The effectiveness of EU capabilities and current situation of pooling and sharing

Dissemination Level: PU

IECEU
CSA project: 653371
Start date: 01/05/2015
Duration: 33 months

PROJECT TITLE:

Improving the Effectiveness of Capabilities (IEC) in EU conflict prevention

D5.1 The Effectiveness of EU capabilities and current situation of pooling and sharing

Lead beneficiary: SaferGlobe

Delivery date: 21/06/2017

Revision: 5.0

Dissemination Level	
PU: Public	PU
PP: Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission)	
RE: Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission)	

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Revision history

Rev.	Date	Author	Notes
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1.1	25/11/2016	**Kari Paasonen, SaferGlobe**	**Preliminary qualitative observation**
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5.0	21/06/2017	Kirsi Hyttinen, Laurea	Final version and submission

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFBiH	Air force of Bosnia and Herzegovina
AGSR	Airborne Ground Surveillance and Reconnaissance
AU	African Union
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
C2	Command and Control
C3	Command, Control and Communication (C3)
CAR	Central African Republic
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CMS	Case Management System
CIVCOM	Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management
CivMil	Civilian-Military
CMC	Crisis Management Concept
CMPD	Crisis Management and Planning Directorate
COM	Commander
CONOPS	Concept of Operation
CPCC	Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
CSO	Civilian Strategic Option
DG EVCO	Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation
DG ECHO	Directorate-General for Development and Humanitarian Affairs
DG IX	Directorate-General of Civilian Crisis Management
DG RELEX	Directorate-General for the External Relations
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
E&F	Evaluation and Feedback

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ESDC	European Security and Defence College
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUBAM	EU Border Assistance Mission
EUD	Delegation of the European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUMC	EU Military Committee
EUMS	EU Military Staff
EU OPCEN	European Union Operations Centre
EUPOL	European Union Police Mission
EUPOL COPPS	EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
EUPT	European Union Planning Team
EUSEC	European Communications Security & Evaluation Agency of the Military Committee
EUSR	European Union Senior Representative
EUAVSEC	EU Aviation Security Mission
EWS	Early Warning System
FPI	Foreign Policy Instrument
HQ	Headquarters
ICM	Integrated Crisis Management
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IT	Information Technology
ITC	Information Technology
JOP	Joint Operation Procedure
KFOR	Kosovo Peacekeeping Force
LOT	Liaison and Observation Team

MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MIP	Mission Implementation Plan
MLU	Multinational Logistics Unit
MMA	Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising
MOI	Ministry of Interior
MONUC	United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
MS	Member States
MTU	Multinational Transport Unit
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental Organisation
OCC	Operational Capabilities Concept
OHQ	Operation's Headquarters
OPLAN	Operational Plan
OSCE	Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe
PCP	The Palestinian Civil Police
PSC	Political and Security Committee
PSOTC	Peace Support Operation Training Centre
P&S	Pooling and Sharing
RoE	Rules of Engagement
RS	Operation Resolution Support
SIAC	Single Intelligence Analysis Capability
SoR	Statement of Requirements
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

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About the Authors

Maria Mekri is the Executive Director of SaferGlobe, the leading Finnish think tank focused on peace and security. She is also the conceptual framework manager of the IECEU project. Maria Mekri has over 20 years of academic experience in international relations, political theory, peace and conflict studies and international law (human rights) and 10+ years teaching (e.g. international relations, peacebuilding, human rights, negotiation). Her Specific interest in creating sustainable, practical solutions for improving security and peacefulness, also in crisis situations and fragile contexts. She holds an MPhil in International Relations from Cambridge University, a BA in politics and fine arts from Brandeis University and an MBA from Haaga-Helia University of Applied Sciences.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This comparative review analyses the case studies of the IECEU-project to consolidate findings from the project. In its core are the six capabilities of crisis management identified in the project. These capabilities are planning capacity, operational capacity, comprehensiveness, competences, interoperability and technology. Together the six capabilities form an overall picture of the capabilities used in crisis management.

The general conclusion of the review is that EU crisis management missions and operations are very varied in their effectiveness and the capabilities that they are able to deploy. The great variation also extends to all missions under study, which showed a mix of capabilities on both high and low levels. Furthermore, the capabilities themselves showed great variation between different operations and missions, which was not attributable to the nature of the mission.

The study highlights two factors for effectiveness in crisis management. First, mandate creation and planning. Although strides towards better planning have been made, the EU still has significant potentials for improvement. Specifically challenging to planning is the combination of linear and relatively slow planning mechanisms with both complex institutional arrangements, coordination with other international actors, and the changing local context. Here, there is anecdotal evidence that crisis management operations and missions with a clear, broad, overall goal are better placed to deal with changes than those with either overly limiting or overly broad mandates.

Second, comprehensiveness and coordination, especially with other international actors is vital for operations and missions. Especially in military operations, EU typically works well with other international actors. As the number of potential international actors grows, the coordination challenges also grow, but nevertheless it is clear that here is one of EU's strengths in crisis management. Coordination with locals is more varied in practice, but still a clear emphasis in crisis management.

Other identified impediments to effectiveness include short rotation cycles, especially in combination with poor hand-over practices and lack of information sharing. Recruitment of skilled professionals with necessary soft-skills (e.g. communication skills, language skills) remains challenging especially for positions that require the highest level of expertise.

The most underdeveloped capability, especially in the civilian missions (or in civ-mil cooperation), is interoperability and pooling and sharing. Here there is both potential for development and synergies to be found. However, further development of joint EU tools will require additional emphasis on training in general and wider use of train& equip.

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In terms of effectiveness, the overall the comparison showed that the EU's venture into operational conflict prevention is neither an unconditional 'success' nor 'failure'. Instead it demonstrates how the Union has had significant achievements as well as difficulties in this regard – sometimes in the same missions/operations.

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1 INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly complex world, the EU is one of the few international organisations actively engaged in conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding efforts. The political significance of deploying a CSDP operation or mission is in itself great as it shows Europe's international commitment to supporting crisis situations. However, there are increasing calls to show effectiveness in conflict prevention and crisis management requiring broad analysis of the way current operations and missions are conducted.

This report consolidates understanding from over 200 interviews, around a 1000 pages of study reports and a quantitative survey to identify lessons and find potentials of increasing effectiveness of the capabilities in EUs crisis management (as identified in D1.5: planning, operational, technology, interoperability, competences and comprehensiveness). It also analyses the overall effectiveness of the missions and operations studied by using four main criteria; internal goal attainment, internal appropriateness, external goal attainment and external appropriateness. The comparative study here is focused on creating a basis for the development of policy recommendations. Hence, wherever possible, the lessons identified are formulated as policy potentials.

This report is based on comparing the study results from EUFOR ALTHEA, EULEX, EUBAM Libya, EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL COPPS, EUPOL Afghanistan, EUVASEC, EUFOR RCA, EUPOL RD Congo, EUSEC RD Congo. Moreover the operation Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo were analysed. These missions give a good overview of CSDP missions and operations in terms of both their geographical locations and their mandates.

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
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Figure 1: CSDP missions and operations after 2003 with IECEU case studies

In terms of duration, the missions are also show great variation as is evident in Figure 2. where the longest missions have been in existence over a decade, whereas the shortest (EUFOR RCA) was operational from 2014 to 2015.

This report is unique in its scope and depth due not just to the number of missions and operations under study but also their broad representation of CSDP activities.

Figure 2 Years of activity of the operations and missions under study

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The main finding of this report is that there is great variation in EU crisis management in terms of capabilities both within each operation and mission and between them with very few noticeable patterns or clustering. The variation was mirrored in their overall effectiveness. Simplistic negative/positive analysis of CSDP missions lack both nuance and understanding of the broader context. Each operation1 under study showed great variation in terms of capabilities and their overall effectiveness. In the comparison, these great variations were also evident. It was not possible to make any broad generalisations such as identifying top missions/operations or claiming that civilian missions are more effective than military operations. Even those operations where it became impossible to fulfil the

European Union's crisis management operations are characterised by large variation in all capabilities they employ as well as their overall effectiveness.

purpose of the mission had different levels of capabilities, and elicit an interesting conversation of why they were unable to carry out their tasks when so many components where in place.

Ingrained in the variation is lack of standardisation. One clear potential for increasing effectiveness is creating and adhering more closely to EU standardised practices. However, standardisation in complex environments may also create unforeseen bottle-necks and overly limit possibilities, and requires careful consideration as to where and when standardisation is helpful.

Evident in the study are the clear structural weaknesses in EUs current crisis management. These weaknesses include complex and multifaceted institutional arrangements which retard or prevent action, competing political interests, a lack of political unity or increasingly the lack of political interest in crisis management, a general lack of emphasis on evaluation and improving the quality of engagement, as well as a general lack of common understanding on why operations are deployed (e.g. as a statement of political will or to create change), for whom operations are deployed and how long their duration should be. Specifically, the EU struggles to end missions when they are no longer feasible or where the EU is unable to contribute.

The structural issues identified in CSDP mirror broader issues within EU foreign policy reflecting the competing interests, needs and wants of individual member states and the central EU structures. Here, the challenge is especially lack of member state interest and committed to crisis management. Especially for larger member states, CSDP missions and operations offer only one potential

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1 Note: "mission" and "operation" in the rest of the deliverable are used interchangeably to refer to both the CSDP missions and operations under study. The report will use both terms so that there is no bias.

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mechanism for influence among many. Bilateral initiatives may be preferred for ownership and direct involvement. [2] When a member state shows specific interest in a mission or operation, it is broadly welcomed even where the interest translates to recruitment practices favouring specific nationalities.

Political and policy strives, which are currently in place towards improving these structural weaknesses are both welcome and conducive to improving effectiveness. There were clear signs of improvement in some aspects of crisis management, as well as more concerted effort to do so. However, simultaneously, the operational context is becoming all the more challenging both within the EU, especially changes caused by the UK invocation of Article 50 and its potential impact on EUs military capabilities in crisis management, and globally with blurring divides between internal and external security threats. The importance of CSDP missions is growing, and their effectiveness as a tool for conflict prevention is needed.

1.1 Methodology

The methodology of this deliverable derives from two sources. The capabilities are examined through the IECEU conceptual framework, which was created during WP1.5 and has been presented in D1.5. The overall effectiveness of EU missions and operations is examined in Chapter 10 using the criteria developed in D1.4. The methodology for the chapter is elaborated in the chapter itself. The discussion below focuses on chapters 2-9, or in other words the capabilities rather than the missions and operations as a whole.

The task of the Conceptual Framework has been to direct the methodology development for each case study, as well as the comparison of case studies (10 in total) in WP5.1. Modularity of the framework enabled researchers in each case study to tailor the framework to best suit their research context (flexibility), yet it produced data that can be aggregated across case studies (rigidity) regardless of the restrictions embedded in their conduct, such as limited access to information, variance between case studies and contexts, and diversity of researchers and institutions carrying out the case studies. Data utilized in the comparison in WP5.1 comprises of the case study reports and especially the study reports that were compiled of all the case studies by the researchers with specific reference to the conceptual framework, whereas primary data collected in the case studies has not been disposable.

In the process of analysing and comparing the case study findings, the conceptual framework has been further developed – mainly due to variance in the ways in which the case studies have been

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[2] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 34–35.

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carried out. First, the two levels of analysis ("politico-strategic" and "field-operational") have been combined in the analysis. The separation of the two levels was from its origin an analytical tool and as such malleable in its use. The case study findings do not maintain this distinction as from the operational perspective the two levels of analysis are clearly intertwined.

Secondly, the two perspectives ("EU" and "non-EU") have been re-organized for D5.1 as these differing perspectives have already been compiled and contrasted in the analysis of the case study reports. Although the analysis of the interview materials could have provided additional data on the differences, the data protection issues surrounding sharing interview material were insurmountable. Additionally using primary material to supplement meta-analysis of the material already analysed by the researchers would have created additional challenges for validity and reliability through confusing analytical levels. Hence, the analysis here is focused on the analysis made by the researchers (the study reports) and supplemented by other information in the case study reports. However, the "EU" / "non-EU" distinction has been utilized in the examination of the comprehensiveness of crisis management (one of the six capabilities) as it is a key component of the capability. "EU" perspective thus implicates the internal comprehensiveness of EU crisis management, whereas "non-EU" perspective refers to the comprehensiveness of overall crisis management, including relations and cooperation with the local actors as well as embeddedness in the wider international framework.

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Capabilities in IECEU	
Planning Capacity (P)	Strategic/Operational planning, Management, Budgetary constraints, Consultation of lessons identified reports, Situational Awareness
Operational Capacities (O)	Leadership, Mission organisational structures, Mission decision making process, Mission resources, Mission funding, Culture, Security, Procurement
Interoperability (I)	Cooperation/Collaboration, Coordination, Civ-Mil/Civ-Civ/Mil-Mil synergies
Competences (knowledge and skills) (C)	Interpersonal skills, Training, Cultural awareness, Professional background, selection criteria
Comprehensiveness (CH)	Cooperation, Coordination, Actors: other EU actors Civilian, Military & Other, NGOs, Locals, International community (e.g. NATO, UN, OSCE, AU, other regional organisations)
Technologies (T)	Technological resources at disposal, EDA priorities, housing, equipment.

Table 1: The 6 capabilities in IECEU

Focus in the comparison is thus – as in the case study reports – on the six capabilities: planning capacity (PC), operational capacities (OC), interoperability (I), competences (C), comprehensiveness (CH), and technologies (T). In addition, findings fed in by the researchers in each case study from the outside of the conceptual framework are presented in case study reports. Furthermore, chapters designated to the cross-cutting themes of human rights and gender have been included in WP5.1 presenting aggregated findings on these themes across the case studies.

Figure 3: IECEU Conceptual Framework

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As the case studies and case study reports are descriptive in their nature, comparability between the cases is restricted to juxtaposition. To create the basis for the comparison in lieu of coded case study material, the researchers created a tabulation table with each of the operations/missions on the horizontal axis, and the capabilities of missions/operations on the vertical axis as well as a row for basic information, for gender, and for human rights.

In the organisation of the information, it became clear that some themes were prevalent in the case study findings. In planning capacity, specific attention was given to mandate, lessons learned from earlier operations/missions and coordination and cooperation with other relevant actors in planning. In operational capacities, specific focus was on rotation, budget/financial resources, communication within operation/mission and between Brussels and operation/mission, the number of staff, and dealing with misconducts. In competences, focus in the case studies was on quality of recruits, hand over & training in the country of mission/operation and pre-deployment training. Moreover, the case studies highlight the interlinkages between the different capacities demonstrated in Figure 4. Planning creates the foundation for all other capabilities. Hence operational capacity is both interlinked and dependent on planning capacity. [3] Similarly, competences form the core of all operations, which are "only as good as their people".[4]

Figure 4: Interlinkages of the Six Capabilities

The tabulation table, and the analysis that took place in its creation following the conceptual framework are the foundation of the analysis here. It allows for organization of the data and its analysis. The table itself is 71 pages in word (and 144 pages as the original excel table) and as such is not only too large to add as an annex. The tabulation table is complemented by qualitative review

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[3] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,30.
[4] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 46.

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of all the case studies as well as a quantitative survey of the researchers, who carried out the research to offer a broad understanding of the effectiveness of CSDP missions and operations.

1.2 Limitations of the study

To ensure validity, this analysis is based on multiple cases and as such does not offer further depth to individual case study analyses, which can be found in the public deliverables. Detailed analysis on pooling and sharing and interoperability can be found in WP6.

The original grant agreement description of this description includes a comparative analysis of interview answers from all three case study working packages. Sharing the original interviews was not possible due to ethical and data protection issues. More specifically, the ethical concerns raised included the potential for identifying even anonymised responses and formulation of original data protection certificates, which did not allow for the circulation of interview data within the consortium. As the interviews conducted were based on trust, the researchers also felt strongly that sharing the interview answers would constitute a breach of that trust regardless of the level of sensitivity used in the processing of the interview data. This sentiment was echoed both in the Project´s Steering Committee and the Ethical Committee, and thus a joint decision was made to focus on the analysed interview findings in the deliverables rather than the original interview material.

Similarly, the Conceptual Framework (Deliverable 1.5) proposed that research material would be coded to ensure robustness of analysis. This coding of research material was found cumbersome in practice and instead, the focus was placed on well-formulated and clearly structured study reports, which form the basis of this deliverable. This decision transferred a greater share of the data analysis to the case study participants than originally envisaged. In terms of research methods, the primary analysis was thus made in the case study reports by the case study researchers. This deliverable is based on a secondary analysis of these case study reports supplemented by a primary quantitative analysis.

There are merits to both approaches of a comparative analysis of the primary material, as well as a comparative analysis of the secondary analysis as here. Although, there would be more breadth of material in primary analysis, the analysis would be much less informed by the expertise and knowledge of the case study participants. The approach selected here balances between the two as it supplements the researchers' analysis with the quantitative survey. However, it should be noted that the findings here do not fulfil strict academic criteria for comparability, where primary data analysis and coding is emphasised. The following analysis is based on juxtapositions and similarities

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rather than strong comparability creating evidence or evaluation of crisis management operations or missions.

The individual case studies may show subjectivity or bias depending on who studied the operation and mission, what kind of access they had, and who they interviewed. Moreover, all case studies are snapshots in time, and results are likely to vary according to when in the mission lifecycle, the cases are studied. To ensure validity, this analysis is based on multiple cases and as such does not offer further depth to individual case study analyses, which can be found in the public deliverables.

In terms of EU policy, the findings analysed here are from the field implementation of policies that were formulated some years ago. The findings would be significantly different if the study focused on short-comings identified by and within Brussels institutions and the policy initiatives made to tackle these short comings. Implicitly, these findings also show that implementation of policy initiatives is both time and resource consuming in complex settings and complex organisational structures. Hence crisis management practice may differ greatly, and lag behind crisis management thinking.

To ensure practicability, these findings will be refined into policy recommendations in D7.1, and later debated in the round table discussions of experts. Refining these results is necessary for applicability as the findings show practice but not whether effectiveness could be improved through creating new policy initiatives or by focusing on implementation of already existing practices.

1.3 Purpose and structure of the deliverable

This comparative review consolidates findings from the IECEU case studies to establish a foundation for further analysis and the consolidation of lessons learned from the different case studies, analyses the results of the quantitative survey, as well as the effectiveness of EU missions.

