strategies drafted requires consistent effort. In general, we found that the challenge for improving the effectiveness of EU's capabilities is specifically in the implementation, mainstreaming and adherence of current mechanisms, rather than in a need to create new mechanisms. The policy recommendations here have been drafted to mainly strengthen existing processes. The main exceptions found were related to interoperability and technology where additional development is needed. Similarly, tailoring missions and operations to take into consideration the local context and local interests, needs further development. For the EU, CSDP missions and operations will also need to be developed with regard to both the security environment and the changes within the EU.

³ For more detailed discussion of the cross-cutting themes: D5.1 The Effectiveness of EU capabilities and the Current Situation in Pooling and Sharing. 2017. IECEU, 653371, 79-81 and Appendix A. 56 Potentials Identified in D5.1, potentials 51-56.



1.1 Purpose of the task

From the IECEU Grant Agreement:

This task elaborates findings from comparative study to create a clear lessons learned-document with specific focus on cross-cutting themes. The document will compile both analysis of EU mission effectiveness and more general lessons learned as well identify potential conclusions and recommendations about the effectiveness. This task will be implemented as a mixed method and will include the participation of Advisory Board, Steering Committee as well outsource experts.



2 PLANNING CAPACITY

For the EU as much as for any other crisis management actor, effective crisis management requires a sound understanding of the environment in which it operates, both in terms of ‘the problem to be tackled’ and in terms of ‘the types of policy responses that are required’. In addition, the crisis management spectrum encompasses activities that relate to security, civilian protection, the rule of law, security sector reform, institution-building, electoral support, economic recovery and development, humanitarian assistance, human rights, good governance, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, etc.

The diversity of crisis management challenges requires a wide range of policy tools and responses, both civilian and military. The establishment of the EU Global Strategy (2016) has been accompanied by the anticipation that the European Union represents a unique strategic actor due to its ability to mix civilian and military crisis management instruments as part of its wider capacity. The findings of this research into mission planning highlight the criticality of this aspect to the success or otherwise of a CSDP mission.

Planning is multi-faceted. It involves politics, strategy, logistics, co-ordination, collaboration and implementation. Planning is the means of turning abstract political aims, strategic objectives and security policy into tangible results on the ground. This research indicates that, at times, the initial planning phase has been too rushed, at times it has been too slow. And more often than not, planning produces interventions that are too brief, and goals that are overly ambitious.

The net effect is that planning tends to inhibit a mission’s operational effectiveness. For EU institutions the planning aspect is difficult. Member states have different self-interests, as do other intervening nations and the host nation that requires help. The political scene can be as complex and fractious as the security situation on the ground.

It appears that organisations, such as NATO, are more effective at planning than the EU and that the civilian side of the EU can learn from the military side. Within the EU, the language has changed from comprehensive approach to integrated approach. This is not to say the Crisis Management Concept and comprehensive approach are redundant, rather, that institutions within the EU are highlighting integration and interoperability as areas to develop in going forward.

Based on an analysis of the data provided in ten different IECEU studies, three main recommendations are presented in relation to planning: developing cooperation between the civilian and military sides within the EU; involving other agencies (especially local actors); and deciding on the purpose of a mission in clear terms.

These recommendations are validated by a detailed analysis at both politico-strategic level and field-operational level of how civil-military interface and what potentials can be identified for further development. At the politico-strategic level, civil and military capability to plan and conduct operations was reviewed, and the main finding is that both are separate stovepipes, where requirements are identified separately and support platforms differ.

This document uses eleven recently researched papers pertaining to eight nations: Afghanistan;



Bosnia and Herzegovina; Central African Republic; Democratic Republic of Congo; Kosovo; Libya, South Sudan; and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The papers were part of a collaborative study on CSDP missions by academic and security institutions from across Europe. The purpose is to capture, in broad terms, the mission planning aspect of CSDP in order to present recommendations that may influence future EU policy in this area.

What follows is a presentation of the main thematic findings of the review which include:

- Civilian- Military interoperability in CSDP planning
- Planning Processes and Mission Conduct
- Involvement of local and other actors
- Articulation of desired end state through the mission mandate

The findings are followed by a series of final recommendations and conclusions.

2.1 Defining planning capacity

During the research, capability was examined. Capability is the capacity to deploy a combination of resources through collective organisational routines to attain goals. To better understand 'capability' in respect of a mission it was divided into six categories. The first and most important of these relates to planning:

- **Planning capacity:** Strategic/operational planning, management, budgetary constraints, consultation on lessons identified from reports, and situational awareness
- **Operational capacity:** Leadership, training, mission organisational structures, the mission decision-making process, human resources (deployment and expertise), technologies, mission funding, culture, security, housing, and procurement
- **Interoperability:** Co-operation/collaboration; co-ordination; and civ–mil, civ–civ, and mil–mil synergies
- **Comprehensiveness:** Co-operation and co-ordination, with civilian, military, and other actors alongside NGOs, locals, and the international community
- **Competences and skills (knowledge and skills):** Communication, training, and professional background
- **Technologies:** The technological resources available, pooling and sharing, and EDA priorities



2.2 Key findings

Civilian Military Interoperability in CSDP Planning

According to the research report 'Identification of the Overlap' (AIES), Civil-military interaction is guided by a broad concept that is reflected through a number of specific doctrines, models and guidelines and policy approaches. There are several concepts or tools that are used by the EU and other international organizations such as UN and NATO to describe relations between civilian and military sides.

Three concepts are evident that are usually mentioned in efforts to interconnect civil and military approaches to crisis management: **Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)**, **Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO)** and **Comprehensive Approach (CA) or Integrated Approach**. Sometimes making a clear distinction between the concepts can be challenging since different organizations have developed their own interpretations. The concepts can for example describe the scope of interaction between the different agencies within one organization such as **EU CMCO** or **UN Integrated Approach**, or strictly between the military and humanitarian actors in the humanitarian disasters such as UN Civil-Military Coordination (**UN-CMCoord**), or it can refer to the military capability or function to cooperate with the civilian population and external civilian actors. Whatever the definition or the status quo, the important objective must be to maximise the cooperation, coordination and synergies between all the EU instruments. Development of the CivMil will go a long way in achieving this overall goal.

The research report indicates that CivMil planning frameworks in the EU has developed positively since the inception of ESDP/CSDP. There is still much work to be done but there is a good degree of interaction between the civilian and military institutions and individuals and the professional practitioners both at the strategic level and in the field continue to explore ways to further cooperate and coordinate. It is quite clear that the separateness of structures and procedures at the Brussels level extends also to the field level. While at the tactical level in the field synergies are sought and implemented, this cannot make up for strategic shortcomings. However, it does generally lead to positive outcomes which in turn enhance mission accomplishment. The search for CivMil synergies is an ongoing process. There is unlikely to be a point where it will be possible to say 'job done'. There will continue to be serious challenges but there is also clear evidence of a determination to make the EU a more effective international player in Crisis Intervention. The major obstacles for the implementation of effective CivMil cooperation, coordination and synergies can be primarily identified as the planning and decision-making process and financial and command aspects of CSDP missions.⁴ The differences in culture and ethos are factors which make the task of reconciling the military and civilian processes more difficult. Based on the applied research and deliberations and

⁴ Thierry Tardy, "CSDP in Action – What Contribution to International Security?" Chaillot Papers, No.134 (2015); Article 41 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU); Wolfgang Wosolobe, "The Challenges of CSDP Command Control", in Jochen Rehl and Galia Glume (eds) *Handbook on CSDP Missions and Operations*, (Vienna: The Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria 2015); See for instance: European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), *Yearbook of European Security 2013* (2013), 275-6.



taking into consideration the findings of the case study, as well as the online poll, the following main conclusions and recommendations are offered:

The principles of the military planning process are fundamentally similar worldwide. Individual nations train their military for mission-oriented courses or send them on international courses. The focus of these programmes are mainly on the planning process. In examining the planning process, the research report illustrates the potential for civilian–military synergies have generally not been fully exploited, criticising separate ‘pipelines’ that prevent this from happening.

Separate financing of civilian and military missions and operations is likely to continue as it is for the foreseeable future. This gives rise to a number of constraints, such as the legal provisions underpinning the financing streams. However, many of the dysfunctionalities can be reduced or even eradicated by a helpful interpretation of the constraints. This needs goodwill by the owners of all the EU instruments as well as political will by Member States. Much can be achieved with flexibility. An example of this dysfunctionality is the Bosnian study which states that possible civilian–military synergies were destined to be difficult from the outset, since the two CSDP missions were planned separately. There were no joint strategic planning or connecting structures.

Since this was the first time that the EU deployed a civilian and a military crisis management operation simultaneously in the same country, EU faced several challenges – only some of which have been resolved. It is clear that the EU had problems identifying the overlaps between the mandates, which were not addressed when the military operation EUFOR Althea was first launched in 2004, but rather after May 2005, when the first report on the lessons identified was released. A clear example of this is the planning process, where it was obvious from the very beginning that the civil mission EUPM and the military operation EUFOR Althea did not have a joint strategic planning and a common set of connecting structures was not provided for. No direct obligation to liaise existed and the lack of organic liaison personnel slowed down the creation of relationships between EUPM and EUFOR Althea in the field. Moreover, EUFOR Althea was ordered to perform tasks that belonged to or were more suited to other authorities (the fight against organized crime). Hence the first phase, the overlaps between the missions happened mainly due to the differing interpretations of the mission mandates.

This Bosnia and Herzegovina case study exemplifies how important the planning process is, but also the sole operationalization of it in the field, regarding the potential of overlaps (or double jobbing) of the civilian and military efforts. Pre-established liaison structures and guidelines on practices of cooperation and communication substantially reduce the overlaps and prevent possible gaps that would not be covered by any equivalent mission. However, coherence can largely be improved with creation of clear mandates and guidelines that emphasize cooperation and coordination between the civilian and military mission from the beginning. The potential of improvement of cooperation and coordination between the civilian and military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was a process of learning by doing and even though that cooperation has improved during the years of the missions’ concurrent functioning, there is still much room for improvement in the coordination of different EU crisis management instruments.

The report on EULEX Kosovo however, indicated positive potential for integrated activity as it noted that civil-military engagement with KFOR was an example of good practice in this regard. There was



cooperation and communication between EULEX and KFOR at appropriate levels, the relationship was defined in a Joint Operations Procedure and asset sharing of rotor wing, airlift capabilities and imagery detection. The report however does note tensions between military and civilian ways of working and lack of coordination of training.

Bilateral military actions by EU MS had an effect on the ability of EUBAM Libya to implement its mandate. For example French military action in northern Mali increased the number of armed insurgents in Southern Libya between 2012 and 2014. In addition, military personnel working on Italian bilateral interests were 'double hatted', working simultaneously with EUBAM Libya, thus blurring the lines of EU and MS bilateral interests in the country. These 'realpolitik' activities indicate that political realities of MS can impact on operational planning and limit the missions credibility or ability to achieve its mandate (P75 D2.3). Other salient points raised in the research reports are that beyond framework mechanisms to enhance interoperability, three primarily tacit challenges for civil planning are identified:

- i) divergent, non-standardised and sometimes contradictory national allegiances and practices, which remain evident in CSDP operations and missions.
- ii) lack of a mind-set for increasing interoperability in practice especially in civilian missions, but also between civilian and military actors, even where increasing interoperability has no foreseen costs;
- iii) the current intergovernmental set-up of the CSDP crisis management operations, some of which, is based on the very foundations of the EU (including the Lisbon treaty), which hinders the development of interoperability (developed further in 3.0).

The current development under way in establishing a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) for non-executive military missions is a very important step forward and it must be handled with considerable care⁵. There has to be unity of intent and effort by all actors. It is unclear exactly how the MPCC will develop - whether it will continue to be a component of the EUMS or something different; whether it is an interim step or an end in itself; what channels it will identify and develop in order to work with the CPCC; and what resources it will have to fulfil the mandate of the Council. It will be vital that all parties realise the enormous potential of this initiative, particularly in terms of its potential to provide a giant leap forward in developing the CivMil interface. For example, the reports indicate insufficiency of multiple level coordination with other international actors (UN, OSCE and NATO). This also extends to the absence of pooling and sharing exemplified in the absence of common intranet within EU missions and operations, or the absence of a common warehouse, all of which are potential areas of common interest (Kosovo report p68). The greatest danger is that the MPCC end product will be unfit for purpose leading to a version of MPCC which will lack the necessary resources and exacerbate the above mentioned issues.

The chains of command for civilian and military missions, and operations are likely to remain separate and distinct and the challenge is, therefore, to develop effective coordination at all levels of command. This is essential not just in terms of deployed missions and operations, but work is also required to define and develop the relationships between these and the wider spectrum of other EU

⁵ www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/06-defence-security/



instruments, specifically, EEAS Managing Directors, EU Special Representatives, Heads of Departments and Commission representatives. This is necessary in order to de-conflict activities in the same theatre by actors representing different EU instruments.

The research shows the CivMil is an integral and vital component of the Integrated Approach and as such requires a focus by MS, the Council of the EU, the EEAS, the Commission and all of the EU Institutions. Other international organisations, especially the UN and NATO are working on related concepts and should be studied closely and consulted. In addition to existing liaison structures in place with the UN and NATO, consideration should be given to the creation of a dedicated CivMil development unit.

There has been much good work done in the decade and a half of ESDP/CSDP on CivMil with the creation of EU bodies and structures facilitating greater CivMil coherence. This work should continue. The concept of CMCO should be built upon with the CivMil as one of the central themes. Currently the EU Council stresses that developments must be within current structures and resources and this is fully understandable. However, it may not be possible to continue the positive development track of CSDP in this vein indefinitely. In the long term it may well be that additional structures and resources will be necessary.

Lessons Identified

- The major obstacles for the implementation of effective CivMil cooperation, coordination and synergies are the planning and decision-making process and financial and command aspects of CSDP missions
- Inadequate contact at appropriate level has existed between civilian and military staff at the planning level
- The current development under way in establishing a military planning and conduct capability (MPCC) for non-executive military missions needs to be addressed with a degree of caution
- Consideration should be given to creation of dedicated CIV Mil Development Unit
- While concrete recommendations can be made to strengthen CivMil cooperation, the political will is not always coupled with realistic levels of ambition

References

EU Althea; EULEX Kosovo; EUBAM Libya

3.0 Planning Process and Mission Conduct

The planning of civilian CSDP missions is based on the EU's Crisis Management Concept. This outlines what is needed from the political level down to the mission level, how responses are planned, implemented and ended. The same procedures broadly apply to civilian and military responses. The main difference is that military planning practices are based on national and NATO standards.

The research reports identify the key documents used in the civilian planning are: Political Framework for Crisis Response (PFCA); Crisis Management Concept (CMC); Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA); Civilian Strategic Option (CSO); and the Operational Plan (OPLAN). The EU's



Crisis Response System was developed after the adoption of the Lisbon treaty and is based on a comprehensive approach. Central to the system is the crisis platform in the EEAS. This relates response options to a crisis.

When a crisis is identified, the PSC employs the crisis platform to see if a CSDP operation is appropriate. This will result in a possible PFCA if the Council agrees to a crisis management response. The assessment explores a range of EU instruments, selecting the best suited for the situation. The PFCA establishes the overall political approach to the crisis. Once the PSC decides that action is needed, the CMPD is tasked to frame the CMC, triggering the planning process.

The report on Kosovo indicates difficulties in coping with the violence in the field, which was the consequence of poor logistical planning. The research paper points out that both the EU Planning Team (EUPT) and the ICM/EUSR Preparatory Team were responsible for maintaining close cooperation between all relevant actors, including within the different EU actors and with the UN, OSCE and KFOR, as well as other key factors such as the US and the Russian Federation. This coordination between international organizations proved problematic and was limited during the set-up phase of the EULEX mandate. This made strategic planning regarding interactions with the new Kosovo institutions very difficult.

That report quoted interviewees who noted that: "Brussels is not well-informed about the challenges in Kosovo, which has a negative impact on the mission planning process." The report also shows the 'Kosovo perspective' was rarely considered and that staff in Brussels tended to 'micro-manage.' This, the report argues, worked against the field staff developing an effective Mission Implementation Plans (MIP) at the operational level. The paper shows that a rigid and lengthy planning process hindered the mission. It usually took 12-18 months for the mission to change direction and operational focus. Logistical planning, particularly defined logistical planning cycles, was weak.

Regarding the EU planning process, the report suggests that decision times can be improved, indicating that it usually takes too much time to reach political consensus within the EU. Second, the planning process is still too long. Third, there are too many partial interests within various EU institutions as well as among member states, which prolong the decision-making process and often result in poor agreement that does not reflect the actual needs of post-conflict environment. Fourth, the comprehensive approach was still not at the desired level (e.g. in the planning process there are at least four phases led by four different bodies). Fifth, there is a very well elaborated analysis and lessons learned process; however, the implementation of the findings on the operational level was weak. But positively, the report indicates that the planning process has been elaborated through the past 10 years and major steps forward have been taken. The MIP now includes clearer directions, albeit that MIP planning relies too much on quantitative data at the expense of qualitative data.

EULEX Kosovo was planned at a time when the CMC had only started to develop. The report details a similar issue of delay in planning, citing an initial reluctance to reach political consensus, adding that the planning phase was additionally delayed by the partial interests of offices in Brussels and phased planning process in use at the time. To a degree, the EULEX planning process copied the Bosnian case, which has sometimes been referred to as a 'testing ground' for the CSDP from the point of view of planning and coordinating the different EU crisis management instruments. The EU



planning process has developed since then, particularly after the Treaty of Lisbon. A step forward was the new planning phase. This stimulated the interested actors (EU institutions, member states and so on) to contribute to the preparation of the first report on the necessity of a mission.

While the EULEX paper points out that in general the planning process within the EU takes up to one year, in cases when strong political will is exhibited it can take less. Planning and implementing the EUMM Georgia could be perceived as a best practice case, since the process took around two months. The reports indicate that deployments in Africa such as the particularly hostile environment in Democratic Republic of Congo suffered similar planning shortcomings as other missions.

The South Sudan report demonstrates that the planning was made difficult by various EU member states that had mixed feelings about the operation. This was because, in general, member states had little knowledge of the situation in South Sudan and questioned the need of the EU to engage. Once the mission deployed, however, there was good support in general by the member states.

This paper in its conclusion reads: “For the South Sudanese government nonetheless any help and support was highly welcomed immediately after gaining independence and thus no political pressure was exerted for a stronger mission. The CONOPS and OPLAN were generally based on the (wrong) assumption that the new airport terminal would have been constructed. However, the GoSS [Government of Southern Sudan] failed in taking real ownership of the project, since the outbreak of the internal conflict hindered the completion of the new airport terminal and thus limiting the training impact of EUAVSEC South Sudan” (page 44).

The paper shows that the mission deployed along the usual lines. It points out that in 2012 the initial planning phase produced a needs assessment and “thick report.” In its conclusion section, South Sudan report demonstrates that even against the backdrop of various shortfalls in planning, logistics, procurement and overall strategy, the mission staff had succeeded to train an impressive number of South Sudanese officials in issues such as civil aviation, airport security, border management and overall public administration.

The South Sudan paper presents concrete recommendations to be taken into consideration for crisis management missions and operations in general. These are:

- The pre-mission planning needs to be of higher quality and firmer agreements with the host country need to be negotiated.
- The time between the fact-finding mission and the actual political decision and deployment needs to be shortened to provide a realistic picture of the situation on the ground. It would have been wise to keep a core team with accurate equipment on the spot to report political developments and to adjust the strategic and planning documents accordingly.

The CAR paper concludes that the early response to the crisis in that country and the deployment of EUFOR RCA was undoubtedly a result of a French diplomatic offensive aimed at Europeanising the intervention. France led and put pressure on its EU partners to stop the massacres. It also provided most of the troops for the mission. The operation commander and the force commander were French generals. It is unlikely the operation would have happened had it not been for France,



particularly when considering a taxing force-generation process wherein France filled the gaps, similar to what had happened during the establishment of EUFOR Chad/CAR in 2007/2008.

The CAR study mentions that the EU should have taken additional time to plan the operation, with staff on the ground indicating they had a 500 page OPLAN for a 700 men operation. It was a problem because at the beginning as they had a staff of 10 officers and couldn't digest such a huge OPLAN.

The paper in fact highlighted a point mentioned earlier in Civilian Military section of this report, that operational planning was quicker in Brussels than in European capitals. Similarly, it also raised the point that it seems some Member States felt that EUFOR's planning process was 'too quick.' The contradictory points demonstrate the difficulties faced by EU institutions and the problem in pleasing everyone.

Clearly the planning does seem to have been done expeditiously, but such a performance matters little if Member States refuse to provide the equipment and troops required on time. It is true that the institutional structures used for decision-making differ from one country to another. However, at the end of the day, what matters was the result in terms of lives saved and reduction of violence in the crisis-beset country, and the problems in the CAR case stemmed from an apparent lack of political will, not from cumbersome institutional procedures.

In Afghanistan, the report shows that a fact-finding mission visited for several weeks in 2006. A team from the Political and Security Committee (PSC) planned how the police mission would be done. This guided the Council on the type of approach to be implemented. It is unclear whom the planning team engaged with (inclusive of local actors) or what their report contained. "From 2010 onward, representatives from the European External Action Service (EEAS) chair the PSC and planning phase. Notwithstanding these unknowns, there are questions about the planning phase that still appear to be relevant despite the development of the EEAS" (page 24).

During a round table in Maynooth, Ireland, experts in the field of Security Sector Reform including both practitioners from the field, and those who have worked in Brussels, and academics considering the Afghanistan review, observed that the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) is under-resourced. In essence, one person - the Director - is expected to do everything.

The report indicates that the CPCC is in essence, a planning and conduct body that is capable of performing the principal functions required of it. It has an adequate budget for its activities and it has adequate competencies in the planning, conduct and mission support areas. The main deficiency is in terms of personnel resources, especially in planning staff, but also in other areas of conduct and support. Some of these deficiencies could be alleviated by assistance from the EUMS, especially in the matter of planning staff, but there are limits to the extent to which this can solve the problems because of civilian-specific issues and areas of technical speciality.

In Bosnia, from an operational planning perspective, the transition from SFOR to EUFOR Althea was smooth and relatively simple. This was mainly due to the 'Berlin Plus' arrangements and existing SFOR operational plans. This was the foundation for EUFOR Althea's strategic/operational planning.

