



**POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS**
from a Whole of Society
perspective for the EU's conflict
prevention and peacebuilding
capabilities


W O S C A P

ENHANCING EU PEACEBUILDING CAPABILITIES



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
Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

Partners:



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1
INTRODUCTION

W O S C A P

ENHANCING EU PEACEBUILDING CAPABILITIES

The EU-funded Horizon 2020 project WOSCAP (Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding) aims at enhancing the capabilities of the EU to implement conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions through sustainable, comprehensive and innovative civilian means. It assesses current EU capabilities through the project's four objectives: to **review** the past and ongoing initiatives of the EU, to **reflect** and create an evidence base of good practices and lessons learned, to **recommend** policymakers to complement and adjust existing capacities, policies and initiatives, and to **innovate** with new approaches and identify future research priorities.



REVIEW

To assess past and ongoing conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives of the EU and its partners.



RECOMMEND

To complement and adjust existing capacities, policies, and initiatives for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, through an inclusive policy-practice dialogue and the development of policy recommendations.



REFLECT

To create an evidence base of best practices and lessons learned, to identify capability gaps in current EU and partner engagements, and to elaborate options for change and potential improvements in long-term civilian peacebuilding efforts.



INNOVATE

To make a significant contribution to civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding, by identifying future research priorities, and enhancing the potential of information and communication technologies.

This document presents a selected set of key recommendations for the EU, based on the in-depth research on the one hand, and policy roundtable discussions on the other, as implemented by the project.

In order to be able to do this, the project articulates its assessment around three clusters: SSR, Governance reform and Multi-Track Diplomacy; and five cross-cutting themes: local ownership, multi-stakeholder coherence, gender, ICTs and civil-military synergies. This was done through a combination of desk and field research in Mali, Yemen, Georgia, Ukraine, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Guatemala and Honduras. The project is designed in such a way that local researchers and civil society from several of these countries were an integral part.

The central question of the WOSCAP project is: what are the current EU civilian capabilities in the fields of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and how can these be enhanced in order to make policies more inclusive and sustainable? Given the salience of these challenges in current policy practice and agenda, the research approach was based on a Whole-of-Society approach which we identified as combining greater inclusivity with improved integration of policy choices. By applying the ideal of 'Whole-of-Society' (WOS), it intended to pay attention to the role of local societies, to multiple relationships at policy level and on the ground, and a wide range of stakeholders in the conflict space.

This recommendations booklet presents several key points of this research. It also takes into account the recommendations discussed during round-tables that took place in the cities of case study countries as Bamako, Tbilisi, Sana'a, Kyiv and in cities of EU member state countries as Berlin, Paris, The Hague, Madrid and London. The project has brought together academic researchers and policy-makers, civilian and military practitioners, and beneficiaries of EU interventions.

Selected recommendations will be further discussed during the final conference on 8th of November 2017. The complete set of recommendations and research reports are available in the website of the project, www.woscap.eu.

2 THEMATIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

THEMATIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A. HOW TO ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF EU CSDP MISSIONS AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM?

The EU defines Security Sector Reform (SSR) as ‘the process of transforming a country’s security system so that it gradually provides individuals and the state with more effective and accountable security in a manner consistent with respect for human rights, democracy, the Rule of Law and the principles of good governance. SSR is a long-term and political process, as it goes to the heart of power relations in a country’ (European Commission Joint Communication 2016). Over the last decade, SSR has become a prominent tool in the EU’s external intervention toolkit, exemplified by missions in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Up until now, the EU has launched 27 SSR-related missions, and among the ongoing 17 CSDP missions, 14 have elements of SSR. According to the European Union’s Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, and the preparatory documents related to the EU-wide strategic framework for SSR, the EU has renewed its commitment to SSR.