As experiences of EU missions in different contexts can vary greatly, comparing different contexts and finding unifying themes, will raise more comprehensive understandings, and in turn more practically applicable results, which will be developed further in working package 7.

The review is based on the six capabilities identified in D1.5, which are planning capacity, operational capacity, interoperability, competences, comprehensiveness and technology. Together these six capabilities give an overall view of all capabilities that are in the missions use. Through the case study comparison, the deliverable finds lessons learned and identifies potentials for further discussion in improving effectiveness for EU crisis management.

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The deliverable has 10 body chapters, Ch 2. Is on general findings form the quantitative survey. Ch 3-8. are each focused on one of the six capabilities identified in IECEU. Of the six capabilities, the analysis in the study reports was clearly focused on four. These four were planning capacity, operational capacity, competences and comprehensiveness, which will be explored in more detail. There is a specific chapter (Ch.9) on cross-cutting themes of human rights and gender, and chapter 10. on effectiveness of crisis management missions under study.

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2   GENERAL QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS: GREAT VARIATION

The study reports that the qualitative part of this report is based on are brimming with information, show strengths and weaknesses within the different operations, and in the analysis of the tabulation table clearly identified topics for further study. This further quantitative study is necessary, as although the study reports answer the question "what is important for effectiveness?", they do not show *how* important different capabilities are for effectiveness. To establish significance is especially necessary here as the study reports show great variation in capabilities. The variation is mirrored in the results of the quantitative survey as well. The method for conducting the survey is explained in further detail below as are some general survey results. The survey results are also integrated into discussions of each individual capability.

Figure 5: Distribution of responses by mission/operation

In relation to capabilities, the aim of the survey was twofold. First, to find out how well certain capacities were available for missions through using simple statements and asking the respondents to evaluate whether the statements described the mission under study. Here a scale of 0 to 10 was used, where 0 meant that the statement described the mission very poorly and 10 meant that the statement described the mission very well. The responses to these statement showed whether or not the operation had a well formulated OPLAN, sufficient financial resources, efficient pooling and sharing etc.

Secondly, the survey was structured to find out how significant the capabilities and their extent were for the success of the mission. For this second topic, after each statement, respondents were asked how this contributed to the success of the mission. Here a scale of −5 to +5 was applied. −5 meant that the (non)existence of the capacity hindered the success of the mission greatly, 0 meant that it had no effect on the success of the mission, and +5 that the evaluated capacity contributed to the success of the mission greatly, and positively. In both types of questions, those evaluating how well

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the statements describe the missions/operations and in those evaluating how this has contributed to the success of the mission, the respondents have been offered possibility to answer "I don't know". The "I don't know" answers are simply excluded from the results and calculations. The survey form as a whole can be found in Appendix B.

All responses are consolidated in Figure 6. The respondents (13) are IECEU researchers who carried out the research in the case study research. Each respondent answered the questions on the mission or operation that they had carried the research out on, and thus had extensive insight on. Further details can be found in Appendix C. Two figures are presented for each of the questions measuring the effect on success of different capabilities. As an example of how to read this figure, here, the first statement ("Circumstances and the situation in the receiving country were investigated adequately before planning the mission.") will be examined in more detail. Each bar in the rightmost column of figure 6 shows the average of absolute values of the answers assessing the effect.

In the first statement, the average of absolute values is 2.46. Absolute value is a reasonable way to measure the effect on success in this case; as fig. 7 as the impact of different factors on success varies greatly in different missions. If the average would be calculated based on these original values, the average in this case would be −0.04. Reporting using the average would misleadingly denote that investigation of circumstances in the receiving country had hardly any effect on the success of the mission. Average of absolute values, 2.46, tells that investigation of local circumstances in reality had an effect on the success of the mission although by itself does not show whether this effect was positive or negative.

In most cases, the answers indicate mixed results about the effect of an evaluated capacity; what has in one mission been considered a hindrance for success of the mission has in another mission seen to have contributed to the success. As demonstrated in more detail in Appendix B, there is a statistically significant − and indeed expected − relationship between how the statement has described the mission and how it contributed to the success of the mission. The better the statement described the mission (i.e the closer the answer is to 10), the more often, in general, it is seen as a positive contributor to the success of the mission (answers approaching +5). Conversely,

What has in one mission been considered a hindrance for the success of the mission has in another been seen to contribute to it.

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statements that described the mission poorly were likely to be considered hindrances for the success of the mission. This relationship is not surprising, as the statements have been worded so that if the statement describes the mission well, it is expected to be positive for the mission.

The absolute values indicate the magnitude of the effect but not its direction, which is assessed in the green and orange bars of the middle column. Again looking at the uppermost line, green bar shows how much the level the local circumstances were investigated contributed positively to the success of the mission. In practice, the value is the average of answers where positive contribution was identified. When calculating this average of positive answers (green bar), the negative responses have been included in the calculation as zeros; standing for that they have not affected the success positively. Average of negative answers (orange bar) has been calculated following the same logic, positive answers are included as zeros. Excluding negative responses when calculating the average of positive answers or vice versa would create misleading results; for example, in the hypothetical situation of 6 negative answers with value of −2 and one positive answer with value of +3, the average for negative answers is −2 and for positive +3. Here it would seem that the evaluation was more positive than negative whereas the evaluation was in fact more negative.

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Figure 6: Answers to Analytical Survey, Comparison between Capabilities

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The issues which most affected the success of the missions (fig. 6) have been i) how well (validly, realistically, and clearly) the objectives are defined in the mandate(s), ii) how well the missions have coordinated with other international actors working in the receiving country, iii) how well the missions have coordinated with local actors, iv) whether local circumstances were investigated adequately and v) whether those recruited had adequate knowledge and skills. In terms of contributing to or hindering the success of the mission, most responses were mixed and showed variability between the different case studies. There was wide agreement among the respondents on some statements. Most notably respondents agreed that the number of staff and pooling and sharing (interoperability) were both seen almost solely as hindering the success of the operation/mission. Conversely, well-formulated operation plans were generally seen as contributing to the success of the operation/mission.

There are also notable differences in whether certain issues have affected success positively or negatively. Compared to other statements, the statement about mandate(s) has not described missions well, in other words, the mandate creation hindered the success of the missions

Mandate formation and coordinating well with other international actors were found to be especially important for creating a successful crisis management operation.

considerably. By contrast, the missions have coordinated relatively well with other international actors working in the receiving countries, which contributed significantly to the success of the missions. Mandate creation and coordination with other international actors were also noted in the qualitative findings as central to mission success although there was greater variation in how coordination with international actors was viewed.

Due to the limited number of respondents to the survey, the results should be viewed as indicative rather than definitive. Small differences in fig. 6 certainly fall into the margin of error and should not be given too much importance. Nevertheless, there are some potentially interesting relationships between the different capabilities. It, for example, seems that challenges in creating mandates in a mission, can lead to further challenges in implementing the mandates, and in turn potential surplus in the operational budgets as funding cannot be absorbed. Surpluses in operational capacity may

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point to challenges within planning. Hence inverse relationships between the different capabilities are also possible.

In the graphs for individual capabilities and their overall success (fig. 7) each mission is represented with only one dot per mission or operation. If there are multiple answers from a mission or operation, each mission and operation is represented by the average of answers in the graphs. Missions/operations are excluded from graphs if no other answers are available in addition to "I don't know" creating some variation in the numbers of dots in the different graphs.

Although it was known that there are great differences between operations and missions, as well as within the missions and operations in terms of their capabilities, the extent of unevenness and the profoundness of the variation is surprising. Our original hypothesis was that i) clear clustering into better and worse performers would be evident within the capabilities and that ii) this clustering would be linked to the overall success of the mission/operation. The results of the quantitative survey clearly show that this original hypothesis is incorrect, and although there is some clustering, the clustering is not strong enough to find relationships between certain capabilities and success of a mission/operation. Moreover, interestingly, even those missions/operations that were low-performers in terms of the overall success of the mission and the operation, showed variation in terms of capabilities. For example, the personnel of the low-performing mission/ operation in question may have had notably high level competences.

Similarly interestingly, there was no clear clustering between military operations and civilian missions that would signify clear difference in respective capabilities. In many ways military operations and civilian missions are surprisingly similar at their core although military operations focus more on technologies and interoperability. Here, there is potential for both lessons learned from the military, as future civilian missions are likely to need more developed technologies. There is also potential for further civ-mil cooperation.

In analysing the quantitative survey, it was not possible to identify clear clusters of better/worse performing missions/operations or get a clear sense of which capabilities were stronger or weaker. Rather all missions/operations have both stronger and weaker capabilities, which will be explored in more detail in the following chapters.

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3 EU PLANNING CAPACITY: MOVING PIECES

EU missions and operations never exist in a political vacuum or are created in isolation. Integration, comprehensiveness and coordination all are integral to EU effectiveness but also make planning processes multi-faceted, complex affairs.[5] Planning, especially civilian, EU crisis management missions could well be compared to a puzzle where each piece is constantly moving and reforming its shape. Military operations are aided by NATO planning structures, where "the current planning system based on NATO assets as functional and considered the planning process to take all the necessary factors into account."[6] but are hampered by resource considerations.

> **Definition of Planning Capacity**
>
> Strategic/Operational planning,
> Management, Budgetary constraints,
> Consultation of lessons identified reports,
> Situational Awareness

To establish a mission is a feat of planning but also requires a series of compromises, limitations created by EU structures and national caveats. At best, the planning processes are able to consolidate existing knowledge and result in a solid foundation for operations to follow. At worst, the compromises required for the establishment of a mission/ operation end up with a crisis management operation that no-one really wants, but no-one strongly objects to either. However, once begun, the political investment in the operation and mission is such, that it may be difficult or impossible to end the mission if no pre-planned exit strategy is in place. When there is no clear exit strategy or understanding of an end-state to achieve, the mission or operation suffers.[78]

> "The challenge is that the planning done in Brussels is [often] conducted with limited knowledge about the resources that will be forthcoming for completing the operation…. According to the interviews there were also mismatches between the original version [of the Statement of Requirements in the Operational Plan] drafted by EUAVSEC personnel and the structures in Brussels. The latter obliged several changes which the mission personnel did not agree with in terms of their local experience and knowledge."
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> *D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,22*

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[5] See: D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 23–24.
[6] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 76.
[7] Ibid,145.
[8] Also noteworthy is the potential for discrepancy between short-term CSDP instruments and e.g. the explicitly long-term engagement mandated for EULEX. See: D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 65

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EU crisis management planning processes have evolved, and are much more sophisticated now than before the foundation of the Lisbon treaty, the creation of the EEAS in 2010 and specifically, the establishment of the civilian Planning and Conduct capability (CPCC) under the General Secretariat of the Council, in 2007 with about 60 staff. The CPCC´s role is plan and conduct civilian missions under political control and strategic direction of the PSC, to support the High representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as well as to direct, coordinate, advise, support, supervise and review civilian mission in the areas of police, border assistance management, rule of law and security sector. [9]However, in our study, there is too much variation to conclude that evolved planning mechanisms have resulted in better planning of newer missions/operations in general as the. Although the planning of some newer missions seems to have improved, there are also notable exceptions, especially that of EUBAM Libya (began 2013).

> "The biggest challenges, however, in both the planning and execution were the difficulties to get the regional agents on board in agreeing on joint strategy. The cooperation of the Libyan interlocutors was similarly lacking. According to mission planners, this is where the EU really "got lost". Libya was considered like any other country, even though it had no central structure, or administration that would have been needed to secure any effectiveness and especially sustainability. Interviewees emphasized that this is still (June 2016) the situation, one calling it "an Alice in Wonderland" situation where there are four different governments, clinging to power with whom to talk with."
>
> *D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,188.*

This variation in planning is not surprising as although, additional resources and new structures have changed the way planning is conducted, the complexity at its heart remains. Specifically noted are first, complexity within the EU, especially between the 28 member states, in terms of differing political interests, different investment into crisis management operations, differing mechanisms for making decisions, differing understandings of what success in crisis management is, and divergence of views and variations in political tolerance. The CPCC act as a necessary intermediary between the politics of Brussels and the missions, as well as an important on the political influence for the missions within Brussels. Often for those interviewed, the political wrangling between member states and the limits of decision making in the central EU mechanisms is lost. For many Brussels "becomes a distant abstract easy to blame." [10]

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[9] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 19
[10] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,81.

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Secondly the complex arrangements with other international actors. If, as in Libya, the EU is late to the table, then it will have to follow blueprints created by others and adjust its own operations accordingly. [11] If, however, other international actors are involved in joint-planning early on, and the coordination is well-functioning, there is more potential for effectiveness in the field. For example, "capacity-building and training for the AFBiH, the main area of focus of EUFOR Althea, is organised, planned, and co-ordinated well among EUFOR Althea, NATO, and the AFBiH."[12] Similarly, for EUFOR RCA, significant joint planning on the political levels lead to effectiveness. "The calendars and roadmaps were adjusted such that the activities of EUFOR RCA, the UN, and Sangaris would support rather than conflict with one another."[13]

Finally, conflict areas are in flux and both foreseen and unforeseen changes in the operating environment are likely. Several of the case studies point to the importance of **improving situational awareness** including better mechanisms of gathering and analysing data to use as the basis of planning as well as **coordination with other partners in planning**. According to the survey (see figure 7, Answers to Analytical Survey, Planning Capacity) there was variety in how well the circumstances and situation in the receiving country were investigated before planning the mission. Mostly the investigation were somewhat satisfactory but nowhere were they conducted very well, and in some cases, they were conducted rather poorly.

As important as situational awareness is, gathering accurate, full and timely data from conflict zones both before and during missions is difficult and further limited e.g. by the number of liaison and observations teams or other intelligence collecting capabilities.[14] Even where the data is collected, it may be outdated, incorrect and assumptions about future trends can be based on best guesses. These guesses may be correct but most conflict situations also include unforeseeable black swan-events, which require flexibility and room for manoeuvring from planning. In EUBAM Libya, the situational awareness was reduced to "the daily (security) circumstances, which with varying degrees prevented the mission to operate…""awareness"" was forced [and] reactionary" and had limited contribution to a broader understanding of the situation in Libya.[15]

To best serve political decision-making, situational awareness needs to be both current and give an accurate picture of the political situation on the ground. Ideally, fact-finding continues with a core team on the ground simultaneously with political decision making so strategic and planning

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[11] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,186.
[12] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 112.
[13] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,116–117.
[14] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 74–75 & D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,94.
[15] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371, 179.

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documents can be adjusted if need be as early as possible. [16] In any case, the fact-finding missions should be deployed so that they take place as close to political decision-making as possible. Since complex situations are prone to frequent and wide-ranging changes in their political situation, gaps between fact-finding and the decision-making process, increase possibility of creating mandates that are no longer applicable or relevant.

Coordination with both host country and international partners in planning is also needed to ensure

> *Planning is also about managing stakeholder expectations.*

that the actions of the EU are wanted on the ground, and needed for the purpose. Successful and close joint-planning between the UN, Sangaris and the EU before deployment of EUFOR RCA had a clear positive impact on the operation as a whole.[17] Improved coordination with local agents and fact-finding could have, for example, found that the "Libyan counterpart did not actually want the ""European"" IBM concept (but were more interested in the ""Homeland security"" model by the US)." [18] Similarly, there was a lack of clarity over where EUPOL Afghanistan would fit into the overall picture of 'rule of law' in Afghanistan as there was no plan that EUPOL Afghanistan could nearly fit into. This shortcoming and limited cooperation and coordination between international agents added complication in mission design. [19] Furthermore, choosing crisis management approach i.e. gearing the mission towards civilian policing in a non-conflict environment was considered a debatable choice. As a former mission member points out: "Crisis management is not relevant for Afghanistan. This is a war, not a crisis." [20]

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[16] Ibid,47.
[17] Ibid,116–117.
[18] Ibid,183–184.
[19] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,114–115.
[20] Ibid, 59.

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A core challenge for planning in crisis management is that the situation on the ground used as a basis for planning is seldom the reality that crisis management finds itself in. However, changes in planning, even if generally impacting the crisis management mission favourably, create uncertainty and confusion. Moreover, while those on the field require clarity in planning in order to identify and carry out their tasks, there are political and other interests to not provide that clarity. Far from

Figure 7: Answers to Analytical Survey, Planning Capacity

aiming to complicate mission implementation, overly ambitious mandates[21] which "aim to do everything"[22] may be the result of well-intended pressure for the EU to act broadly to create significant difference in a crisis situation. The mandates are then more designed to show political aspirations than provide a practical blueprint for missions and operations to follow. Often planning processes are balancing acts between the possible and the optimal, and create compromises, which are variable in how well they are able to create a structure for the mission/operation in question.

The following discussion on planning will focus on three main themes: mandate creation and process, lessons learned processes and timeliness and exit strategies, which were all highlighted in the study reports.

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[21] Ibid,47.
[22] Ibid,186.

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3.1 Mandate design vital for effectiveness

Mandates and their design is identified in the quantitative study as being a key limiting factor of tthe overall effectiveness of the mission. Typically, mandates are compromises arising from political negotiations and bartering in a post-conflict situation. Their nature as compromises,[23] however, also place limits on both their implementation and design.

Mandate can be either too broad, too limiting[24], ambitious, or ill fitting in some other way. The objectives may not be considered valid, realistic or clear (see fig. 7). If the mandate is too broad, the mission/operation lacks a clear sense of purpose and there is additional pressure on operational planning and resources. In terms of evaluation, overly broad mandates accompanied with limited resources can lead to assessment for failing to reach targets that were known to be impossible to reach to begin with. Similarly, if mission objectives are not understood and expectations are not realistic, wider disappointment in EU crisis management activities is inevitable. Equally some mandates may be overly limiting as the changing conflict context may provide unforeseen possibilities for creating impact, or resource allocation could be carried out in some other way.

"While the mandate provides essential guidance for planning the everyday activities of the operation it may also become a limitation that prevents operational activities that may seem relevant and necessary in a changing conflict context."

D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,16.

The mission may also outgrow the mandate when the context changes but the mandate stays the same. It may no longer be necessary or even possible to carry out the mandated tasks due to improvements in the local contexts, worsening security situations, changes in the political landscape or activities by other international actors. EUBAM Rafah, for example, "has been able to execute its mandated tasks only to a very limited manner ever since Hamas took over Gaza in 2007, the mission's access to Rafah was blocked and the mission was put on hold. Due to the inaccessibility of Rafah crossing point the mandated tasks have been reinterpreted, and now include training activities taking place in the Jericho training centre in the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority is trying to push for expansion of EUBAM Rafah's mandate to cover all crossing points, and the PA has also formally approached the EU in this matter. The EU Member States are unable to find one

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[23] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 17.
[24] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,74.