The Bosnian paper shows that, on the planning side EUFOR Althea profited from access to NATO



along with the infrastructure provided by SFOR. The paper underscored the role of NATO as the main counterpart for EUFOR in the planning process, and that NATO is considered to be better at planning and resource allocation. The paper points out that during the mission planning phase there were unexploited opportunities for joint work in the areas of security, logistics, force protection, medical, CIS etc. and even more importantly it could have provided an opportunity to ensure that planning of civilian and military missions is not done in isolation but with considerable consultation and mutual support.

In the conduct phase, the Bosnia paper suggests furthering communications between the heads of the MPCC and CPCC at Brussels level and between the mission commanders in joint or adjacent theatres on all aspects of the missions. It could also facilitate joint reviews by CMPD and even joint reporting to the PSC by the Civilian and military Mission Commanders. This is very important as it would help to develop the CivMil interface at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, thereby countering the tendency for separateness at the strategic level to cascade down to mission ground level.

The overlap paper argues that purposeful coordination and cooperation between the different actors is important in peace building efforts. This is based on a philosophy that a single actor does not have all the assets needed to restore peace. Joint planning, coordination and cooperation between different organisations are needed. To do this requires acknowledging the competencies of others, identifying the full mix and range of available capabilities and using them in a coherent manner. This is the essence of a Comprehensive Approach which integrates the full measure of components.

Lessons Identified

The pre-mission planning needs to be of higher quality and firmer agreements with the host country need to be negotiated.

The time between the fact-finding mission and the actual political decision and deployment allows gaps to emerge with the realistic picture of the situation on the ground and the EU response

References

EUFOR Althea; EUPOL Afghanistan; EUFOR RCA; EUPOL COPPS; EULEX Kosovo; EUBAM Libya; EUAVSEC South Sudan

Involvement of Local and other Actors

A recurring phenomenon of most theatres studied, is that local host nation actors were consulted but it is unclear to the extent regarding the nature of consultation regarding other actors alongside the EU deployment. This was reported as a wider issue than just EU deployments and some IECEU reports mentioned marginal or completely exclusion from the wider international planning process.

For example, according to a non-EU official, the challenge with the stabilisation process in CAR was that the local actors were rarely involved in the process efficiently. Others observed that despite the planning being rapid, key partners on the ground, including the United Nation and African Union were consulted throughout.



In CAR, EU operations were 'planned to be short bridging operations with the aim of being replaced by the UN peacekeeping force' (page 68, CAR Review). In what was a multilateral approach, lack of a common international HQ was seen as having 'hampered the overall planning and execution of the operations' (page 72, CAR Review).

Notwithstanding previous observations, limited sharing of information was an important planning issue raised by the CAR paper. The report implies that insufficient information sharing was a barrier to the co-ordination among the operations and identified as an issue among the supranational actors. For example, in the absence of an 'information sharing agreement', the EU and UN are not entitled to share all their information. This led to some delays – in, for example, receiving crucial intelligence information from the ground – that had an impact on the operational planning. In addition, lack of a shared HQ for the international actors was seen as having hampered the overall planning and execution of the operations. The good co-ordination efforts aside, different military operations still had different mandates and so had different priorities and responsibilities, raising the question of why the three military operations could not be combined into one.

The work of EUBAM Libya was hampered by an inability to secure an accountable local partner or recipient and this impacted on the drafting of a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA). Obviously, this is crucial to the effectiveness of any operation as on occasion, such as strategic border management planning and capacity building training and mentoring work of EUBAM Libya and EUPOL Afghanistan, the mission relies on the work done by the UN and the EU Delegation on a more strategic level.

In Kosovo a positive aspect of the mission is that local actors were consulted in the planning process of majority of MIP (except for sensitive cases, such as witness protection). EULEX officials were also embedded in local institutions alongside their local counterparts, which enabled daily exchanges and cooperation and indeed were perceived to be a bridge between different sides.

The research indicates that likewise in Palestine, the PA officials are involved in planning process of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah activities, however there seems to be few efforts to involve other Palestinian actors. Perhaps the research team were unable to uncover examples, but the representatives of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah who were interviewed for this research did not mention Palestinian civil society organizations or other non-PA actors as their local contacts, though civil society representatives were occasionally invited to participate in workshops or seminars organised by EUPOL COPPS.

In Palestine, the observation was made that the short rotation cycle of EU CSDP missions – for example, police experts' deployment to a CSDP mission is limited to one year by many EU Member States - as well as the one-year mission mandate period which determines the cycle of planning and implementation of operational activities and leaves the experts little time to invest on developing a deeper understanding of conflict context and Palestinian society. This does not mean that all EU CSDP activities would lack awareness of local society and conditions, and indeed a number of individual projects of EUPOL COPPS and some of its international experts were mentioned as good examples on how local conditions have been taken into account. Rather, the question is how the EU CSDP missions could ensure that all their activities are based on local ownership and inclusiveness?



Lessons Identified

- Local actors were rarely effectively involved in the planning process
- Increased strategic level coordination is recommended to facilitate information sharing with other international actors on the ground

References

EUPOL COPPS; EUBAM RAFAH; EULEX Kosovo; EUBAM Libya; EUAVSEC South Sudan

Desired End State

According to these reports, certain mission planning lacked clear goals and related exit strategy. This created uncertainty and a challenge, not just for EU staff, but also for other actors. That led to EU staff having an unclear understanding what the EU mission was ultimately about and its future role in the host country. For example the EUPOL Afghanistan mission mandate changed 5 times over the 10 year period of the mission. Given the political origins of CSDP missions, their duration was a political decision in the hands of 28 member states. As a result, the mission end state can be vague in some areas and unrealistic in others.

In EULEX Kosovo the mandate was perceived as deliberately vague and some critics even argued that it hampered the effectiveness of the mission, exposing the mission to accusations of being an instrument of international control and oversight (p31 D 2.3). In the words of one mission member: "Certain end goals and standards envisaged in the mission's mandate are overly ambitious. If the mission was to fully fulfill its mandate, it could stay in Kosovo for another 20 years, perhaps 50 or even indefinitely" (page 31).

In Bosnia, the research paper shows that the operation was not very demanding in terms of planning, since it has been carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus arrangements. It concludes that, even though the initial planning was successful, it failed to define and agree on an end state for the exit strategy for EUFOR Althea.

The biggest problem in Libya, according to the EUBAM paper, was that, in essence, there was not a single accountable recipient representing a particular branch of border management that could have served as an established partner. Instead, the limited strategic planning that the mission was able to carry out was unproductive, partly because the absent and changing partners, partly because of the misplaced idea that the Libyans would be interested in what was described as an 'IBM' style way of arranging border management. While the strategic goals of the mission failed, it has, however, engaged in some operational training.

Like other missions, the intervention in Libya suffered greatly from a dire security situation and dysfunctional politics. Several excerpts of the paper follow. Each is insightful. "This, certain out of sync-nature between the operational reality and the strategic level ambitions is where the most important lessons in the case of EUBAM Libya might be learned. Therefore any assessment of the mission has to analyse both the politico-strategic level of the mission planning and execution with the operational reality of the mission" (page 10).



“In hindsight the deeply factional nature of the country and the way that this directly influenced the security situation should have reflected the way in which outside powers formed their policies towards Libya, starting from the decision to intervene. On the other hand, the situation in Libya had a level of complexity that would have been very difficult to analyse and use as a base for a strategic planning within the spectrum of instruments that the CSDP has” (page 21).

“Based on the contextual assessment, the mandate of EUBAM Libya was clearly overoptimistic and its task to develop a completely new (to Libya) concept for border management was not realistic. However, the worsening security situation, which effectively ended EUBAM Libya in the summer of 2014 might have masked the other problems that the mission had, also in terms of its effectiveness and the lessons learned. These lessons seem to be mostly related to the mission planning and to the assessment process that predated EUBAM Libya. One must ask how was it possible that the problems that the mission faced were not to be seen by the time of its planning, or did the political ambitions of member states cloud the decision making process in such a way that a mission that was not scaled up to the challenges it was facing, was capable of escaping the drawing board?” (page 50). “The mission planning as well as the operational and political-strategic objectives were based on false assumptions and although the mission personnel managed to apply the mandate in a flexible manner, the goals were not reachable and as such the mission [was] doomed to fail from the start ... Furthermore, the cooperation between Brussels and the field did also not work properly” (page 38). In essence, Libya was not ready for the intervention as conceived in the mandate of the mission.

Two EU operations in CAR under the CSDP were mandated by the UN Security Council to protect populations most at risk and provide humanitarian aid. These are, EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008-9) (not reviewed) and EUFOR RCA (2014-15) (page 3, CAR Review). Of EUFOR RCA, France applied pressure on the EU to make this happen (page 20, CAR Review). As stated in a previous paragraph, the two EU operations were ‘planned to be short bridging operations with the aim of being replaced by the UN peacekeeping force’ (page 68, CAR Review).

‘Both of these interventions were planned as transition operations with short and limited mandates. They were part of the multilateral co-operation aimed at restoring peace in conjunction with efforts of other international actors. Although these operations were limited in their scope and mandate, both operations have, according to several reports, been perceived to have had an important contribution to supporting security in the areas where they deployed. Nevertheless, both of these operations have been widely criticised for not really helping to enhance the long-term stability of the region. Much of the criticism has been directed at the EU, with the argument that there is a huge gap between the needs on the ground and the means provided by the EU’ (page 3, CAR Review).

In CAR the research paper shows that planning was geared toward meeting a set end date instead of reaching an end state, of which the latter involved reaching a situation where an operation can be successfully ended. At the round table on CAR, there was unanimous agreement that a three-year mandate was too short. Typifying the outlook on this, a participant stated: “Capacity building cannot be done in short two to three year timeframes. This gives no time to develop the police, especially given the threat environment. It is not possible to overcome strategic failures with tactical successes.



There was a failure to anticipate and learn”.

A brief study of wars like Afghanistan’s shows they are protracted affairs, measured in decades rather than years. One did not need the experiences and hindsight of EUPOL Afghanistan to see this. Yet, Council Joint Action 2007/369/CFSP raised a three-year time frame, reviewed every six months. The EU was not in Afghanistan for the long haul. This was palpable with Afghans interviewed. Almost every interviewee criticised a rolling three-year strategy. The viewpoint of a senior mission member with lengthy experience of Afghanistan is representative of this sentiment. He states: “A rule of law mission, which is what a police mission really is, takes a long time, 20-30 years. The political construction is wrong, too short-term. You cannot hope to achieve anything worthwhile in three years. The EU Council needs to re-think this. A short-term mindset meant we never achieved long-term goals. We did not think strategically”.

Lesson Identified

- Some missions lacked clear goals that did not reflect what an appropriate intervention relevant to the needs of the nation would look like. As a result, there was an unclear desired end-state or related exit strategy.

References

EUPOL Afghanistan; EUFOR RCA; EULEX Kosovo; EUBAM Libya; EUFOR Althea

2.3 Policy recommendations

Planning forms the core of crisis management activities, and as missions and operations undergo continual changes, planning is and should be also an on-going activity, which needs sufficient resources both on the strategic and the operational level.

Civilian and military elements within the EU should combine at the initial planning phase on future missions deploying to a crisis situation and remain in close partnership thereafter. Advanced communications between the heads of the MPCC and CPCC at Brussels level and between the mission commanders in joint or adjacent theatres on all aspects of the missions should be further developed. In order to support this communication, consideration should be given to a programme of staff exchanges and expanded purposeful training between the military and civilian institutions

Local actors should be involved in the planning phase, particularly at the start. The same applies to partner agencies. In the same vein, the mission should have more influence on the MIP. A core planning team with accurate equipment should be immediately established on the ground in order to report political developments and to adjust the strategic and planning documents accordingly.

The desired end-state, purpose or overarching strategic objective of the mission should reflect an appropriate intervention relevant to the needs of the nation it is operating in, at that juncture. Invariably, this may be to stabilise the territory and make it safe for its people.

All of these complement new EU thinking on the Integrated Approach as a means of boosting and fully utilising the Comprehensive Approach.



3 INTEROPERABILITY⁶

Interoperability has been a key focus of the European Union from its inception. From an interoperability point of view, the institutional framework of the CSDP crisis management operations is challenging, as all 28 member states, the European Commission, the Council General Secretariat, and the European Parliament (as budgetary authority) have their role to play. The impact of this complex decision making matrix varies between civilian missions and military operations.

On the military side, there is a clear argument for enhancing interoperability as promoting national interest, stemming from the post WW2 and Cold War context. The need to cooperate, as ingrained by the Alliance and NATO, has become an integral part of a common defence culture extending to a mind-set where cooperation is enhanced by a common doctrine and a series of mechanisms from common training and exercises to equipment. The standardization process within NATO is very developed, with three standardization bodies, a NATO Standardization Documents Database (NSDD) and 231 (often very detailed) standards, whose implementation is facilitated through apps and training.

This acquis has been the starting point of the military component of the CSDP, giving it a competitive advantage over civilian missions, where both the rationale behind the CSDP missions as well as interoperability in general is a work in progress. Development of interoperability in the CSDP missions is also much less developed in terms of common doctrine and implementation hereof, as well as focus of the central organisation in charge of steering the process, but on the other hand cooperation is also 50 years younger than on the military side.

Specifically, the development of interoperability is focused mainly on Council conclusions and strategies, whereas implementation in the field is equally vital, if not more so. In the field, interoperability is often quite detailed and technical, and lagging on the civilian side. Taking the example of pre-mission training and capabilities of the CSDP-staff, one finding is that relying on the member states resources leads to the result that staff is pre-mission trained in 28 different ways, affecting both their level of preparedness as well as their ability to work on-site in a standardised way. Such an effect is much less noticed in military operations, where the benefits of the common defence culture nurtured by NATO (and now further enhanced by the EDA) are evident in the field.

There is now the potential of renewed political will to increase interoperability as evidenced in the vision of 'integrated CSDP crisis management operations' in the 2016 Global Strategy, an increased focus on EU's neighbourhood as well as growing security concerns. Interoperability is a key enabler of Pooling and Sharing, both central mechanisms for improving the effectiveness of CSDP crisis management operations, as well as improving potential for cooperation between national actors. Although interoperability is often seen as mainly seen as a cost saving mechanism, it builds common organisational culture and solidarity. Interoperability leads to more effective use of current capabilities and increases availability of resources for the States to deploy for EU, NATO,

⁶ This chapter is based on D6.3 The interoperability of resources. 2016. IECEU, 653371.



multinational or national purposes. In short: increasing interoperability is one of the key mechanisms that EU can use to improve its effectiveness.

This understanding has not gone amiss within the EU in general, and there have been several positive initiatives to create greater interoperability. One applaudable example is the recent force generation planning guide for civilian CSDP missions⁷ that revised the existing job descriptions to ensure continuity within and between them for comparable functions across the missions. It is detailed and practical, with harmonised job descriptions, job categories and references to the European Qualifications Framework.

Other positive developments are taking place in mission support platform and the common warehouse initiative. By centralising assets that are used in missions, there are greater economies of scale, and speed for both deployment and liquidation of missions can be significantly enhanced. The centralisation creates a common rulebook, this time about the equipment and services needed for a crisis management operation. It establishes a de facto standard that ideally is again linked to the training system and national states. On the military side, a similar initiative is the work on the capabilities performed by the EDA. By developing European core operational concepts, that are both highly relevant in any crisis management operations and enable capabilities of 27 member states to work together, interoperability is enhanced and the potential for pooling and sharing of capabilities is realised. Here too agreeing on a common rule book is a key part of the process.

However, it seems, and as IECEU study on interoperability shows, interoperability is seldom hampered by the lack of a joint rule book (as there are many) per se but rather by the lack of implementation and focus on interoperability in the field. Certainly, rule books themselves could be more comprehensive, tailored (e.g. for strategic, tactical and operational levels) and cover the crisis management operation life-cycle better. Indications from the field, however, show that the main obstacle to interoperability is in a mind-set, where even when there are relatively simple potentials for increasing interoperability, these potentials are not acted on.

A new dimension to interoperability is both the potential of a greater number of integrated missions necessitating a higher level of civil-military interoperability as well as the increased need to include civilian components into military operations (generally to add expertise), and military components into civilian missions (generally to increase the security of the mission). Where military or civilian components are added, the mission/operation becomes somewhat integrated while remaining purely military or purely civilian in terms of organisation.

As the “soft-power” afforded to the EU in the form of its civilian missions is unique global asset for the EU, there are also clear limits to increased cooperation and integration between the civilian missions and operations to ensure that that “soft power” is not lost through lack of credibility as a civilian actor. Similarly, although the EU cooperates with many actors, third country and international participation and cooperation in CSDP is growing emphasis. The larger the number of actors, the more clearly challenges of interoperability become visible, and the more benefit EU has on increasing interoperability. Moreover, the more divergent EU practices are, the more challenging will

⁷ Force Generation for the civilian CSDP Missions: A planning guide for Member States Seconding Authorities September 2016, Ref. Ares(2016)5438627 - 19/09/2016.



cooperation be with external partners and the less likely it is to produce desirable outcomes. In addition, the proliferation of the security challenges, and the proliferation of the number of different actors, the understanding of interoperability need to adapt to this change as well. The widening web of actors involved in the crisis management adds amount of challenge to the coordination of the efforts. Furthermore, evolving domains such as cyber defence, needs also to be taken into consideration in the interoperability related discussions.⁸

3.1 Objective

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a list of recommendations for enhanced interoperability in the field of the European Union CSDP military and civilian crisis management. The scope of this document is built on IECEU (Improving the Effectiveness of the capabilities in EU conflict prevention) – project serving as basis for discussions on potentials as well as challenges related to interoperability. Ideally, the paper will provide basis for the key issues related to interoperability and how to enhance it in forthcoming years.

Interoperability relies on systems being able to both provide and accept services, units, tools and personnel, as it is the foundation of cooperation and pooling and sharing within crisis management. Poor interoperability or lack of interoperability leads to inefficiency, wasted resources and in the worst case, inability to act. There are several on-going processes and initiatives within EU to increase interoperability. Strengthening interoperability is vital also within the civil-military environment, with the increasing focus on integrated crisis management operations and an even more complicated security environment in the European neighbourhood.

Through IECEU comparative analysis of interoperability in civilian CSDP crisis management missions (EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL RAFAH, EUBAM Libya, EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUPOL Congo) and CSDP military operations (EUFOR Althea, EUFOR Chad/RCA, EUFOR CAR, EUFOR RD Congo, Operation Artemis (Congo)), IECEU has found potentials for enhancing interoperability in the current EU structures and practises. The seven key components of analysis on IECEU interoperability are:

- (1) planning;
- (2) staffing;
- (3) shared services (mission support);
- (4) equipment;
- (5) command systems and information sharing;
- (6) third state participation and cooperation;
- (7) review systems.

Beyond the findings there are mechanisms to enhance interoperability, three main challenges for interoperability identified as part of IECEU project can be concluded into three main areas: i) divergent, non-standardised and sometimes contradictory national practices, which remain evident in CSDP operations and missions. ii) lack of a mind-set for increasing interoperability in practice

⁸ D6.3 The interoperability of resources. IECEU, 653371.



especially in civilian missions, but also between civilian and military actors, even where increasing interoperability has no foreseen costs; iii) the current intergovernmental set-up of the CSDP crisis management operations, some of which, is based on the very foundations of the EU (including the Lisbon treaty), which hinders the development of interoperability.

3.2 Defining interoperability

Interoperability is defined in the conceptual framework of the IECEU-project Deliverable 1.5 (DL1.5)⁹, where interoperability is one of the six capabilities examined in the IECEU-project. D1.5 defines capabilities as 'resources plus competences' and gives an overall description what interoperability is in the context of the project as follows:

- Cooperation/Collaboration
- Coordination
- Civ-Mil/Civ-Civ/Mil-Mil synergies

Table 2: Definition of Interoperability 10,

<p>Interoperability - Cooperation/Collaboration, Coordination, Civ-Mil/Civ-Civ/Mil-Mil synergies</p>	<p>IEUPS/ IEUFO*: The processes of cooperation and collaboration in the mission / operation, Coordination processes, National caveats or deficiencies, Prior mission co-training and exercises, Different aspects of interoperability (technical, skills-related, resources-related), Civ-Mil / Civ-Civ / Mil-Mil dimensions of cooperation and synergies</p>	<p>INEUPS/ INEUFO*: The processes of cooperation and coordination (also with the local stakeholders), Different aspects of interoperability (technical, skills and training related, resources related - also in the local context or with local stakeholders and within the wider international community), Civ-Mil / Civ-Civ / Mil-Mil dimensions of cooperation</p>
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This definition gives a very broad understanding of interoperability. To enable more in-depth analysis, a more detailed definition has been used in work package 6, provided in 2011 by the Presidency in a note issued to the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, on the subject of Standardization and Interoperability. In this note, interoperability is identified as one of several levels of standardization described. The note defines interoperability in the context of CSDP crisis management operations as:

“The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”

⁹ D1.5 Conceptual Framework. 2015. IECEU, 653371.

¹⁰ D1.5 Conceptual Framework. 2015. IECEU, 653371.



This definition will also be used in work package 7, in order to ensure the coherence of the findings and results.

3.2.1. INTEROPERABILITY IN CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT¹¹

EU civilian crisis management seldom receives as much attention as its military counterpart, although there are more civilian missions in number and civilian missions also cover a larger geographical area. The need for development of civilian capabilities, and beyond to military operations¹², for crisis management reflected the changing nature of international conflicts, which the EU has most significantly experienced in its neighbouring Western Balkans¹³. The centrality of civilian aspects of CSDP to EU crisis management is evident through both the early emphasis on civilian crisis management (first EU CSDP mission in 2003 to Bosnia Herzegovina was a civilian mission), the larger number of EU civilian missions, and continued development of CSDP missions.¹⁴

Although interoperability in the realm of civilian CSDP missions may be a less central issue or at least a different kind of issue than it is as for the military operations, several important and specific features of interoperability are certainly relevant for the analysis with an overall objective of improving the effectiveness of civilian CSDP missions. Observing the definitions in use in the official EU documents related to the civilian missions, it can be argued that the theoretical definition of interoperability is primarily the same or deriving from military operations.