The Whole of Society Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (WOSCAP) project has assessed the EU’s capabilities in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and asks itself the question whether the EU lives up to its ambitious goals regarding SSR. In the countries studied within the WOSCAP project, the EU has carried out a significant number of SSR-related programs and projects. There are mandate, coordination, funding and coherence issues. Moreover, these activities had to be done in difficult security conditions and weak institutional contexts. In view of this it is not surprising that results show a mixed record and diverging assessments of the EU’s accomplishments. On the basis of the diverse SSR missions studied, a number of conclusions and recommendations can be drawn:

KEY FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1 Overall, the EU’s SSR efforts show a tendency towards applying the traditional, short-term, “train and equip” approach. This focuses on improving the technical capacity of security forces, and contrasts to the more long-term “governance-development” approach, aiming to meet the broader range of security needs of these countries’ societies, based on principles of transparency and accountability, amongst others.	The EU should take on a comprehensive, governance-development focused approach to SSR in line with its stated ambitions, wherein coherence with other actors in the field (EU member states, UN, others) is secured in order to not duplicate efforts. Furthermore, information sharing between the Council and Commission is still far from perfect and needs to be improved.
2 A common problem in multilateral SSR missions is the lack of a coherent and adequate training programme for seconded staff. In many cases there are discrepancies between the skills and expertise, for example in police trainers from different countries. Moreover, the skills and expertise, needed to carry out SSR related work in a conflict or post-conflict setting, are often different from the skills and expertise needed in the national context.	The EU should invest in a better preparedness and expertise for seconded staff, especially in the field of SSR, and efforts should be tailored to the local context. Too often EU missions and trainings have insufficiently taken into account the views of local, regional and international experts and have therefore not been well adapted to the local context.
3 An issue in SSR processes in conflict and post-conflict contexts is the accountability of the EU missions towards local communities. It remains unclear to the larger population how SSR processes take place, and what security challenges SSR missions or other efforts seek to address. In view of the above, the results are not shared by the local communities, making it difficult to measure the EU’s impact. Furthermore, the perceptions of the EU missions among the local population greatly differ per country.	The role of EU delegations in SSR missions should be strengthened. The EU should capitalize on the EU delegations’ key role in consolidating the EU’s long-term commitment with a partner country, acting as a ‘hub’, building on both diplomatic and operational expertise. This could help resolve issues with regards to, among others, trust building with local partners, sustainability of the missions, coherence with local and international stakeholders, visibility and accountability. Moreover, there is a need for better-defined strategies to ensure accountability.

4 Coordination and coherence problems are rife at different levels of EU interventions. Of the many tensions and problems discussed in the studies conducted through the WOSCAP project, the relations between civil and military actors, and the relations between EU Member States stand out.

CSDP missions should enhance the inclusion of local and international CSOs in the continuous evaluation of the missions. This engagement can take the form of involving CSOs in conducting baselines and in monitoring and evaluation. A broader civil society involvement can be key for creating local accountability, as they are often in a better position to represent or engage local communities.

5 The launch of the Women Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has highlighted the inclusion of a gender perspective as an important aspect, based on the importance of taking into account security needs of women, which define sexual and gender violence as a security threat.

The EU's agenda in terms of the gender, peace and security capabilities could be reinforced through strengthening the gender approach at the most senior level of peace support interventions and increasing 'gender champions' and tailored training at high level. The EU needs to constitute an effective gender construction in all peace support interventions and to establish specific gender positions, with enough human and financial resources, in all EU CSDP missions. This is part of an inclusive approach to SSR.

B. HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE EU'S CAPABILITIES ON MULTI-TRACK DIPLOMACY?

The research conducted within the WOSCAP on Multi-Track Diplomacy (MTD) was focused on assessing the aims of the European Union in terms of Multi-Track Diplomacy, and analysing its practices across a number of country cases (Georgia, Ukraine, Yemen, Mali, and Kosovo). According to the WOSCAP project, Multi-Track Diplomacy in the context of EU peacebuilding should entail: negotiation, mediation and dialogue support by EU bodies or instruments in various stages of conflict, through coordinated efforts, across various levels or 'Tracks' of conflict-affected societies. The research focused on three recurrent dimensions featured in the EU policy and guidance documents related to mediation and dialogue support: (1) the EU's capability to act proactively as well as to react rapidly in the situation of crises pertaining to armed conflict; (2) the EU's capability to coordinate its MTD efforts internally, with its Member-States, and with other multilateral and international agencies; and (3) the EU's capability to support inclusive engagement on the ground with all relevant national and sub-national stakeholders, including armed movements and civil society.