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voice in the matter, and accordingly opt for a safe solution to maintain EUBAM Rafah in its current status.[25]

Mandates are often changed to suit changing circumstances. The change may be driven by operational pressures or by political leadership. However, changes in the mandate also lead to confusion as those implementing the mandate may not be aware of the changes, or may not be able to modify their way of operating. In one study, "reasons behind the mission seems not to have fully reached the mission members, who listed many different reasons for the mission, such as the danger facing the uranium mines in Libya, or the specific threats of Boko Haram or Al-Qaida; some of them clearly different than what the mission planners in Brussels said and different from what was achievable with the manpower at use."[26] The more often the mandate is changed, the more difficult it is to articulate what the main purpose of the mission is effectively to all the personnel, and the more need there is for better flow of information and information sharing. These assumptions can also effect emphasis given to different tasks.

When changes in the mandates are extensive, the result is significant change to the operation, which can be difficult to carry out. In some cases, "revision of the mandate has caused significant change and has been really challenging because personnel were mostly selected for a different purpose."[27] These significant changes include the addition of the Rule of Law component into the mandate of EUPOL Afghanistan in 2010[28] and a shift from operations to strategic advising. The staffing profiles and terms of reflected however, do not reflect this shift. Although, "many of the staff have risen to the task and have performed beyond their level", having staff recruited for their tasks would have clearly been preferable.[29]

When the emphasis in Libya was shifted to the tactical elements from the original mission concept for strategic assistance new problems emerged as the mission was built for strategic effectiveness i.e. development of strategic IBM effectiveness rather than grassroots capability building. For, example, practical training needs equipment, which was not resourced for Libya.[30] However, changes in operating also enable the mission to ensure that they make a positive impact even if the overall goal of the mission becomes unreachable. Despite equipment shortages, the practically focused training was welcomed. The cooperation with customs and coast guard units rather than the

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[25] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,17–18.
[26] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,186–187.
[27] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,64–65.
[28] Ibid, 60–61
[29] Ibid, 96.
[30] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,209.

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originally envisioned partner, the military Libyan Border Guard, was clearly successful. [31] Similarly, "there was success in getting the different Libyan regions to connect and share information, something that they had virtually never done before. This can be seen as a clear merit, especially considering the stateless nature of Libya and the very high autonomy between the different regions."[32]

The limits of mandates, of actions taken and not, are sometimes debatable. For example, EULEX is only indirectly involved in Security Sector Reform (SSR), where it could possibly have a more positive role as even the indirect involvement is seen as positive. [33] For EUPOL Afghanistan, the interviewees were overwhelmingly of the opinion that EUPOL "should have focused on one area and done this well, with training the most popular choice." [34] rather than the mandate which included a number of tasks from community policing to policy writing. Similarly, a lack of focus was considered a fault among those interviewed about EUBAM Libya.[35] Overly extensive OPLANs in terms of the size of missions also challenge operational planning.[36]

Mandate design is clearly and inherently challenging. The main potential for enhancing effectiveness of mandate creation is to ensure that strategic planning processes in EU are well resourced. Other potentials include creating mandates around one key priority area that then leaves room for flexibility in operational planning.

3.2 Timeliness and exit strategies

General challenges identified in planning are timeliness, as in doing the right thing at the right time, identification of end points for EU engagements and exit strategies for those end points. Behind each of these challenges are larger questions of the efficacy of EU mechanisms but also of the role and length of CSDP missions in general. The underlying idea has been that crisis management is short-term, and the structures are built on this premise. However, as we see from figure 2, missions and operations are often years or even decades long.

The shorter the time is from the identification of the need for an operation to deployment, the more likely it is that the operations will be able to create a positive difference. Often, in the early planning processes there is both optimism amongst the member states, which for Libya was accompanied

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[31] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 67–68.
[32] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,210.
[33] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 67–68.
[34] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,66.
[35] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,185–186.
[36] Ibid,80.

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"by a rush to get things done and to "get to Tripoli". [37] However, processes are still long, even when EU´s fast-tracking procedures, which simplify operation´s planning in urgent situations is used. In August 2013, the UN Security Council warned that CAR poses a risk to regional stability. [38] On 5th December, the UN Security Council adopted unanimously resolution 2127 authorizing the MISCA and Sangaris operation. The EU followed, more than a month later, by approving the crisis management concept CMC of EUFOR RCA on January 20, 2014, for EUFOR RCA to achieve operational capability in June 15 2014 -- The mission ended its mandate and was closed on the 15 March 2015.[39]

> "Casualty aversion is common in most EU governments in their approach to risk and duty of care. They want to help places like Afghanistan but do not want to put their people in danger, and place caveats based on this [casualty aversion] before a mission deploys."
>
> *D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,71.*

The duration of the missions is often deemed to be too short, especially when a one-year mandated period is used as the basis of planning. Mandates can, and often are renewed, but longer term planning is thwarted when there is no certainty beyond the end-point determined by the mandate. Longer mandates seem especially useful for more technical missions, which require longer engagement to create both sustainability and impact.[40] More strategic activities, such as mentoring and supporting local expertise may also require several years to show impact. [41] The short mandates combined with current lessons learned processes where broader impact is measured may direct mission´s planning towards shorter-term activities like organising trainings, workshops or study trips to member states. However, sustainability and impact of these shorter term activities may also be difficult to achieve and measure if there is no overall structure that the activities fit into.[42]

If the situation on the ground changes, as it often does in complex situations, the EU is often slow, unwilling or unable to react quickly enough. Changes in the security situation are the main reason for the mission to be unable to fulfil its mandate. The security considerations may be severe enough to warrant the evacuation of the operation or mission. Ideally, missions should have coordinated evacuation plans and lines of command already before deployment[43]as well as stock piles of food and supplies if evacuation is needed. [44]

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[37] Ibid, 183–184.
[38] Ibid, 74.
[39] Ibid, 71–72.
[40] Ibid 47.
[41] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,19.
[42] Ibid,19.
[43] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,29.
[44] Ibid,48

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The limits placed by security on movement either outside the base or in certain areas frustrate mission members especially if it is perceived that security threat assessment is overly cautious or not based on the best, most relevant intelligence available (e.g. NATO/RS intelligence network). In severe security situations, civilian missions are no longer able to work autonomously but have to rely on security providers including local security agents, private security companies or other international agents. Private security companies are varied in their performance, which may complicate the mission further. [45] The security situation in Libya due to internal conflict, first forced the mission to fortify itself in its compound and severely limited its operations due to for example, the added complications of organising suitable security for meetings with Libyan beneficiaries. Eventually the mission was evacuated to Tunis and then to Malta.[46]

When political and other considerations are preventing or delaying ending a mission/operation, the personnel can be left in a limbo with little to do and little commitment. After rotating staff between Malta and Libya due to the limited ability of the contracted private security company to guarantee security in a worsening security environment. Some of the staff, who should have not been on a mission with critical status, effectively stayed in Malta and never returned to Libya. One interviewee stated that those on Malta did the absolute minimum, which was ""breakfast, lunch and dinner"". Another interviewee told that the contracts of many should have been terminated, as the work that the people outside Libya were doing was essentially useless. [47]

For most mission members, the potential positive impact of the work done is a main motivator for being removed from their families and their own lives. When that work is impossible, the impact on motivation is immediate. "We've been nowhere in almost three weeks. What's the point of being here? [48] Another interviewee notes "If EUPOL perceives the risk to be such that personnel cannot move easily and if it cannot relocate to a site where movement would be easier, then, it should consider whether its presence in Kabul has any value.""[49]

When there is broad agreement in the EU over a mandate, ending EU involvement due to changing security circumstances is no easy feat, and the non-functional missions exemplified by EUBAM Libya in its latter stages are a possibility. More consideration is needed for those missions and operations that have lost their ability to effectively fulfil their mandate.[50]

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[45] Ibid,184
[46] Ibid, 212–213.
[47] Ibid, 202.
[48] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,70–74.
[49] Ibid, 70–74.
[50] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,198–199.

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Several of the missions under study suffer clearly from a lack of a clear end state for the mission/operation or an exit strategy[51][52] Establishing clear end states for EU engagement structure the missions both explicitly and implicitly; most importantly, however, they give EU personnel a clear understanding of why they have been deployed and what their importance in achieving mission´s objectives.

[51] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 75–76
[52] Ibid, 30.

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3.3 Planning capacity: complexity, strategic leadership and potential

Planning is the corner stone of all CSDP activities. The planning processes are extremely complicated and time-consuming. It takes time to reach political consensus with EU member states.

Textbox 1: Potentials for Improving Effectiveness in Planning

1) Increase resources in planning to ensure on-going planning during the mission life span.

2) Emphasise the importance of mandate design and resource mandate creation accordingly.

3) Consider building mandates around one thematic priority (e.g. policing, judiciary or training) while ensuring there is flexibility for the Mission implementation plan.

4) Ensure on-going, long-term planning support and active engagement though-out the mission lifecycle: timely and flexible decision making, improving situational awareness, being present in early discussions where international intervention is discussed.

5) Standardise templates, reports and feedback, especially MIP template, wherever possible.

6) Set-up early communication on future operational resources to ensure that planned missions have the resources they need.

7) Create a timeframe for crisis management with establishment of clear end state and exit strategies already before a mission/operation is launched. Encourage strategic leadership to deal with changes in circumstances.

8) One pipeline: create a unified planning mechanism for both missions and operations for joint-missions wherever possible.

Planning processes are also time consuming as they include coordination with other international actors and require understanding of the commitment of member states and the resources that the mission or operation will have at its disposal.

There has been increased attention on planning for the last decade or so and several major steps forward have been taken in the planning of civilian missions specifically.[53] This progress was confirmed by interviewees, who noted "that the current planning process produces detailed and co-ordinated plans and orders and that the decision-making process is functional and takes into account all of the factors that need to be considered." [54] These steps were clearly recognised in the case studies. Still, investment in and sufficient resourcing for planning was encouraged by several interviewees.

For further development of integrated missions, integrated planning and budgeting systems are also necessary. If joint planning and budgeting is not feasible, then some development of connecting structures is welcome Without these integration in the planning stage to create synergies, they are

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[53] Ibid, 27.
[54] Ibid, 86.

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destined to be lost from the outset, as they were in EUPM and EUFOR Althea, which were planned in separate 'pipelines'. [55]

Planning is the foundation for all CSDP missions and operations. The sentiment is echoed in the interviews from missions and operations where increasing planning capacity and resources is often mentioned as a way to improve efficiency in the field. There is also a need for on-going planning and on-going development for missions and operations during the mission lifespan, so that changes in the operating context are responded to with expedience but also so that the responses strengthen EUs overall objectives.

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[55] Ibid, 96.

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4 OPERATIONAL CAPACITY: BUILDING FROM SCRATCH

CSDP missions and operations in the host countries are the visible aspect of crisis management, which transform planning into action. Fulfilling mandates requires operational planning, but operations also need structures, leadership, resources, funding, security, materials and personnel.

Definition of Operational Capacity
Mandate fulfilment, Leadership, Mission organisational structures, Mission decision-making process, Mission resources, Mission funding, Culture, Security, and Procurement

Setting up an operation is hugely complex and time-consuming especially if the steps are not, or possibly cannot be due to differences in size, context and purpose, standardized.

It may take over a year for an operation to become fully functional, which is a significant amount of time, especially if EU support is urgently needed. [56] The more urgent the situation, the more likely it is that security considerations further complicate the mission through requiring re-enforced compounds, additional procurement, requirements for using added support when meeting locals or additional equipment. The EU takes it responsibility to protect its personnel seriously, and depending on the viewpoint potentially too seriously in comparison to other international organisations. [57]

Some interviewees called for the creation of a "start up kit" including all necessities for that particular kind of mission including both competences [58] e.g. civil engineering and equipment like armoured cars, a small number of laptops and secure communications. Also called for in the interviews was a common and standardized structure for an EU mission. However, although standardisation may remove some challenges, it certainly does not solve others. Military operations like EUFOR RCA, follow standardised procedures for code of conduct, structures and execution [59] but there were still deficiencies in "intelligence capabilities, troops, equipment, language skills, information- or intelligence sharing within the force, funds for the CIMIC component, training, and leadership." [60]

The beginning of the operation/mission paves the wave for on-going changes in the operation's mandate, tasks and personnel, which require leadership and flexibility from the operation. Operations are also tackling challenges caused by lack of support from member states for crisis management especially in terms of personnel and staff shortages. However, much of this decision-making takes

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[56] D3.5. The Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Libya and Central African Republic, IECEU, 653371, 62.
[57] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,205–206
[58] Ibid, 211.
[59] Ibid, 83.
[60] Ibid,56.

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place in Brussels, leaving little, and possibly too little autonomy in implementation of projects in the field. [61]

Differences in national cultures and work cultures are visible in both operations and missions, although operations also have to contend with more extensive national caveats and national agendas. [62] The unified command of EUFOR RCA of nationally controlled armed forces creating a single multinational command chain lead to both challenges of integration and simultaneous differing unofficial communications from home country. [63] Creating and strengthening a common operation culture [64] with clear, shared working definitions of EU best practices [65] helps different parts of the same operation work together.

Figure 8: Answers to Analytical Survey, Operational Capacity (part A)

The post-2012 mission structure, which divides the missions into two basic functions, executive and strengthening, is considered better at addressing

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[61] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,71.
[62] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,88.
[63] Ibid, 83–84.
[64] Ibid, 103–104.
[65] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 40–41.

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the needs of the mission. However, there are still challenges in, for example, transforming OPLAN goals into clear MIP objectives. [66]

As the operational capacity encompasses all the main functions on the operation/mandate, many of the findings from other capacities should be discussed here. Similarly, the discussions on each of the aspects of operational capacity are broad and worthy of deeper investigation. Here the discussion is guided by our findings in the study reports, which highlighted problems with understaffing, questions of misconduct with staff, and creating feedback for planning.

Figure 9: Answers to the analytical survey, Operational Capacity (part B)

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[66] Ibid, 66–67.

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
4.1 Staffing

In general CSDP missions and operations are blighted by understaffing, which clearly impacts effectiveness. The extent of impact, however, varies greatly from no impact to being a clear hindrance to the effectiveness depending not just on the quantity of staff but also on their expertise, the centrality of that expertise for the mission or operation, and the extent of changes in the number of staff requiring re-planning and re-tasking. Understaffing or staffing that is unaligned with mandated goals or the mission´s current needs are common.

The problem of understaffing is most clearly felt in military operations, especially military, as participating nations are becoming less able or willing to make new contributions or maintain their current contributions.[67] but is also clearly evident in civilian missions. At the time of writing, for example, EUFOR Althea was two battalions short, which was considered serious or even critical

Figure 10: Personnel and personnel approved in OPLAN 2014–2016

Notes: Both seconded and contracted personnel are included in the figures, both local and international personnel are included in the figures.
* For EUBAM Libya the number of local contracted personnel was missing for 30.6.2014. For this reason the date has been left out from the figure.

Source of data:
Personnel Figures of the Civilian CSDP Missions as of 28.2.2014; Personnel Figures of the Civilian CSDP Missions as of 30.4.2013. etc.

challenge if the security situation in BiH were to deteriorate. The operation has also been

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[67] Ibid, 100.

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restructured and is now much smaller resulting in limited visibility and presence throughout BiH.[68] Similarly, despite wide support for EUPOL DRC, it was difficult to entice troop deployment from members. When troops were deployed, they were often done with national caveats and other limitations for their use.[69]

Civilian missions are also understaffed both in numbers but especially in terms of expertise, where certain departments or certain types of expertise is lacking.[70] From October 2014 to October 2016 the total number of personnel in all ongoing civil missions was on average 81% of the total number of personnel approved in the OPLANs of the same missions. More precisely the percentage varied between 73% and 88%. The percentages ranged from missions with only 73% of OPLAN staff numbers to those with 88%. In case of changes, the lack of regular personnel is also reflected in lack of sufficient reserves. If more personnel is needed, it is unlikely to be available.

The number of staff is in constant flux but typically grows in the early years of the mission and then starts to decrease as the mission comes closer to its close. The number of locally contracted contracts also often increases as the mission is coming to its close (see fig.11).

The number of personnel, however, does not give an understanding of the composition of staff, which changes during the mission lifecycle both in terms of numbers, the kind of personnel employed and the type of contract they are on. Figure 12. presents the number of personnel in 2014, the only year when all these ten missions under study have been in operation in the same year (due to data availability the figures for EUFOR Althea are for 2015 and for EUVASEC South Sudan for 2013). Clearly apparent are the differences in mission size, and the differences in mission composition, which varies widely from those where

Figure 11: Number of Personnel and the Mission Life Cycle, EUPOL Afghanistan 2008-2016

local contracts are favoured, like in EULEX to those where finding local contracted personnel seem to have been very difficult (EUBAM Libya). Military operations under study – EUFOR Althea and

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
[68] Ibid, 89–92.
[69] D3.5. The Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Libya and Central African Republic, IECEU, 653371, 58.
[70] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 148.

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EUFOR RCA – have had a relatively large contributions from states outside EU. Similarly, there are large differences in the number of local staff, where civilian missions almost always have a small or significant part of personnel which is local, military operations on the other hand rarely take local staff.[71]

Often locally contracted staff are important bridge builders, and help open up communication channels. [72] There may also be possibilities of using local staff more creatively, by for example exploring the "National Liaison Officer"-model, where locally contracted staff could act as liaison officers in government offices or as legal experts, thereby supporting the creation of more local capabilities in the longer term. [73] For some locally contracted members, employment with the EU can have a lasting impact on their life in the local context. As a national mission member points out: "All Afghans who work for internationals are under threat. EUPOL need to know this. It is not good enough that they come here, use us and then leave without offering an opportunity for citizenship in Europe or political asylum." [74]

Changes within staffing levels can be dramatic. EUFOR Althea in turn had a staff of 7 000 in its highest while it now has a personnel of roughly 400. Even with the fluctuation of personnel numbers over time, there are notable size differences, EUFOR Althea peaked at 7000 personnel whereas EUBAM Libya had 57 at its peak.[75].