The discussion paper on arrangements for common equipment for EU police operations (11839/1/02 REV 1) notes that interoperability refers to both operational issues and logistic issues and can be defined as a condition where two or more structures or systems can work in a cohesive way. In general terms, it can be considered as sufficient compatibility between systems and procedures in member states which would allow them to work together effectively. Assessing these and other sources, we may conclude that the 2001 note by the Presidency issued to the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, on the subject of Standardization and Interoperability (document 13307/01)⁹ seems to be a central piece for defining interoperability also in the civilian sphere, as it is referred to also by the EU documents dealing with interoperability aspects of civilian crisis management.

Other types of civilian CSDP missions (e.g. rule of law missions) may face entirely different set of interoperability challenges, such as for example the question of applicable law and the necessity for interoperability among CSDP staff coming from different legal systems and backgrounds (e.g.

¹¹ This chapter is based on D6.3 The interoperability of resources. 2016. IECEU, 653371.

¹² Per M. Norheim-Martinsen, "EU capabilities for a comprehensive approach: Broad interoperability as comparative advantage," Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (2009). accessed December 15, 2016. <https://www.ffi.no/no/Rapporter/09-01300.pdf>.

¹³ Chivvis, Christopher S., "EU Civilian Crisis Management: The Record So Far". Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation (2010), Accessed December 15, 2016. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG945.pdf

¹⁴ European Union External Action Service. "Military and civilian missions and operations." Accessed. December 5, 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en.



difference between civil law and common law systems). The EU concept for CSDP Justice Missions (within the Rule of Law framework) (18173/10) recognizes the potential issue of determination of applicable law and (indirectly) **its consequential relation to (inter)operability of CSDP staff:**

“When developing or reforming their legal framework some countries receive assistance and advice from experts with background from different legal systems which are not always compatible with local legal rules and tradition. As a result the legal framework is often inadequate for the specifics of the country with many structural deficiencies, inconsistencies, overlapping and contradictions and often does not address the local needs”.

The EU committed to develop strong and effective non-military component in the framework of the EU by the decision to develop the civilian aspects of the crisis management in four priority areas defined by Civilian Headline Goals adopted at the Feira European Council in June 2000: police, strengthening of the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and civil protection.¹⁵ In 2004, two additional areas (monitoring and supporting EU Special Representatives) were added by the Civilian Headline Goal 2008. The aspirations and goals of the EU in the field of civilian crisis management have been further reinforced by the Civilian Headline Goal 2010¹⁶. Despite a hardening of the security atmosphere, and an increased focus on the military, the EU's civilian capabilities are often seen as an example of EU's unique “soft power” and are also noted as such in the new EU Global Strategy.¹⁷

With the availability of wide spectrum of civilian instruments of an economic, social or diplomatic nature, the EU focus on preventative activities is not surprising.¹⁸ Since the first civilian deployment in 2003 (EUPM BiH), civilian CSDP missions have varied in scope (police, monitoring, justice, and security sector reform), nature (non-executive and executive), geographic location and size. Although this variety of civilian tools is EU's clear advantage in comparison to other international security actors, it has also created additional challenges to ensure high degree of interoperability within civilian capabilities.

¹⁵ European Union External Action Service. “Shaping of a Common Security and Defence Policy.” Accessed November 23, 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/nuclear-safety/5388/shaping-of-a-common-security-and-defence-policy_en

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ “CSDP must become more rapid and effective. This requires member states to enhance the deployability and interoperability of their forces through training and exercises. /.../ at the same time, we must further develop our civilian missions – a trademark of CSDP – by encouraging force generation, speeding up deployment, and providing adequate training based on EU-wide curricula.” Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign And Security Policy. Accessed November 23, 2016. <https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en/global-strategy-foreign-and-security-policy-european-union>

¹⁸ Malešič, Marjan. “EULEX Kosovo: A Test of the EU's Civilian Crisis Management”. In Towards a Strategic EU Vision for Security and Defense. (2015). Ed. Maria Raquel Freire and Maria Grazia Galantino. Palgrave Macmillan.



3.2.2. INTEROPERABILITY IN MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT¹⁹

A broad interoperability concept was introduced in the EU Headline goal 2010, which defines it as ‘the ability of armed forces to operate together and act in conjunction with other civilian instruments. Although, the NATO and EU generated capability initiatives had similar starting points and remain interlinked, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) process, initiated at the 2002 Prague Summit, is committed to a US transformation model that indiscriminately imposes the same set of standards on every Member State.²⁰ The EU has been more open to diversifying tasks between the member states, and considering ways to reform systems and procedures for defence acquisitions and production. As the process has moved along, a clearer understanding of the kind of tasks that the EU member states are expected to carry out under the CSDP has also emerged, although this remains subject to continuous political controversy.

These fundamental differences have had some implications to the development of the interoperability requirements within these organisations. For example, unlike NATO or traditional nation states, the EU does not have a formal military doctrine²¹ and there is no jointly agreed framework under which countries contributing to the CSDP operations shall ensure their technical interoperability. Furthermore, it seems that EU has largely avoided separate interoperability standards that would replace those of NATO due to constrain amongst several member states. NATO member states and Partners have ratified (with some national restrictions) the NATO standards and directives into their national military structures, procedures and practises.²² The national implementation can cover the technical, tactical and procedural perspective, training and education, and command and control structures. Hence, the implications of the NATO STANAGs and directives can be deducted from the national research and development initiatives, acquisition, military strategy, doctrine, tactics, training, and combined exercises.²³ Therefore, there has not been need or space for the development of the EU specific military standards for the member states.

Consequently, within the EU the interoperability related discussion has mainly circulated around civil-military cooperation and coordination rather than military-military aspect. To ensure some degree of interoperability the EU has established procedures²⁴ for international crisis management, which

¹⁹ This chapter is based on D6.3 The interoperability of resources. 2016. IECEU, 653371.

²⁰ Per M. Norheim-Martinsen. 2012. *The European Union and Military Force: Governance and Strategy*, (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 108.

²¹ Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application. AAP-6(2016) NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

²² Interview with a representative of the Ministry of Defence, 18 October, 2016, Helsinki.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ The new crisis management procedures were adapted in 2014. The revision process of crisis management procedures in the EU was stimulated by the contemporary reflection on lessons learned from the 24 CSDP missions and operations conducted by the EU over the last 10 years and is driven by three main purposes: (1) to enable a comprehensive approach to crisis management; (2) to align civilian and military planning process; and (3) to rebalance responsibilities between EU institutions, notably by the EEAS and member states. Nicoletta Pirozzi. 2013. ‘The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management’, EU Crisis Management Papers Series, DCAF Brussels, (2013), 13.




comprehends the whole mission cycle for both - civilian and military crisis management missions. Although, this civilian aspect and thereby EU's Comprehensive Approach is the EU's competitive advantage in comparison to other institutions, the military interoperability cannot be completely neglected.

When studying the applicability of the NATO STANAGs to CSDP operations, it is also worth knowing the interoperability challenges that the NATO has faced while implementing its multinational peace support operations. Those include information sharing, language skills of the staff, command and control, force capability and readiness to act as a part of multinational force.²⁵ The case studies carried out during the IECEU-project have also projected many of the same challenges.

3.3 Key findings

As outlined in Figure 1: Process of Analysis, to gain in-depth understanding of the key issues relevant to civil-military interoperability, we first analyzed separately the key barriers and enablers to interoperability in CSDP civil-civil and military-military context. Finally, the potentials for enhanced civil-military interoperability were discovered."

Figure 1: Process of Analysis



²⁵ Interview with a representative of the Ministry of Defence, 18 October, 2016, Helsinki.



3.4 Key challenges to interoperability

Following the definition of interoperability used in the case studies, the interoperability related issues are analysed through two functions; (1) coordination and (2) collaboration. In this context, the coordination relates to issues that were identified to limit the internal coordination within a CSDP operation/mission. The collaboration refers to issues that hampered the effective and resource efficient cooperation between the CSDP mission/operation and the different actors.

3.4.1. COORDINATION

A central aspect of interoperability in CSDP is the ability to people and resources dedicated to mission/operation to operate effectively together. Hence, the issues related to interoperability of the human, technology and procedural dimension of the mission and operation shall be discussed. Based on the comparative analysis, this issue is more critical to the effectiveness of the military operations than the civilian ones. This weight of importance is also reflected to the amount of issues (see Table 4) emerged from the case studies, where the interoperability of equipment, information-sharing & management systems, and language skills were perceived to be more crucial for the effectiveness of a military operation than for the civilian missions.

Table 3: Coordination Challenges

MISSION/ OPERATION	WITHIN THE MISSION/OPERATION
EUFOR Althea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Due to the variance in national recruitment policies, and amount and level of training received by the personnel prior to their deployment, significant differences in skills related to work as part of a multinational staff/ operation can be identified. Among others, major differences in cultural awareness, language skills, reporting procedures, existed. • Lack of financial instruments that would enable providing equipment to AFBiH, hampered the effectiveness of the training, and makes training a nation-by-nation requirement. • Lack of common equipment used by the EUFOR staff, reduces its ability to cross-train and equip the AFBiH. • Uncoordinated donations of equipment to AFBiH, and insufficient material support to AFBiH projects hampered the sustainability and effectiveness of the EUFOR's efforts to build the AFBiH capacity. • National caveats a challenge to operational planning. • Strong national interests sometimes compromise effectiveness of the operation. • Lack of common pre-deployment training standards.
EULEX KOSOVO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Restraints in the sharing of sensitive information are identified: weaknesses and communication flaws have been evident especially on higher (strategic) levels,



	<p>while cooperation and the information sharing on the tactical level is generally better.</p>
<p>EUFOR RCA</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of French language skills hampered the information gathering and sharing. • Lack of reliable classified communication systems. For example, establishing the information system for the operation took more than three months, and the communication between Bangui and OHQ in Larissa took place via internet. • Absence of common framework for information and intelligence gathering, sharing and storing hampered the circulation of operation-related information. • Lack of common equipment, which limited the considerably the activities of the different units. Interviewees reported huge differences in equipment levels between national contingents. While some had everything they needed, others faced a lack of equipment that hindered soldiers' capacity to do their job efficiently. • Due to the absence of a common funding mechanism to fund common equipment i.e. medical support, radio communication, computers, the national platoons are heavily dependent on home support in terms of equipping and maintenance. If the home country does not provide appropriate equipment to execute the tasks required during the operation, a considerable security and efficiency problem results for the whole operation • The national caveats were hampering the sharing of information namely between the NATO and non-NATO countries. In addition, the releasability of documents was even more difficult among the third countries such as Georgia, as the information can be circulated only among the EU Member States.

3.4.2. COLLABORATION

CSDP missions and operations function in parallel with several other actors. Promoting local ownership throughout the mission/operation life cycle is central for the sustainability and legitimacy of the CSDP efforts in the host country, and hence the collaborative approach must be mainstreamed to all the activities. Furthermore, purposeful collaboration with the other international actors, NGOs, and bi-lateral actors must be observed for the greater EU visibility and impact. Consequently, interoperability in terms of collaborations with the local and other international organisations is a central capability for the CSDP missions and operations. Based on the case studies, it seems that although a number of good practises for enhanced collaboration exist, there is room for improvements as well. As Table 3: Coordination Challenges shows, many of issues affecting on the quality of the collaboration is beyond the CSDP's capacity to solve such as lack of infrastructure or dysfunctional host government, yet these issues need to be considered throughout planning and conduct of the mission/operation.



Table 4: Collaboration related challenges

MISSION/ OPERATION	COLLABORATION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS AND LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS
EUFOR Althea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The overall picture of the roles and activities of other EU and international actors, such as EU Delegation, Commission programmes, NATO have remained slightly unclear to individual EUFOR officers. • Fragmented attitudes towards information sharing between the different organisations prevail. Due to unwillingness to share information and differences in working logic has at times hampered the cooperation between EUFOR Althea and i.e. humanitarian and development actors. • The equipment of AFBiH is poor, and the AFBiH does not have the resources to purchase new equipment. This causes a real interoperability challenge, since several countries donate equipment to AFBiH, which are not in-line with the needs, or competences of the AFBiH.
EULEX KOSOVO	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of coordination and pooling and sharing among international actors on training and education, which leads to overlapping or lack of specific programs. • Coordination among actors often relies too much on informal, personal contacts rather than on formally structured communication lines. • There are certain real limitations in regards to the sharing of information, which is often frustrating for local government. Consequently, there is a need for improved communication channels and information sharing (both with local institutions and international actors). Contacts often rely heavily on personal connections. • EULEX (2nd responder) should improve information link between KP (1st responder) and KFOR (3rd responder), which takes too much time for effective response. • EULEX corruption allegations, which affected public image of the mission in the eyes of the local population has hampered the willingness of the local stakeholders to collaborate with the mission. As a result of the distrust towards EULEX, the Kosovo actors believe they are not provided with sufficient information, as the information flow is filtered by EULEX, which acts as a go-between.
Operation Artemis, EUFOR RDC, EUPOL and EUSEC (Congo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • EUPOL: institutional infighting between the donors and national interest-driven approaches have a negative impact on EUPOL's work. • EUPOL: Congolese host did not have any overview or control over what kinds of projects were initiated at the local level, which undermined the overall objectives of the mission. • EUSEC: The UN had the lead in cooperating with the FARDC in SSR, and the EUSEC had to work within this framework. However, the different donor-actors did not necessarily have the same priorities and mandates, and cooperation was often difficult. Furthermore national interest often blocked actual cooperation, and the Congolese strategy from 2007 to prioritize bilateral cooperation made coordination more difficult. • EU was blamed for not understanding the local dynamics and hiring international experts instead of using the locally available expertise.



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The fragmented views on the role of the donors including the role of CSDP initiatives in the country, have had impact on the collaborations efforts between the EU and local, and other international actors.
EUFOR RCA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The information sharing among the supranational actors was insufficient. For example, in the absence of an 'information sharing agreement', the EU and UN are not entitled to share all their information. This led to some delays – in, for example, receiving crucial intelligence information from the ground – that had an impact on the operational planning. Operation Sangaris functioned quite separately from others, having quite different rules of engagement and approaching the population differently than the UN and EU troops did. At times, the reputation of Sangaris also influenced how EUFOR RCA officers were perceived by the local population, making differentiation between these operations even more important. Co-operation efforts between the operation and other international actors were challenged by the fact that there were problems with internal communication between different nationalities within EUFOR RCA. The information given by the humanitarian actors often did not circulate among the EUFOR staff, and this made the co-operation inefficient at times. Information-gathering was often hampered by lack of language skills. Lack of understanding of each other's roles and working culture was at times perceived as hampering the co-operation between the civilian and military actors. Lack of functioning governmental institutions, armed forces and police forces hampered the joint pre-operation planning, as well as, collaboration with the local stakeholders throughout the conduct of the operation.
EUBAM Libya (Libya)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information sharing, planning of joint projects were the main forms of cooperation between EUBAM and other international actors. Nevertheless, not much concrete was established. The access to information was hampered due to the unwillingness of some of the other operators in the area to share information and/or resources with the mission. The embassies did live a "life of their own" and were mostly used as information channels without much joint operational capabilities.
EUAVSEC (South-Sudan)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The people interviewed strongly underlined that the cooperation between EUAVSEC and other international organizations was excellent in Juba. Due to unwillingness by UN HQ to provide assistance to the establishment of the mission in EUAVSEC in the shared facilities with UNMISS, the EUAVSEC had to rent a hotel. Besides this the collaboration with UNMISS worked well. Dysfunctional government was perceived as the key challenge for the collaboration between the mission and local stakeholders.
EUPOL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah (Palestine Territories)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> There was a coordination system created to coordinate the different programmes and activities of different actors. The point of having coordination system at place is to identify problems and potential overlaps and try to develop solutions to them. Many respondents pointed out that successfulness of coordination efforts was much dependent on personalities, and that a change in key personnel in the agencies may affect inter-agency coordination negatively or positively.



	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One problem to effective coordination was that people did not always understand properly the mandates and roles of various agencies. • There was overlapping aid efforts and fragmentation of assistance. I.E. funding for building community police stations in the West Bank has come from the EU, its individual Member States Germany and the Netherlands, and from the US, and it was stated that there was little coordination among the donors, or between EUREP and EUPOL COPPS that also has community policing experts on the matter. • A major obstacle for efforts to support building justice and security sectors remains to be the non-functioning PLC and, related to that, lack of civilian oversight. • The EU is the biggest donor, but in individual cases the models or systems they offer to the PA are competing with those presented by others, and the Palestinians are selecting the ones that are best suitable for their local context and purposes. • EU CSDP missions in the OPTs have limited contact with Palestinian or Israeli civil society organisations. • In EUPOL COPPS cooperation with the civil society was perceived to be difficult as there already were too many meetings and seminars. • Lack of cultural awareness at times hampered the collaboration between the mission staff members and local partners.
<p>EUPOL Afghanistan</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The pillar structure also made it difficult to work across the pillars and ensure synergy between, for example, the legal system and police reform. • Co-operation did not occur at the highest level, thereby impeding the functions of lower levels in the field, and inter-agency co-operation was limited and did not extend to joint-learning and analysis. • Much of what EUPOL promoted contradicted other programmes. An example is intelligence-led policing. • Overlap of activities between the different actors working within the field of rule of law: Training across MOI was disjointed. Nobody knew what anybody else was training. The Germans, French, US and others had their bi-lateral agreements with the Afghan government. Each operated in their own silo. • There was no clear division of labour within Afghan SSR. Internal competition and fighting at all levels and confusion over roles in the ANP rendered the job of EUPOL more difficult. Many of actors were dominated by the US. • The dominant role of US (the biggest donor) combined with the ex-military personnel in senior ministry posts has resulted in the focus of the interest and efforts by local government and international community to be on military interventions instead of activities related to rule of law.



3.5 Conclusions

As the analysis of case studies have shown, the key strategic-level challenges are often related to the access restrictions, changing political objectives, Command and Control (C2), decision-making capabilities, as well as the force structure requirements.²⁶ The disparities in technological capabilities, sovereignty concerns, differing national interests, cuts in defence spending are political in nature and can only be resolved by politicians at the strategic level. There are limits to what extent the nations are willing to trust another. These limits constrain openness and system interdependencies (i.e. intelligence, communications) which in turn affect interoperability.²⁷

Nevertheless, these challenges tend to reverberate throughout the operational and field levels. Operational and field level interoperability challenges are often related to planning, C2, and management namely in terms of information exchange and security issues. In addition, challenging for military operations, some nations are likely to continue to maintain direct national control of their national assets rather than contribute them to a larger, shared pool under direct control of the Force Commander. Furthermore, in the field challenges relate often to performance capabilities referring to the capability of the humans and technology to operate as intended. They may include challenges related to logistics, information sharing; command, control and communication (C3); Doctrinal differences, and resource gaps²⁸. Furthermore, sharing of the information in the field is seen to be challenging as a result of over classification of information. Also change or hand-over of information between the troop rotations and shift changes hampers the interoperability.²⁹ Above all, when political motives are misaligned, no amount of interoperability, technological or otherwise, can mitigate the problem.

3.6 Potentials for enhanced civil-military interoperability

As the case studies conducted as part of the IECEU-project have shown, being able to work together in coherence is however not only an institutional, but also a cultural and political question. Coherence between the civilian and military actors has been recognized to be an important tool to increase the efficiency of international conflict prevention and crisis management efforts. Therefore, understanding the key elements enabling and on the other hand preventing interoperability of the EU's civilian and military crisis management instruments is crucial. D6.3 The Interoperability of Resources -report provides in-depth analyses of possibilities of strengthening interoperability within

²⁶ See for example; Myron Hura, Gary McLeod, James Schneider, Daniel Gonzales, Daniel M. Norton, Jody Jacobs, Kevin M. O'Connell, William Little, Richard Mesic, Lewis Jamison. 2000. Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations- A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations. (RAND Project Airforce, 2000), 17-19.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ James Derleth. 2013. Enhancing interoperability: the foundation for effective NATO operations. NATO Review, published 25 September 2013, available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/enhancing-interoperability-the-foundation-for-effective-nato-operations/EN/index.htm>.

²⁹ Interview with a representative of the Ministry of Defence, 18 October, 2016, Helsinki.



the civil-military environment, with the increasing focus on integrated crisis management operations. Based on the analysis, 19 potentials were identified, and they are outlined in Table 5: Potentials for civil-military interoperability.

Table 5: Potentials for civil-military interoperability³⁰

PLANNING	STAFFING	SHARED SERVICES	EQUIPMENT	COMMAND SYSTEMS AND INFORMATION SHARING	THIRD PARTY INVOLVEMENT	REVIEW SYSTEMS
Reinforce the jointly initiated crisis management concept with a more integrated, structured civilian/military operationalization	Further develop/support centralized/harmonized system of standardized pre-deployment and in-mission training, linked to job descriptions	Develop common standards for civilian and military shared services	Develop a common warehouse for military operations/missions and consider to building synergies with the existing civilian warehouse	Develop a CSDP specific military command and control (C2) that caters both for synergies with the civilian C2 systems in use and is compatible with NATO structures	Include third country participation in the early planning stages	Continue working on a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations.
Discourage national (re)interpretation of the 'Statement of recruitment' used in CSDP military operations			Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP logistics strategic framework, addressing in a cost effective way the logistical challenges	Develop a CSDP specific information sharing doctrine and that details what information, is shared with whom, under with conditions and when	Develop standard operating procedures for third countries, that address doctrinal, procedural and technological differences/interoperability	Continue sharing the information with external parties conducting research and external evaluations
	Support joint civilian-military in-mission training where possible		Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP CIS architecture	Strengthen the EDA's role in developing cyber defense for CSDP operations and invest in building synergies with NATO		
Aim to harmonize "working" versions of key concepts				Consider developing a CSDP concept for CNO's, enhancing the common operational picture and field interoperabilities		
	Create mechanisms to enforce institutional memory through training, standardized or near-standardized tools and ways of working and by creating mechanisms for frequent, brief, and focused updates			Consider developing a CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tools on top of existing information sharing tools		

The potentials for enhance civil-military interoperability are listed also here:

1. Reinforce the jointly initiated crisis management concept with a more integrated, structured civilian/military operationalization,
2. Further development/ support centralized/ harmonized pre-mission and in-mission training, linked to job descriptions.
3. Discourage national (re)interpretation of the 'Statement of recruitment' used in CSDP military operations. Aim to harmonize "working" versions of key capacity building concepts (e.g. 'Integrated Border Management')
4. Support joint civilian-military in-mission training where possible.

³⁰ D6.3 The interoperability of resources. 2016. IECEU, 653371, 92.