Based on the case study findings and analysis of the range of technical and political constraints impeding a full implementation of the EU's high ambitions for timely, coordinated and inclusive mediation and dialogue support, a range of targeted policy recommendations for EU staff can be drawn as presented in the table below:

KEY FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1 The EU Global Security Strategy (EUGSS) puts strategic internal and external communications as a crucial element to strengthen EU citizens' adherence to the EU's external action and to ensure coherence with external partners. Nevertheless, the lack of visibility for EU's action is often pointed out as a weakness, especially regarding MTD interventions. Clearer mandates and statements of objectives on the self-defined role of the EU in a given peace process (e.g. as lead mediator, in support to other third-parties or through its Member States' diplomatic engagement, as technical advisor, as donor, etc.) would increase coherence with other international actors	The EU should create and implement a communication and outreach strategy early on in the intervention cycle, ideally closely linked to the national government's communication strategies, that will contribute to a better understanding of the reforms and concerns of citizens and help increase the visibility of EU MTD efforts. The EU can also institutionalise the exchange of information with other international stakeholders on the ground. For this purpose, the EU should use the potential of ICTs to connect a wide range of local and external actors and processes. Internally, EU Country Strategies and mission mandates for CSDP missions or

	<p>EU Special Representatives would help streamline the multiplicity of external actors engaged in MTD by setting out clearer objectives and explicitly spelling out the respective roles of each EU actor.</p>
<p>2 Multi-stakeholder coherence also relies on the capacity of the EU to pool the required resources and adapt to the changing context. This capacity is undermined by the multiplicity of international and local actors involved on the ground and by the overlaps with Brussels institutions. Through their local presence, EU delegations can work purposefully on multiple levels and act as an information hub on the ground between EU Member States, EU headquarters and local societies.</p>	<p>EU delegations should coordinate the various tracks of engagement and policy domains/instruments of intervention, through regular information-sharing, joint briefs, both internally and with local and international partners. Such coordination should not be limited to the highest strategic level (heads of mission and EU Member States' ambassadors) but also applied at the operational level. An increased level of multi-track coordination would enhance opportunities for local development or reconciliation projects to leverage Track 1 mediation processes, and vice versa.</p>
<p>3 The inclusion of the gender dimension and the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda into all EU interventions on conflict prevention and peacebuilding shows progress at the practical level, but some challenges remain for the EU in developing strategic efficient policies in the field of MTD.</p>	<p>The EU should establish gender specific positions in all actors engaged in dialogue support, including in Special Representatives' teams; reinforce the gender component of mandates of EU actors engaged in facilitation and mediation support; and develop further coordination on the ground at an early stage with international and national stakeholders in third countries on the inclusion of WPS. Therefore, the EU can, through EU actors such as EU delegations and EU Member State Embassies, promote the establishment of informal and formal working groups for joint synergies.</p>

<p>4 The lack of political will on gender can result in the lack of gender analysis and mainstreaming in EU MTD and non-inclusive dialogue processes. In many cases there are not enough concrete actions foreseen to encompass the entire spectrum of local gender issues and to ensure a better understanding of the dynamics prior to EU interventions.</p>	<p>The EU should increase the number of gender champions at leadership level in mediation and dialogue support. It should also implement a practical gender approach to peace processes, powered by gender analysis in all phases of EU interventions and by systematic gender mapping and early, effective and sustained consultations with women's organizations and local gender stakeholders. Gender interlinkages between dialogue tracks should be promoted. Increased national and cross-national knowledge sharing on WPS and support to women's coalitions can also add to this.</p>
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
C. INCLUSIVITY AND LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN THE EU'S CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACEBUILDING EFFORTS

The WOSCAP project examined the accountability of EU policies towards local actors, inclusiveness and the outside-inside/external-local dynamics of EU peacebuilding, including to what extent EU engagements respond to local demand for assistance and reform. It took a Whole-of-Society (WOS) approach which pays particular attention to the breadth and diversity of stakeholders involved in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. It emphasises the importance of including a variety of local societal actors. It defines local ownership as a normative concept, which envisages that local people control reform and reconstruction processes in the context of an external intervention. It includes attempts to bring together policy-level initiatives and perspectives with the views and expectations of end-users of security among populations in conflict-affected societies. Inclusivity is about how local ownership is implemented, and about actors owning the process rather than to be at the receiving-end only.