The need for different kinds of staff also changes during the mission life cycle. Some at EUPOL COPPS suggested that the mission should work towards cutting the number of international staff members. In the model suggestion, the mission would have a core-team of long-term experts complemented by short-term experts. This model would be more cost-effective as in terms of numbers, most personnel would be short-term visiting experts.[76] An early deployment of the head of Mission support was recommended from EUAVSEC but an overall focus on operational roles. [77] In general it seems that it is more difficult to find sufficient operational staff, whereas support staff roles are easier to fill.

Missions and operations have difficulties finding and recruiting experts including senior level IBM experts, cyber security experts, legal advisors, judges, prosecutors and human intelligence. [78]

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[71] EUISS Yearbook of European Security 2016: 60, 63
[72] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371, 203.
[73] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,84,
[74] Ibid,74.
[75] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371, 193.
[76] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,34–35.
[77] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371, 27.
[78] Ibid,201–204. D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 146 &148.

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Positions of expertise, however, also require corresponding ability to absorb that expertise, which was limited in both Libya and South Sudan.[79] Interestingly, when certain activities or expertise in the mission is earmarked for certain nationalities, this earmarking is generally approved. In Libya, the mission members unanimously felt that the expertise and local knowledge that the Maltese and the Italians brought to the mission was very valuable[80] and their earmarked positions were not questions.

Staffing is further complicated by short rotations, which in most cases was not considered suitable for the missions and operation. These short rotations are often only 6 months to 1 year, with limited opportunity for contract renewal. Deducting annual leaves, sick leaves and training, a 1 year rotation, becomes an effective deployment of 6-7 months. A more reasonable length for a rotation was considered to be 2-3 years.S

The negative impact short rotations on operational capacities and efficiency of the mission is especially noticeable in strategic positions where strategic level continuity, long-term guidance and leadership is required. In these positions up to a year is needed for

No data from EUFOR ALTHEA, EUSEC RD Congo, and EUFOR RCA.

Source of data:
EUVASEC South Sudan: Personnel Figures of the Civilian CSDP Missions as of 30.6.2013.
Other missions: Personnel Figures of the Civilian CSDP Missions as of 30.8.2014.

Figure 12: Number and Type of Personnel Approved in the OPLAN vs. Number of Staff in the Mission

personnel "to ´get into´ the system, the country, and to acquire the necessary knowledge on local issues in order to operate effectively. It also takes time to establish trustworthy relationship with local counterparts in order to be able to conduct, for example, effective bilateral meetings and

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[79] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,191.
[80] Ibid,203.

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negotiations. [81] For all positions, the short rotation effects institutional memory, continuity, and creation of a unified operational culture as well as the possibility of developing skills in the missions.[82]

The constant staffing flux that missions and operations are in, changing circumstances a nd different pressures for staffing make finding the right personnel, in the right numbers and in the right mix[83] extremely challenging. This puzzle is seldom perfect, and finding more personnel to ease the chronic shortages would certainly impact the effectiveness of missions and operations positively.

4.1.1. MISCONDUCT OF STAFF

In general, EU missions and operations have suitable mechanisms to deal with cases of misconducts and the extent of misconduct is on an expectable level. Nevertheless, the issue remains especially relevant as the EU acts in fragile contexts with vulnerable populations where impunity is a possibility, and individual misconduct reflects badly on the entire operation/mission. Although most deployed EU staff is motivated and experienced, there are also exceptions requiring adherence to a clear codes of conduct. As misconduct is both a source of ineffectiveness and a liability in terms of legitimacy, it is worth noting here too, especially in terms of disincentives for reporting or dealing with misconduct. In general, there are four key concerns in terms of misconducts: i) inexperienced or unsuitable staff, which is more likely to need clear codes of conducts ii) underreporting of misconduct iii) incentives for non-reporting by leadership iv) difficulties in removing staff members if concerns arise.

Member states do not necessarily their best staff to operations even though demanding operation environments would require experienced personnel. [84] Variable recruitment processes and differing standards for those seconded drain resources from mission leadership, who have the added responsibility of dealing with inappropriate behaviour. Some issues are mitigatable or preventable through training, communication, operational culture and a clear code of conduct, but if a member of staff is sufficiently unmotivated or even has a criminal record in their home country, mission leadership is severely limited in its possibility to correct the situation in the field. Moreover, dealing with the misconducts is resource intense and often fraught with potential, political, pitfalls for mission leadership.

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[81] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 38–39, 87 & 146.
[82] Ibid, 81.
[83] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,56.
[84] Ibid,102.

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Misconduct may be, and is, underreported as those reporting may not want to be viewed unfavourably. We found no evidence that reporters would actually be treated unfavourably, but currently, even if protocol is strictly followed, there may be an impression of favouritism based on nationality. It is very difficult to show equal, unbiased, objective treatment when decisions are made by one person. It seems this fear of being treated unfavourably or of losing favour within the mission or at home is based mostly on personal impressions of incentives rather than anything concrete within the mission structures.

There are a number of incentives for national commanders especially but to mission leadership in general to minimise, ignore or cover-up misconducts by staff under their command for risk of losing face, losing power or attracting criticism from the home state. Moreover, there are very few mechanisms to report misconduct by commanders, although any misconduct by commanders is likely to have wider detrimental effect.

However, the misconduct of any nation has the potential of affecting the legitimacy of the operation as a whole since few locals or counterparts understand differences between national practices, but see the EU flag. The potential for national or other favouritism in cases of misconduct could be rectified by creating *a **direct channel of communication*** where national commanders cannot act as bottlenecks as other EU personnel would also be automatically involved.[85] Similarly, it should be possible also to report misconduct by commanders or other leadership.[86] Wherever possible, other obstacles should be minimised to encourage reporting.

The missions and operations seem to vary greatly in terms of sending ill-qualified personnel home. Some operations/missions sent those who did not meet the standards home "without delay"[87] while other operations and missions seem to retain unsuitable staff for a number of reasons, including perhaps most importantly, maintaining positions and headcount. The concern that sending someone home will impact the resources of the operation/mission negatively, and thus retaining someone ill-suitable whilst hoping that they leave on their own accord, seems to be one mechanism of dealing with misconducts. However, there are also structural impediments to changing staff in case of misconducts. Strengthening the understanding that dealing effectively with misconducts does not lead to further negative consequences may be conducive for further reporting.

Specifically concerning are grey and complex areas of misconduct, including alcohol use and transactional sex, which can lead to security concerns and questions of legitimacy. Cultural

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[85] Ibid,108–109.
[86] Ibid,84.
[87] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,36.

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differences within the European member states also impact behaviour in these grey areas and make navigation between personal freedom and acceptable behaviour on mission, more difficult to navigate. Alcohol consumption and partying (including loud music) raised issues of cultural awareness, especially in Muslim countries, where seeing inebriated EU-personnel could cause embarrassment. Timing of parties (e.g. that they were regularly on an evening before a free day) also caused security concerns, as they provided opportunities for attack. [88] Similarly, the boundaries between transactional sex and relationships between locals may be blurred.

Strong common procedures for the EU are conducive to preventing subjective interpretations, and enable the creation of set-standards in practice. The stronger the EU ownership of the process of dealing with misconducts, the fewer potentials there are for national exceptionalism, and the more effective and legitimate the crisis management operation will be. The question of how best to deal with misconducts will remain

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Textbox 2: Potentials for Dealing with Misconducts

1) Create a channel to the ground, so there are no national bottlenecks in the reporting of misconducts.
2) Deincentivise non-reporting
3) Strengthen unified mechanisms of dealing with misconducts
4) Ensure there is an anonymous mechanism for reporting available also to non-EU actors including locals.
5) Ensure that personnel can be removed from their posts without negative consequences to the mission, if need be.
6) Consider external evaluations.

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a central concern in crisis management as the combination of weak local structures, being removed from limitations placed on behaviour at "home" and complex arrangements, make misconduct easier. The disincentives for reporting, also on a local level, mean that misconduct can fester and go on for longer, while being especially detrimental to the legitimacy of the EU operation and its morale. Further development is also needed for stronger mechanisms to deal with local concerns (e.g. corruption buttons) as these would enhance EU´s legitimacy further.

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[88] Ibid, 76–77.

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4.2 Budget and financial resources

For most missions and operations (see fig. 8) financial resources are considered sufficient although rigidity of financial instruments may limit effectiveness. Finite financial resources always place limits on what is possible in a crisis management operation, especially for high-cost military operations, but typically these limits can be anticipated in the planning process and impact CSDP overall more than individual missions and operations.

The pressure created by budget limitations and changes, seem to overall be dealt with quite effectively in Brussels where diminishing contributions from member states complicate planning. For military operations, the potentially high costs of crisis management, potential for casualties but also bilateral contributions, is a clear disincentive for member states to contribute[89] leading to fewer EU member states to second personnel. [90] The contributions provided by member states are instrumental in funding any crisis management operation or mission.[91] Often, in comparative terms, the EU financial contributions were modest, in Afghanistan less than 10% of the overall effort. [92] However, the key consideration in terms of financial resources, were restrictions on the way that the budget could be used, which in turn lead to inability to use source locally loss of effectiveness, and complication.

In the flexibility of financial mechanisms there is a clear difference between the more rigid rules for the military, and the more flexible arrangement that are possible in civilian missions. For the military, "inflexible financial mechanism has been identified as one of the main shortfall of the CSDP military engagement in general, yet progress in solving the challenge has not been made."[93] The inflexible financial mechanisms limit the potential of operations to carry out tasks or to take on new tasks that would positively impact effectiveness of the mission/operation such as the short reconstruction projects.[94]

Whereas, in South Sudan, resources were saved by renting a hotel for use as mission headquarters. Here "the Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI) was considered as a very flexible and adaptive instrument.

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[89] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,88–89.
[90] Ibid,25.
[91] Note: Crisis management financing comes from two sources; either directly from the EU or from the member states. See more: D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 24.& D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,25.
[92] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,56 & 88..
[93] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,82–83.
[94] Ibid,89–90.

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The FPI contributed strongly to the mission's ability to adapt to changes in the conditions on the ground and to act in a flexible and speedy manner. "[95]

Financial resources and effectiveness are often inversely related. In other words, the more effective the crisis management operation is, the more likely it is that the financing becomes a limiting factor and the more pressure there is from the operation to have more funding. When the operation is unable to

> "From the perspective of the mission personnel, the budget was overly restrictive. Very few items could be acquired locally as there was no provision within the budget specifications for variation of technical specifications. According to the opinion of senior staff member of EUAVSEC, the specifications should have been more generic and less constraining taking into account that the mission was deployed in an underdeveloped nation where a higher degree of flexibility would have been needed."
>
> *D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,25–26*

perform its tasks effectively, it is typically also unable to use the financing given to it. In the spring 2015, for example, the EEAS estimated that EUBAM Libya would be able to use a maximum of 30% of the means allocated to it.[96] For military operations, like EUFOR Althea, success depends largely on the resources available for the execution of given tasks determined in the Operation Plan (OPLAN).

In general "Budgets must be realistic and applicable in underdeveloped countries." [97] Increased flexibility in funding mechanisms and budget specifications would also allow the EU to have more potential in contributing to the local, legal economy and thus promote conflict prevention further.

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[95] Ibid,26.
[96] Ibid, 193.
[97] Ibid,48.

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4.3 Creating feedback from missions for planning: Communication lessons learned processes

Within the operation/mission, communication is especially limited by diverging national practices and limits to information sharing, where one EU nationality may e.g. have more access to intelligence and former documents than other.

A general view is that communication between Brussels and the field could be enhanced. As one interview summed up ""In the field, we often don't understand what's going on in Brussels and vice versa."" [98] The main challenge lies in improving existing formal mechanisms as "unofficial communications between certain individuals in the mission and Brussels, which was considered very negative in terms of the cohesion of the mission. [99] This sentiment is echoed by the survey where the communication and flow of information between "Brussels" and the mission was mediocre in most missions/operations. Dysfunction in communication between the field and Brussels, however, was only seen as having limited impact on the effectiveness of the mission in general, but in specific instances effectiveness was clearly impacted by lack of clear communication.

> "There is a gap between strategy and implementation. Reporting is a cottage industry that keeps people in jobs. The more idle we are, the more creative the reporting becomes."
>
> *D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,66.*

Enhancing understanding seems to specifically require visits by Brussels to the field, which are well-received even if their impact on incorporating local perspectives into planning is limited. [100] For example, "the Op Cdr pays regular visits to EUFOR Althea, thereby enabling face-to-face contact among the commanders, supporting COM EUFOR Althea's leadership, and giving him direct guidance from strategic/operational level. This also supports the Op Cdr's situational awareness and understanding of the current situation at field level. [101]

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[98] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 75–76
[99] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,82.
[100] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 81–82.
[101] Ibid, 86.

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Figures 13 and 14 show both an ideal feedback loop and the challenges identified based on a very typical planning-monitoring-evaluation cycle used widely in results based management, which is not currently applied to crisis management. However, the cycle shows the weaknesses identified in the crisis management lessons learned, where reporting is extensive but there are underlying questions of the quality of reporting, its usefulness in planning processes, its impact on EU policies and on the crisis management missions and operations.

Figure 13: Ideal feedback loop

So-called "creative reporting" may be quite common. According to one interview: "Creative reporting has to change. It gives a false picture. The SPAR has not worked well on this. If a member puts in a report with little in it that falls below achieving their tasks SPAR change it to a point that it is unrecognisable. This is then sent to Brussels. It seems Brussels does not want to hear bad news and the mission does not want to give it. All the emphasis is on needing to show successes. Because the political will in Afghanistan is to leave, the motivation in reporting is to show we are achieving. But in another EU mission I was on, it was the opposite. The political will was to stay, so the reporting showed we were underachieving. There are different energies and motivations to deal with different truths." [102]

The information and experiences from the field may not be passed forward within the chain of command or reach those doing planning in Brussels, [103] but even when feedback does reach the higher levels, it is seldom incorporated into the planning. Internal feedback procedures are viewed as ineffective, especially when the feedback is not seen as resulting in changes or improvements in the operation in a timely fashion (i.e. between 12 and 18 months, the expected duration for operational changes).[104]). Specifically, several interviews pointed to how little impact field reporting seemed to have on strategic planning of the mission. "The management of the mission was never happy with the feedback from Brussels. Brussels overlook the reports from the mission" [105].

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[102] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,66.
[103] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 27–28.
[104] Ibid, 37–38.
[105] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,199.

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Operational success especially at the fringes in the provinces seem to be a blind spot for Brussels due to reporting mechanisms that do not note exceptional innovation. The top-down structures may also stifle innovative tactically driven initiatives.[106]

Of special concern are new security challenges that may not have existed at all or at least to the same extent when the mission/operation was in place. In Kosovo, these security challenges include, for example, the threat of foreign fighters (jihadists) and home-grown terrorists.[107] Similarly, it was

Figure 14: Challenges identified in practice in the ideal feedback loop

1). D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,: 45 &198.D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,71. 2) D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371,76; D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,81 3) D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371,66; D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,72 4) D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371,91; D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371: 84 & 94. 5) D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371: 81–82 6) D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,66 7) D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 28. 8) D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 27–28; D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371: 201. 9) D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371,38; D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,29 & 80. 10) D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371,75–76; D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,: 73–78; D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,81.

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[106] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,115.
[107] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 37–38.

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felt by some in Libya that "The Brussels end did not understand the severity of the matter when things started to go bad. Matters were not dealt with then. There were political encouragements to stay put when the security situation had already worsened" [108] - One mission member said that during those occasions the staff wondered "why do we have a mission leadership, if all the decisions are made in Brussels" [109]. External pressure from Brussels or member states was also seen as impacting the decision making in the mission "Sometimes decision was taken and changed the next day because of pressure."[110]. The political guidance or member states' 'approval' linked to national interests/agendas extended to lengthening or adjusting the mission, nominating reserves, or amending the operational plan. [111]

Limits to access placed on key mission documents by classification can limit access even to some staff in the mission. "The need-to-know basis of sharing information implies that individual employees have a limited perspective over the broader strategy of the mission and are focusing primarily just on their specific field. However, there has been some improvement noted in relation to the clarity of the specific EULEX executive and MMA objectives after 2012, when the reconfiguration of the mission took place." [112] Information and intelligence sharing, in general, is complicated both by national caveats, problems of communication between nationalities [113] and an unwillingness to share [114] although there are also differences of opinion as to what is "intelligence" and what is "information" and therefore shareable without caveats.[115]

There is clear development in both planning and lessons learned processes, which now routinely collect material from the missions. The reporting mechanisms are also largely in place. However, there are three areas where there is room for improvement. First, the overall quality of reporting from the field is questionable and creates a poor basis on which to build a lessons learned process. The effort into creating more standardised and quantifiable mechanisms that mitigate potential of false reporting are welcome.

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[108] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,198.
[109] Ibid, 213–214.
[110] Ibid,199.
[111] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 86.
[112] Ibid, 66.
[113] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,120.
[114] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 91–92.
[115] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,94.   -

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> The biggest internal factors affecting the operational effectiveness of the mission in Afghanistan was, a top-down structure remotely controlled by Brussels, short strategy, small budget, shifting mandate, small size and short deployments. There was no continuity with people or the approach.
>
> *D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371, 89.*

Second the implementation of lessons learned should be strengthened.[116] as otherwise there is a danger that the same lessons are repeatedly not learned.[117] Follow-up and study of longer trends within lessons learned processes (e.g. from the beginning of mission, five years), so even when some lessons learned are too complicated or difficult to implement, their existence is recognized and there is no need for processes of renewed discovery of old concerns.

Third, the availability of lessons learned documents as well as other operational documents should be strengthened within the operations. In EUPOL DRC, lessons learner documents were not available to the project planners and implementers on the ground making planning and especially learning from results of lesson learning processes impossible.[118] Access to older lessons learned documents should be available to those conducting mission planning in order to consider longer trends and potentials for mission development.

4.4 Operational capacity: creating unified EU crisis management culture

Operational capacity is limited by shortage of staff, short rotations and changes in planning. In sometimes extremely challenging situations, all CSDP operations and missions create a functioning entities by piecing together staff, contingents, materials etc, which is no small feat. There are evident weaknesses, but also successes in creativity, innovation and good working environments.

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[116] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and   BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 145.
[117] Ibid,47
[118] Ibid, 64.

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Increased flexibility for operations and missions in terms of planning and budgets, creates further potentials. However, at the same time, the ability of missions and operations to deal with low-performing staff effectively should be strengthened. Wherever possible, the focus should be on strengthening the ability of missions and operations to focus on their key tasks.