5. Aim to harmonize “working” versions of key concepts for development of shared understanding.
6. Create mechanisms to create and enforce institutional memory
 - a. Through training
 - b. Through standardized or near-standardized tools and ways of working
 - c. Through creating mechanisms for frequent, brief, and focused updates and hand-over notes
7. Develop common standards for civilian and military shared services.
8. Develop a common warehouse for military operations and consider to building synergies with the existing civilian warehouse.
9. Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP logistics strategic framework, addressing in a cost effective way the logistical challenges of CSDP crisis management operations.
10. Develop an integrated comprehensive CSDP CIS architecture
11. Develop a CSDP specific military command and control (C2) that caters both for synergies with the civilian C2 systems in use and is compatible with NATO structures.
12. Develop a CSDP specific information sharing doctrine and that details what information, is shared with whom, under with conditions and when.
13. Strengthen the EDA’s role in developing cyberdefence for CSDP crisis management operations and invest in building synergies with NATO.
14. Consider developing a CSDP concept for so called CNO’s, enhancing the common operational picture and interoperabilities in the field.
15. Consider developing a CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tools on top of existing information sharing tools.
16. Include third country participation in the early planning stage.
17. Strengthen third country participation in CSDP crisis management operations by including them in the early planning stages and develop standard operating procedures that address doctrinal, procedural and technological differences/interoperability.
18. Continue working on a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations.
19. Continue sharing the information with external parties conducting research and external evaluators

3.7 Identified Lessons and Recommendations

All the potentials listed in the previous chapter are based on lessons identified and hence could be developed into further policy recommendations. However, in order to stay balanced with the number of recommendations provided for each capability, we sought to highlight the key interoperability-related issues that on one hand have a direct impact on the day-to-day running of the CSDP operation, and on the other hand, would effect on the development of CSDP organizational culture. Hence, the issues related to information and intelligence gathering, managing and sharing, third country participation and implementation of lessons identified & continuous development were selected as the key areas to be addressed for enhanced interoperability. Consequently, based on the 19 potentials were further civil-military synergies could be achieved our recommendation is to address the following needs;



- Need for better mechanisms to collect and share information within the mission, between the field and Brussels.
- Need for better intelligence gathering and sharing tools.
- Need for better ways to strengthen third country participation to the planning and conduct of the mission.
- Need for better mechanisms to support organizational learning

Each one is detailed below, including references and policy recommendation.

3.7.1. LESSON 1: NEED FOR BETTER MECHANISMS TO COLLECT AND SHARE INFORMATION WITHIN THE MISSION/OPERATION, BETWEEN THE FIELD AND BRUSSELS

Lesson identified: Information functions as an enabler of interoperability. The key issue hampering effective coordination & collaboration among field missions operating in the same geographical regions has been a lack of shared situational awareness, underutilized reporting, access to information and analysis on these. Due to number of technical, procedural and human related reasons information sharing within the CSDP operation is seen insufficient in the field and between the Brussels and Field. The lack of secured networks, and fragmented information sharing practises significantly hamper the information sharing, information management and overall communication within the operation, between the different actors in the field, and between the field office and OHQ. In the absence of common information sharing culture, adequate and compatible tools and systems, lots of valuable information, contacts and intelligence is lost or poorly transferred. In regards to the interoperability significant gaps remain in the realms of information-sharing and communications, styles of command, cultural understanding, standard equipment, and complex intelligence sharing policies.

1. Case study EULEX Kosovo (D2.3) Restraints in the sharing of sensitive information are identified: weaknesses and communication flaws have been evident especially on higher (strategic) levels, while cooperation and the sharing of information on the tactical level is generally better.
2. Case study Operation EUFOR Althea (D2.3): Fragmented attitudes towards information sharing between the different organisations prevail. Due to unwillingness to share information and differences in working logic has at times hampered the cooperation between EUFOR Althea and i.e. humanitarian and development actors.
3. Case study EUFOR RCA (D3.5, 57 -59) In these contexts, issues in information sharing have been related to inadequate intra-mission communication and language barriers, and gaps caused by rotation of staff in missions.
4. Case study EUFOR RCA (D3.5) The information sharing among the supranational actors was insufficient. For example, in the absence of an 'information sharing agreement', the EU and UN are not entitled to share all their information. This led to some delays – in, for example, receiving crucial intelligence information from the ground – that had an impact on the operational planning.
5. Case study EUFOR RCA (D3.5) Lack of reliable classified communication systems. For example, establishing the information system for the operation took more than three months, and the communication between Bangui and OHQ in Larissa took place via internet.



6. Case study EUFOR RCA (D3.5) Absence of common framework for information and intelligence gathering, sharing and storing hampered the circulation of operation-related information.
7. Case study EUBAM Libya (D3.5) The access to information was hampered due to the unwillingness of some of the other operators in the area to share information and/or resources with the mission,
8. Case study EUPOL Afghanistan (D4.3) Co-operation did not occur at the highest level, thereby impeding the functions of lower levels in the field, and inter-agency co-operation was limited and did not extend to joint-learning and analysis.

Recommendation: *As the mandates and operational environments of CSDP missions have evolved, their capabilities, processes and procedures required to gather and analyze information must develop too. The EEAS should consider better ways to compile, analyze and discuss reports and other relevant information through an enhanced information sharing framework within the CSDP structures and between their support elements at both strategic and operational-field level. In order to ensure the timely and efficient flow of information within the EU crisis management structures, the information sharing framework should take into account the procedures and practices, tools, technological solutions, staffing, capability development means. This should be done in active cooperation with field missions to foster interoperability among EU actors and provide a basis for cooperation with external partners.*

3.7.2. LESSON 2: NEED FOR BETTER INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SHARING TOOLS.

Lesson identified: The current capabilities to collect, analyse, store and share CSDP-related intelligence are inadequate. The shortfalls range from proper means in terms of services and equipment, skills, staff, procedures, common intelligence policy and intelligence sharing culture. There is no policy or guidance on early warning, situation assessments and legal aspects of the Computer Network Operations. All these domains are strongly interlinked to intelligence capabilities and further requirement work is needed to develop a capability that is interoperable, i.e. that enables the development of a common operational picture. Furthermore, there is an absence of a common CSDP civilian-military intelligence analysis tool. Currently, the different organisations have their own systems which are often not compatible with the systems used by other EU missions or institutions.

1. Case EUFOR Artemis (D3.5) The EUFOR deployment showed that if intelligence is not shared and accessible and the national contingents do have national caveats that prevent them from operating effectively, it can endanger the missions and its objectives.
2. Case EUFOR Artemis (D3.5) the EUFOR deployment showed that if intelligence is not shared and accessible, and if national contingents have national caveats that prevent them from operating effectively, this can endanger the missions and its objectives
3. Case EUVSEC (D3.5) Although the mission was deployed under the comprehensive approach of the EU, the evacuation of the mission showed the lack of coordination of intelligence among the different EU bodies in the field.
4. Case EUBAM Libya (D3.5) The same problem of not having enough intelligence information is repeated in all the interviews of the people involved in planning. This was perceived as a big problem



5. Case EUBAM Libya (D3.5) it does seem plausible that the EU's failure in the case of EUBAM Libya was to fail in reacting to the change of the situation with inadequate and outdated intelligence information and to cling to the mode of operation that was doomed from the day of deployment.
6. Case EUFOR RCA (D3.5) EUFOR faced several hindrances. Most notably, deficiencies could be observed in intelligence capabilities, troops, equipment, language skills, information- or intelligence sharing within the force.
7. Case EUFOR RCA (D3.5) Due to the EU's limited intelligence capabilities, receiving enough adequate intelligence is highly dependable on its partners and Member States' capabilities, as well as willingness to share information.
8. Case EUFOR RCA (D3.5) EUFOR RCA relied heavily on the capabilities of the other international organizations, namely in terms of force protection, logistics, intelligence information, and Medical support.
9. Case EUFOR RCA (D3.5) EUFOR RCA's intelligence gathering assets were nevertheless insufficient for ensuring adequate situational awareness. Furthermore, it must be noted that some national contingents collected intelligence on their own but did not necessarily share it with others, largely because some spoke of intelligence while others talked about information. Therefore, intelligence gathered on the ground did not always reach the higher levels and the other contingents. It was suggested that in the absence of adequate intelligence gathering tools could this capability be strengthened with appropriate in-mission training.

3.7.3. LESSON 3: NEED FOR BETTER MECHANISMS TO INCORPORATE THIRD COUNTRY PARTICIPATION TO THE PLANNING AND CONDUCT OF THE MISSION/ OPERATION

Lesson identified: The current crisis management procedures do not enable solid third state participation to the EU CSDP. In theory, third states have same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation as the EU member states. However, any contribution of third states is without prejudice to the decision making autonomy of the Union. In addition, one key aspect which effects on the use of third-nations' capabilities is that they are not officially involved in the drafting of the concept of operations or the operation plan nor do they participate in force generation conferences. They are invited to contribute – in most cases to fill gaps – but are required to accept the EU's timeline and procedures. Even once the operation is launched, the various mechanisms in place limits the involvement of partners, effectively reducing them to second-class stakeholders. Furthermore, lack of institutionalization of third state contributions in EU crisis management may hamper the information sharing within the mission and operation. National caveats may limit the releasability of documents within the CSDP, as some of the information can be circulated only among the EU member states.

1. Case study EULEX Kosovo (D2.3) There are certain real limitations in regards to the sharing of information, which is often frustrating for local government. Consequently, there is a need for improved communication channels and information sharing (both with local institutions and international actors). Contacts often rely heavily on personal connections.
2. Case study EUFOR RCA (D3.5, 35-36). Information sharing with external partners has lacked coordination, as no specific personnel has been tasked with management. Furthermore, national caveats, cultural differences, national interests effect on the intelligence gathering and sharing.of information sharing, necessitating ad hoc arrangements, or none at all.



3. Case study EUFOR RCA (D3.5) Co-operation efforts between the operation and other international actors were challenged by the fact that there were problems with internal communication between different nationalities within EUFOR RCA. The information given by the humanitarian actors often did not circulate among the EUFOR staff, and this made the co-operation inefficient at times.
4. Case study EUFOR RCA (D3.5) The national caveats were hampering the sharing of information namely between the NATO and non-NATO countries. In addition, the releasability of documents was even more difficult among the third countries such as Georgia, as the information can be circulated only among the EU Member States.
5. Case EUPOL Afghanistan (D4.3) External cooperation and communications have even been impacted by a view of the EU as a difficult partner due to limited substantial engagement with partners.³¹

Recommendation: *Strengthen third country participation in CSDP crisis management operations by including them in the early planning stages and develop standard operating procedures that address doctrinal, procedural and technological differences/interoperability. Tackling these interoperability challenges at operational level and better incorporating third states in CSDP crisis management operations is important as it has economic benefits, force generation benefits and gives political legitimacy.*

3.7.4. LESSON 4. NEED FOR BETTER MECHANISMS TO SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

Lesson identified: The utilization of lessons identified from the past or on-going missions/operations in the planning and conduct of the CSDP operations/missions are not monitored. Despite the standardized process of collecting and distributing the lessons, the current challenge to the EEAS is to ensure that the lessons identified are learned at appropriate levels. The implementation of the lessons at the planning of a new CSDP operations and missions has been inadequate, as often there is no time to conduct lessons cycles or consult lessons learned documents. Therefore, the mechanism to ensure that Lessons are incorporated into CSDP Planning and Conduct of Activities should be strengthened.

1. Review on Civil-Military synergies (D1.3) The lessons are collected regularly from the missions (weekly reports, six-months reports, results of the yearly lessons learned processes are collected into a formal lessons learned report, submitted to the PSC in combination with input from EU delegations in the field). However, the key lessons and best practices listed in the EEAS Annual Reports are very general in nature and seem to be perceived of little importance at field level. It may take a very long time for an observation to be approved for learning and finally propagated as a best practice. Sometimes national interests and political constraints may also limit the observations getting through the official process. In addition, there seem to be widespread use of informal best practices and mechanisms, such as information-sharing within personal networks.
2. The interoperability of recourses (D6.3) The implementation of lessons identified is siloed. Noticeably, there does not seem to be any kind of standardized reporting for both sides on how the

³¹ D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. 2016. IECEU, 653371, 83-87.



different actors have responded to the key lessons and recommendations presented in the yearly report. Instead, the actors report to the lessons management group based on the specific lesson/recommendation, which in turn reports to the PSC in the next lessons learned report.

Recommendation: EEAS should *continue development of a shared platform for lessons identified as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations, and strengthen the mechanisms to monitor the lesson implementation process. This can be strengthened by continue sharing the information with external parties conducting research and external evaluations.*

3.8 Key stakeholders

The table below outlines the key stakeholders at politico-strategic and operational-field level. It is notable, that strengthening interoperability requires multi-agency involvement across the EU institutions, EU member states and partners.

Table 6: Key stakeholders

	EU	Non-EU; other international and bi-lateral actors
Politico-Strategic Level	Member States, EU Delegations, Parliament, CPCC, EUMS, CMPD	NATO, UN, UNDPKO, AU and OSCE,
Operational-field level	Head of Mission/ Head of Operations, Training organizations, mission/operation staff, Contributing countries and their recruitment agencies	UN Missions, NATO operations, NGOs, Embassies, Media, Research community, UN OCHA, UN Country Team,

3.9 Discussion points

The discussion points were first drafted as part of the report ‘D6.3 The interoperability of resources’ and have been further developed for the purposes of the policy discussions.

3.9.1. Divergent national practices

First, divergent national practices, especially in terms of civilian missions, lead to more divergence in the field. Some standardization of national practices may be politically sensitive but much of the more practice-oriented, technical interoperability seems less so and would offer an easy beginning



point for strengthening interoperability. However, political sensitivity can also be overestimated and thus processes of interoperability can be retarded even before it begins properly.

NATO has managed to create interoperable systems in the military realm, which extend to EU Member States own armies and equipment, and even non-NATO EU Member States; greater interoperability should certainly be possible within the EU. Moreover, although there are a number of policy initiatives to extend interoperability and rule books, the implementation of interoperability remains challenging. Certainly, common doctrine can also be strengthened, but the main focus should be on the implementation and mainstreaming of existing initiatives.

The divergent national practices are evident also in terms of prevailing information sharing practises, as well as intelligence sharing policies. A joint framework for information and intelligence sharing within the CSDP can support the development of EU specific information sharing principles and routines, which would apply to civilian and military CSDP initiatives, both at politico-strategic and field-operational level.

3.9.2. INTEROPERABILITY MINDSET

Secondly, the analysis from the case studies points to a weak interoperability mindset both *within* civilian missions and military operations but more significantly *between* actors involved in CSDP crisis management operations. Competition for resources, position, and general lack of willingness to cooperate or work towards common goals hamper the realisation of interoperability potentials even where there are benefits that could be gained from greater interoperability. The need for such a mindset becomes evident namely in relation to willingness to share information within CSDP missions and operations. Difficulties in creating a common mission-related intelligence gathering and sharing culture still prevail, which has become evident in several civilian and military CSDP missions/operations.

The political will to pursue interoperability as expressed in numerous Council Conclusions and Decisions seems not be sufficient to make it really happen at tactical and operational level. The main obstacle is a mind-set where interoperability is a priority and sought after horizontally, in every action that is being taken both at headquarters level as in the field. For creating such a mindset it is necessary that all parties involved in CSDP crisis management operations have an internalised understanding of working together towards a common goal and act upon it in their daily business, by identifying obstacles, creating dialogues and common standards.

Such actions over time will be one of the founding principles for a common CSDP-crisis management operations culture, which integrates the national CSDP cultures. Ideally, over the coming years platforms should be created to discuss interoperability in different fields, fostering the dialogue needed to build the mindset and culture.

3.9.3. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

Thirdly, the CSDP crisis management operations complex institutional framework does cause challenges for interoperability. In essence, the CSDP is an intergovernmental form of cooperation,



with Council, EU Member States and Commission steering the same ship. This makes it difficult to navigate, as depending on the type of operation, there are very different procedures to follow, with multiple actors involved (e.g. funding of equipment). Also, it does affect the creating of a common culture, as for instance staff is mainly trained nationally and seconded. The fragmented structure is also a key aspect of the review systems, and information system. The current institutional framework makes it challenging to create institutional memory, routines of information sharing across the EU structures, and between the Brussels and the field.

This fragmentation is ingrained in the Lisbon Treaty, and will influence the level of interoperability that can be achieved in CSDP crisis management operations in the long term, as no changes are foreseeable in the next 5 to 10 years. The recommendation is made that proposals aiming at enhancing interoperability should always include a paragraph with an analysis on what can be achieved in the current framework and what needs a modified institutional framework. Such an analysis can inform in the long run the cost-benefit analysis needed to justify modifications of the legal set-up.

3.10 Presentation of interoperability



Component	Analysis	Impact	Outcome	Other relevant information
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10

- Potentials for further discussion**
- (1) Possibility of an **enhanced information sharing framework** between missions and their support elements to compile, analyze and discuss reports, intelligence and other relevant information.
 - (2) Continued development of a **CSDP civil-military intelligence analysis tools**.
 - (3) Continued development of a **shared platform for lessons identified** as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations.

- Discussion points**
- Divergent national practices and lack of implementation in the field**
Divergent, non-standardized and sometimes contradictory national practices, which impact interoperability in CSDP operations and initiatives.
 - Shared interoperability mindset**
Lack of a shared set for increasing interoperability, in particular, in civilian missions, but also between civilian and military when within EU, even where increasing interoperability has no immediate costs.
 - EU Institutional CSDP – framework and its implementation**
The current institutional set-up of the CSDP does not ensure interoperability, none of which, the need for the necessary framework and the EU, which ensures the success of interoperability.



4 COMPETENCES

In the previous Work Packages of the project the following points regarding competences were raised, as based on the study reports included in the work packages:

- The WP 2 identified the challenge that the lack of existence of EU best practices has created to both competences and operational capacity of the mission. More specifically the D2.3, the Study Report on Kosovo and BiH raises several issues in terms of competences, especially when discussing the EULEX (Kosovo) mission. The report notes that the competences might have been high level as such, but that they were "not necessarily most suitable in the circumstances of dealing with sensitive civilian issues pertaining to the rule of law"³². This problem was discussed at length in the paper mentioned, but as it is a problem concerning recruitment, not competences as such, it was not suitable for a policy recommendation.

D2.3. also highlighted the issue of cultural awareness, which was to become the focus point of discussions in the group. Specifically it points out from the primary material that "There are numerous examples which prove that strategies or projects fail, simply because the cultural perspective was ignored"³³. The paper also points to the identified lack of formalized cultural awareness training and proposes a "healthy balance" of cultural awareness, respect and imported solutions³⁴. In the case of EUFOR Althea (BiH), the D2.3 the paper notes briefly that "the basic skills and competences of the staff officers are good"³⁵ but that as selections and recruitment systems are not standardized, the competences among the staff are "inconsistent"³⁶, however, not being specific on the inconsistencies.

The section of the D2.3 discussing EUFOR Althea specifically raises the point of hand-over procedures as they are critical in terms of transferring key know-how in short period of time³⁷. The paper also argues that, based on the interviews, "Special attention should be paid to the hand-over/take-over process at HQ, for guaranteed continuity in the functions"³⁸

- In WP 3 there was an overall notion, encompassing all the cases discussed in the work package (of African missions and operations), that sufficient emphasis is needed to improve the competences in reference to regional experience, as deliverable 3.5, Study Report on the DR Congo, South Sudan, CAR and Libya notes that "There should be more emphasis and focus in the pre-deployment training on country specific information as well as intercultural competences"³⁹. The latter being critical in gaining support from local counterparts and the success of any mission and people need to be sensitive to these issues.

³² D2.3. The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 4.0, 49

³³ Ibid, 51

³⁴ Ibid

³⁵ D2.3. The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 4.0, 148

³⁶ *ibid.*

³⁷ D2.3. The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 4.0, 101

³⁸ D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 4.0, 87-88

³⁹ D3.5 The Study Report of DR Congo, South Sudan, CAR and Libya, 137



Similarly to WP2, it was noted in WP3 that sometimes the competences that the personnel had, although very high level, were not suitable for the task at hand, for example as the mission EUBAM Libya had to evolve from strategic to a more tactical level, the personnel with tactical knowledge were not the best situated for the change⁴⁰. In the case of EUBAM Libya it was also noted that some of the mission staff lacked adequate physical competences to manoeuvre in a protective gear, which had a negative effect on the overall effectiveness of the mission⁴¹.

- In D4.3 Study report of Afghanistan and Palestinian Territories the question of competences triggered, in the case of Palestine, "comments on recruitment process, required skills, and ideas about training needs"⁴². However, also this study report brought up the emphasis needed on the development of soft skills. Interestingly this came out in the interviews of the representatives of the Palestinian civil society, who noted that "EUPO COPPS international experts had insufficient knowledge on human rights and gender in the Palestinian context and/or that their understanding of Palestinian culture and society as well as the dynamics of the conflict needs to be improved"⁴³. Further, the paper argues that these topics were also not sufficiently appreciated by the mission leadership, which considered in-house training given on the topic as a taking time from the "actual work"⁴⁴. In the case of Palestine the interviews also pointed out to negative view on human rights and gender issues also in the case of Brussels, which extends the sphere of needed development in the case of soft skills appreciation⁴⁵.

In the case of Afganistan, the D4.3 argues that the problem related to competences was that EUPOL Afganistan "did not know what effective policing in an armed conflict looked like"⁴⁶. This can be seen representing the case of "misplaced" competences that was reported widely among the other work packages and which refers to the fact that competent people were not necessarily equipped with the right competences. In the case of EUPOL Afganistan, this also presented itself as a recruitment problem as, for instance, policing a conflict was not something that was emphasized in the selection of the mission members⁴⁷.

4.1 Defining competences

The everyday definition for competencies is that it is the ability to perform a particular task well. The IECEU Deliverable 1.5 defined competences as knowledge and skills, and as **resources put into action**, which is in itself a very broad and contestable definition. The actions that the definition refers to are understood by us as collective (social) interactions that part of the organisation can perform

⁴⁰ Ibid., 166

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² D4.3 Study Report of Afghanistan and Palestinian Territories, 39

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 95

⁴⁷ Ibid.



proficiently and repeatedly. They are contextualised social routines based in explicit and tacit knowledge. Therefore the scope of competences is very broad. It means the capability to interact successfully in a non-familiar culture, which is not easily measurable. At the same time competence can also mean a very narrow and measurable ability, such as the ability to speak a language or operate machinery, at least in its everyday meaning. For this reason, narrowing what we considered as the most relevant aspects of competences was pivotal for the working group. In the previous work packages of this project, competences were also looked at from different angles, as one can see from above, in the case studies (WP2-4) the focus was on soft skill type of competences, whereas the WP6.1 for instance had a much more technical approach towards competences.