The results show that selection of local interlocutors in the civil society sphere is in the majority of cases informed by externally conducted conflict analysis with limited or no local knowledge input, and based on technical and organisational capacity, and visibility of local civil society organisations. Such engagement strategies have proven to be unsustainable. On the basis of the diverse EU interventions studied, some recommendations can be drawn as presented in the table below:

KEY FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
<p>1 The EU presence on the ground enables it to operate as a repository of knowledge about other actors (both external and indigenous), and their capacities. That knowledge is at present insufficiently utilized, not only across the EU institutions, but also in relation to local constituencies as well as other international actors.</p>	<p>The EU should develop a clear strategy to build on the knowledge gathered during local interventions. The EU should invest in longstanding ground presence or seek partners that have such presence, and rely on their institutional memory. Certain positions within EU delegations would benefit from a longer-term posting, especially positions with a strong outreach function and those that need extensive local contacts.</p>
<p>2 The EU experience in conflict prevention and peacebuilding interventions shows the lack of an explicit engagement strategy including different categories of stakeholders, beyond the usual elites. EU interventions are missing important contributions from local constituencies such as companies and faith groups that could provide a better alignment between the intervention and local needs and capabilities. This limitation restricts the EU's capability to deliver sustainable results.</p>	<p>Policies should be accompanied by a comprehensive stakeholder engagement strategy tailored to individual country context, and developed as part of a participatory process with both other policy actors at EU and country level and with local counterparts. Such a strategy should be systematic and itself inclusive, containing a systematic assessment of the context and local actors, including local actors' perceptions and expectations of the EU role and their own role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This is needed to gain a shared understanding of the remit of international interventions and processes.</p>

<p>3 Companies evolving in a sensitive context have an influence, direct or indirect, on local communities, which may lead to the rise of tensions and emergence of conflicts. On the other hand, their establishment could be perceived as an opportunity for development or stability. While dialogue with the private sector is crucial, it may be difficult to be implemented. Often, stakeholders face the issue of lack of basic knowledge on peace and human rights from the locals, which undermine the benefits of such dialogue, or prevent further development of such activities.</p>	<p>The EU should envisage the possibility of using companies' leverage and involving the private sector in conflict prevention and peace processes. These actions could be developed within a European preventive economic diplomacy, or the concept of corporate peace. The EU should develop a strategy of peacebuilding partnerships focused on a tripartite dialogue. This could be fostered by the development of training in mediation in order to prevent conflict, avoid binary dialogue and contribute to communities' resilience and implementation of peace agreements. This could be conducted with the support of peace builders' focal points and companies' expertise.</p>
<p>4 Missions are often not tailored sufficiently to the local context, which makes them less effective. Mandates are the outcome of politics (Member States), and less of a needs assessment stemming from the beneficiary country and population. Local ownership is often equated with buy-in from the government, which has its limitations and risks, for instance when the EU loses traction with that government.</p>	<p>Local civil society actors – beyond the national government – should be involved in all stages of EU interventions, from the design and implementation to the evaluation phase. Vulnerabilities should be identified, not only through a unilateral exercise of a needs assessment, but through dialogue and interaction with local communities.</p>
<p>5 The lack of diversity among the CSOs working with the EU or supported by EU funds is still a challenge, as for now, most of the funds are allocated to CSOs that are institutionalised and larger, already familiar with the EU processes, and who are already working on the most strategic issues for the EU.</p>	<p>The EU should also develop an efficient platform allowing a wider range of CSOs, including local and small grassroots CSOs, to receive funds and collaborate.</p>



D. HOW TO MAKE THE INTEGRATED SYSTEMIC APPROACH WORKABLE AND OPERATIONAL?

With the launch of the EUGSS in June 2016, the EU has put a new concept at the core of its strategic external action that aims at fostering inclusiveness and efficiency: the Integrated Approach. This new concept is conceived as a means to go beyond the EU Comprehensive Approach by encompassing multi-level dimensions of conflicts. Several consultation sessions have been organised since June 2016 with a wide range of stakeholders (EUMS, EU institutions, civil society organisations) in order to discuss additional aspects and next steps in its implementation. The Whole-of-Society approach developed through the WOSCAP project offers a perspective on these steps.

Based on this, the next section will present the recommendations on the governance of the Integrated Approach following our main findings. These recommendations are articulated around various axes: strategy, protocols and mechanisms, management of human resources, trainings and, evaluations which could be explored to strengthen the EU capabilities.


KEY FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1 From an operational point of view, research demonstrates that EU protocols and mechanisms need to be enhanced when it comes to its peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities and missions. At present, various EU actors follow poor operational guidelines, based on unclear objectives and conceptual frames. The lack of clear guidance and established procedures for monitoring and reporting can affect the compliance between the different dimensions of the EU missions.	The EU should develop a systematic approach to interventions backed by clear mission statements and operational guidelines for EU staff. Individual actions and programmes should be clearly defined in terms of scope, durability and sustainability as well as their expected impact in addressing inter-related vulnerabilities among the local people in conflict-affected societies.