There is much on-going development of CSDP missions and operations, which is creating new and exciting potentials in a changed security environment and with renewed interest in cost-effectiveness. This focus on development is welcome to ensure that operations and missions are able to use their capacities effectively also in changing circumstances.

Textbox 3: Potentials for Operational Capacity

1) Set-up a start-up kit that has all main components for setting up a mission and operation to expedite getting the mission/operation fully functional

2) Strengthen the role of operational planning to take advantage of local possibilities

3) Aim to increase rotation length where possible.

4) Encourage creation of simple templates and easily usable standards where possible

5) Encourage the creation of a joint mission/ operation culture

6) Focus on staffing, and member state contributions

7) Create a channel to the ground, so there are no national bottlenecks in the reporting of misconducts.

8) Deincentivise non-reporting

9) Strengthen unified mechanisms of dealing with misconducts

10) Ensure there is an anonymous mechanism for reporting available also to non-EU actors including locals.

11) Ensure that personnel can be removed from their posts without negative consequences to the mission, if need be.

12) Consider on-going external evaluation processes for missions and operations to encourage learning.

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5 TECHNOLOGIES

In general, technologies, especially in military operations, are sufficient and available[119]. with the identified exceptions of armed vehicles secure communications (especially to Brussels) and joint IT

Definition of Technology
Technological resources at disposal, EDA priorities, housing, equipment (information technology and other equipment).

databases and programs. These findings are supported by the analytical survey results (see figure 15). Perceptions of the suitability of technology was correlated with when in the mission life-cycle those interviewed had been present. Those who were deployed in the beginning of the mission were more likely to experience short-comings in technology[120], delays of up to 6-9 months in the arrival of

crucial technology[121], and to be dissatisfied with the procurement system.

The challenges related to technology stem from four sources. First, **software development in CSDP is needed** [122], meaning that missions/ individuals create their own solutions, which is both time-consuming but also creates vulnerable solutions, where basic updating, data management and sharing, and cyber security are not stream-lined. There were great hopes that the development of

Figure 15: Answers to Analytical Survey: Technologies

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[119] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 150; D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 110; D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 150; D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,40.
[120] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,218.
[121] Ibid,126.
[122] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,40.

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an integrated management system would be expedited. [123] An integrated management system would be especially beneficial for mission support units but would also benefit other activities including training, public information, human rights and gender mainstreaming. The perception on the field was that there was a lack of effort and interest in the CPCC to develop a CSDP-wide integrated management system as despite several years of process, no significant progress had been made nor was it known when such a system would be functioning properly to create a living archive of missions and operations. [124]

Second, **technical solutions may require additional training and understanding** which may be provided but often is not, making people gravitate towards programs and solutions that they personally are familiar with. Thus even the best technical solutions may be limited by the lack of personnel who are able to use the technology competently.

When the EU is involved in enhancing the local technological skill-sets a technological needs assessment would offer understanding of the kind of technology needed in the host country.The more complex systems in Kosovo would benefit from integration with international systems such as those of INTERPOL and EUROPOL.[125] Any more advanced IT systems including data bases for information management, however, need to be accompanied with tailor-made training for both EULEX and local staff to ensure maximum usability. [126] The cost of implementing local and national database systems is too high in EUPOL. In general, in Congo, there seemed to "to have been "a discrepancy between the ambitions and goals of the projects and the reality and magnitude of the problem at hand." [127]

> EUFOR Althea's Airborne Ground Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AGSR) system enables real-time information gathering and advanced warning from remote areas which are not covered for example by the LOT houses or getting information from the ongoing hot spots
>
> *D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 150.*

Third, **procuring needed technologies is complicated** by difficulties in the EU procurement and logistics system including an ill-defined logistics planning cycle, [128] lack of a well-functioning warehouse concept and budgetary constraints. The problems in procuring of needed technologies

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[123] Ibid, 6.
[124] Ibid,40–41.
[125] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 150.
[126] Ibid, 69–70
[127] D3.5. The Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Libya and Central African Republic, 2017, IECEU, 653371, 65.
[128] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 70.

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are especially evident early in the mission lifecycle, with specialist equipment like armoured cars, [129] and within some military operations.

 A critical issue for EUAVSEC was technological capabilities as everything needed to be supplied for the mission to run properly. There were serious issues with logistics and procurement that caused long delays, and when equipment arrived it was either insufficient in number or somehow lacking otherwise. In short: "The IT equipment, personal protection gear and motor vehicles were generally perceived as a disaster. There was a lack of radios, satellite phones, etc. In the opinion of leading mission staff, this was a procurement and logistics issue which was handled from the beginning in Brussels." [130] EUFOR RCA had a deficit in intelligence capabilities provided by drones or helicopters, as no participating states wanted to provide the equipment, which is both expensive and demanding on logistics. This deficit could be somewhat filled through cooperation with Sangaris and the UN, but having better intelligence capabilities of its own would have enhanced the operation.[131]

Mission personnel criticized that the SIAC (Single Intelligence Analysis Capability) requirements were quite impractical and unnecessary compared with the application of practical security measures by other organization on the ground, such as the UN, the EU Delegation and other member states as well as NGOs. As a concrete example the need of having the personal set of body armour was mentioned, which was considered a must, however, the body armour and helmets were delivered about seven months after the mission had already been deployed. [132]

Some interviewees suggested a *"start-up" kit of both technologies and competences*.[133] In "EU should provide electricity to start with. At least we would need the basic tools to start with." "When I arrived the mission had no computers."[134] There are differences in the experiences of seconded and contracted personnel, with those seconded usually being better equipped especially in the early stages of the operation. In contrast, in South Sudan, contracted staff had to wait some nine months arrived with their own personal protection equipment.[135]

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[129] Ibid, 112.
[130] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,32.
[131] Ibid, 126.
[132] Ibid, 23.
[133] Ibid, 211.
[134] Ibid, 207.
[135] Ibid, 31

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Challenges of procurement of technologies extends to training provided by missions and operations requiring specific equipment. Equipment for training in EUBAM Libya was provided mainly by mission members, who brought the equipment with them rather than being sourced from the EU. [136] Train& Equip schemes are often hampered by lack of EU funding for the equipment or knowledge of the current equipment by the EU. In Equipment for the training of locals was sometimes lacking or was provided by mission members, who brought equipment with them rather than from inside the EU.[137]

For some globally ubiquitous technologies, like basic IT equipment, local procurement is likely to be more efficient than using the warehouse concept. [138] Using local providers could also ensure timeliness of technologies and strengthen the state-building functions of missions and operations.

Finally, **secure communications was a challenge for several of the missions and operations** under study. The lack of reliable secure communication equipment and channels is keenly felt especially in remote and underdeveloped areas,[139] where crucial information is lost or not available due to short-comings in communication systems. Before secure communications are available, the communication is online, sometimes, especially in the beginning of missions, through personal computers in public wifi hotspots like coffee shops in hotels. Depending on the mission, it may take months to establish secure information sharing and communication systems and source basic IT equipment.[140]

> **Textbox 4: Potentials for Technology**
>
> 1. Develop common IT technologies for CSDP missions and operations to enhance effectiveness and interoperability.
> 2. Link development of technologies both to CSDP mission/operation needs but also to the needs identified in host country.
> 3. Tailor training to the technology in use or provide new technology in the training (train&equip).
> 4. Consider creating set standards for local procurement of technology.
> 5. Create a "start-up kit" to shorten procurement processes in the beginning of missions/operations
> 6. Provide secure communications from the beginning of deployment

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[136] Ibid, 193–194.
[137] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 150.
[138] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,207.
[139] Ibid, 48 &115.
[140] Ibid, 126.

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6 INTEROPERABILITY

Interoperability is the least developed of the six capabilities in the study reports and in the analytical survey. The concept itself, and its applicability to CSDP mission seems to lack exploration. In the quantitative survey, interoperability is considered as having the least positive impact currently on effectiveness. As such the discussion here will be brief. However, the potentials of interoperability have been also specifically investigated in D6.3 Review of the Interoperability of Resources in CSDP and Crisis Management as well as other deliverables from Working Package 6. A more in-depth understanding is provided there.

Interoperability is a well-developed concept in the military, where especially technical interoperability is investigated broadly. The core of this type of technical interoperability within EU crisis management is NATO driven and uses NATO standards. Although using NATO standards has enhanced interoperability within the militaries, it has also removed incentives the development of interoperability in civ-mil or civ-civ cooperation.

> **Definition of Interoperability**[1]
>
> Cooperation/Collaboration, Coordination, Civ-Mil/Civ-Civ/Mil-Mil synergies, pooling and sharing.
>
> A more detailed definition used in WP6: "The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together."
>
> *Council of the European Union. 26.10.2001.Note from Presidency to Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management on Standardisation and Interoperability.13307/01, 1.*

At its core interoperability creates shared standards and tools that make cooperation and pooling and sharing possible. This kind of standard setting is possible within the civilian context but also in civ-mil cooperation. Interoperability is seldom limited by shortfalls in technology or skills, but rather by national caveats and the lack of a mind-set to encourage interoperability. [141]

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[141] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 147.

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Interoperability in military operations, although technically possible may, as in EUFOR Althea, be nearly impossible in practice due to national caveats or restrictions, political and financial issues, non-interoperability, resistance to creating interoperability. One potential for developing pooling and sharing for future CSDP operations is 'multinational logistics units (MLUs) or transport units (MTUs); where participating nations agree on specific responsibilities and deploy assets accordingly. For example, in a MTU, fuel transport, bus transport and cargo transport could each be managed by one country.[142] Moreover, member states vary in both the extent of equipment that they give their personnel and the kind of equipment they give. If the member state does not provide the needed equipment to execute the tasks required during the operation, it results in considerable security and efficiency problems for the whole operation [143] that cannot typically be rectified by sharing the equipment in the operation between different nationalities.

Figure 16: Answers to Analytical Survey: Interoperability

There are clear limitations to interoperability as the local context is central for what equipment is useful or not, and could be more comprehensively assessed in a joint warehouse. As EULEX is the largest mission by far, most surplus is also from EULEX and sent to other missions regardless of its suitability. South Sudan was supplied with surplus VW and Skoda vehicles from Kosovo 5-6 months after deployment although Toyota vehicles are used most in Africa, and thus have both best garages and spare parts support. These vehicles had winter tires, snow chains and air condition that was inadequate for the African climate. In a few months more than a third of the cars were unserviceable with little possibility of being repaired in South Sudan. Mission uniforms were also unsuitable to the hot local climate. [144]

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[142] Ibid, 113.
[143] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,115.
[144] Ibid, 32–34.

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Further, attempts at cost-saving by consolidating shipments into one container meant that the delivery of vital equipment, like shedders and secure safes, was delayed to accommodate adding other less vital equipment into shipping inventory. Necessary IT equipment arrived a year after deployment, and hearing and eye protection and high visibility clothing for airport staff were also significantly delayed. As a result several items were bought by staff directly from local stores in Juba [145]

A central warehouse is vital for shortening the supply chain and improving the timeliness of supplies and their usefulness. [146] However, the current warehouse was seen as too rigid, too far away from current CSDP operations, [147] and as having too much outdated equipment (e.g. computers), while missing some equipment that was urgently needed e.g. armoured cars.[148]Cost-savings could also be made through local sources or following recommendation and advice from the field, rather than buying equipment that needs to be replaced or is redundant in the local context. [149] Some changes needed to adapt to local environments are unpredictable. For example, EUFOR changed its helmets to berets to appear less aggressive and thus altered the way the local population perceived the troops.[150]

> "In the case of EUFOR RCA pooling and sharing of resources was important for the overall running of the operation. Due to force generation difficulties, there were gaps in capabilities, which were then filled up through bilateral agreements. Some of the critical capabilities, such as medical care, would have not accessible without the bilateral agreements. For example, Germany offered strategic airlift capability for EUFOR RCA. On a bi-lateral level, France and Germany agreed to make the strategic airlift operation available also to Operation Sangaris. For its part, Sangaris offered medical capabilities and a rapid-response force for EUFOR RCA. Sharing of information, as well as joint planning can also be seen as examples of pooling and sharing. In general, the tasks were divided among the UN, France, and EU, in line with their competencies and capabilities."
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> *D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371, 126–127.*

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[145] Ibid, 32–34.
[146] Ibid, 48.
[147] Ibid, 207.
[148] Ibid, 219.
[149] Ibid, 32–34.
[150] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,122–123.

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There are potentials for encouraging civ-mil and civ-civ interoperability especially in terms of training and shared technologies. Some coordination in training already exists. For example, EUPOL COPPS invited the EU delegation staff to participate as well in staff security trainings in Palestine. Conversely, however, when the EC developed a new eHEST training it was offered only to EU delegations although the training material was largely applicable to the CSDP missions too. [151] EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS share some human resources including Political and Legal Advisors, Press and Public Information, Human Rights and Gender and IT support, although sharing IT support is complicated due to geographical distance.[152] Training in some topics such as the local context and cross-cutting themes is largely applicable to both civilian and military personnel present. Joint-trainings support a mind-set that encourages interoperability and finds potentials for pooling and sharing. Encouraging interoperability supports a broad, and cost-effective use of EUs available resources while creating a common culture between EU actors in the field.

Textbox 5: Potentials on Interoperability:

1. Create shared standards/technologies/planning mechanisms for civilian and military missions and operations to enhance interoperability

2. Develop the current warehouse concept to encourage standardisation

3. Recognise that there are limits to interoperability as the local contexts differ greatly

4. Emphasise potentials (especially in training and technology) for interoperability specifically in terms of civ-civ, and civ-mil cooperation

5. Encourage an interoperability positive mind-set.

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[151] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,50
[152] Ibid, 3 4.

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7 EU COMPETENCES (KNOWLEDGE AND SKILLS)

Knowledge and skills of those recruited to the mission personnel are a key factor in creating effectiveness as CSDP missions and operations rely on the expertise of their personnel. EU competences in the field are, in general, of relatively high level. When compared with other international organizations, EU is able to provide expertise, wide knowledge and draw on even wider pools of knowledge. Here is one of EUs main strengths in the international contexts. High-level expertise often corresponds with high levels of work motivation.

Definition of Competences

Interpersonal skills, Training, Cultural awareness, Professional background, selection criteria, EU Personnel: Expertise, Skills and Competences Professional Background, Training and Deployment

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Investment both in training and cooperation between training institutions have strengthened EUs competences and resulted in less variability in comparison to other capabilities. A significant number of staff now attend pre-deployment training and there are initiatives to strengthen training further and make it more standardised. Overall standardisation within CSDP including development of CSDP specific tools and technologies will further increase the need for training, especially tailored, task-specific, context-specific and technology-specific training.

"EUPOL COPPS was perceived to be a mission that could offer good quality experts to the Palestinian statebuilding efforts. Mission members, Palestinian counterparts and international partners alike repeated this view. Some even said that while the US had more money the EU provided better expertise."

D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,35.

Training is important but it does not remove the importance of finding suitable personnel, who are suited to missions in terms of their practical skills and attitude. Differences in the types of contracts between contracted and seconded complicate recruitment. Seconded staff is typically preferred by member states to maintain some ownerships of the mission but often contracted staff is better prepared for mission life and thus more easily employable.[153] In military operations, seconded staff is often better trained, prepared and equipped. Some, however, simply do not have the necessary skills and qualifications for the work they are sent to do regardless of their rank or position in the national army.[154]

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[153] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 53.
[154] Ibid, D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 81, 88, 102 & 148.

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The requirements for contracted personnel in military operation are lower and more varied. [155] The skillsets of especially locally contracted personnel may not be adequate for their tasks. [156]

The three employment types presented are large categorisations with wide range of divergence depending on the operation, the task and the member state in question. Secondment policies also differ greatly between different member states and lead to even radical remuneration differences between employees from different states and on different contracts working in similar positions, which understandably dampens motivation of employees on lower salaries. [157]

Unwillingness of participating

Figure 17: Answers to Analytical Survey: Competences

nations[158] to contribute further to military operations may have impacted the quality of recruits seconded in addition to the quantity.[159] The diminishing of the pool of potential recruits also increases the pressure on missions and operations to accept the personnel that they are able to recruit

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[155] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,27.
[156] Ibid, 50.
[157] Ibid, 54.
[158] Ibid, 31–32.
[159] Ibid, 76 &148.

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regardless of their skill-set. The mission interview panels have say in who is recruited may be largely inclined to accept those seconded by member states.

The increasing number of local employees and third nation staff requires also increased emphasis on transferring understanding of EU values, standards and procedures at the core of EU missions and operations, especially on higher strategic levels.[160]

The importance of qualified and motivated operational staff cannot be overestimated. In addition to broad recognition of the valuable work EU conducts in its operations, the study reports identified four main weaknesses. These are: difficulties in finding and recruiting high quality recruits including non-standardised and variable standards used; lack of the recognition of the importance soft-skills including intercultural communication skills and cultural awareness; weaknesses in hand-over processes and task-specific training. When severe problems with personnel arise, removing the person from mission or operation may be impossible.

7.1 Selection and quality of recruits: standards and soft skills

Finding and recruiting appropriate, specialized staff to missions is both difficult.[161] Financial inducements, even when available, are seldom sufficient motivation for specialized staff, who often already have interesting, well-paid and safe positions in their home countries.[162] For locally contracted staff, financial incentives are often clear but seconded staff are motivated by a variety of personal and career progress.

The attractiveness of a mission including its location impacts recruitment of the mission greatly. In general, EUPOL COPPS, which was perceived to be an attractive CSDP mission due to its unique location in the Middle East, had few problems in recruiting and received several applications for any vacancy notice. However, low salaries for contracted staff were feared to result in higher employee turn-over as the per diems for both EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah were considered too low compared to the high living costs of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv [163]

If it becomes clear that recruitment is not possible, changes may be necessary for the mission itself. The challenges of recruiting people with aviation skills and an understanding of aviation security (rather than police and border management personnel that member states would second) for EUAVSEC in South Sudan lead finally to a change in the recruitment procedure from seconded to

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[160] Ibid, 52.
[161] Ibid,, 48.
[162] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 54.
[163] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371, 41–42.