4.2 Key findings

In our first discussion 27.2. 2017 the working group on competences decided on the division of labour, so that CMC Finland and NUIM would essentially focus on the relevant Work Packages (3-4) that they have been working on and based on that identifying the policy suggestions. Laurea and Safer Globe would take a more overall view on the work done previously and through that would provide a more detailed perspective on the evolving policy suggestions. In the end CMC Finland took responsibility of most of the work, in relation to combining the work of the previous work packages.

On our March 6 2017 discussion we identified the problem that arose from the material related to competences. It was noted that there were repeating mentions concerning especially soft skills competences in almost all of the cases. We could not identify another competence related issues that would have surfaced as frequently. However, based on the discussions we reached a conclusion that also that hand over processes, or rather a lack of handovers is another matter that we wanted to explore further. As hand-overs can encompass also culture-related soft skills, these two topics were seen as paramount. We do not argue that these are the most stressing issues concerning competences, but they were identified as the most overlapping ones, although these issues were not strictly speaking always competences by themselves, they also had a negative effect in the utilization of a particular competence. For example, in the case the hand over process does not exist, a person is not able to use her competences in a non-familiar context. This relates strongly to the issue of misplaced competences that was present in almost all case reports above, but as it is more of a recruitment issues that was not suitable to be co However, the definition of soft skills did raise further discussion.

We decided to continue by mapping out to which extent the EU guidelines on soft skill assessment and handovers are used both and what could be the policy suggestions based on results.

Based on further discussion and research , it seems that mapping of the soft skills in the recruitment process is superficial, for example, it only plays a marginal role for these questions is given in the interview of a recruit. At the same time there exists clear EU guidelines on soft skills. To elaborate, we then turned to the existing EU documentation relevant to CSDP soft skills. The Planning Guide



for Member States Seconding Authorities⁴⁸ is, on a policy level, to enable early force sensing, improve recruitment procedures and increase transparency, and, on a practical level, to assist Member States with their own forward planning in terms of providing personnel to the Missions. The planning guide provides information on how to conduct the selection process, the interview in particular, but it does not provide detailed information on how to assess soft skills. The essential requirements define that the candidates “must have excellent interpersonal and communication skills, both written and oral”. Furthermore the future mission member “must have the ability to work professionally as a member of a team, in task forces and working groups with mixed composition (e.g. civilian and military staff)”.⁴⁹

However, the recruitment process to the point of when the candidates are being presented to operation is owned by the Member States, which might have different priorities. On the other hand, as for example in the case of Finland, also national guidelines state that special attention should be paid to the knowledge and values of the beneficiary country⁵⁰. From this perspective the underrepresentation of soft skills in the recruitment process was surprising.

There are indications in the material of the IECEU-project, quoted above, that the lesser focus paid on the soft skills in recruitment might have a negative effect on the whole effectiveness of the mission. This could have a negative influence to the way in which the soft skills competences can be utilized in the operations. On a generic level, the failure to grasp, for example, gender aspects as a potential force multiplier of effectiveness can easily be seen as detrimental and there were indications that, for example, the appreciation of gender advisors was not always optimum⁵¹.

In the skype-discussions of the group we elaborated that it is important to note, that by soft skills it is not wise to limit oneself to the superficial meaning of of cultural awareness as understood as learning things such as history, habits and cultural norms, but rather focus on a "dignity" oriented mindset⁵², which would allow the personnel to function in multiple various theatres and would also have the flexibility in situations when the mission focus might change radically

In terms of identifying the hand-over process as another policy recommendation we saw is as a more practical partner to the idea of soft skills improvement. Another problem that we identified was the hand over process, which in multiple cases lessened the competence level of the mission significantly. Again, it seems that the documented hand over process that is in place on EU level is not used.

When the handover issue was researched further, it was discovered that the Civilian CSDP mission operational headquarters, CPCC, has issued several guidelines on handover processes. The issue of deficiencies in handover processes was brought in to the public, when Professor Jacque published his report about handling the allegations in Kosovo in March 2015. Shortly after this CPCC issued

⁴⁸ CPCC Force Generation for the Civilian CSDP Missions: Planning Guide. Ares(2016)5438627 - 19/09/2016

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Interview of a CMC Finland member

⁵¹ See e.g. D4.3 Study Report of Afganistan and Palestinian Territories, 39

⁵² Se e.g. Donna Hicks (2013) *Dignity: Its Essential Role in Resolving Conflict*. Yale University Press



Civilian Operations commander instruction “Written Handovers to be completed by Outgoing Mission Members” on 4 September 2015.⁵³ In addition the Mentoring and advising guidelines provide detailed information on what information incoming mentor or advisor should receive from his/hers predecessor.⁵⁴ However, as noted in the quotations from the previous work packages above, the hand over-procedures are not followed according to these instructions⁵⁵.

4.3 Policy recommendations

Improvement of soft skill assessment

As noted, there are gaps in the Planning Guide for Member States Seconding Authorities in terms of detailed assessment of soft skills. The recruitment process focuses on personal, measurable competences, resulting that the testable set of might not been the best possible one, for instance, if the focus of the mission changed.

As a very pragmatic part of this larger policy recommendation we recommend that at least on the management level of missions there should be a separate test of soft skills. In a broader sense the existing guidelines on soft skills should be more closely followed, so that vital competences from the perspective of the overall effectiveness of the mission are not missed.

Documented hand over process should be followed.

As noted above, there are clear procedures present on how to document a handover, but for some reason this is not followed, resulting in the competences of the mission personnel being insufficiently utilized. The non-standardization of hand over processes can also lead to a lack of, or decreased institutional learning, as the knowledge remains encapsulated to individual mission members without being transmitted to the mission as a whole in the best possible way. Written handover process should be enforced and the mission personnel should be made aware of its requirements. The existence of written hand overs is also easily documentable and measurable.

4.4 Key Stakeholders

In both cases the key stakeholders are difficult to pinpoint. In terms of the soft skills assessment the focus rests mostly on the member states, as they represent the first level of selecting and training personnel for crisis management missions and operations. As soft skills and most of all integrity and

⁵³ EEAS/CPCC/RS/4076460, Civilian Operations Commander Instruction “Written Handovers to be completed by Outgoing Mission Members, 4 Sept 2015

⁵⁴ CivOpsCdr Operational Guidelines for Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising in Civilian CSDP Missions eeas.cpcc(2014)4077896, 7 November 2014.

⁵⁵ See e.g. D4.3 Study Report of Afghanistan and Palestinian Territories, 24



dignity are characteristics more than acquired skills, they should be assessed already at the early steps of possible recruitment. The main stakeholders therefore are the national institutions and organs responsible of training and recruitment.

In the case of the hand over process, if the above-mentioned guidelines regarding hand over processes are in place and accepted by the Member States it falls on the missions and operations to see that these procedures are followed. Again, the Member States as well as the CPCC also need to pay attention to this. In the case that there is uncertainty of the existence of such procedures, the CPCC and the CivOpsCmdr must clarify and follow through that the guidelines are followed.

4.5 Discussion points and conclusion

We also discussed the Pre-deployment training (PDT) as a very important type of training, and as something that should be addressed in relation to our policy recommendations. The importance of PDT's is emphasized by the fact that it should be organised immediately before the mission deployment. Therefore to improve the structural reasons currently handicapping the competences, PDT's can serve as a vehicle in both issues identified; those of soft skill improvement and especially on the notion of written hand over procedure.

The PDT aims to harmonise the management culture of CSDP missions and ensure that the persons concerned receive the knowledge and skills they will need to be fully operational from the beginning of their tour of duty. European Security and Defence College has with its partners developed a EEAS recognised and Member States approved PDT curriculum, of which adoption by all seconding authorities might increase the competence level. Another point for discussion is, whether organising EU certified PDT for civilian missions and possibly for military training missions centrally should be adapted by all seconding authorities. Currently ESDC is organising PDT training programme on monthly basis in Brussels, but only few Member States are taking advantage of this programme.

4.6 Presentation of Competences

The image shows three slide thumbnails from a presentation. The first slide is titled "IECEU - Policy recommendations regarding competences" and lists two key points: "Improvement of soft skill assessment" and "Documented hand over process should be followed". The second slide, titled "Improvement of soft skill assessment", contains two bullet points: "As noted, there are gaps in the Planning Guide for Member States Seconding Authorities in terms of detailed assessment of soft skills. The recruitment process focuses on personal, measurable competences, resulting that the testable set of might not been the best possible one, for instance, if the focus of the mission changed." and "As a very pragmatic part of this larger policy recommendation we recommend that at least on the management level of missions there should be a separate test of soft skills. In a broader sense the existing guidelines on soft skills should be more closely followed." The third slide, titled "Documented hand over process should be followed", contains a bullet point: "As noted above, there are clear procedures present on how to document a handover, but for some reason this is not followed, resulting in the competences of the mission personnel being insufficiently utilized. Written handover process should be enforced and the mission personnel should be made aware of its requirements. The existence of written hand overs is also easily documentable and measurable." Each slide features the IECEU logo and the European Union flag.



5 COMPREHENSIVENESS

The proliferation of actors and activities involved in conflict prevention (incl. crisis management) makes comprehensiveness ever more important. Especially on the civilian side of the spectrum, there is vast engagement from a variety of actors, but also on the military side there is increasingly more than one actor and activity involved. This makes the study of EU comprehensiveness crucial to ensuring an integrated approach to conflict prevention in practice.

Comparing and contrasting key findings from IECEU WP2-WP6, this chapter generates a policy recommendation specifically regarding how to enhance and sustain comprehensiveness in CSDP missions and operations in order to improve the effectiveness of capabilities in EU conflict prevention. The policy recommendation, which is presented below, is both practical and possible. It was put forward to policy makers at the IECEU Policy Dialogue in Finland in Spring 2017.

5.1 Defining Comprehensiveness

Comprehensiveness, as it is defined in the IECEU project and therefore in this deliverable, encompasses cooperation and coordination activities conducted by CSDP missions and operations – with both EU and non-EU actors.

This chapter focuses on comprehensiveness in the field and thus on activities undertaken by CSDP missions and operations attempting to develop, enhance and sustain cooperation and coordination with other actors on the ground.

5.2 Key Findings

Efforts to cooperate and coordinate within EU missions and operations on the ground

- Contributing countries to CSDP missions and operations must cooperate and coordinate their efforts internally to ensure that their personnel work well together towards a common purpose in country.
- This became a challenge in Kosovo, e.g., when some member states did not recognise the declaration of independence, whilst others did. EU member states sought to bridge this gap by agreeing to stay focused on improving standards in Kosovo despite their disagreements over the status issue. This ensured internal cooperation and coordination among contributing states within EULEX Kosovo, although disagreement on the status issue left the EU with a general credibility challenge in Kosovo (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report, p.24*). The problem of credibility has also been an issue for the EU in Bosnia-Herzegovina, albeit for different reasons to which we shall return below (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report, p.36*).



- It is also important that different contributing countries do not come across as contradictory by pushing different models, e.g. for policing as seen in EUPOL Afghanistan (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*).
- Coordination and cooperation among contributing states is important before, during and after deployments and therefore relates to activities from pre-mission training to hand-overs from one member of staff to another, as seen in the case study of EUPOL Afghanistan, which recommended both better pre-deployment training and handover procedures (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.38).
- With regard to training the case studies of EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS also recommended that the EU develop trainings on interpersonal skills specifically (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.35). See Training chapter in this deliverable for further details.
- Seconded staff can be a problem as the personnel deployed are not always enough – or indeed the best people for the job. Another issue stressed in the case study of EULEX Kosovo (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.26).
- Short-term deployments and rotation cycles are a common concern in CSDP missions/operations, as seen e.g. in EULEX Kosovo and EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where some staff were rotated after only 6 months (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.26 & 81).
- Local staff can alleviate some of the problems related to short-term deployments, as they usually stay in post for longer periods of time. This was the case, e.g., in EULEX Kosovo (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.26).
- Likewise, mixing contracted and seconded staff and making sure that these work well together may enhance internal comprehensiveness in CSDP missions and operations.
- Such efforts can help alleviate challenges related to short mandate and rotation cycles in conflicts and countries that really require long-term solutions, as seen for example in the occupied Palestinian Territories (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.35)

Efforts to cooperate and coordinate with other EU actors on the ground

- The next level of investigation is comprehensiveness across different EU efforts in the same country. Across all the CSDP missions and operations appraised in the IECEU project there is evidence of efforts made to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other EU actors in the field.
- In particular, efforts have been made in countries, where one or more CSDP missions/operations have been deployed alongside another EU actor(s).
- In Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), e.g., there have previously been significant cooperation and coordination problems both between the EUFOR operation and EUPM mission (as well as between the EU Special Representative and the European Commission delegation). BiH in many ways served as a 'testing ground' for coordinating CSDP deployments with other EU efforts on the ground. Initially, there was 'lack of strategic coordination' and EUPM and EUFOR overlapped in their efforts to combat organised crime. There has, however, been significant improvement in this regard, and nowadays the EU – as a whole – has a much



- more comprehensive approach to conflict prevention in that country (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.36-41).
- A positive practice of two EU missions working well together was the European Planning Team deployed in advance preparation for EULEX Kosovo (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.24).
 - Likewise, EULEX Kosovo has made significant efforts to consult and support other EU initiatives – including the EU integration process – in Kosovo, although cooperation between different EU institutions and coordination between different EU instruments could still be improved (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.28 & 75 & 83 & 91).
 - Continuous efforts and improvements are needed in cooperation and coordination among EU actors in the field, as the EUPOL Afghanistan case study also recommends: ‘A future mission needs the support of and close connection with the EUSR and EU Delegation if there is one’ (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.40)
 - To this end, it is also imperative that missions/operations report honestly back to HQ. Interviewees in the case of EUPOL Afghanistan stressed the importance of bad news as well as good news in an honest feedback loop (IECEU Policy Dialogue Finland, 2017; IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.36).

Efforts to cooperate and coordinate with other international actors on the ground

- There is general agreement among international actors in the field that cooperation and coordination are useful – and sometimes necessary – to be effective in the field.
- Nevertheless, there is often a higher degree of enthusiasm for coordinating others than for being coordinated oneself. Although the responsibility to coordinate is not always popular either (IECEU Policy Dialogue Finland, 2017).
- Generally, CSDP missions and operations are fairing better than previously with regards to cooperation and coordination with other international actors on the ground.
- Especially military operations within the CSDP have made good efforts to cooperate and coordinate better with partners. In particular cooperation with NATO has improved. E.g. through the Berlin Plus arrangements, which facilitated the EU operations in the Western Balkans – although here too NATO and the EU have their challenges, e.g. with regard to inter-organisational information and intelligence sharing. More about this below.
- A specific example of good EU-NATO cooperation on the ground is in Bosnia-Herzegovina where the two organisations seek to coordinate their efforts in support of defence reform, bringing their requirements in line with one another and creating a common baseline for their local counterparts. Continued and enhanced cooperation with NATO in this realm is desirable (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.50-52 & 94).
- Another good example of international cooperation on the ground is through the Peace Support Operations Training Centre, which brings EUFOR, NATO and the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina (incl. all ethnic groups) together in training for overseas peacekeeping and peace support operations (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.69). Although improvements have to be made, so gaps are filled and other international actors are brought in line or at least do not provide capabilities (e.g. equipment), which is not in line with the EU-NATO effort (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.51). At



- present other non-EU actors involved in BiH are 'often not in line' with EUFOR efforts (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.92-93).
- Another example of international coordination being facilitated on the ground is EULEX (together with UNMIK) acting as 'middlemen' facilitating Kosovo's cooperation with EUROPOL and INTERPOL (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.75).
 - However, in Kosovo too inter-organisational cooperation and coordination is still a 'substantial challenge' (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.76).
 - Generally, the EU cooperates and coordinates better with other international actors involved in operational conflict prevention (incl. crisis management) than it previously has.
 - This improvement is in part due to the EU's efforts to enhance coordination and cooperation, and in part due to its international partners' efforts to do the same.
 - In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, mapping the international engagement in the country has helped international actors know what others are doing. The EU was included in this process, which was led by the UNDP. In Kosovo the EU took the lead in a similar initiative to coordinate donors, which is a positive if yet incomplete process (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.20).
 - Still much of the effort to cooperate and coordinate international efforts is left to individuals working in the field, e.g. in CSDP missions/operations. One illustrative case of this is EUFOR CAR, which worked closely and successfully with humanitarian actors on the ground. This was in large part due to the Commander's personal efforts to communicate with and to these actors that EUFOR was there to facilitate their work (IECEU Africa Workshop Denmark, 2016).
 - The EUPOL Afghanistan case study similarly suggested that cooperation and coordination with NATO could provide force protection arrangements ensuring better access and helping to build relationships like what the EU and its local police partners lacked in Afghanistan (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.36).
 - The case study of EUPOL Afghanistan recommended that the EU cooperate with other international actors like the UN and NATO to identify good practices in the field (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.40).
 - Overall, as the case study of EUPOL Afghanistan recommended: 'In going forward a mission needs to better coordinate at the strategic and tactical levels with the international community and host organisations to reduce duplication and contradictory advice' (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.39).

Efforts to cooperate and coordinate with local actors on the ground

- CSDP missions and operations are always restricted by political realities and constraints in the local contexts in which they engage. This is a particularly great challenge in protracted conflicts, as experienced by all the missions/operations reviewed in this project.
- 'Local elites will to cooperate is a central element to international security sector reform and state-building efforts (...) local ownership and nationally owned reform strategies become equally important' (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.49).
- In other words, it is paramount to its effectiveness that an EU mission/operation appreciates and acts upon local realities, hereto its relationship with so-called 'local actors' is key.



- The level of cooperation and coordination with other actors – international and local – depends on the conflict in question and the EU's role herein.
- In the Western Balkans, the EU plays a lead role, whereas the EU has played a 'marginal role in the Middle East Peace Process', despite being a significant aid donor to the occupied Palestinian Territories. Thus, whilst the Union has helped introduce some key concepts (e.g. on borders and the two-state solution) to the peace process, both case studies of EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS recommended that the EU make better use of its political and economic leverage bilaterally with the Palestinians in future (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*).
- The case study of EUPOL Afghanistan recommended that EU mission objectives mirror those of host countries to demonstrate relevance, show commitment and deliver tangible change on the ground (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.36).
- Likewise, EUPOL Afghanistan demonstrated the importance of understanding the challenges local partners – in this case the Afghan police – face, so that the EU's support is relevant and practical (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.36).
- Having said this, the case study of EUPOL Afghanistan also illustrates the importance of managing expectations on both the side of the EU and the host government (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.40).
- To this end, it recommended that there should be a contractual agreement or obligation between the EU mission and the host organisation specifying (1) what is realistically achievable and (2) how this can be tracked, measured and reviewed. Furthermore, it recommended that EU support for the host organisation be conditional on progress in this regard (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.40).
- A similar recommendation was made in the case of EULEX Kosovo, which the case study suggested needs strategic reconsideration, possibly reconfiguration, with benchmarks and success indicators that can be communicated more clearly to local parties, incl. the wider public, which has been disappointed with the mission not 'going after the big fish' – arguably prioritising stability over accountability (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report*, p.25-26 & 91).
- Generally, there is still lack of 'local ownership' in CSDP missions and operations' efforts to prevent conflict on the ground. Some of this cannot be helped, as these are – by nature – external interventions in internal conflicts; however, IECEU research findings suggest that further improvement in terms of cooperation and coordination with local actors is both possible and desirable.
- To this end, the case studies of EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS recommended that the EU develop joint trainings on local ownership specifically (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report*, p.35). See Training chapter for further details.
- IECEU case studies also show that local partners to CSDP missions/operations tend to be picked – sometimes on an *ad hoc* basis – and that choice is not systematically revisited – or if necessary revised – later in the process (IECEU Africa Workshop Denmark, 2016).
- Sometimes there is simply no 'good' local partner(s) that the CSDP mission/operation can cooperate with, cf. in Libya, where there for some time was no recognised government at all,



or in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where the government is accused of gross human rights violations (IECEU Africa Workshop Denmark, 2016).

- Another common problem is that there is usually not one local partner or perspective to take into account. Thus, the EU has to bridge local divisions and consider different local positions and practices, like it has done in various ways in the Western Balkans and Kosovo (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report, p.35-38*).
- In Kosovo EULEX facilitated dialogue and ‘positive examples of inter-ethnic engagement’ through communication with Serbia as well as Kosovo and acting as an ‘intermediary’, e.g. between Serbian and Kosovo customs (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report, p.20, 27, 74 & 88*).
- Whilst EUFOR Althea’s capacity building with the Armed Forces facilitated cooperation, coordination and even some integration between different ethnic communities in BiH (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report, p.66*).
- Local partners complain about lack of feedback, after they have given input to a CSDP mission/operation. Thus, they claim not to know, whether their input has had any effect. This problem was flagged, for example, in the Palestinian cases. To alleviate this problem, the case studies of EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS recommended regular public reporting on the impact of mission activities to increase transparency and decrease information gaps (IECEU, 2017. *Deliverable 4.5 Middle East and Asia: Conclusion Report, p.35*). The EU office in Kosovo has established a positive practice of regular meetings between local, international and EU actors on the ground (IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report, p.24*).
- Whereas in the DR Congo local interviewees complained that ‘the EU is one of the most difficult partners to work with’, because of the extended timelines and long response time between planning initiatives with local partners and decisions upon them (IECEU Africa Workshop Denmark, 2016).
- Despite efforts to the contrary, there has been fragmentation and overlap between different projects and activities, e.g. in the DR Congo, Central African Republic, Afghanistan and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which leaves local partners at a loss and the EU with credibility problems (IECEU Africa Workshop Denmark, 2016; IECEU, 2016. *Deliverable 2.5. The Conclusion Report, p.40-42*).
- Generally, local level actors suggest that there is need for a more realistic EU approach, with better correlation between the resources available and the Union’s ambitions, which can realistically be achieved in partnership with local actors.