2 The EU displays limited capacity for reflexive learning and for conducting reflections and lessons learned exercises. Besides having a negative impact on comprehensiveness, the lack of multilevel learning inhibits trust building and sharing with local stakeholders, and developing good practices that would benefit from the rich and diverse experiences of a variety of international actors active in peacebuilding and conflict prevention.	The EU should improve its capacity for reflexive learning by reflecting on its own successes and failures, starting from the operational to the strategic level. A better monitoring and evaluation system can contribute to refined flexibility to respond and adjust to an ever-changing context on the ground. Moreover, joint programming should be further expanded in order to enhance coherence and reduce fragmentation of EU interventions.
3 It is essential for the EU to be able to provide a systematic assessment of local context and local actors, including the perception and expectations of local actors on their role and of the EU in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. An effective engagement strategy should also be dedicated to accessing local constituencies that for a variety of reasons – physical barriers to access due to armed violence or cultural barriers around marginalized groups – remain out of the purview of EU standard practices.	A stakeholders' engagement strategy should be systematic and inclusive. It goes together with the appointment of qualified EU staff in charge of the formulation of such a strategy and others in charge of key issues at the operational level. The EU should devote additional human resources to the creation of specific positions, with enough financial resources, in charge of continuous monitoring of progress of the projects in terms of advancing on and implementing its commitments on gender, ICTs, multi-stakeholder coherence, civil-military synergies and local ownership.
4 Research demonstrates that institutionalised learning can assure the sharing of knowledge between relevant stakeholders both internally and outside the EU. Such training capacities are crucial to build the EU delegation staff's expertise and to enhance the awareness of EEAS staff in Brussels about on-going local dynamics.	The EU should encourage the promotion of training mechanisms to actively support and increase EU staff awareness of MTD and SSR capabilities and their knowledge of how to use and mobilise them. The five aspects underlined by the WOSCAP project (namely local ownership, gender, coherence, ICTs and civil-military synergies) should be integrated in specific trainings and deployed in different stages of intervention and levels of EU staff. Moreover, the EU should continue its effort to develop research programs on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, potentially in the frame of the H2020 program. In this regard, the EU should support the development of research chairs led by EU Member States.

5 Researchers and practitioners highlight the difficulties in securing agreement among EU Member States on prioritising objectives and resources, as well as the EU Member States preference for bilateral policy. Acting as representative of the EU on the ground, the EU delegations is not always able to play a coordinating role. However, most practitioners and researchers agree that the EU influence is stronger when acting in coherence with Member States on the ground: speaking with one voice gives more weight and allows acting coherently all together while promoting peace processes and mediation.

The EU should institutionalise regular interactions with the EU Member States involved on the ground, based on the added value of regular meetings led by the EU delegations to ensure information sharing, to improve mutual understanding, and coherence about common objectives to which EU Member States have committed. To ensure its leadership in third countries, which leaves a place for stronger engagement and influence during the process, the EU should rely on the personal qualities of the Head of Delegation in being respected and persuasive, especially to set the agenda and contact the EU Member States, as well as by making them take a common position on sensitive topics. Targeted training for relevant EU delegation staff would increase their ability to increase EU leadership.

3 COUNTRY-SPECIFIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS




A. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU IN GEORGIA

The policy recommendations are based on the WOSCAP project's Case Study Report on Georgia "The EU's Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Interventions in Georgia". The research conducted covers the period from 2008 until now and focuses on three cases: the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), the Geneva International Discussions (GID), and Confidence Building Early Response Mechanism (COBERM). These cases were chosen as they correspond to the three types of the EU interventions the project focuses on: Multi-track Diplomacy, Security Sector Reform and Governance Reform. It focused on the peacebuilding functions of EU capabilities placed within a general context analysis of Georgian whole society in peace-building processes.

EU capabilities of the EUMM, the GID and the EU-UNDP programme COBERM analysed in the case study confirm the importance and need for more effective and efficient application of the horizontal as well as vertical coordination mechanisms.