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contracted requested by the Head of Mission and Granted by the Mission via the Foreign Policy Instrument and DG Relex.[164]

The variety of selection and recruiting systems, mechanisms and procedures, and a lack of standardisation, lead to inconsistent competences in the field. [165] These inconsistencies are especially noticeable when they directly affect the whether it is possible to carry out work in the way that it was planned or if the inconsistencies seem based on practice rather than underlying structural factors. Wherever possible the same criteria on training, background, soft skills and the same medical standards should apply to both contracted and seconded personnel. [166] Basic understandings and standards are especially vital in difficult security situations, where variability staff skills and the additional support required by some staff member' drains resources from other work.[167]

The current recruitment processes focus on formal qualifications. Similar focus is not given to soft skills including cultural awareness and respect, intercultural communication, language skills, flexibility, ability to deal with uncertainty etc. These soft skills, however, directly impact the ability of the recruited staff to carry out their work effectively especially in cooperation with local representatives. Recruiting the best available candidate does not necessarily correspond to recruiting the candidate who best serves the mission.

Specifically important are communication skills, respect and cultural awareness, or in other words, the ability to work effectively with local representatives. Difficulties in communications make potentially already challenging cooperation with local actors even more challenging.[168] In EUFOR, for example, Georgian soldiers charged with the airport's protection had no French skills and very limited English skills and as such were barely or even unable to carry out their tasks requiring communication with locals.[169]

Strengthening understanding of local culture, society and the impact of conflict on the society is needed. [170] Regional experience is also valuable[171] and in operations close to EU member state, staff contributions from neighbouring states strengthen cultural awareness. Availability of information through libraries, common databases or training especially in the country, strengthen soft skills. However, respect often trumps cultural awareness and knowledge and is more difficult to train.

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[164] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,26
[165] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 148
[166] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,27 & 48.
[167] Ibid, 215.
[168] Ibid, 205.
[169] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,102–103.
[170] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,6.
[171] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,27.

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7.2 Hand-over and training for the position

Hand-over processes are crucial in ensuring transference of institutional memory especially in light of the short rotations of CSDP missions and operations. Although there are clear guidelines for hand-overs, these seem to be seldom followed leading to weak, inconsistent or at worst non-existent hand-over procedures. EUPOL COPPS, for example does not seem to have any systematic hand-over procedure. [172] Weak handover processes impact effectiveness negatively as incoming experts need to invest additional time in understanding their tasks and procession. Moreover, weak handover processes, often results both in duplication of efforts, loss of information and understanding, and may also have a negative impact on EUs counterparts.

For some senior staff, the hand-over and take-over period also is an important part of practical training and knowledge transference [173] .but for most other tasks a period of overlap would be valuable to ensure continuity as well. For contracted staff, interest and investment in the mission is often tied to their personal contracts making it important to incorporate hand-over into the work, preferably as the work is carried out through archives, records and creation of appropriate hand-over material. However, some staff also felt that their input was no longer valued as they were preparing to leave missions. [174] Hand-over processes were most concentrated on international and seconded staff, but local staff also need hand-over and in-job training. **[175]**

The preparedness of new recruits for their new tasks varies greatly. Pre-deployment training ranges from nothing to five-day courses depending on the member state seconding. A significant number of staff have no pre-deployment training. For contracted staff pre-deployment training may not even be available. Some may have had little knowledge of the mission or the context beyond the basic understanding gathered for interviews. The staff from different countries "brought to the mission different, sometimes even contradicting sets of experience, working practices and knowledge" [176]

The access, use and applicability of pre-deployment training to specific contexts is not standardised although the more tailored and adapted a training is to specific posts/positions, the more likely it is to be directly beneficial to the trainees Training that takes place in the mission and operation context is generally well received. Mission staff in Kabul considered a four-day security course provided by

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[172] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,33.
[173] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 101.
[174] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,74–75.
[175] Ibid, 77.
[176] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 40–41.

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the private security company responsible for their protection outside the base "as relevant, practical and well run." [177]

The effect of weak handover structures combined with insufficient pre-deployment training is clearly noticeable in the field. "A contracted mission member states: 'I had no pre-deployment training or any training on advising or mentoring. We need better briefings on joining a mission. I had no handover. My line manager was invisible.' Explaining the line manager aspect, another member states: 'Institutional memory is bad. There is no handover because one person has left the post before the other arrives. There is no crossover. For many there is no interest in what their predecessor did.' On the same subject, a mission member notes: 'Institutional memory is poor. Once a member leaves the mission there is no real effort to debrief them.' " [178]

Hand-over processes and training are vital for the development of EU standards and practices, especially where there is national divergence. Incorporating experienced former mission members into the core of new missions and operations, could also aid in hand-over. Hand-over processes are, however, most aided by a mind-set that incorporates hand-over into the working structures.

7.3 Dealing with challenges in human resources

Missions and operations are continually dealing with changes in personnel. However, sometimes changes in personnel are also due to subpar performance or unsuitability for the tasks[179] in question. These changes are very difficult to achieve. It is equally complicated to explain subpar performance to the member states that had seconded them.[180] In EULEX, the cumbersome procedures of the mission itself impede the substitution of staff. Leadership and direct managers have little impact on recruitment decisions made by EULEX human resources department, which is especially problematic as the HR department itself lacks qualified staff. [181]

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[177] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,75.
[178] Ibid, 74–75.
[179] Ibid, 6.
[180] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,201.
[181] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 49.

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All too often, poorly performing mission members ignored as long and as much as possible, as dealing with them is seen as too difficult. Contracted staff are able to end their contracts early, if needed, without creating a track-record for future EU missions or impeding their changes of employment in another EU mission.[182]

There were inconsistencies between internal evaluation systems, where majority of staff was performing well or above expectations, and the interviews conducted. The inconsistencies may point to short-comings in the internal review mechanisms but subjective experiences may also be universalised.[183]

The experience shared by the IECEU researchers is that overall, CSDP mission and operation personnel

> We had too many people for what we were doing and many were just trying to justify their position. A lot of them rarely went outside. They did not care about the Afghans. They were there for the wrong reasons and could not be talked to. They were incompetent on the ground but competent in how to play the system.
>
> *D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371, 98.*

were both exceptionally committed and well qualified, but there were exceptions.[184] In terms of numbers, CSDP missions and operations are unlikely to be blighted by problematic personnel significantly more than other comparable organisations. However, poor performance is especially difficult to ignore in complex contexts with close working relationships. At missions and operations, low performance often has direct impact on overall possibilities to achieve goals, and its impact is felt widely affecting motivation, morale and task achievement.

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[182] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,98."
[183] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 51.
[184] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,27.

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7.4 Competences: variation, standardisation and requirements

EU needs committed and skilled staff in its operations but recruiting and maintaining expertise is

> **Textbox 6: Potentials for Competences:**
>
> 1. Prioritise HR and focus on recruitment processes
> 2. Include soft skills assessment especially for more strategic roles
> 3. Ensure that skype video interviews or interviews in person in Brussels for higher roles are possible.
> 4. Emphasise contextual knowledge, intercultural communication, flexibility and respect
> 5. Standardise requirements for all personnel whenever possible (including e.g. medical and security certification).
> 6. Make pre-deployment training mandatory with no caveats
> 7. Develop more task- and context-specific training and ensure that it is available in missions and operations
> 8. Consider combining training with equipment allocation.
> 9. Create structures and a mind-set that allows the removal of unsuitable personnel quickly and efficiently.
> 10. Prioritise personnel considerations as committed personnel are the EUs core resource in crisis management.

challenging. For EULEX, "staff recruitment, selection procedures, deployment, and pre-deployment training are some of the biggest challenges for the mission." [185] Unlike, the challenges identified for other competences, these challenges are similar to those faced by any large, international organisation. There are, however, two main differences that are directly relevant to CSDP missions and operations. First, as the working contexts are especially challenging, the skillsets of personnel are especially crucial for accomplishing tasks. Secondly, for, especially international staff, crucial motivators are excellent colleagues and interesting tasks. When these are replaced by HR challenges and inability to work, poorly performing staff is likely to effect CSDP operations and missions more widely and deeply than in other types of work.

There is great variation in personnel skills, and adherence to standards is needed. Similarly on-going investment in CSDP staff is needed in terms of

developed training (both pre-deployment and in the missions/operations), more streamlined recruitment processes and lowering the threshold of removing low-performers. For the future of

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[185] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 48.

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CSDP, flexible, trained, experienced personnel is vital; and likely to become even more vital with increasingly complicated and complex conflict scenarios.

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8 COMPREHENSIVENESS

In general, comprehensiveness is perhaps the strongest capability EU crisis management has. Cooperation is emphasised between EU actors in the field and other international actors, and crisis

Definition of Comprehensiveness

Cooperation, Coordination, Actors: other EU actors Civilian, Military & Other, NGOs, Locals, International community (e.g. NATO, UN, OSCE, AU, other regional organisations)

management operations and missions typically actively coordinate with both. For some missions and operations, cooperation with other international organisations is key to being able to function, and central for potential success. The EU is often proactive in both encouraging cooperation and taking part in it, although cooperation is challenged by boundaries between actors, including EU member states as well as the length and size of the

engagement.

Coordinating with local actors is both more challenging and more varied in its outcomes. While some missions and operations were able to coordinate well with local actors, others struggled (see fig. 18).

The variation is due to a number of reasons, some related to EU performance but others not. The possibilities for EU to influence broader coordination seemed to also diverge greatly, as coordination is bi- or even multi-directional and influenced by the willingness of all parties to cooperate with one another as well as their resources and capabilities to do so.

Results of the analytical survey (see figure 18) suggest that

Figure 18: Answers to Analytical Survey: Comprehensiveness

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coordination with other EU actors was the strongest form of comprehensiveness, coordination with other international actors was more varied although at its best seemed to function even better than with other EU actors. Coordination with local actors was most dispersed with some missions coordinating very well with local actors and others not at all well. The following discussion will focus on the three types of coordination (EU-EU, EU-other international actors and EU-local actors) more closely.

8.1 Cooperation with other EU actors in CSDP missions and operations

Cooperation in general works relatively well or even well between EU actors[186], although it is complicated by practical challenges such as different planning and activity cycles[187] resulting in differing schedules, as well as differences in basic tasks and the roles of EU actors. Some EU actors also cooperate better than others. [188] However, in general regular (e.g. weekly) meetings are scheduled between major EU stakeholders to ensure flow of information and coherence of action. [189].In our survey, there are no very low performers in terms of EU-EU coordination, which seems to be acknowledged as central to all missions and operations.

EUFOR RCA was integrated into broader European initiatives as a part of the EU's global approach. The global approach was implemented via narrow co-ordination among EUFOR, the European Commission's Directorate-General for Development and Humanitarian Affairs (DG ECHO), Directorate-General for Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO), and the EU delegation in Bangui. This co-ordination took place through regular meetings within the delegation but also through video-based teleconferences in Brussels involving OHQ, FHQ, European Commission staff, and the EEAS. -- The EU's global approach translated into efficient and consistent coordination and co-operation among EUFOR RCA, DG ECHO, and DG DEVCO for implementation of humanitarian and development projects. -- According to several EU officials, the co-ordination among EU actors turned out to be quite efficient. One highly ranking ECHO officer qualified EUFOR as 'a perfect example of civilian– military co-operation' because the humanitarian perspective was integrated not only during the planning but also in the implementation phase.

D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371, 113–114.

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[186] Ibid, 149. & D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,110.
[187] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,6 &52.
[188] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 96.
[189] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,28 & 217-218; D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,50.

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Interestingly, the perceptions of how well cooperation works and how challenging comprehensiveness is in practice can vary widely. [190] Some of the variability may also be dependent on what role (coordinating, participating) the person has.

Within the EU, the boundaries between different actors, and the interests of the different member states are often keenly felt. Specifically, the EU-funded civil society initiatives on human rights, peacebuilding and development, may be fully disconnected to EU CSDP missions[191] with little, at least formalized, information sharing between them. Some interviewees identified general reluctance for those working with development to coordinate with CSDP mission members, who they thought were seen as "security-types" [192] but the reluctance may be mutual. However, synergies are lost without at least some coordination. Typically, EUs broader, development, projects have longer presence in the host country and are perhaps more aware of local sentiment. CSDP missions, however, have important security information and capabilities that other projects do not. Both could benefit from some information sharing while retaining separate identities.

These internal divisions are not noticeable from outside EU structures, where those interviewed mostly perceived a united EU voice despite occasional disagreements and lack of coordination between different EU actors. [193] Speaking as one also blurs divides between different EU actors easily absorbing especially smaller and less visible EU actors into one. A common EU front has many benefits including preventing other actors from playing one EU actor against another. [194]

In contrast to planning, where it seems that the interests of individual member states can complicate processes, it seems that within

One of the main factors in EUFOR's success was the quality of the co-operation with humanitarian and developments actors. For this purpose, EUFOR created a platform with OCHA leadership in order to exploit synergies between humanitarian actors and the European troops. Unlike the forum established by the MINUSCA later, the EUFOR platform was open to all actors of any size. An opening of this type was very useful since many small NGOs were leading valuable microdevelopment projects in the country.

D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,118.

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[190] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371, 50-51; D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,46; D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,216.
[191] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,52
[192] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,216.
[193] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 57; D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,114; D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,104.
[194] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,114.

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operations, most member state involvement is welcomed, especially when accompanied with specific knowledge or history of the area, and when it is not in contrast with interests of other member states. In Libya,for example, Italian connections were considered helpful.[195]

Double-hatting, as in the combining the assets of Commission and the EEAS has both enhanced comprehensiveness, and brought value to the EUD. [196] Double-hatting also gives an opportunity to influence the way another EU actor works, which is otherwise limited. [197]

Challenges of coordination and comprehensiveness between EU actors are often tied to either unflavoured residual tasks [198] that no-one wants to take responsibility to, a worsening security situation, where it becomes evident if there are shortfalls in intelligence or information sharing,[199] or different political stances taken by different member states.

The multiplicity of EU actors in a conflict area, especially when there are differences between political stances taken by member states, increase difficulty in coordination. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict "there have also been difficulties in the coordination of the EU and its Member States' programs and activities in the field that have led to for example some Member States initiating programs that overlap with the EU assistance programs." [200] Perspectives of how well coordination and information-sharing work between representatives of EU agencies and EU Member States vary greatly from some interviewees' opinion of "excellent" to others noting that there were still EU Member State projects carried out in Palestine without any information being shared. One EU actor in EUPOL noted that "There is a clear need for better communications between EU actors in Afghanistan. There is no shared strategy. EUDEL could play a bigger part in change management, because they have strategic oversight and this could inform our work in the mission. [201].

Development of a comprehensive approach in the field may take time[202] and is easier in smaller organisations. [203]. Cooperation between European organisations takes place especially on the Head of Mission Level.[204]. Beyond the leadership level, information is often shared and advice sought through informal networks of former colleagues who now work in other CSDP missions. Some suggest that CSDP leadership do not create "the formation of formal sectoral networks across the

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[195] Ibid, 218.
[196] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 149.
[197] Ibid, 149.
[198] Ibid, 149.
[199] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,48
[200] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371, 49–50.
[201] Ibid, 49–50 &93.
[202] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 95.
[203] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,199.
[204] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371, 50.

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missions as these were claimed to create a risk to the chain of command of CSDP system."[205] However, mentoring from other missions and operations has the potential to be a powerful tool both for improving the competences of personnel, but also in terms of broadening comprehensiveness and information sharing between CSDP missions and operations.

8.2 Cooperation with other international actors in CSDP operations and missions

In any host country, there are a number of international actors present from IGOs to NGOs to bilateral projects. [206] The EU cooperates with a number of other international actors in any mission or operation; most notably NATO, the UN, AU and OSCE. Cooperation with other internal agents is variable. For some missions and especially operations, coordination and cooperation with other international organisations is vital. For others, the coordination is less crucial, and based on more ad hoc relationships and the courtesy of information sharing rather than actual need. In these circumstances, the cooperation is clearly less effective and often becomes a form of information-sharing rather than coordination.

An often repeated dictum is that "everyone wants to coordinate but no-one wants to be coordinated" but often it is difficult to find an organisation who is willing to reallocate resources from their own work to coordination. Similarly, if someone organises meetings, attendance is typically not a problem. Issues are centred on limits of organisational boundaries and independent decision-making mechanisms, which bind those in the field, and the role of the EU in the field and what it can offer those it cooperates with. Often EU is a minor actor among the larger actors and can thus lack the clout of the other actors. However, EU can bring diverse expertise to the table. [207]

As strategy is formulated elsewhere with little coordination, there are limits to how much the organisations that modify their operations in the field. Lack of coordination with other international actors leads not only to duplication (or multiplication) but also to omissions, where some issues may be overlooked by international agents as they are not included in planning, while other issues are competed over. In addition to multilateral agreements, there are also bilateral agreements with different governments. Removing duplication would require steps on higher strategic levels from common information-sharing to joint-planning and lessons learned processes, which are currently lacking. As the Head of Training of a US police mission notes: "Training across MOI was disjointed. Nobody knew what anybody else was training. The Germans, French, US and others had their bi-

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[205] Ibid, 41.
[206] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,118.
[207] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371, 93.

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lateral agreements with the Afghan government. Each operated in their own silo. The thing is, when you ask a group of Afghan Generals their job description and they do not know. What does this say about the ANP and MOI?" [208]

International actors often share general understandings[209] as to what is taking place or should take place, but there may be large differences between cooperation in practice also on different levels of the same organisation. Both EUAVSEC and UNMISS agreed that their cooperation on the ground was good but cooperation between New York and Brussels was seen as problematic and the relationships between the headquarters with respective mission challenges. According to leading EUAVSEC officials on the ground, both mission staffs worked together against the short-sightedness and bureaucracies of their respective headquarters.[210] In contrast, "The EUFOR RDC was deployed in support of the existing MONUC force, and there was close cooperation between the EU and UN on several levels. On the political-strategic level there was close coordination in both military and political matters between the UN Secretariat and the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union for the duration of the mission."[211]

> Some significant achievements of EUPOL COPPS have resulted from its cooperation projects with other international agencies. For example, developing a Code of Conduct for the PCP was one of the activities of EUPOL COPPS joint program with UNDP in 2012-2014. An independent evaluation report on the joint program characterized it as an interesting example how a UN development organization and an EU technical advisory mission can cooperate and bring together their respective strengths.
>
> *D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,46.*

Sometimes the EU can have an important role in creating field-level co-ordination among the AU, the UN, the EU and France.[212] The EU may also replace the work of some of the other international agents.[213] Conversely, however, "From a US, UNAMA and EUSR perspective, EUPOL was not viewed kindly in regards of co-ordination and co-operation. The severest criticism was that EUPOL was getting in the way."[214]

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[208] Ibid, 94.
[209] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 83. D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,48.
[210] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,30.
[211] D3.5. The Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Libya and Central African Republic, 2017, IECEU, 653371, 60.
[212] Ibid,116.
[213] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 95.
[214] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,92–93

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Often coordination relies on informal personal contacts between representatives of different organisations. [215] These personal relationships can be very valuable especially on higher strategic levels[216], but their benefit is also easily lost with personnel changes and sustainability is difficult. Some cooperation is clearly dependent on the persons involved and can be damaged when the actors are changed. In CAR, for example, cooperation with several humanitarian and development actors decreased when the Force Commander was changed.