5.3 Policy Recommendation

As communication is a necessary condition for cooperation and coordination, it is imperative that CSDP missions and operations have a comprehensive communication strategy.

- The EU and its partners tend to focus on cooperation and coordination.
- However, communication is key to comprehensive cooperation and coordination between different parties on the ground.



- All too often ‘the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing’.
- This, however, is of great importance to what can – or cannot – be achieved in the field.
- Not only because it enables (1) the EU itself and (2) other external actors involved in conflict prevention to work better together, but also because it allows them to work better with (3) ‘local’ parties in the host/target country.
- Thus, it is imperative that a CSDP mission/operation have a comprehensive communication strategy.
- That is, a communication strategy specifically focused on ensuring comprehensiveness between EU, non-EU and host country actors and activities – and that communicates the importance of this comprehensiveness to everyone involved.
- Such a communication strategy must be directed not only at those directly involved in conflict prevention but also towards the wider public.
- Cooperation and coordination must be ensured not only with those with high levels of *activity* but also with those who have high levels of *influence* on whether such activities succeed. Note here that parties, which (currently) have little activity, may well have much influence on whether CSDP missions and operations succeed or not. In other words, the most active partners may not be the most influential.
- It is important that communication is continuous – before, during and after the CSDP mission/operation – and that it goes both ways.
- This ensures that other actors know what to expect from the mission/operation.
- Mutual communication does not necessarily mean mutual agreement, but it is important that other actors can see that the input they provide is taken into account – even if it is overruled.
- If the mission/operation decides to go a different direction than other actors’ request, it is important that this decision and the reasons therefore are communicated widely.
- The communication strategy should include both (a) high and (b) low-level dialogue as well as (c) formal and (d) informal communication conducted both (e) publically and (f) privately.
- It is important that the EU has and follows one overall and consistent strategy for conflict prevention in a country or region and that it communicates this overall message consistently – although not necessarily with one voice or one ‘speaker’.
- In sum – the overall policy recommendation to help achieve, enhance and sustain comprehensiveness in EU conflict prevention (incl. crisis management) is that CSDP missions and operations adopt a ‘C³ model’, where they communicate, coordinate and cooperate with other actors active and/or influential to their success.
- This policy recommendation is made based on a comparative review of CSDP missions and operations in the Balkans, Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The most important findings related to comprehensiveness are summarized above.

5.4 Key Stakeholders

The following EU stakeholders are mandated to handle conflict prevention issues directly. Within the Council structures:

- European Council



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- Council of the European Union and the Foreign Affairs Council
- Political and Security Committee
- EU Military Committee
- Politico-Military Group
- Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
- Working Party of Foreign Relations Councilors
- Thematic and Regional Working Parties

Within the European External Action Service:

- Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
- EU Military Staff
- Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
- Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department
- Crisis Management Board
- Geographical, Multilateral and Global Affairs Departments
- Security Policy and Conflict Prevention Directorate
- EU Intelligence Analysis Centre
- EU Operation Centre
- EU Delegations
- CSDP Agencies

Within the European Commission:

- DG International Cooperation and Development
- DG European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
- DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
- Service for the Foreign Policy Instrument

The European Parliament has a limited role in CSDP; however, it is not irrelevant. Its influence is through its role as the budgetary authority and its right to scrutinise CFSP/CSDP activities. Overall, the most important EU positions (stakeholders) relevant for conflict prevention are:

- President of the European Council
- President of the Commission
- President of the European Parliament
- High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-president of the Commission
- Chairman of the EU Military Committee
- Military Operations Commander
- Civilian Operations Commander/Head of Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
- Heads of Missions
- EU Special Representatives



5.5 Discussion Points and Conclusions

Conclusions

- It is clear from all the cases studied in the IECEU project that communication facilitates cooperation and coordination on the ground.
- It is important that communication, coordination and cooperation (C³) activities feed into each other, so as to enhance and sustain the comprehensiveness of CSDP missions/operations.
- In practice this means that CSDP missions and operations must at first and as a minimum communicate with other actors in the field, so they can subsequently coordinate their efforts and where possible cooperate in their activities on the ground.
- Across the missions/operations appraised there is evidence of efforts made to strengthen communication, cooperation and coordination with other actors – it is important that these efforts continue.

Most important discussion points for policy dialogues

It is generally assumed and agreed that comprehensiveness is necessary – and should therefore continuously be enhanced and sustained, however:

- What – if any – are the limits to comprehensiveness?
- Why are they there/important?
- (When) are they necessary – or even useful?



6 TECHNOLOGY

This chapter examines to find practical, achievable policy recommendations for improving the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention in CSDP crisis management operations in terms of the capability 'Technology'.

The working group has identified key lessons based on eight (8) IECEU Case Study research findings in different regions (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DR Congo, Central African Republic, Libya, South Sudan, Afghanistan and Palestine Territories), which are:

1. The technological solutions have been much technology –driven
2. Tailored training is needed and it should be linked to existing technological resources
3. The relevancy of local ownership is seen as being high
4. There is a lack of centralised systems aimed at supporting the CSDP crisis management operations

This report chapter reviews the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention in CSDP crisis management operations in terms of the capability 'Technology'. More specifically, it consolidates main lessons identified from the IECEU-project research relating to the capability 'Technology' and aggregates the individual case studies findings. In doing so, it ensure the significance and validity of the findings and informs the subsequent steps of the project, i.e. the policy dialogues and testing of the identified lessons and recommendations at policy level and with key stakeholders.

The used methodology is to review all eight (8) IECEU case studies and research on pooling and sharing with a view to identify the findings relevant for the capability 'Technology'. This is done by categorising the case study and pooling and sharing research findings about technological resources, technical interoperability and integration as well as identified technical deficiencies or lacking resources and incorporation of services providers.

So, all case study findings were reviewed in-depth by the working group focusing on the technology capability findings. The key findings with most mentions from different case study regions were identified as key lessons.

After review, the working group (in cooperation with IECEU partners Laurea, FINCENT and Enquirya) organised three (3) online meetings in order to build common understanding of the key lessons identified. Moreover the key successes and shortfalls related to this topics were screened based on the conducted effectiveness analysis by individual case study researchers. If possible, the identification of perspective (EU or NON-EU) is also described. The identified lessons were further analysed in line with key policy documents and will be validated in organised Policy Dialogues (27 April 2017 and 2 May 2017) with key stakeholders.



6.1 Defining The Capability Technologies (T)

The conceptual framework of the project⁵⁶ identified six capabilities. One of the capabilities is the capability ‘Technology’, which is defined as:

Table 7 Definition of Technologies Capability

<p>Technologies - Technological resources at disposal, Pooling & Sharing, EDA priorities</p>	<p>TEUPS/ TEUFO*: Technological resources at disposal, Technical interoperability and integration, Processes of pooling and sharing, Integration and evaluation of the results of EDA's R&D, Technical deficiencies or lacking resources, Incorporation of service providers</p>	<p>TNEUPS/ TNEUFO*: Technological resources at disposal, Technical interoperability (also with the local stakeholders and the international community), Technical deficiencies or lacking resources</p>
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This definition has been applied by the IECEU researchers in all case studies and the research relating to pooling and sharing, thus enabling the capturing findings that are comparable. IECEU case studies focused on analysing the technological capabilities of EU operations, while taking into consideration also the technology available to the local counterparts (e.g. police and customs). Both the EU and non-EU perspectives were aimed to be assessed, as well as the functionalities of information systems, and the specific needs and characteristics of operation’s technological requirements. All case studies also evaluated the possibilities for pooling and sharing of technologies and information. The methodological framework is set already in the beginning of IECEU –project, namely in the deliverable 1.5. Beyond from the set methodology, some of the IECEU research data clarified further analysis based on interview themes according to these subtheme.

6.2 Key Findings

The key findings of the technology as capability are iterated from the several case studies and analysis completed part of this project. In total, IECEU –project has looked into 12 CSDP crisis management (both civilian and military) operations. In addition, it also reviewed the state of art in pooling and sharing, the civil-military interface and the interoperability of resources. More specifically, the following areas have been analysed in-depth basis of this review :

1. D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH
2. D3.5 The Study Report of DR Congo, South Sudan, CAR and Libya
3. D4.3 The Study Report of Palestinian Territory and Afghanistan
4. D5.1
5. D6.1 Standardisation Review
6. D6.2 Identification of the gap
7. D6.3 Review of interoperability of resources

⁵⁶ Deliverable 1.5 Conceptual Framework for IECEU –project.



The findings from each case study region are listed below.

6.3.1. IECEU KOSOVO CASE STUDY FINDINGS

Shortcomings in Kosovo

- Lack of appropriate ICT technology within Kosovo police and customs (not yet on the level of the EU standards);
- Local IT systems are not connected with Europol, Interpol and several other crucial international systems.
- People should be trained to use technology, which requires tailored training programs and education. The main issue in regards to technology is thus often not the technological equipment itself, but rather the lack of proper training.
- In the case of EULEX, the pooling and sharing of rotor-wing transportation and airlift capabilities has been identified as an example of good practice between EULEX and KFOR missions. Specialized equipment, such as imagery detection is also noted among technical capabilities that are pooled and shared between the missions (for example for the mapping of possible mass grave locations)

Successes in Kosovo

- EULEX has sufficiently good equipment and ITC system for its requirements;
- EULEX and KFOR have established channels for pooling and sharing of equipment (e.g. rotor wing aircrafts, capabilities for imagery detection, analysis and support, etc.)

Challenges identified in Kosovo

- Need to improve training of EULEX staff for advanced equipment to ensure its maximum usability;
- Need to improve Kosovo technology for data bases management and advanced IT systems;
- Kosovo IT systems not integrated in international systems such as INTERPOL, EUROPOL, etc.



Table 8 Kosovo: summary of the findings

Category	EU Perspective	Local perspective
Successes	EULEX has sufficiently good equipment and ITC system for its requirements;	
Challenges		Lack of appropriate ICT technology (not yet on the level of the EU standards);
Challenges	Need to improve training of EULEX staff for advanced equipment to ensure its maximum usability	Need to improve Kosovo technology for data bases management and advanced IT systems;
Challenges		Local IT systems are not connected with Europol, Interpol and several other crucial international systems.
Pooling and Sharing Practices or Potentials	In the case of EULEX, <u>the pooling and sharing</u> of rotor-wing transportation and airlift capabilities has been identified as an example of good practice between EULEX and KFOR missions	

Lessons identified based on case study report of Kosovo:

- i. There is a lack of appropriate ICT technology within Kosovo police and customs (not in the level of the EU standards) (local perspective)
- ii. Local Kosovo police and customs IT systems are not connected with Europol, Interpol and several other crucial international systems (local perspective)
- iii. People should be trained to use technology, which requires tailored training programs and education.[2] The main issue in regards to technology is thus often not the technological equipment itself, but rather the lack of proper training. (local perspective)
- iv. EULEX CSDP operation has sufficiently good equipment and ITC system for its requirements;
- v. In the case of EULEX, the pooling and sharing of rotor-wing transportation and airlift capabilities has been identified as an example of good practice between EULEX and KFOR missions. Specialized equipment, such as imagery detection is also noted among technical capabilities that



are pooled and shared between the missions (for example for the mapping of possible mass grave locations)

6.3.2. IECEU BIH CASE STUDY FINDINGS

Shortcomings in Bosnia and Herzegovina

- According to the interviewees, HQ EUFOR Althea possesses the technological resources, such as computers and means of communication that staff officers/members need for carrying out their work and supporting COM EUFOR Althea in execution of the Operation Plan (OPLAN).
- The HQ also has enough vehicles – though only soft-skinned – for the staff officers to perform their duties outside Camp Butmir. From a technical point of view, also the medical and other logistics services are on a satisfactory level.
- Several interviewees stated that, besides the use of NATO planning experience and capabilities (see Chapter 3.1), the possibility of using the NATO CIS, the NATO secure networks and intelligence systems, and the NATO intelligence database has provided an efficient and cost-effective mechanism for EUFOR Althea since the beginning of the operation.
- One very good asset/resource in EUFOR Althea's matrix is the Airborne Ground Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AGSR) system. It enables real-time information-gathering and advance warning from remote areas that are not covered by, for example, the LOT houses or flows of information from the persistent hot spots.
- Some interviewees stated that the 'hardware technology', such as tanks and weapons, within the AFBiH is satisfactory but what is really needed is, for example, bridge-building, alongside horizontal and vertical construction equipment.
- However, one 'low level' model for pooling and sharing in possible future CSDP operations might be found in multinational logistics units (MLUs) or transport units (MTUs); the participating nations could agree on specific responsibilities and deploy the assets in accordance with the agreement.

Successes in Bosnia and Herzegovina

- HQ EUFOR Althea has necessary technological resources, e.g. computers and means of communication for staff officers/members to carry out their work and support COM EUFOR Althea to execute the OPLAN;
- EUFOR Althea benefits from the access to NATO planning assets, structures and capabilities under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements;
- EUFOR Althea's Airborne Ground Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AGSR) system enables real-time information gathering and advanced warning from remote areas which are not covered for example by the LOT houses or getting information from the ongoing hot spots;



Challenges in Bosnia and Herzegovina

- The only EUFOR military manoeuvre unit operating in BiH is the MNBN. The battalion is only equipped with weapons for self-defence and soft-skin vehicles;
- ATHENA mechanism cannot be used to fund equipment or materiel to AFBiH. AFBiH is trained with equipment/technologies which they normally do not have in use. As a result no real capability has been established;
- The idea of pooling and sharing is considered desirable but does not work in practice due to national caveats or restrictions, political and financial issues, non-interopability, unwillingness, etc.;

Table 9 Bosnia and Herzegovina: summary of the findings

Category	EU Perspective	Local perspective
Success	HQ EUFOR Althea has necessary technological resources, e.g. computers and means of communication for staff officers/members to carry out their work and support COM EUFOR Althea to execute the OPLAN;	
Success	EUFOR Althea benefits from the access to NATO planning assets, structures and capabilities under the "Berlin Plus" arrangements;	
Success	EUFOR Althea's Airborne Ground Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AGSR) system enables real-time information gathering and advanced warning from remote areas which are not covered for example by the LOT houses or getting information from the ongoing hot spots	
Challenges	The only EUFOR military manoeuvre unit operating in BiH is the MNBN. The battalion is only equipped with weapons for self-defence and soft-skin vehicles;	ATHENA mechanism cannot be used to fund equipment or material to AFBiH. AFBiH is trained with equipment /technologies which they normally do not have in use. As a result no real capability has been established;
Challenges	Firstly, lack of HUMINT capability is a gap that hinders efficient and effective intelligence-gathering.	
Pooling and Sharing	The idea of pooling and sharing is considered desirable but does not work in practice due to national caveats or	



Practices or Potentials	restrictions, political and financial issues, non-interoperability, unwillingness, etc.;	
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6.3.3. IECEU DR CONGO CASE STUDY FINDINGS

Shortcomings identified in case study report (D3.5)

The issue of technology was a priority area for the EUSEC mission. A cornerstone of the project was to use modern technology to improve personnel management in the FARDC. This was done by using biometric data registration conduct a census of the force and by issuing ID cards based on the data obtained from the census. On top of that the EUSEC attempted to introduce a personnel database for personnel management by distributing 800 computers to the FARDC and helping provide some connectivity. Although the project might have been a good idea, a combination of the sheer geographical size of the DRC, the absence of any IT infrastructure, the Congolese lack of ability to maintain the system, the lack of economic and human resources, and finally a limited project budget ultimately resulted in the inability to roll out the system to all FARDC units. This means that the system is now a hybrid between more ancient filing systems done by hand and modern technologies, which has had a limiting effect on the electronic system.

DRC, the absence of any IT infrastructure, the Congolese lack of ability to maintain the system, the lack of economic and human resources, and finally a limited project budget. The issue of technology was a priority area for the EUSEC mission. A cornerstone of the project was to use modern technology to improve personnel management in the FARDC. This was done by using biometric data registration conduct a census of the force and by issuing ID cards based on the data obtained from the census. On top of that the EUSEC attempted to introduce a personnel database for personnel management by distributing 800 computers to the FARDC and helping provide some connectivity. Although the project might have been a good idea, a combination of the sheer geographical size of the DRC, the absence of any IT infrastructure, the Congolese lack of ability to maintain the system, the lack of economic and human resources, and finally a limited project budget ultimately resulted in the inability to roll out the system to all FARDC units. This means that the system is now a hybrid between more ancient filing systems done by hand and modern technologies, which has had a limiting effect on the electronic system.

Another problem has been that the bank-based salary payments system has only worked properly in the areas around Kinshasa, while fewer soldiers have access to banks in other parts of the country. This points to the fact that the DRC, like many other African states, has only limited access to reliable banking, which could indicate that models like the Mpesa-cellular telephone-based system would be a more workable option.

EUPOL did implement a national registration project for the PNC. The problem with this system is that it is based nationally, while most police officers work at the local level, where there is no connectivity or even IT infrastructure. This means that everything has to be reported manually through the chain of command, which makes it extremely vulnerable. Currently the system is not being used to its full capacity. One of the problems was the three trainers from Morocco and Tunisia that the EU decided to recruit to train their Congolese counterparts, who did not manage to provide



the necessary training to make the local operators capable of operating the system, in stark contrast to the EU arguing that the system is fully operational.

Another aspect of the technological dimension is the physical infrastructure of the PNC. The force lacks the most basic infrastructure. Consequently, if EUPOL had been focused on the national level and not on improving the physical infrastructure of the PNC units that are to implement the proposed reforms such as the PdP, then reform would have been extremely difficult to achieve. Another problem facing EUPOL in relation to the technological aspect was that the mission was willing to provide training, but could not and would not help equip the trained police units due to the arms embargo imposed on the DRC during the first part of the mission. The EU even helped block Congolese attempts to acquire the necessary equipment from elsewhere. As one local informant argued this was nonsense, and it undermined the whole training initiative.

6.3.4. IECEU SOUTH SUDAN CASE STUDY FINDINGS

The mission lacked almost all basic infrastructure. In certain areas, the Government of South Sudan had to start from zero. Already the South Sudanese Development Plan of 2011 underlined the need for building up the necessary infrastructure in the country. Thus, it was of no surprise that none of the South Sudanese Airports did fully comply with standards set by the International Organisation of Civil Aviation (ICAO). Juba International Airport was very small and the number of passengers using the Terminal exceeded the capacity of the building. By the time of the independence celebrations in Juba, the area of the Airport was even not fenced and easy to access.

Therefore, technological capabilities turned out to be one of the critical issues related to EUAVSEC as basically everything was needed on the ground to run the mission properly. The IT equipment, personal protection gear and motor vehicles were generally perceived as a disaster. There was a lack of radios, satellite phones, etc. In the opinion of leading mission staff, this was a procurement and logistics issues which was handled from the beginning in Brussels. The procurement process caused long delays and essential IT equipment only started to arrive about six months into the mission. Seconded personnel arrived with their own personal protection equipment but contracted staff had none until some nine months into the mission. This was not acceptable in the view of the mission leadership.

Especially transport vehicles turned out to be problematic as the advices from the mission were largely ignored. The mission had to operate in an undeveloped equatorial area of Africa and the mission personnel was mainly deployed in the open air in extreme heat and weather conditions. The supply of suitable vehicles that could also be maintained and supplied with parts in South Sudan would have facilitated the mission operation on the ground enormously. Instead of providing the mission with Toyota vehicles – although there was a dealership in Juba with a good workshop and parts support, vehicles were sent from storage in Kosovo because they were surplus to the needs there.

This procurement however did not take into consideration that there was no support for VW or Skoda vehicles in entire South Sudan as for African purposes Toyota vehicles are the most often used. Also the air conditioning was reported as absolutely inadequate for the hot African climate. As a result, more than a third of the cars were unserviceable within months and with little chance of being fitted



in the country. Some were used as warehouses to restore other cars and improvising became the key skill within the mission.

Also the mission uniforms were unsuitable for the African climate with short sleeved Polo-shirts and baseball caps. The mission staff was also very concerned about the way vital equipment was shipped. The procurement of supposedly vital equipment, including shredders and secure safes was delayed by the fact that the EU mission support was trying to consolidate the shipments in one container. Thus, vital security equipment was delayed whilst other less necessary equipment was added to the shipment inventory.

Also necessary IT equipment arrived a year later after the mission was deployed and the same happened with equipment for hearing protection, eye protection or high visibility clothing for staff members working at the airport did not arrive until the very late in the mission. Several items needed to be bought directly by mission staff, such as specific safety lights to be fitted to the vehicles which were substituted by flashing lights acquired from local stores in Juba.

The importance of having a central warehouse was strongly underlined as the vital equipment needed to fulfill the tasks of the mission did not arrive on time and was rather inappropriate. Also from a financial perspective it was argued that too many resources were spent in the wrong issues in advance. By following the recommendations and advices from the ground, many resources could have been saved or better used in other vital equipment areas.

6.3.5. IECEU CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC CASE STUDY FINDINGS

CAR has long been one of the least developed countries in the world, with poor and underdeveloped infrastructure. The lack of necessary infrastructure renders parts of the country inaccessible. Consequently, moving around the country outside the Bangui area is difficult. Furthermore, the country's communication network is limited. Fixed telephone lines are rare, and those that exist are in bad shape. The main communication channel for reaching the majority of the population is radio. There is also a broadcast television station, but it does not reach the entire population. Also, television sets are expensive, and the majority cannot afford them.

The lack of logistical and communication networks, and lack of skilled local human resources made the establishment and running of the operation challenging. The security situation in Bangui area was dangerous, and EUFOR RCA had to build the camp with limited local resources and infrastructure, and before it had reached its full operational capability.

According to several EUFOR RCA Officers, building the camp took too long, and was built with too much care and resources, considering that the operation was meant to last one year maximum. For the first two months staff of EUFOR RCA stood with Sangaris at the M'Poko airport. That was considered as a real weakness, as it showed that such Force as EUFOR cannot be deployed in a country where there isn't already an international Force able to take some things in charge. Challenges related to poor road network the lack of internet connection and electricity, also created difficulties for the day-to day running of the operation. Consequently, the second problem was the information systems. It took more than two months before the operation managed to establish secure



information sharing and communication systems, as well as basic IT equipment. Until then, the staff had to work on their personal computers, and the only way to communicate with the OHQ was internet. Furthermore, during the mission, equipment deficiencies were identified in some contingents but few or none were addressed. Soldiers even complained about outdated software and cheap computers. Because of lack of an Internet connection and electricity, crucial information was lost or not available.