KEY FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
<p>1 The EUMM is currently the most concrete instrument used for conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Georgia. The information sharing meetings organised by the EUMM with representatives of NGOs are considered a key forum for the EUMM's monitoring updates in Western Georgia, and constitute a clear indication that local ownership is being exercised. Nevertheless, it should be developed further.</p>	<p>The EU should increase CSO involvement in threat assessment and analysis regarding human security, including in the establishment and strengthening of people-centred early warning systems by providing necessary financial assistance. CSOs should also be supported to conduct needs assessments on human security to be presented at information sharing meetings organised by the EUMM.</p>
<p>2 The EUMM mission is considered as a successful tool. The EUMM gets active only in ad-hoc situations when there is a crisis and immediate involvement becomes necessary. Even if the EUMM has limited power to operate on the other side of the boundary line, inside the breakaway regions themselves, its impact is still very significant.</p>	<p>The EUMM mission should get a longer renewable mandate to send a strong signal to parties about the EU's involvement in conflict resolution in Georgia. The European Union should expand negotiations with relevant parties to allow monitors of the EUMM to control the conflict zones.</p>
<p>3 The GID is almost the only diplomatic platform functioning around the conflict in Georgia. The platform offers a venue for diplomats, politicians and decision-makers to exchange information and address certain ad hoc issues. Nonetheless, the GID has not been able to find diplomatic solutions to the conflict. The EU capacity within the GID format is seen by most researchers as restricted due to the elite character of the platform and its lack of transparency, particularly from the perspective of local civil society organisations.</p>	<p>The EU should support the dialogue between conflicting parties by promoting and increasing the funding for the involvement of a broader spectrum of CS actors, such as independent experts, young people, or women, and thus to make the process more accessible. The EU should also more actively invite non-EU States from the UN and the OSCE to effectively influence, promote and empower knowledge and experience-sharing between CS actors from Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia.</p>

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| <p>4 The Geneva Talks and the EU mediation in these should thus be understood mainly as a prevention tool of a new conflict between Georgia and Russia. One of the challenges for the implementation of the EU goals in the GID is to broaden people's understanding of the security dimension. It is not just about tanks and weapons, but it needs to be understood as what the EU calls 'human security'.</p> | <p>The EU should support the creation of analytical capacity in Georgian Government and civil society for conflict research and analysis as well as the development of conflict resolution and confidence building methodologies.</p> |
| <p>5 The EU-UNDP joint programme COBERM invests in grassroots dialogue and trust building. Different stakeholders inside Georgia generally evaluate this programme as useful and positive, since it is able to stimulate people-to-people contact across conflict divides, and to generate increased capacities within communities, as well as CSOs to mediate political differences in constructive ways. However, measures are needed to make the programme more permeable to new actors and to allow it to increase its impact beyond the small groups that have been participating thus far.</p> | <p>The EU should set up civil society coordination meetings to stimulate and improve networking among donors, international NGOs and Georgian CSOs in the area of projects facilitating dialogue processes and people-to-people contacts. In order to diversify participation, the EU should also encourage the joint participation of women and young people from Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in regional or European educational institutions, and in peace education. Moreover, the EU should support capacity building of CSO's in breakaway regions in order to enhance their participation into grassroots dialogue and trust building initiatives.</p> |



B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU IN UKRAINE

During the Revolution of Dignity and after the Russian role in the annexation of the Crimea, the EU has been active in setting up the Geneva format for negotiating a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the stabilization of Ukraine. Although it was replaced by the Normandy format, which no longer included the EU but a representation by Germany and France, Brussels remained active in helping Berlin and Paris to put together a settlement plan. Moreover, several waves of sanctions imposed by the EU against Ukrainian and Russian persons and companies seem to have thus far been effective in deterring Russia from seizing more territory.


The EU also made an attempt at contributing to the conflict settlement by dispatching an EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) to Ukraine. Although the mandate of the mission did not match the request of Ukraine, the EUAM remains a significant tool in Ukraine's institution building at the time when viable and functional institutions are paramount for the state's survival and sovereignty. Having looked into the three cases of EU involvement in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Ukraine: the Normandy Format (multi-track diplomacy cluster), the EUAM and the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) missions (security sector reform cluster) and the decentralization (governance cluster), the following recommendations for enhancing EU peacebuilding capabilities can be drawn.