Formalizing coordination mechanisms, such as in the Joint Operation Procedure (JOP) between EULEX and KFOR enhanced both cooperation and understanding.[217] The JOP explains procedures for EULEX and KFOR and sets the basic framework for their cooperation, and was assessed by both as a clear and comprehensive tool. [218] Similarly the presence of KFOR and US liaison officers at EULEX for better coordination and increased interoperability [219], is a step towards avoiding overlap as EU and the US are the largest donors for Kosovo but there is still room for further improvement.[220] Lack of coordination between the two has resulted in unnecessary spending through investment duplication on similar or the same projects. [221] For example, there are a number of agents both IGOs and NGOs providing training in Kosovo resulting in both duplication but also a lack of specialized training programmes, certification and follow-up to investigate wider impact.[222] Similar concerns were raised in Afghanistan. "The Head of Training of a US police mission notes: "Training across MOI was disjointed. Nobody knew what anybody else was training. The Germans, French, US and others had their bi-lateral agreements with the Afghan government. Each operated in their own silo. The thing is, when you ask a group of Afghan Generals their job description and they do not know. What does this say about the ANP and MOI?" [223] Organising trainings jointly more commonly would increase efficiency by releasing both personnel and financial resources to be used elsewhere.[224]

Another simpler option of formalizing relationships is to create regular, weekly or monthly meetings. However, if there is a large number of international stakeholders, it may be difficult to clarify the roles and activities of the different international stakeholders.[225] Similarly, coordination with the EU is complicated by both information sharing practices and limitations both by the EU but also by other

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215 D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 42–43. & D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,45.
216 D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 75& 97.
217 Ibid, 147.
218 Ibid, 43.
219 Ibid, 147.
220 Ibid, 44.
221 Ibid, 61.
222 Ibid, 44.
223 D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,94.
224 D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 44–45.
225 Ibid, 95.

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international organisations. An interviewee from another agency noted that EUPOL is not keen on information sharing when they are in influential positions in the government– they don't share when they are in an influential position with government. This attitude of not being eager to share is endemic, making it difficult to co-ordinate efforts across the international community. [226].

Coordination between international organisations is valuable, but outcomes vary. When joint-planning has taken place, EU and other international organisations can collaborate closely and very well. When it has not, cooperation can be reduced to a number of coordination sharing meetings where each representative tells others what they are doing, but there is little possibility to further coordination in terms of tasks done as each organisation has its own silo.

8.3 Cooperation with local actors

Extent of cooperation with local population varies greatly between missions, and practices are very diverse. Cooperation with local actors is often complicated in crisis management operations. Some of the complication is due to EUs own inability to coordinate with local actors, create stable coordination mechanisms, and modify the way it operates to accommodate the feedback it receives. However, cooperation is influenced by multiple factors, not least the capacity of local actors, and the perception that locals have of the EU. The more favourable the perception of EU activities, the lower the threshold for cooperation. Local engagement is necessary for all missions and operations, but can be largely limited to those, typically government, actors that EU directly works with.

EULEX functions both directly and indirectly as an intermediary between Serbian and Kosovo authorities through e.g. the Serbia–Kosovo dialogue and its "Support to Dialogue Implementation" objective. The dialogues facilitated by the EU are both an example of the positive potential of EU's potential to foster reconciliation and in line with broader EU engagement in the region. However, in addition to normalizing relations and establishing a degree of coordination and cooperation, EULEX has also (inadvertently) consolidated its intermediary position making direct contact less likely.[227].

Similar, but much smaller and ad hoc, confidence building measures evident to a smaller extent in Palestine where EU organises joint Palestinian Palestinian-Israeli workshops on politically 'non-

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sensitive' issues such as the work of traffic police. Often organized without any publicity, these measures foster communication and cooperation without attracting public criticism.[228]

Local perception of the EU mission, needs, wants, preferences and interest in coordination are directly reflected in EUs ability to coordinate with local partners. Creating a positive public image and visibility, through the media, the way EU presents itself[229] and the support it gives to local communities is central to fostering cooperation. Conversely, poor local perception is an obstacle to efficiency.[230] EU processes outside crisis management, especially conditionality based initiatives e.g. twinning projects, visa liberalization, often have a positive

> [M]any Palestinians are frustrated because they do not know what is done with the ideas they have presented to EUPOL COPPS, or because EUPOL COPPS is unable to implement the plans they presented, allegedly either due to the mission's focus on technical assistance or due to lack of funding. Palestinian civil society organisations working in the field of security and justice sectors stated that they had many suggestions on how EUPOL COPPS could support Palestinian SSR and JSR, but they had few or no contacts with the mission representatives to discuss them.
>
> *D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,24.*

impact on the mission and comprehensive EU engagement,[231] through creating momentum for implementation of reforms on a local level, especially when, as in Kosovo, "the European perspective remains the main driving force of reforms in Kosovo.[232]

The EULEX corruption allegations have had a significant detrimental impact on Kosovan public perception and a lesser impact on cooperation with Kosovan authorities, not least because the situation is broadly used and rehashed by Kosovan political leaders to promote their own agendas.[233]. However, already before the allegations, the EULEX's complex engagement was difficult to communicate and understand by the locals, and is further complicated by operational move from robust and visible executive functions into more strategic MMA.[234].Some missions, like EUAVSEC in South Sudan lack visibility, which leads to difficulties in finding wider support for operation.[235]

EUFOR RCA was able to at least to some extent win the 'hearts and minds' of Bangui citizens. As the militias were actively trying to exacerbate tensions and undermine local support for the

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[228] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,48.
[229] Ibid, 36.
[230] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 149.
[231] Ibid, 146.
[232] Ibid, 58.
[233] Ibid, 46.
[234] Ibid, 63–64.
[235] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,28.

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transitional government and international forces, basic tools of counterinsurgency proved useful. These tools include: winning local support, coherent integration of civilian and military actors, emphasis on intelligence support not just to identify potential spoilers and hostile intentions but also to gain wider understanding of the context, emphasis on using restrictive force to prevent collateral damage and civilian casualties.[236] A key objective for EUFOR RCA in Bangui was to create force acceptance and protect the population, while simultaneously preventing violence and convincing locals to not join militias, by helping the local population meet their basic needs directly or indirectly. [237]

Understanding local perception is also vital for the mission. The LOT houses are efficient information gatherers and convey local feelings well. However, their performance is enhanced by more experienced senior members, who are able to garner respect and trust. Similarly, language and communications of both personnel and interpreters are vital for information gathering. [238]

Formalization of relationships may benefit local engagement. Often coordination with locals is based on informal practices and mechanisms leaving doubts about reliability, reach, renewal, and results. [239] When ad hoc mechanism are set up, those invited are the ones that happen to be close to the mission at the time, but with time ad hoc mechanisms often become semi-formalized. These semi-formalized mechanisms are often unreliable and provide irregular and unsystematic engagement. [240] Renewal of actors, and revisiting invitation lists is vital to ensure that the structures remain responsive to the changes in the society.

Formalization also speaks to the importance of local engagement, which is often understood as being difficult as "there already were too many meetings and seminars." [241] However, often there are multiple CSO actors working in the area that the EU works in, and information is lost without coordination. In formalizing relationships, consideration should be given to what kind of relationships through joint-planning (e.g. how often are meetings, is an introductory round necessary or will name tags suffice, should meetings have predetermined themes) so that the formalization aids in creating tools that help rather than hinder the work done by the operations.

In more developed operations/missions, the mechanisms of cooperation are also more developed. In Kosovo, there are a number of mechanisms to coordination between EU institutions,

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[236] Ibid, 94–100.
[237] Ibid, D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,104.
[238] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 103 &146.
[239] Ibid, 82
[240] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,29.
[241] Ibid, 48.

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representatives of member states, and among actors including the Legislative Review Mechanism (LRM), Joint Rule of Law Coordination Board (JRCB) as well as regular meetings for EU heads of mission to foster cooperation and coordination between EU actors in Kosovo.[242]

Setting public expectations is vital for local cooperation as they are the base for public perception**.** When expectations are set too high, disappointment is inevitable. "In the case of EULEX, expectations were initially set very high and were not realistically possible to fulfil, especially not in the set timeframe. Even though there are several concrete positive results and improvements resulting from EULEX engagement in Kosovo, the majority of locals believe it has failed." Sometimes setting expectations too high can benefit local leaders, who can then hide their own failures behind the mission's failures. [243]

Cultural awareness should go hand in hand with local ownership; nevertheless, cultural awareness should not be an excuse for not changing specific laws and customs that are not in accordance with the EU best practices. A "healthy balance" of cultural awareness, respect for local traditions and imported solutions is required.

D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 51- 52.

Setting expectations also extends to information sharing, EUs role in supporting EUs values in the local context, and the missions' ability to conduct development work. Information sharing by the EU is limited by a number of reasons from security concerns to mind-set but the expectations are often for much wider information sharing by the EU especially by local authorities, who are the main beneficiaries of EUs work. Boundaries between information that is shared and information that is not, should both be clearly communicated and also develop over time. If information sharing does not develop, then the EUs information sharing becomes overly restrictive.[244]

Civil society organisations working especially with human rights and democracy, often with EU funding, may have high expectations for the mission/operation to also support them in their work. Clear communication and revisiting expectations is necessary. The civil society critics said they understand the limitations of EUPOL COPPS's technical advisor role, but they said that the EU is a political actor and the largest donor and that it should take clearer political stand in advancing democracy and human rights. [245] Where possible, civil society engagement should be encouraged to encourage a wider understanding of the local context.

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[242] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 149.
[243] Ibid, 60.
[244] Ibid, 147
[245] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,27–28.

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In the CAR, the most important CIMIC project implemented by EUFOR has been the building of a bridge. This initiative may seem trivial, but it must be stressed that the bridge was particularly appreciated by the population. It reinforced EUFOR's popularity and acceptability among the citizens because it helped them improve their daily conditions of living --

D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,93.

Providing improvements in infrastructure or equipment may aid in creating positive public perception. In CAR, the building of a bridge provided the basis for positive engagements. Similar projects, which aid both the operation and the local context may aid cooperation. These initiatives are often limited by funding but could be valuable both for the operation and the local context, and if suggested by EU actors from the field, should be welcomed and funded if possible.

Setting EUs own expectations of local capabilities and accountability just right**.** Often expectations for the local actors are set too high, too low or they are not set at all**.** In Congo, there was "unrealistic expectations and a lack of understanding of what could and can be expected of the Congolese partner. The latter was just coming out of a war situation, and a number of the central actors within the Congolese system had an interest in blocking or at least delaying the project."[246] Palestinian counterparts, however, were calling for EU mission experts to be more critical in their advice; they

As with the rest of the international community, EUPOL did try to co-ordinate activities with their Afghan counterparts, but the overall result was unimpressive. For many members interviewed, coordinating the Afghans and working with them in the last years of the mission turned into cosmetic work groups and seminars.

D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,94.

did not want them 'just to clap their hands whatever we do.' [247] Palestinian civil society representatives also called for more open assessments to enable evaluations by both Palestinians and Europeans.[248]

The EU expectations in Afghanistan seem unclear. As one interview notes: "EU language has no connection with results based management and does not hold the Afghans accountable." [249] Similarly as one mission member notes: "We were talking about civil policing and stuff like that, and our counterparts made out they were listening. But they were not. When the real talking started it was obvious that what they wanted to do was

kill Taliban. -- Two others I mentored told me what they thought I wanted to hear. -- " Of this, a senior mission member states: "There is a sense that the Afghans are doing this only to keep the

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[246] D3.5. The Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Libya and Central African Republic, 2017, IECEU, 653371, 83.
[247] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,47.
[248] Ibid, 32."
[249] Ibid, 66.

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internationals happy." [250] A lack of commitment from local authorities in Congo also meant that promises were made but seldom delivered.[251]

Local engagement is often extremely challenging but also both vital to the operations and missions. At best, positive local engagement establishes new possibilities and opens new avenues. At worst, negative local engagement makes the mission or operation impossible. As seen above, the performance here is very varied and depends greatly on the type of mission or operation in question and the staff in that mission or operation.

8.4 Comprehensiveness: further strengthening

Comprehensiveness is both vital for EU operations and missions, but also one of EUs strengths in crisis management. In general, EU organisations work well with other EU organisations, although this cooperation can also be strengthened through double-hatting and clearer mechanisms of coordination. Results for comprehensiveness are more mixed with international actors and still more varied with local actors. As comprehensiveness is vital for the EU, its further and continued strengthening is also needed.

There is a clear, natural, boundary between those actors that deemed necessary for the operation (close cooperation) and those that are not. Coordination takes time and resources from other tasks and needs to be useful. However, once set, these boundaries, may not be revisited, especially in reference to developing local institutions. Formalizing some coordination channels may aid in creating sustained cooperation, as contacts often rely heavily on personal connections [252], which are then often lost when that person leaves the mission.

The reliance on informal relationships is seen both within the EU, between international actors and with local actors, and in all three, formalization at least to some extent may be valuable.

For comprehensiveness, public perceptions matter between all actors. How the mission is perceived, aids or hinders the mission in its work. Public opinion polls and public engagement, including a media strategy is vital for all missions and operations, although continued consideration of return on time and resources invested in benefits is needed.

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[250] Ibid, 69.
[251] D3.5. The Study Report on DR Congo, South Sudan, Libya and Central African Republic, 2017, IECEU, 653371, 62.
[252] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 147.

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Textbox 7: Potentials for Comprehensiveness

1) Double-hatting for EU institutions can effectively aid coordination

2) Emphasise using an agreed working definition of central EU concepts

3) Encourage mentoring and communication between missions and operations.

4) Create communication plans, engage with media. Hearts and minds matter- public perception of a mission/operation helps or hinders operation

5) Formalizing some relationships for all forms of coordination may enable better longer-term cooperation as ad hoc relationships are often lost

6) Consider reach (representation) results (follow-up), structures (creating invitation lists) renewal (revisiting invitation lists) and reliability (both in terms of regular meetings but also openness of communication in ad hoc local engagement.

7) Emphasise speaking with one "EU voice" externally to avoid confusion.

8) Some projects for short reconstruction projects may aid mission/operation´s activities and aid in confidence building

9) Avoid prioritising expediency over efficiency and consider the value of coordination to the mission/operation.

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9 CROSS-CUTTING THEMES: HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER

In both human rights and gender, the EU crisis management missions have been able to make great strides in both human rights and gender concerns. Specifically important have been structural changes to local institutions, including establishing police ombudsmen and departments for human rights and gender[253] which ensure that both gender and human rights are will be structurally addressed. Similarly, improved gender and human rights training among staff and local counterparts is slowly but surely making an impact. The credibility of EU missions and operations is tied to action on human rights and gender especially there is a pre-existing expectation of their inclusion and advocacy by European actors. [254] However, there are still large structural impediments, and on-going attention is needed.

The ability of human rights and gender advisors to enact policies depends largely on their position in the mission/ operation and the attitudes they encounter. Often the relatively junior positions of the human rights and gender advisors in mission structures determines possibilities for mainstreaming, funding, the possibilities to develop projects, and influence over other mission activities. Strengthening the role of human rights and gender advisors would be possible if they were, for example, directly connected to the Head of Mission like political and legal advisors[255] or if they were more central in the MIP planning and including in the MIP steering group.[256]

Negative attitudes towards human rights and gender mainstreaming among mission members and CSDP leadership are both easily identifiable and need sustained effort to be overcome. Although there is bias, most commonly the negative attitudes are not about human rights and gender *per se* but about the imposition of trainings and talks, which may be seen as too time-consuming and as taking away from the actual work. The implicit or explicit opinions and support of mission/operation leadership matters greatly for promotion of human rights and gender. The internal attitudes reflect externally, and undermine EUs efforts to act change especially as the local partners are often resistant to change. [257]

The knowledge of EUPOL COPPS on human rights and gender in the Palestinian context is seen as poor by Palestinian civil society. The Mission begun in-house human rights and gender training to all staff in 2015 but the allocated training time is two hours for staff. Only the very basics of human

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[253] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,110.;
[254] D3.5. The Study Report of South-Sudan, CAR and Libya, 2016. IECEU, 653371,130.
[255] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,35.
[256] Ibid, 25.
[257] Ibid, 43.

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rights and gender mainstreaming can be covered. These trainings are seen as too time-consuming and as taking away from the actual work by the mission leadership.[258]

Technical assistance given to security agents can have the unintended consequence of improving their capacity to carry out human rights violations as well. EUPOL COPPS and other internationals building technical skills of security forces including the police were perceived to be partially responsible for human rights violations that these security actors later committed.[259] When human rights violations were committed by PA security forces, such as using excessive force against peaceful demonstrators during a teachers strike, EUPOL COPPS seemed to pay no attention.[260]

The EU cooperates with PCP, which is seen as the most reliable and professional of the Palestinian security agencies. There are certainly still problems, but PCPs human rights record is better than other agencies, transparency and accountability has improved, and it is better able to serve vulnerable groups through establishment of family protection and juvenile units as well as a gender unit.[261] EUPOL COPPS coproduced a human rights guide that was distributed to police stations and was accompanied with training but after the initial project ended, there were no efforts for EUPOL COPPS to sustain human rights training.[262] EU funding mechanisms for peacebuilding and human rights programs are detached from CDSP missions. CSOs receiving money from the EU for human rights programs have few opportunities to cooperate with CSDP missions, although their work might be valuable to reduce human rights violations by security actors. Human rights-based approaches have been included in some projects, with the potential of further development of human rights mapping as well as accompanying indicators and standards.[263] Especially for projects related to increasing the capabilities of security services and the police, this mapping is welcome as there may be unintended consequences on human rights.