Furthermore, the operation also suffered from a shortfall in intelligence capabilities and from a lack of intelligence sharing. This intelligence capability could have been provided by drones or helicopters, with which EUFOR could have been more reactive. However, as an air component is by nature very costly and heavy from a logistics perspective, no participation states wanted to provide such equipment to EUFOR RCA. The importance of having timely geospatial intelligence available was highlighted. The delays in operational deployment could be caused if the required maps were not produced in time. Hence, developing Timely Geospatial Requirements Management could help to overcome these challenges. Both civilian and military missions would benefit from enhanced Geospatial capability. These capability needs are not only equipment related, yet to fully benefit from the Geospatial information, this capability would include staff planning and technical support.

**Member states are often reluctant to commit manpower and hardware to foreign operations of any kind. It does not help that military CSDP operations are funded principally by intergovernmental means (the 'costs lie where they fall' principle).*

6.3.6. IECEU LIBYA CASE STUDY FINDINGS⁵⁷

Mission members who were deployed right from the start of the mission, told that being without a computer was precisely the reality of EUBAM Libya at first, and that this carried on for quite a while. There were problems with getting computers and when getting them, getting them without software. In addition, there were technological limitations of the competences of the mission personnel that effected the mission. This was because the mission did not have an expertise like that could have advised the Libyans of what kind of technology they needed.

In essence, this was a procurement problem and goes to the foundation of the mission thinking. As stated above, the EU did not want to give the Libyans the kind of a technology that they wanted and needed, but wanted to develop an IBM concept with the Libyans and then provide assistance in the procurement. However, other operators, like US and UK worked the other way around and offered systems of technology first and had personnel who were trained in helping with those technologies.

In terms of technology for the disposal of the mission, the people interviewed seemed generally disappointed in the working of the warehouse concept, according which the technology needed is ordered from an EU warehouse. The warehouse was seen as too rigid, handing out already outdated devices. The logic of stockpiling items that are outdated rapidly, like computers, was questioned by many. As was the fact that the warehouse did not have the items that the mission would have required badly, such as armoured cars. Also the location of the warehouse was criticized. On the

⁵⁷ IECEU –project. 2017. Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya.



other hand, IT-support was also said to have worked very well and the availability of the satellite images, when needed, was good, although one person interviewed questioned the rationality of paying for the as they were provided by the EU for an EU CSDP mission. In terms of e-learning, the people interviewed felt widely that the Libyan absorption capability is not good enough for those kinds of applications, although they were considered the future.

6.3.7. IECEU OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES CASE STUDY FINDINGS⁵⁸

Both EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah use Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) as the key planning and monitoring tool for operational activities. The MIP is a project management tool that helps the mission leadership to plan how the mandated tasks are operationalised, to keep track on ongoing activities, to assess progress, and to make adjustments as required. For CSDP missions like EUPOL COPPS that has many activities and counterparts MIP offers a good tool to follow up the progress both inside the mission and from the CPCC. The use of MIP in planning and monitoring of progress - the mission's progress reporting to Brussels and MIP follow the same structure that is outlined in the OPLAN - also helps the CPCC and the EU Member States to follow and assess progress and effectiveness of CSDP missions. The EUPOL COPPS Planning and Evaluation Department is responsible for managing the mission's programmatic approach to mandate implementation. EUBAM Rafah has also developed its own MIP system through which mission activities are followed in respect of its defined objectives. There is an ongoing process in the CPCC to develop a standardised MIP to all CSDP missions, but currently the missions still create their own MIP templates. Another often presented remark was that not all mission members were familiar with project management tools such as MIP, and thus did not possess the necessary knowledge and skills to use the system, or indeed did not understand the purpose of using it. MIP system has also introduced increased reporting requests to international experts that some mission members find burdensome.

6.3.8. IECEU AFGHANISTAN CASE STUDY FINDINGS

Afghanistan case study findings focused on relevancy of local ownership and purpose of ICT in crisis and conflict zones. The interviewees pointed out for example:

"Technology tended to be counter-intuitive. The clearest example is computers." We had to create a Case Management System to help the police and prosecutors process a crime. The US [Justice Sector Support Programme] supported this was what they called a CMS programme, computers and software. But it was never properly linked and not that relevant. The problem was electricity supply and buying ink cartridges. Equipping them with computers doubled their work. We got too modern too soon. Technology is something that needs to go into the strategy from the start. What kind of technology? How relevant is it? Are the end-users computer literate, or even literate? That sort of enquiry is needed. I saw projects where we gave Afghans 100 computers. After that no one reviewed

⁵⁸ IECEU –project. 2017. D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan.



what they did or how they worked. Most disappeared into peoples homes.”⁵⁹ In the same vein another mission member notes: “They did not so much need computers as supervision. A photocopy machine would have been better, build on the paper-based bureaucracy...”⁶⁰

6.4 Level of and Potentials in pooling and sharing⁶¹

The technology findings in the research on pooling and sharing, civ-mil interface and interoperability offer a variety of results, such as:

1. *“The material and technical capabilities offered for use in crisis missions and operations are the foundations on which all else rests. Here, the potential for joint-procurement and standard setting in the civilian missions is vast and has the potential to directly positively impact also civilian capabilities within the European Union. Currently, there is overlap between both NATO and the UN, as well as between the civilians and the military, but also potential for cooperation. The potential for civ-mil cooperation in common capabilities development and procurement, especially, is considerable and could be better much better utilized.”⁶²*
2. *“Explore the development of a unified Command and Control system for joint civilian and military deployment”⁶³*
3. *“In the field of technology the mission members hoped the EU to speed up developing an integrated management system for the EU CSDP. Currently, all missions develop their own software solutions for managing human resources, logistics and mission reporting purposes. This is time- consuming and makes the systems vulnerable to maintenance problems.”⁶⁴*
4. *“Adopting project management tools such as MIP planning and evaluation tool for CSDP mission work also requires new type of skills sets from seconded experts and EEAS officials in Brussels.”⁶⁵*

6.5 Identified Lessons And Recommendations

The findings of the previous chapter can be categorized and aggregated in four main points:

- Need for CMO/User Centric Technologies, including the local dimension
- Need for Training
- Need for Local Ownership
- Need for CSDP Technology Infrastructure Management

Each one is detailed below, including references and policy recommendation.

⁵⁹ IECEU –project. 2017. D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ IECEU –project. Work package 6: Potential for Pooling and Sharing the EU capabilities

⁶² IECEU –project. 2017. D6.1 Standardisation review.

⁶³ IECEU –project. 2017. D6.2 Identification of the overlap in CSDP missions and operations.

⁶⁴ IECEU –project. 2017. D6.3 Review of the interoperability of resources in CSDP and crisis management.

⁶⁵ IECEU –project. 2017. D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan.



6.5.1. LESSON 1: NEED FOR CMO/USER CENTRIC TECHNOLOGIES

Lesson identified

The technological solutions have been much technology –driven. Moreover local representatives in crisis area can be trained by EU/operation with equipment/ technologies which they (locals) normally do not have in use. As a result no real capability has been established.

References:

- Case Study: Kosovo⁶⁶
- Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina⁶⁷
- Case Study: Central African Republic⁶⁸
- Case Study: DR Congo⁶⁹
- Case Study: Afghanistan⁷⁰
- Case Study: Libya⁷¹

Recommendation:

Consider strengthening the planning phase of the crisis management operation by implementing a technological needs assessment before the start of the mission/operation. Should a needs assessment should be linked to the mandate of the mission/operation, tasks to be accomplished by international and local staff, levels of technological proficiency of identified users and existing local technological infrastructure. Such a needs assessment can be preventive and an ongoing process, facilitated by EU delegations and implemented in areas where there a not yet missions/operations.

6.5.2. LESSON 2: TAILORED TRAINING LINKED TO EXISTING TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES

⁶⁶ IECEU –project. 2017. D2.3 Study Report of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. s.155 “There is a lack of appropriate ICT technology within Kosovo police and customs”

⁶⁷ IECEU –project. 2017. D2.3 Study Report of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.“AFBiH is trained with equipment /technologies which they normally do not have in use.

⁶⁸ IECEU –project. 2017. Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya. “Challenges related to poor road network the lack of internet connection and electricity, also created difficulties for the day-to day running of the operation”

⁶⁹ IECEU –project. 2017. Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya. “EUPOL mission: who did not manage to provide the necessary training to make the local operators capable of operating the system, in stark contrast to the EU arguing that the system is fully operational. The mission was willing to provide training, but could not and would not help equip the trained police units”

⁷⁰ IECEU –project. 2017. D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan.”I saw projects where we gave Afghans 100 computers. After that no one reviewed what they did or how they worked. Most disappeared into peoples homes”

⁷¹ IECEU –project. 2017. Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya.”One year on and there were still mission members without computers”



Lesson identified

People should be trained to use technology, which requires tailored training programs and education.

References:

Case Study: Kosovo⁷²

Case Study: Libya⁷³

Case Study: Afghanistan⁷⁴

Recommendation

Include the competence-based learning objectives to current training curricula and link them strongly with the current ICT infrastructure in the field (since one fits all –solution does not exist)

6.5.3. LESSON 3: THE RELEVANCY OF LOCAL OWNERSHIP

Lesson identified

Local representatives in the crisis area can be trained by EU/operation with equipment/ technologies which they (locals) normally do not have in use. As a result, no real capability has been established.

References

Case Study: Kosovo⁷⁵

Case Study: Bosnia and Herzegovina⁷⁶

Case Study: DR Congo⁷⁷

Case Study Report – Afghanistan⁷⁸

Recommendation

The operation and personnel should always take into account that the local perspective that the country representatives (target audience) are trained with the similar technological equipment that they have in use in practice.

⁷² IECEU –project. 2017. D2.3 Study Report of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. “The main issue in regards to technology is thus often not the technological equipment itself, but rather the lack of proper training”

⁷³ IECEU –project. 2017. Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya. *“In addition, there were technological limitations of the competences of the mission personnel that effected the mission.”* *“In terms of e-learning, the people interviewed felt widely that the Libyan absorption capability is not good enough for those kinds of applications, although they were considered the future.”*

⁷⁴ IECEU –project. 2017. D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan

⁷⁵ IECEU –project. 2017. D2.3 Study Report of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁷⁶ IECEU –project. 2017. D2.3 Study Report of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁷⁷ IECEU –project. 2017. Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya.

⁷⁸ IECEU –project. 2017. D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan



6.5.4. LESSON 4: NEED FOR CSDP TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE

Lesson identified

A number of case studies mention the lack of centralised systems, aimed at supporting the CSDP crisis management operation. Two specific findings are observed:

1. The lack an integrated management system that would be readily available to all CSDP missions
2. The lack of a common warehouse for technologies has also been mentioned.

References:

Case Study: occupied Palestinian Territories⁷⁹

Case Study: Libya⁸⁰

Interoperability of the resources in CSDP missions and operations⁸¹

Case Study: South Sudan⁸²

Recommendation:

To strengthen the technological capability of CSDP crisis management operations, consideration can be given to further strengthen the development of a centralised technological capability that supports the field activities. Priority should be given to the development of what are called

⁷⁹ IECEU –project. 2017. D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. *A major problem to mission members and to the Mission Support in particular is that EU CSDP lacks an integrated management system that would be readily available to all CSDP missions.* “An original plan was also to include procurement and finances in the same management system. It was brought up in the interviews that the current system, now failing due to lack of maintenance, was becoming a burden to the mission.” “There was a similar problem with the EUPOL COPPS reporting system: the mission had developed its own system for reporting and archiving information in order to create a ‘living archive’ for the mission, but the system was not functioning properly”

⁸⁰ IECEU –project. 2017. Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya. “There were problems with getting computers and when getting them, getting them without software” “In terms of technology for the disposal of the mission, the people interviewed seemed generally disappointed in the working of the warehouse concept, according which the technology needed is ordered from an EU warehouse”

⁸¹ IECEU –project. 2017. D6.3 Review of the interoperability of resources in CSDP and crisis management. “There is an effort in the CPCC to establish a CSDP-wide information system that would collect reports from all missions and operations into one system and thus from a living archive for the whole CSDP, but it was not yet known when such system would be ready”. They would make it easier to follow up that CSDP missions are accountable and also more comparable with each other. But also other activities that are present at all CSDP missions and operations such as training activities, press and public information services, or human rights and gender mainstreaming could benefit of a possibility to have a shared database” In the field of technology the mission members hoped the EU to speed up developing an integrated management system for the EU CSDP. Currently, all missions develop their own software solutions for managing human resources, logistics and mission reporting purposes. This is time- consuming and makes the systems vulnerable to maintenance problems

⁸² IECEU –project. 2017. Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya. “technological capabilities turned out to be one of the critical issues related to EUAVSEC as basically everything was needed on the ground to run the mission properly.” “The importance of having a central warehouse was strongly underlined as the vital equipment needed to fulfill the tasks of the mission”



“integrated management systems”, supporting the management of the crisis management operation and common warehousing for technologies.

6.6 Key Stakeholders

Politico-Strategic: EU delegations in crisis and conflict areas, EU institutions working with crisis management, CSDP or relevant policies (EEAS, DG DEVCO, Parliament) and UN, OSCE and international NGOs such as Red Cross

Operational-Field: EU Member States (CivCom, Foreign Affairs), Training institutions providing core courses on crisis management, OSCE training, CSDP missions and operations, international projects (such as SSR projects)

Other: WOSCAP, EU-CIVCAP and Gaming for Peace, CivilEx, H2020 projects, other projects providing recommendations based on research

6.7 Discussion Points And Conclusion

Discussion point 1: CMO/User Centric (human center approach) technologies, including the local dimension.

Consider strengthening the planning phase of the crisis management operation by implementing a technological needs assessment before the start of the mission/operation. A needs assessment should be linked to the mandate of the mission/operation, tasks to be accomplished by international and local staff, levels of technological proficiency of identified users and existing local technological infrastructure. Such a needs assessment can be preventive and an ongoing process, facilitated by EU delegations and implemented in areas where there are not yet missions/operations. In which level currently the technological needs assessment in the planning phase currently takes place? What can we do to further improve this? Who?

Discussion Point 2: Technology related training needed

People should be trained to use technology, which requires tailored training programs and education. The training of personnel will finally be a cost-effective solution and improve the overall actions. How well we have technological points of view (use of technology, technology available in the field, protocols) currently in the curricula design? How can this be further enhanced among training communities in operational level?

Discussion Point 3: Relevance of local ownership

Local representatives in the crisis area can be trained by EU/operation with equipment/ technologies which they (locals) normally do not have in use. As a result, no real capability has been established. Could this be linked into the Mentoring, Training and Advising Concept and training curricula? Do we have common understanding among EU how to mentor and training in different regions which may lack of infrastructure?



Discussion Point 4: Need for CSDP Technology Infrastructure Management

Related to CSDP crisis management operations, consideration can be given to further strengthen the development of a centralized technological capabilities such as information management systems that support the field and operational activities. What would be the entry stage to start working on common understanding with this regards?

6.8 Presentation Of Technologies

Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention -focus on lessons from CSDP missions and operations

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Scope: Technological capability in CSDP missions and operations

- Technological resources at disposal, interoperability and integration, pooling and sharing
- Review of IECEU case study findings of EU capabilities in Kosovo, BiH, South Sudan, Libya, CAR, DR Congo, occupied Palestinian Territories, Afghanistan
- The mission to be provided with equipment that will guarantee the required secure, reliable and adequate Communications and Information systems (CIS) (Draft Guidelines and Control Structure for Civilian Operations in Crisis Management (9918/07))

Limitations in research

- Limited access to information: Documentation may be confidential or secret. The potentially poor and changing security situation of some missions may hamper engagement with mission/operation personnel, or the operation/mission as a whole.
- Language: EULEX Kosovo (WP), ALTHEA Bosnia and Herzegovina (WP), EUSEC and EUPOL in Democratic Republic of Congo (WP), EUNAVFOR South Sudan (WP), European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) (WP), EUPOL Chad/CA (WP), EUBAM Libya (WP), European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah) (WP), European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL/Afghanistan) (WP)
- Different researchers working from very diverse backgrounds, with different viewpoints and in different contexts.

The importance of technological capabilities in operational level

- Lack of technologies (e.g. resources, such as equipment & services) implicates especially in the set up of the functioning mission (cases: EULEX Kosovo and EUBAM Libya)
- Effective use of technology (systems, tools, channels) requires competences of the personnel
- Attention must be paid to access and connectivity in crisis and conflict regions
- Technological capabilities provide a potential for civil-military cooperation through common capabilities development

1 The technological solutions technology –driven

- The technological solutions have been much technology –driven. We must consider to strengthen the planning phase of the crisis management operation by implementing a technological needs assessment before the start of the mission/operation. Doctrines?
- Case Study examples:
 - DR Congo: The lack of logistical and communication networks, and lack of initial local human resources made the establishment and running of the operation challenging. Challenges related to poor road network, the lack of internet connection and electricity, also created difficulties for the day to day running of the operation.
 - Afghanistan: Unusually, some international actors are keen on IT and bring other systems, which are not compatible. It creates confusion and dependency on funding. I am focused in promoting technology in building capacity.

2 Training linked to technological resources

- EU personnel in CSDP operations and missions should be trained to use technology, which requires tailored training programs and education
- Case Study examples:
 - Kosovo: The main issue in regards to technology is thus often not the technological equipment itself, but rather the lack of proper training
 - Libya: In addition, there were technological limitations of the competences of the mission personnel that affected the mission.
 - DR Congo: trainers from Morocco and Tunisia that the EU decided to recruit to train their Congolese counterparts, who did not manage to provide the necessary training to make the local operators capable of operating the system.
 - Afghanistan: I saw projects where we gave Afghans 100 computers after that no one touched what they did or how they worked. Most disappeared into people's homes.

3 Relevancy of Local Ownership

- Local representatives in the crisis area can be trained by EU-operation with equipment technologies which they (locals) normally do not have in use. As a result no real capability has been established.
- Case Study examples:
 - Kosovo: There is a lack of appropriate ICT technology within Kosovo police and customs
 - BiH: AFISIP is trained with equipment technologies which they normally do not have in use.
 - DR Congo: trainers from Morocco and Tunisia that the EU decided to recruit to train their Congolese counterparts, who did not manage to provide the necessary training to make the local operators capable of operating the system.
 - Afghanistan: I saw projects where we gave Afghans 100 computers after that no one touched what they did or how they worked. Most disappeared into people's homes.

4 Shared systems and services

A number of case studies mention the lack of centralised systems, aimed at supporting the CSDP crisis management operation. Two specific findings are observed: (a) The lack an integrated management system that would be readily available to all CSDP missions, (b) The lack of a common warehouse for technologies has also been mentioned.

Mission Support Platform (MSP) established April 2016 to develop common IT infra to civilian crisis management, harmonize and set up the standards, improve efficiency of support services etc.

Dialogue: Discussion Points

- Discussion Point 1: Crisis Management Operations should have User Centric Technologies
 - Relevancy? Needs Assessment? Challenges?
- Discussion Point 2: Technology related training needed
 - Current state? How to ensure?
- Discussion Point 3: Relevancy of local ownership
 - Could this be linked to MMA concept as learning outcome?
- Discussion Point 4: Need for CSDP Technology Infrastructure Management
 - Entry state for common understanding?



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7 OPERATIONAL CAPACITY

Operational capacity of a CSDP missions and operations consists of various factors that are both internal and external to the mission, but in this deliverable we focus only on the EU-internal factors, which can be adjusted and developed, while the EU-external factors depend strongly on specifics of the country where the mission functions and include political situation in the country, dominant views among the host state actors, key counterparts towards the mission and the EU, general working and living environment.

EU-internal factors are obviously closely interlinked and much dependent on the planning capacity, however other EU-internal factors that have impact on the mission's capacity to carry out its everyday tasks include the missions' organisational and decision-making structures, human, financial and material resources, what kind of working culture prevails in the mission etc.

In this chapter, we will introduce the main findings that are an important variable affecting the direction and priorities of the reform processes in terms of operational capacity. Learning from the lessons identified in terms of effectiveness of eight EU civilian missions and military operations, this report gathers significant findings from work packages 2 – 6:

- WP2 Case Study Balkans (Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina)
- WP3 Case Study Africa (Congo, South Sudan, Central Africa Republic, Libya)
- WP4 Case Study Middle East and Asia (Palestine Territory and Afghanistan)
- WP 5 New Media based Learning Application
- WP6 Potential for pooling and sharing the EU capabilities

Our recommendations are based on key findings, provided in the study reports WP2 – 6.

7.1 Defining Operational Capacity

In the IECEU conceptual framework (Deliverable 1.5), the key themes or focuses to be examined, have been identified as six capabilities. D1.5 defines capability as the capacity to deploy a combination of resources through collective organisational routines to achieve goals.

Operational capability is defined in the context of the IECEU project as:

- Leadership
- Training
- Mission organisational structures
- Mission decision making process
- Human resources (deployment, expertise)
- Technologies
- Mission funding
- Culture
- Security



- Housing
- Procurement

Table 10: Definition of Operational Capacity⁸³

perspective focus	EU: policy making, military, civilian	non-EU: local, international community
<p>Operational Capacities - Leadership, Training, Mission organisational structures, Mission decision making process, Human resources (deployment, expertise), Technologies, Mission funding, Culture, Security, Housing, Procurement</p>	<p>OCEUPS/ OCEUFO*: The process of operational planning and execution, Feedback loops and adjustments to changes, Operational capabilities available or within the capacity of ad hoc construction, Connections (information flows, sharing of resources, co-training, shared situational awareness) within the mission / operation, Incorporation of human rights and gender issues in the execution of the mission / operation</p>	<p>OCNEUPS/ OCNEUFO*: Execution of the mission / operation, Feedback loops and adjustments to changes, Operational capabilities available, Operational deficiencies (also in the mandate), Connections to the locals (local ownership) or the international community, Incorporation of human rights and gender issues in the execution of the mission / operation</p>

7.2 Key findings

Key findings from the WP2–6 are summarised in 7 key points:

Human resources/staffing

- 1) rotations of personnel are too short (EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Althea Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUPOL COPPS Palestine, EU BAM Rafah, EUPOL Afghanistan)⁸⁴

⁸³ D1.5 Conceptual Framework. 2015. IECEU, 653371.