KEY FINDINGS

- 1 The EU did not negotiate the mission's mandate with the local stakeholders before the launch of the EUAM. Thus, upon its arrival the mission was looking for a niche to apply its efforts, rather than filling in the existing demand. When the mandate is not negotiated, as in the EUAM's case, this decreases the probability and inclusivity of local ownership, since the local partners are excluded from owning the process from the start.
- 2 The different institutional nature of the EUBAM and the EUAM, and the larger flexibility of the EUBAM suggest that in sensitive geopolitical environments (such as the Eastern partnership for the EU), the EUBAM's "hybrid" nature could be used as a blueprint for further missions.
- 3 Decentralisation is one of the major reform on Ukraine's agenda, but research demonstrates it has to go with comprehensive support to reforms demanded by Ukraine's population (anti-corruption, judiciary and law-enforcement reforms topping the chart) to have an impact on conflict resolution and peacebuilding.
- 4 The EU has taken a low profile in Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict, and has been reluctant to become too deeply involved. Nevertheless, several stakeholders, through the policy meetings, have emphasized various issues connected to the Crimea annexation that have been neglected by the EU conflict resolution strategies. It includes human rights violations, search for "transitional justice" as short-term measures and the necessity of an international de-occupation negotiation format.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The EU should negotiate a mission's mandate with the local partners prior to dispatching a mission. Moreover, the EU should continue its effort to adopt a flexible approach towards the missions' mandates in order to be ready to respond to the needs of the local beneficiaries and the changing geopolitical context.
- The EU should consider using the EUBAM's "hybrid" nature as a blueprint for further missions, rather than a unique exception.
- The EU should continue supporting Ukraine in a wide range of reforms contributing to good governance, e.g. Instrument to Contributing for Stability and Peace, which should be accompanied, with early follow-up plans due to the ICSPs short funding-cycle.
- Crimea should be part of the EU conflict settlement agenda for Ukraine.




C. Policy recommendations for the EU in Yemen

The EU has played an important, albeit limited role in Yemen's recent history. The EU helped push through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Initiative that ushered in the transitional process, most notably the National Dialogue Conference (NDC). While the EU was perceived positively due to its role offering technical support and being a neutral party, the GCC Initiative and outcomes of the NDC are seen by many to have favoured the traditional elites and merely prolonged the inevitable.

KEY FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1 The observance of the 30 percent quota for women and 20 percent quota for youth as agreed in the NDC outcomes are not respected.	The EU should push for more meaningful representation for the post-2011 'newcomers' to the political arena by pressuring the parties to observe the NDC quotas for women and youth. The role played by women and youth should be emphasized and supported but they should not be pushed without being equipped with the adequate knowledge and skills to effectively participate in political arena.
2 During the course of the conflict the power structure in Yemen has been fragmented. Many of the emerging actors and groups with local influence – and in many cases direct territorial control – are not represented at the national level in the peace process. The EU needs to understand how all these groups have transformed since the beginning of the conflict in order to make more informed decisions and engage with relevant actors.	The EU should regularly evaluate the shifting power dynamics on the ground, engage directly with local leaders and groups, and partner with the UN and other international stakeholders in doing so.
3 The EU is able to play a more active and direct role in mediation due to its relatively neutral position and its good relations with international stakeholders such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.	The EU should use its leadership and mediation capacity to support the enabling environment for peacebuilding and embedding democracy.
4 Research demonstrated that Yemen holds an ambiguous place in EU foreign policy and funding structures. Moreover, EU efforts in Yemen have been overshadowed by some EUMS initiatives.	The EU should define Yemen more concretely within the EU's policy and funding structures for the Middle East and increase coordination among member states. It should implement stronger engagement with beneficiaries of EU-funded projects, a more in-depth and multi-level understanding of the Yemeni political system, and, in summation, a more accurate understanding of how EU-sponsored efforts to bring about political and social reforms are likely to play out in reality.