⁸⁴ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 2.5 of the Balkans. The Conclusion Report; IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 4.3 of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. Study Report; IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 3.5. of South Sudan, Central African Republic and Libya. The Conclusion Report,



- 2) handover procedures are not consistent or standardised (EUPOL COPPS Palestine, EU BAM Rafah)⁸⁵
- 3) common access to the EU best practices is lacking, as well as the common understanding of these best practices (EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Althea Bosnia and Herzegovina)⁸⁶
- 4) misconducts are still present and the reporting is not always adequate (EUPOL RCA, EUPOL COPPS Palestine, EUPOL Afghanistan)⁸⁷
- 5) cases of the personnel without adequate language and cultural skills, as well as proper training about the context of the crisis (EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Althea Bosnia and Herzegovina)⁸⁸

Information sharing

- 6) lacking between NATO and non-NATO contributing states (EUBAM Libya, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUFOR RCA)⁸⁹

Decision-making processes

- 7) Lack of appropriate and timely fact-finding prior to the deployment of the mission (EUAVSEC South Sudan)⁹⁰

Communication

- 8) lacking between Brussels and the field (EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR RCA, EUBAM Libya, EUPOL Afghanistan)⁹¹

Some of key findings regarding deficiencies overlap and can be improved with joint recommendations, found further in the document.

7.3 Policy recommendations

Lesson identified: Rotations of personnel are too short and the lack of usage of strict standardized handover procedures is preventing the effective functioning of the mission.

⁸⁵ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 4.3 of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. Study Report.

⁸⁶ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 2.5 of the Balkans. The Conclusion Report.

⁸⁷ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 3.5. of South Sudan, Central African Republic and Libya. The Conclusion Report; IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 4.3 of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. Study Report.

⁸⁸ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 2.5 of the Balkans. The Conclusion Report.

⁸⁹ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 3.5. of South Sudan, Central African Republic and Libya. The Conclusion Report; IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 4.3 of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. Study Report.

⁹⁰ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 3.5. of South Sudan, Central African Republic and Libya. The Conclusion Report,

⁹¹ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 2.5 of the Balkans. The Conclusion Report; IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 3.5. of South Sudan, Central African Republic and Libya. The Conclusion Report; IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 4.3 of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. Study Report.



References: *EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUBAM Libya, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUPOL COPPS Palestine.*

Recommendation: We recommend extending especially the shortest rotations, and stricter guidelines on the usage of the preexisting structures that enable the handovers. If the overlap is not possible in person, information technology should be used to enable smooth transition and successful continuation of activities.

Purpose and Rational: Short rotations are one of the main problems that were seen in the day-to-day operation of the missions and operations. The short tours of the EU missions' personnel – usually six months to one year – create a great challenge to the continuity and general effectiveness of the missions. Staff changing too often is a problem for several reasons. Firstly, it takes a new staff member and estimated 1–2 months to learn the tasks and counting also the annual leave, sick leave etc. means that actual effective deployment is very limited. Consequently, this also increases the time the mission needs to invest on induction training periods.⁹² However, the prolongation of rotations is decided on the political level and has until now been recommended many times, but no evident developments have occurred. As an EEAS Official pointed out, the limitation of the mission mandate periods is related to the annual budget cycle of EEAS and EU Member States that provide funding to the mission; hence it cannot be easily changed. Despite this frequently changing mission' personnel, there are only little tools developed that would enable better usage of this short period.

Handovers between in and out-personnel are an essential tool for reaching this goal. We have indeed identified that despite the regular rotation there is no systematic, clear and consistent handover procedure in place between the outgoing and incoming personnel, to ensure smooth transition and quicker continuation of activities – meaning that the incoming personnel needs to invest long time to find out what has been done so far. The problem with lacking handover and related to this, wavering collective memory of the mission was mentioned in our interviews with missions' personnel, but also by their local counterparts who over the years have met numerous newly arrived international experts and other staff. Representatives of international and local organisations also pointed out the problems caused by frequently rotating staff of CSDP missions. Even if the handovers structures are in place, the handover procedure depends very much on individuals and the absence of consistency is felt.⁹³

Developing further the CSDP rules to allow a short overlapping period during which both outgoing and incoming personnel are in the mission. A good practice is the case of EUREP in Palestine⁹⁴, where outgoing and incoming experts' contracts overlap to allow handover process to take place. However, the problem in the overlapping system is that it would increase the personnel costs; moreover, pre-existing structures for handovers are already in place. We recommend the development of guidelines that would be strict on the usage of these structures. Furthermore, when the overlap in person is not possible, information technology should be used between the in-coming and out-going personnel that would enable the handover to take place. The necessary part of every

⁹² IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 2.4. The round table on Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Discussion Report.

⁹³ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 4.3 of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. Study Report.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*



handover should of course also be EU best practices guidelines and lessons learned reports, further enabling the successful transitions.

Information gathering

Lesson identified: Lack of appropriate fact-finding prior to the deployment of the mission.

References: *EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUBAM Libya*

Recommendation: We recommend that fact-finding is a continued process through-out the planning stage and continues after the initial, broader fact-finding reporting with a core team that can update the EU on political developments and liaise with other actors in the field. This would prevent an inaccurate picture of the situation on the ground by the deployed mission before the arrival to the country.

Recommendation: We recommend that there is a secure channel of communication between the actors on the ground and Brussels, using information technology.

Purpose and Rational: Changes in the security development can strongly influence the security of the mission or operation. An important lesson learned is that there is almost never enough of a fact-finding exercise prior to the launch of the mission, concerning the aims and objectives of the proposed effort, an evaluation of appropriate instruments to conduct the mission, and a decision concerning the appropriate time frame in which the intervention is to be implemented.⁹⁵

Our research points out the reporting of the pre-deployment mission which led to completely wrong assumptions about the situation on the ground, as the gap between the fact finding mission and the political decision too long (for example, the situation in Juba almost entirely changed in almost half a year after the fact-finding mission, before the deployment of the operation⁹⁶). Negatively for the mission to be deployed, nobody was aware of the changes. As a consequence, the mission personnel had to adapt to the situation and to carry out the mandate in a very flexible way.⁹⁷

Hence we recommend that the time between the fact finding mission and the actual political decision and deployment needs to be shortened in order to provide a realistic picture of the situation on the ground. It would have been wise to keep a core team with accurate equipment on the spot in order to report political developments and to adjust the strategic and planning documents accordingly. Such a core team on the ground would also help in avoiding an inaccurate picture of the situation on the ground at the point of departure. EU Planning Team deployed to Kosovo in 2006 should serve as one possible model in preparing to launch a mission or operation.⁹⁸ The team was working with the relevant international partners with the purpose of contributing to the establishment of an international civilian mission, tasked to learn from the experiences from the previous missions and

⁹⁵ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 3.7 of Africa. The Conclusion Report,

⁹⁶ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 3.5. of South Sudan, Central African Republic and Libya. The Conclusion Report,

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁹⁸ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 2.3 of Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Study Report



operations, to transfer good practices and provide advanced contingency, ensuring that the EU decision making would be based on sound analysis.

However, the recent missions and operations have been, comparing to those launched at the beginning of CSDP military and civilian engagement, better equipped with the information about the local environment, where the mission was to be deployed. We further recommend keeping up this work also with the means of information technology, establishing a channel of communication between the actors on the ground and Brussels, with the fact finding mission identifying the important actors on the ground that can provide the mission or operation with accurate information.

7.4 Key stakeholders

National training institutes (responsible for pre-deployment training)

EEAS-HR

EEAS-CMPD

7.5 Discussion points and conclusion

When discussing operational capacity in terms of improving effectiveness, three aspects were covered by recommendations in this chapter.

However, some key findings remain to be discussed for several reasons. Firstly, information sharing between NATO and non-NATO contributing countries is already discussed in the deliverable on interoperability. Furthermore, we have mentioned best practices to be a necessity, when a handover between in and out-personnel takes place – again the recommendation about further methods for lessons learned and best practices to become more available to the missions' staff is a point discussed in interoperability deliverable; even though we put it out as a key finding in operational capacity part, it is also a key finding when it comes to improving interoperability in mission and operations. Hence we did not focus on making new (overlapping) recommendations on those two key points, but rather extended our efforts when approaching other recommendations.

Secondly, a point for discussion in policy dialogues should also be a specific part of managing human resources: personnel that arrives to the mission and does not have adequate language and cultural skills, as well as proper training about the context of crisis. One part of responsibility can be attributed to member states, and the second part to the interview panel at the mission level, which has a final say in selecting the people. Problems were identified also in the selection of local contracted staff as international staff has complained that the qualifications of local contracted staff are often not adequate.⁹⁹ We did mention this problem as a part of key findings, however, we do realise that a lot has been done and is improving in terms of pre-deployment trainings that now better prepare the staff for deployment. During our policy dialogue in Brussels on 27th March 2017 pre-deployment trainings were also discussed and addressed. Moreover, it is a responsibility of Member States to

⁹⁹ IECEU, 2016. Deliverable 2.5 of the Balkans. The Conclusion Report.



deploy their number one staff, which would automatically improve the situation of the ground. Therefore, further debate with the relevant stakeholders is necessary in this regard, since the project only has an external view, regarding open-source documentation – but the development regarding trainings and human resources is only recent.

Lastly, part of the operational capacity deficiencies is also the lack of communication between Brussels and the field. However, although it strongly affects operational capacity, it is also one of the main deficiencies of the planning capacity. The recommendations regarding communication between the country of deployment and the headquarters in Brussels are therefore discussed in the mentioned part of the deliverable, recommending that consideration should be given to a programme of staff exchange and training.

7.6 Presentation of operational capacity

Definition

Operational capability is defined in the context of the IECEU project as:

- Leadership
- Training
- Mission organisational structures
- Mission decision making process
- Human resources (deployment, expertise)
- Technologies
- Mission funding
- Culture
- Security
- Housing
- Procurement

Key findings

Human resources/staffing

- 1) rotations of personnel are too short
- 2) handover procedures are not consistent or standardised
- 3) common access to the EU best practices is lacking, as well as the common understanding of these best practices
- 4) misconducts are frequent and reporting is bad
- 5) personnel does not have adequate language and cultural skills, as well as proper training about the context of crisis

Information sharing

- 6) extremely deprived between NATO and non-NATO contributing states

Decision-making processes

- 7) time between fact finding mission and the deployment is too long

Communication

- 8) lacking between Brussels and the field

Policy recommendations_II

Lesson identified: Lack of appropriate measures to deal with misconducts.

Recommendation: We recommend the creation of the parallel channel to the ground, which would bypass the national commanders, so that higher levels could be informed about the misconducts within the operation as well as in the area of the operation.

Recommendation_II: We recommend that common preventative guidelines are created and sticked to.

Policy recommendations_III

Lesson identified: Lack of appropriate fact-finding prior to the deployment of the mission.

Recommendation: We recommend establishing a core group of the fact finding mission, which will stay in the field and report on how the situation is developing. From the fact finding mission onwards, a core team with accurate equipment should stay on the spot in order to report political developments and to adjust the strategic and planning documents accordingly and to liaise with other actors in the field. This would prevent an inaccurate picture of the situation on the ground by the deployed mission before the arrival to the country.

Recommendation_II: We recommend that the fact finding mission establishes a channel of communication between the actors on the ground and Brussels, using information technology.

Policy recommendations

Lesson identified: Rotations of personnel are too short and the lack of usage of strict standardized handover procedures is preventing the effective functioning of the mission.

Recommendation: We recommend stricter guidelines on the usage of the preexisting structures that enable the handovers. If the overlap is not possible in person, information technology should be used to enable smooth transition and successful continuation of activities.

Discussion points

Overlapping with other capabilities:

- Best practices and lessons learned should be included in the handover process (discussed in interoperability)
- Lack of information sharing between NATO and non-NATO contributing states (discussed in interoperability)
- Lack of communication between Brussels and the field (discussed in planning)
- Lack of personnel with adequate language and cultural skills, proper training about the context of the crisis → new mandatory pre-deployment trainings progress in this field?



8 CONCLUSION: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS IDENTIFIED

This deliverable has both consolidated the understanding of the IECEU-project and then translated that understanding in to policy recommendation and material to be used in policy dialogues and in further dissemination later.

The 19 policy recommendations identified are:

1. **Additional resources are needed in planning both on the strategic and operational level.** Planning needs to be an on-going process to accommodate the continual changes missions and operations undergo.
2. **Civilian and military elements of crisis management should be combined where possible** in the same “pipeline”, especially in the initial planning phases of future missions and operations to enhance integration. In this regard, advanced communications should be further developed between the heads of the MPCC and CPCC at Brussels level and between the mission commanders in joint or adjacent theatres on all aspects of the missions.
3. **Local ownership should be encouraged and strengthened** in the different planning phases of an operation or mission.
4. The **desired end-state for the mission or operation, purpose or overarching strategic objective of the mission** should reflect an appropriate action relevant to the needs of the nation it is operating in at that juncture and be as clearly communicated as possible.
5. **An enhanced information sharing framework should be created.** As the mandates and operational environments of CSDP missions have evolved, their capabilities, processes and procedures required to gather and analyze information must develop too. The EEAS should consider better ways to compile, analyze and discuss reports and other relevant information through an enhanced information sharing framework within the CSDP structures and between their support elements at both strategic and operational-field level. In order to ensure the timely and efficient flow of information within the EU crisis management structures, the information sharing framework should take into account the procedures and practices, tools, technological solutions, staffing, capability development means. This development should be done in active cooperation with field missions to foster interoperability among EU actors and provide a basis for cooperation with external partners.
6. **Consider developing an interoperable capability for better intelligence gathering and sharing tools.** Related to the previous recommendation, the current capabilities to collect, analyse, store and share CSDP-related intelligence is inadequate. The shortfalls range from proper means in terms of services and intelligence sharing culture. There is no policy or guidance on early warning, situation assessments and legal aspects of the Computer Network Operations. All these domains are strongly interlinked to the intelligence capabilities.
7. **Third country participation should be strengthened** in CSDP crisis management operations by including them in the early planning stages and develop standard operating procedures that address doctrinal, procedural and technological differences/interoperability.



Tackling these interoperability challenges at operational level and better incorporating third states in CSDP crisis management operations is important as it has economic benefits, force generation benefits and gives political legitimacy.

8. **Development of a shared platform for lessons identified should be continued** as it can build synergies and enhance the learning process of crisis management operations, and strengthen the mechanisms to monitor the lesson implementation process. This can be strengthened by continue sharing the information with external parties conducting research and external evaluations.
9. **Improving soft skills assessment and testing is needed.** There are gaps in the Planning Guide for Member States Seconding Authorities in terms of detailed assessment of soft skills. The recruitment process focuses on personal, measurable competences, which may not be the most vital competences if, for example, the focus of the mission is changed. The soft skills assessment is especially crucial for higher management levels of missions where a separate soft skills test should be used in recruitment. In general, the existing guidelines on soft skills should be more closely followed.
10. **Successful hand-overs should be further prioritized** and stricter adherence to existing hand-over guidelines stressed. Hand-overs are vital to ensure institutional memory (including lessons, best-practices, knowledge, know-how and contacts) is passed on and instrumental in preparing new members of staff for the tasks ahead. Ideally, there would be a period of overlap between those coming to a position and those leaving it enabling task-specific training. When such overlap is not possible, information technology can be used to enable smooth transition and successful continuation of activities. Where possible the written hand-over processes should be formulated so as to make the processes easily documentable and measurable. Complementing hand-over processes with task-specific training further minimizes the length of the hand-over and enables new staff to be effective in carrying out their tasks earlier.
11. **Comprehensive communication strategies for both CSDP missions and operations should be created and implemented wherever possible** as communication is a necessary condition for cooperation and coordination. Communication and cooperation is an on-going activity, and should be both on-going and developing throughout the mission lifecycle. Across the missions/operations appraised there is evidence of efforts made to strengthen communication, cooperation and coordination with other actors – it is important that these efforts continue. Knowledge and information sharing largely depends on *ad hoc* personal relationships, which may or may not be good. These *ad hoc* relationships are often lost with personnel changes. Institutionalization of the relationships may aid in sustaining them, but very flexible implementation is necessary on the ground and rigorous standardisation potentially harmful. Information sharing agreements have in some instances have helped information sharing in particular between international actors. Regular follow-up conversations, e.g. to communicate that local feedback has been taken into account and to explain whether and why (not) it has had a practical impact, could be introduced.
12. **The planning phase of the crisis management operation could be strengthened by a technical needs assessment** before the start of the mission/operation. The needs assessment should be linked to the mandate of the mission/operation, tasks to be



accomplished by international and local staff, levels of technological proficiency of identified users and existing local technological infrastructure. Such a needs assessment can be preventive and an ongoing process, facilitated by EU delegations and implemented in areas where there are not yet missions/operations.

13. **Competence-based learning objectives in current training curricula should be strengthened.** Similarly, it should be ensured that the training objectives stay current with the ICT infrastructure in use.
14. **Training for local partners should use the technology they use or will use.** Technological considerations are often local and variable, and should be taken into account when designing training. Specifically, it should be ensured that training for country representatives (target audience) uses the technology that they use or will use in the future.
15. **Further development of centralized technological capabilities to support field activities should be pursued.** Priority should be given to the development of so called integrated management systems, supporting the management of the crisis management operation and common warehousing for technologies.
16. Especially the shorter **deployments should be extended wherever possible** to ensure that the mission or operation is not negatively affected by undue disruptions. Hand-over processes are also instrumental in supporting smooth transitions between personnel.
17. **Lessons learned processes should be strengthened** especially vis-à-vis implementing lessons identified in the field.
18. **Fact-finding should be a continuous process during an operation/ mission, and at the very least take place as close to possible to the deployment of a mission or operation.** After the initial pre-planning fact-finding, a core team could remain to update the EU on political developments and liaise with other actors in the field to ensure that EUs understanding of the situation on the ground remains current.
19. **Secure communication is needed between EU actors from the very beginning of a mission or operation.** Secure communication is especially vital between the actors in the field and those in Brussels.



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A representative of the Ministry of Defence, 18 October, 2016, Helsinki.



APPENDIX

Appendix A: 56 Potentials Identified in D5.1 The Effectiveness of EU capabilities and the Current Situation in Pooling and Sharing

1. Increase resources in planning to ensure on-going planning during the mission life span.
2. Emphasise the importance of mandate design and resource mandate creation accordingly.
3. Consider building mandates around one thematic priority (e.g. policing, judiciary or training) while ensuring there is flexibility for the Mission implementation plan.
4. Ensure on-going, long-term planning support and active engagement throughout the mission lifecycle: timely and flexible decision making, improving situational awareness, being present in early discussions where international intervention is discussed.
5. Standardise templates, reports and feedback, especially MIP template, wherever possible.
6. Set-up early communication on future operational resources to ensure that planned missions have the resources they need.
7. Create a timeframe for crisis management with establishment of clear end state and exit strategies already before a mission/operation is launched. Encourage strategic leadership to deal with changes in circumstances.
8. One pipeline: create a unified planning mechanism for both missions and operations for joint-missions wherever possible.
9. Set-up a "start-up kit" that has all main components for setting up a mission and operation to expedite getting the mission/operation fully functional
10. Strengthen the role of operational planning to take advantage of local possibilities
11. Aim to increase rotation length where possible.
12. Encourage creation of simple templates and easily usable standards where possible
13. Encourage the creation of a joint mission/ operation culture
14. Focus on staffing, and member state contributions
15. Create a channel to the ground, so there are no national bottlenecks in the reporting of misconducts.
16. Deincentivise non-reporting
17. Strengthen unified mechanisms of dealing with misconducts
18. Ensure there is an anonymous mechanism for reporting available also to non-EU actors including locals.
19. Ensure that personnel can be removed from their posts without negative consequences to the mission, if need be.
20. Consider on-going external evaluation processes for missions and operations to encourage learning.
21. Develop common IT technologies for CSDP missions and operations to enhance effectiveness and interoperability.
22. Link development of technologies both to CSDP mission/operation needs but also to the needs identified in host country.
23. Tailor training to the technology in use or provide new technology in the training (train&equip).



24. Consider creating set standards for local procurement of technology.
25. Create mechanisms, including a “start-up kit”, to shorten procurement processes in the beginning of missions/operations
26. Provide secure communications from the beginning of deployment
27. Create shared standards/technologies/planning mechanisms for civilian and military missions and operations to enhance interoperability
28. Develop the current warehouse concept to encourage standardisation
29. Recognise that there are limits to interoperability as the local contexts differ greatly
30. Emphasise potentials (especially in training and technology) for interoperability specifically in terms of civ-civ, and civ-mil cooperation
31. Encourage an interoperability positive mind-set.
32. Prioritise HR and focus on recruitment processes
33. Include soft skills assessment especially for more strategic roles
34. Ensure that skype video interviews or interviews in person in Brussels for higher roles are possible.
35. Emphasise contextual knowledge, intercultural communication, flexibility and respect
36. Standardise requirements for all personnel whenever possible (including e.g. medical and security certification).
37. Make pre-deployment training mandatory with no caveats
38. Develop more task- and context-specific training and ensure that it is available in missions and operations
39. Consider combining training with equipment allocation.
40. Create structures and a mind-set that allows the removal of unsuitable personnel quickly and efficiently.
41. Prioritise personnel considerations as committed personnel are the EUs core resource in crisis management.
42. Double-hatting for EU institutions can effectively aid coordination.
43. Encourage mentoring and communication between missions and operations.
44. Emphasise using an agreed working definition of central EU concepts
45. Create communication plans, engage with media. Hearts and minds matter- public perception of a mission/operation helps or hinders operation
46. Formalizing some relationships for all forms of coordination may enable better longer-term cooperation as ad hoc relationships are often lost
47. Consider reach (representation) results (follow-up), structures (creating invitation lists) renewal (revisiting invitation lists) and reliability (both in terms of regular meetings but also openness of communication in ad hoc local engagement.
48. Emphasise speaking with one “EU voice” externally to avoid confusion.
49. Some projects for short reconstruction projects may aid mission/operation’s activities and aid in confidence building
50. Avoid prioritising expediency over efficiency and consider the value of coordination to the mission/operation.
51. Double-hatting may lead to higher degrees of acceptance for gender
52. Promote human rights mapping especially when improving the capabilities of local security providers



53. Continue mainstreaming gender and human rights considerations
54. Advocate gender-sensitive media campaigns
55. Including gender-specific consideration when dealing with considerations of what is a safe and secure environment.
56. Actively encourage strides towards gender parity within operations/missions.