5 Research notes that the EU is being perceived as a relatively neutral actor in Yemen compared to other international actors. This has given the EU greater access to groups like the Houthis, Southern Movement, women, youth, and civil society actors. However, research demonstrates that some local parties have come to view the EU negatively since the escalation of the conflict in March 2015, because a number of Member States declared support for the coalition intervention, including France and the UK, weakening the EU's perceived neutrality.	The EU should develop a stronger communications strategy to inform the public of its neutrality, values, and humanitarian/development support. The EU should have a more pronounced media campaign to reaffirm its neutrality, advertise its democratic ideals, and anchor its presence in Yemen to its support of development and humanitarian projects. While further research is required, in implementing a stronger communications strategy the EU should be mindful of regional and demographic differences in Yemen in terms of how information will be disseminated to a local audience.
6 The immediacy of the humanitarian catastrophe has led international stakeholders to prioritize short-term objectives, and for good reason. As of the beginning of July, the \$2.1 billion required for the 2017 Humanitarian Response Plan is only funded by one-third, and over 20 million people in Yemen require some form of assistance or protection. However, according to the UN envoy, humanitarian assistance can only support 10-15 percent of Yemen's food demand, with the remainder covered by commercial activity. It is therefore necessary to work beyond the critical, but ultimately unsustainable, humanitarian support toward more livelihoods and development support.	The EU should balance immediate humanitarian assistance with more sustainable livelihood and development interventions. The EU should undertake projects in priority sectors, supporting local authorities where feasible. This includes most importantly addressing the collapsing healthcare system, rebuilding water infrastructure, sponsoring agricultural projects, supporting the banking sector, providing income-generating livelihood opportunities, and improving the education system. Regarding the latter, one mutually beneficial way of supporting Yemen is for the EU to invest in preparing the next generation of Yemeni leaders by increasing the number of scholarships given to Yemenis to study in the EU.
7 Instability in Aden, Hadhramout, Ibb, and Marib persists because state institutions have been slow to re-establish security and improve the provision of basic necessities like fuel and electricity. For the most part, state institutions are still functioning but at a substandard level, and the priority should be on building their capacity.	The EU should help strengthen state institutions, including through technical expertise, and should develop modalities to channel funds to local authorities. One of the most important areas in this respect is the justice system, which the EU can play a role in supporting to reinstate.




D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU IN MALI

The set of recommendations presented here are part of a final outcome of the WOSCAP project's research, which covered three selected case studies of EU intervention in Mali. The first case deals with the sphere of multi-track diplomacy, the second case study deals with security sector reform (including the EU missions EUTM and EUCAP Sahel Mali) and the third case study is devoted to EU support for governance reforms. It discussed the effectiveness of the interventions and their level of ownership by local stakeholders and their sustainability.

It aimed to establish if and how EU interventions contribute to preventing conflict and consolidating the peace process in Mali. The recommendations were discussed in Bamako with the government, EU officials, civil society and academics, debating the relevant conclusions concerning EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts in Mali, which in turn increased awareness of its activities.

KEY FINDINGS	RECOMMENDATIONS
1 The EU has taken a low profile in Ukraine since the beginning of the conflict, and has been reluctant to become too deeply involved. Nevertheless, several	The EU should continue and increase its support to the G5 Sahel initiative.
2 Research demonstrates the discrepancy between support provided in terms of EU training and funds, and specific local needs.	The EU should improve EU coordination with other actors such as the UN and ECOWAS and especially strengthen local ownership through support provided to local CSOs and sustainable long-term actions.
3 Tensions between the contracting parties of the Algiers Agreement in the North of Mali have the potential to undermine the efforts undertaken by the Malian state.	The EU should use its influence and role in multi-track diplomacy regarding the implementation of the Algiers agreement, and clarify some of the steps identified.
4 Research demonstrates the inadequacy of the EU's actions visibility towards public opinion in Mali. It is clear that the local population is not aware of the EU's activities or does not understand it, and knows more about the actions of specific Member States.	The EU should enhance the visibility of its efforts and actions, especially regarding the support provided to the Malian state in terms of decentralisation and governance, and how this is coordinated with MINUSMA. This is not for visibility only, but rather to increase the transparency and accountability.
5 The EUTM is mainly focused on training aspects from a technical 'train and equip' point of view. It is also not sufficiently connected to the EUCAP Sahel Mali to speak of a comprehensive approach to SSR in Mali. Monitoring and evaluation of the training is not sufficient.	The EU should emphasise democratic governance aspects related to public action and SSR by strengthening CSOs capabilities. The EU should continue to build on its initiative to have a civil society platform of the EUCAP Sahel. The EU should use the monitoring capacities of other partners in the North to receive feedback on the quality of the trainings.
6 Research demonstrates that operational coordination regarding trainings is facing difficulties related to languages, and different approaches that affect their efficiency.	The EU should adapt its defence and security training methods and constraints to local attitudes and habits in terms of human resources, and better agreements between Member States on the approaches.



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ENHANCING EU PEACEBUILDING CAPABILITIES