The emphasis on gender that the EU has been widely noted in creating both lasting, positive impact and having considerable impact on the operational capability of the institutions the EU has supported, including the Kosovo police.[264] The positive impact that EU has had on gender through creating specific gender units and increasing and improving training on gender and human rights [265], including in-theatre training[266] was widely noted. Many of the successful activities mentioned in the

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[258] Ibid, 42–43.
[259] Ibid, 21
[260] Ibid, 43
[261] Ibid,107
[262] Ibid, 19–20.
[263] Ibid, 25.
[264] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 41.
[265] Ibid, 56, D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 148
[266] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 101.

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case studies were related to gender, and included e.g. EUPOL COPPS's role in the establishment of gender units in the PA institutions.[267]

Double-hatting existing positions by adding gender and human rights components may result in higher degrees of acceptance for these functions within the force. Structurally double-hatting seems to work well, although some consideration should be maintaining a suitable number of women in double-hatted positions as well. At HQ EUFOR Althea, double-hatted positions include a military gender adviser, a double-hatted civilian gender adviser and several double-hatted Gender Focal Point posts. Good examples of EUFOR Althea's gender-sensitive practice include media campaigns and considering gender when dealing with issues around safe and secure environments.[268]

According to AFBiH representatives cooperation with PSOTC on gender and human rights was 'at an enviable level' . The cooperation has resulted in concrete

> **Textbox 8: Potentials for Gender and Human Rights**
>
> 1) Double-hatting may lead to higher degrees of acceptance
> 2) Promote human rights mapping especially when improving the capabilities of local security providers
> 3) Continue mainstreaming gender and human rights considerations
> 4) Advocate gender-sensitive media campaigns
> 5) Including gender-specific consideration when dealing with considerations of what is a safe and secure environment.
> 6) Actively encourage strides towards gender parity within operations/missions.

changes including increased numbers of women in AfBiH. The AFBiH is also the first institution in Western Balkans to appoint Gender Focal Points and implement the relevant SOPs. Beyond AFBiH, EUFOR Althea cooperates with both the government (especially the BiH Gender Equality Agency and BiH MOD) and non-governmental sector (especially with UN Women and OSCE) on gender. The operation also has good contact with both female and male population through the LOTs in particular, enabling understanding of gender-specific security awareness, and strengthening comprehensive situational awareness.[269]

Some structural impediments for gender equality stem from peace negotiations where vulnerable groups are under- or even non-represented. As addressing gender related issues in BiH began only

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[267] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371,31."
[268] D2.3 The Study Report of Kosovo and BiH 2015. IECEU, 653371, 88–89.
[269] Ibid, 98–99.

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after the Dayton agreement resulting, clear deficiencies exist still, in particular with respect to sexual violence in conflict.[270]

There is a danger that EUs credibility on issues of gender are undermined if EUs own missions and operations do not reflect what the EU is preaching.[271] Greater strides should be made towards creating gender parity and ensuring that creation of double-hatted positions does not result in even fewer women in missions and operations.

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[270] Ibid, 139.
[271] Ibid, 135.

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10 EFFECTIVENESS OF EU MISSIONS[272]

This 'Chapter on Effectiveness of Missions' compares EU missions and operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, South Sudan, the Central African Republic, Libya, the Palestinian Territories Afghanistan and DRC. The purpose of this endeavour is to draw common conclusions across missions and operations as the basis for policy recommendations to help improve the future effectiveness of EU capabilities in conflict prevention.

The chapter builds on previous parts of the IECEU project. Deliverable 1.4 developed an analytical approach to better understand effectiveness of EU external action, particularly within operational conflict prevention. An internal EU perspective was combined with an external conflict prevention perspective and 'effectiveness' was defined as encompassing both what was achieved in a mission/operation and the way in which this was sought achieved. The corresponding 'effectiveness criteria' and 'success indicators' developed in D1.4 guided subsequent case studies in IECEU Work Packages (WPs) two, three and four, which examined different types as well as levels of effectiveness in various regions. The missions/operations included were EULEX Kosovo, EUFOR Althea (Bosnia-Herzegovina), EUAVSEC South Sudan, EUFOR RCA, EUFOR RCD, EUPOL RCD, EUSEC RCD, EUBAM Libya, Operation Artemis EUPOL COPPS, EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL Afghanistan.

Based upon the regional studies of EU missions and operations in the Balkans (WP2), Africa (WP3), the Middle East and Asia (WP3), this chapter compares and contrasts effectiveness across the different (types of) missions and operations as well as the various conflicts, countries and regions. In order to identify more clearly the level and nature of the EU's effectiveness – or lack thereof – this chapter is structured around the four effectiveness criteria developed in D1.4. That is, internal goal attainment, internal appropriateness, external goal attainment and external appropriateness. These focus and structure the comparison of the individual cases to test the generalizability of their findings across the larger dataset.

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[272] This chapter was written by Annemarie Peen Rodt, Associate Professor at the Institute for Strategy at the Royal Danish Defence College. In accordance with the IECEU Grant Agreement, Deliverable 1.4, which provides the framework for this chapter, took its starting point in the notion of 'success' that featured in: Annemarie Peen Rodt, 2014. *The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success* (London: Routledge). D1.4 adapted the approach to operational conflict prevention and this chapter applies that in synthesizing the case study findings of previous IECEU work packages. The chapter has been through peer review by IECEU project partners. The knowledge sharing and feedback provided is gratefully acknowledged, although responsibilities for this chapter and any conclusions, mistakes or misconceptions it may contain remain those of the author alone.

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10.1   Effectiveness of missions and operations[273]

The IECEU conceptualization of 'effectiveness' considers the intervener (EU), the target (conflict and country in which the mission/operation takes place) and the aspect of the mission/operation focused upon in this enquiry (operational conflict prevention[274]). Moreover, Deliverable 1.4 proposes, assessments of 'effectiveness' must include not only what missions/operations achieve, but also the ways in which they seek to achieve what they do. This establishes the relative importance of means as well as ends in such endeavours; in other words, appraising not only whether the EU did the right thing, but also whether it did that thing right. Thus, 'effectiveness' encompasses efficiency as well as effect, as the enquiry considers input, output and outcomes of EU conflict prevention. In sum, **effectiveness** or overall success in this deliverable is when a mission/operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner, seen from the perspective of the EU and the conflict in which it intervenes (at least in part) to prevent (further) violent conflict.

Effectiveness is when a mission/operation achieves its purpose in an appropriate manner both from the perspective of the EU and the conflict(s) it seeks to prevent

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[273] See IECEU Deliverable 1.4 for further discussions of 'effectiveness'.
[274] See IECEU Deliverable 1.5 for further discussions of 'operational conflict prevention'.

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10.2 Effectiveness criteria and perspectives on success[275]

The IECEU 'effectiveness criteria' combine perspectives both internal and external to the EU.

The **internal perspective** examines the extent to which missions/operations succeed according to the EU's politico-strategic goals and operational objectives, and whether their implementation went well according to the Union's plans, procedures and principles. In other words, the internal perspective assesses the EU on its own merits. That is, whether it achieved what it set out to do in the way that it set out to do so. This perspective acknowledges the internal EU context and its constraints to assess performance against what was possible rather than what would have been ideal.[276]

The **external perspective** appraises missions/operations according to the overall purpose of conflict prevention. That is, to prevent (further) violent conflict. It considers the effectiveness of short-term EU crisis management with regard to medium term peace building and long-term stability. The external perspective limits its assessment to what can reasonably be expected of operational conflict prevention. Likewise, it examines the ways in which missions/operations seek to prevent (more) violent conflict to determine whether prevention efforts were proportional to the challenge at hand.[277]

Integrating these two perspectives, the IECEU combines existing knowledge and practice to identify new ways of improving the effectiveness of EU conflict prevention. Moreover, by examining means as well as ends, the project provides a fuller picture of the Union's current capabilities, potential for improvement and realistic recommendations in this regard.

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[275] See IECEU Deliverable 1.4 for further discussion of 'effectiveness criteria' and perspectives on success.
[276] Rodt, A. P. 2014. *The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success* (London: Routledge); Tardy, T. 2015. CSDP in Action - What Contribution to International Security? EU Institute for Security Studies, 2015, (http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Chaillot_134_CSDP_missions.pdf).
[277] Rodt, A. P. 2014. *The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success* (London: Routledge).

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Four **effectiveness criteria** facilitated the analysis of 'effectiveness' in EU missions/operations. These are listed below alongside corresponding research questions:

1. Internal goal attainment
   o To what extent does the mission/operation achieve what the EU set out to do?

2. Internal appropriateness
   o To what extent is the mission/operation implemented according to EU plans, procedures and principles?

3. External goal attainment
   o To what extent does the mission/operation help prevent (further) violent conflict?

4. External appropriateness
   o To what extent is the mission/operation proportionate in its preventative measures?

Textbox 9: Effectiveness Criteria and Research Questions

Indicators identified for each of the four criteria allow for focused coding and comparison of operational conflict prevention efforts to understand what it takes to succeed or at least improve the effectiveness of EU capabilities in this regard. Figure 1 breaks down the definition of effectiveness into criteria and corresponding indicators and illustrates the relationship between them. D1.4 explains this process in further detail in an analytical guide to the empirical research conducted in WPs two, three and four, the results of which are synthesized in this chapter.

The success indicators developed with regard to the four effectiveness criteria are:

o Internal goal attainment: fulfillment of politico-strategic goals and operational objectives

o Internal appropriateness: timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness in implementation

o External goal attainment: initiation, continuation, diffusion, escalation, intensification of violence

o External appropriateness: proportional prevention (good vs. harm done)

Textbox 10: Effectiveness Criteria and Success Indicators

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                            ┌──────────────────┐
                            │  EFFECTIVENESS   │
                            └──────────────────┘
              ┌──────────────────────┴──────────────────────┐
    ┌─────────────────────┐                      ┌─────────────────────┐
    │ Internal effectiveness│                     │ External effectiveness│
    │   (EU perspective)   │                      │ (conflict perspective)│
    └─────────────────────┘                      └─────────────────────┘
      ┌────────┴────────┐                           ┌────────┴────────┐
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Internal goal attainment	Internal appropriateness	External goal attainment	External appropriateness
Fulfilment of politico-strategic goals & operational objectives	Timeliness, efficiency & cost-effectiveness of implementation	Prevention of initiation, continuation, diffusion, escalation & intensification of (further) violent conflict	Proportionality in preventive measures: good vs. harm done

Figure 19 Effectiveness Criteria and Indicators of Success

In this chapter the extent to which each mission/operation appraised in the IECEU project met the effectiveness criteria is coded as a 'success' (+), 'partial success' (+/-) or 'failure' (-). Where there was not sufficient evidence either way, this has been marked as 'N/A'.

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10.3 Internal effectiveness: success for the EU?[278]

In order to qualify as an overall success a mission/operation must be internally effective. Two key criteria determine whether the main objectives of an EU mission/operation are successfully obtained and whether the way in which these are (sought) achieved is appropriate – from the intervener's perspective. These two internal effectiveness criteria are internal goal attainment and internal appropriateness. Whether the EU has been successful in their regard is assessed below.

10.3.1. INTERNAL GOAL ATTAINMENT IN EU MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Missions/operations are goal orientated in nature. Their success is typically thought of in terms of fulfilling their mandated objectives. EU missions/operations must, thus, be analyzed according to whether they achieve their intended purpose and the tasks they set out to do. To this end, the first effectiveness criterion is internal goal attainment. The indicators hereof reflect the key objectives and overall mandate of each individual mission/operation. As there may be significant differences between the *politico-strategic goals* and *operational objectives* of a mission/operation, both must be considered. Likewise, missions/operations pursue multiple, sometimes shifting goals, which may change over time, often making goal attainment a matter of degree. Examining internal goal attainment must reflect these nuances and take such developments into account, so as to apparaise and allow for operational flexibility, which may well be an appropriate response to a changing situation. Furthermore, as all goals are not equally important to the intervener, evaluating their achievement evenly would be misleading. It is, therefore, necessary in analytical terms to rank politico-strategic and operational objectives to identity the EU's main goals in each mission/operation to determine whether it successfully obtained its *raison d'etre* as defined by the Union itself. Internal goal attainment is a necessary first condition for overall effectiveness in any mission/operation – after all if the EU is not achieving what it set out to do in these endeavours, which are often risky and costly in the broad sense of both terms, the Union is unlikely to continue (to launch) such efforts and thereby increase its effectiveness in operational conflict prevention.[279]

Table 2. synthesizes the research findings from IECEU WPs two, three and four with regard to internal goal attainment, specifically. Overall, the EU has been more succesful in this regard in the

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[278] See IECEU Deliverable 1.4 for further discussions of 'internal effectiveness' and success for the EU.

[279] Baldwin, David A., 2000. Success and Failure in Foreign Policy, *Annual Review of Political Science,* 3, pp. 167-182; Pushkina, Darya, June 2006. A Receipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission. *International Peacekeeping,* 13(2). pp. 133-149; Ross, Mark Howard and Rothman, Jay, 1999. *Theory and Practice in Ethnic Conflict Management: Theorising Success and Failure.* Palgrave: Basingstoke.

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Balkans than in Africa, the Middle East and Asia. But the EUFOR RCA, the Operation Artemis and EUFOR RCD case studies demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case. The missions that had to withdraw prematurely from Libya, the two[280] capacity building missions in DR Congo, and South Sudan, however, failed to meet the Union's politico-strategic aims as well as significant parts of their operational objectives, which illustrates the danger of 'doing something' rather than doing 'the right thing' in a deterriorating conflict situation – even when it seems like a political necessity to 'do something' at the time. EUBAM Rafah, EUPOL in Afghanistan and EUPOL and EUSEC in the DR Congo similarly show how situational awareness and response are key to what the Union can achieve – even in terms of its own aims and objectives – in complex conflict scenarios. EUPOL COPPS, in turn, shows how getting one's aims and objectives right, allows one to better succeed in internal goal attainment. In the case of the DR Congo a major challenge was the descripancy found between insuficient programming and planing, leading to unrealistic ambitions and aims being formulated, which cannot be achieved.

	EULEX Kosovo	EUFOR Althea	EUAVSEC South Sudan	EUFOR RCA	EUBAM Libya	EUPOL COPPS	EUBAM Rafah	EUPOL Afghanistan	EUPOL DRC	EUSEC DRC	Ops. Artemis	EUFOR RCD
Politico-strategic aims	+	+	-	+	-	+	+/-	+/-	-	-	+/-	+
Operational objectives	+/-	+/-	+/-	+	-	+	-	+/-	-	-/+	+	+

Table 2: Internal goal attainment: effectiveness according to EU goals and objectives

10.3.2. INTERNAL APPROPRIATENESS IN EU MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Complementing internal goal attainment with an internal appropriateness criterion allowed IECEU researchers to examine whether the way in which each mission/operation was implemented was appropriate, seen from the point of view of the intervener. Internal appropriateness reveals whether a EU mission/operation is implemented well on the ground and from the Headquarters perspective. *Timeliness, efficiency* and *cost-effectiveness* are three key indicators of internal appropriateness.

Timeliness refers to early warning as well as early action. It includes efficient decision-making, budgeting, planning and preparation as well as generation, training and deployment of personnel

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[280] The capacity missions in the DRC were in fact three missions, since the EUPOL mission from 2005-2007 was called EUPOL Kinshasa, and after that just EUPOL.

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and hardware, as mandates, mission and operation plans are agreed and implemented. The EU has developed a Crisis Management Concept to guide this process, which allows for fast track procedures, if necessary. In order for a mission/operation to implement its mandate in an appropriate manner in the field, it is essential that it is deployed without significant delays. However, timeliness includes not only the arrival of the first sets of boots on the ground, but also timely and otherwise efficient implementation of the mandate. An effective mission/operation should implement its mandate as quickly and efficiently as possible without compromising its effect.[281] Likewise, it should withdraw when its mission has been accomplished.

In order to achieve full internal appropriateness, a final concern is that the costs of a mission/ operation do not outweigh its benefits for the intervener. Evaluating any policy based on its achievements without taking into account its cost is, as Baldwin has suggested with regard to Foreign Policy Analysis, like assessing a business solely in terms of its sales disregarding its expenses.[282] Costs are crucial when assessing implementation from an internal perspective. It is important to remember that although the financial burden of EU military operations is primarily covered by contributing Member States, the internal appropriateness of these operations (like that of the civilian missions) is evaluated from the perspective of the Union as a whole. Moreover, costs are political as well as material. Cost-effectiveness must, thus, include political costs for the EU. E.g, it is important to recall that ensuring a reasonable prospect of success and protection for one's own personnel is a fundamental premise for legitimate deployment and use of force, whether it be violent or not.[283]

Table 2 synthesizes the internal appropriateness of the twelve cases studied. The EU proved more successful in terms of the timely implementation of its two Balkan missions and its two military operations in the DRC. In the case of the DRC the two military deployment was driven by strong national insterest of some EU memberstates, that opted to lead the process and persuaded the rest of the EU member states to interveen. This was also the case with the French dominated EU mission in the CAR. In the rest of the missions the EU struggled to implement in a timely fashion, and slow EU response time is something that can be found in several of the case studies. Particularly noticable in this regard was the early withdrawal from Libya, South Sudan and Rafah – although the latter was intended to be temporary. Only EUPOL COPPS could be coded as efficient, perhaps because of lessons learned from Rafah, whilst the EUPOL and EUSEC missions both suffered from a slow implementation time. Overall, the missions/operations have been somewhat if not always satisfactorily cost-effective, except in Libya and South Sudan where despite the best efforts of their

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[281] Diehl, Paul F., 1994. *International Peacekeeping*. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp.33-61.
[282] Baldwin, David A., 2000. Success and Failure in Foreign Policy, *Annual Review of Political Science,* 3, pp. 167-182.
[283] Guthrie, Charles and Quinlan, Michael, 2007. *Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare.* London: Bloomsbury, pp.20-21 and 31-32.

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staff both missons were terminated. These cases indicate a significant link between timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. When missions were are launched at the wrong time, this limited their ability to such an extent that their own personnel questioned their worth.

	EULEX Kosovo	EUFOR Althea	EUAVSEC South Sudan	EUFOR RCA	EUBAM Libya	EUPOL COPPS	EUBAM Rafah	EUPOL Afghanistan	EUPOL DRC	EUSEC DRC	Ops. Artemis	EUFOR RCD
Timeliness	+	+	-	-	-	+	+/-	-	+/-	+/-	+	+
Efficiency	+/-	+/-	-	+/-	-	+	+/-	+/-	-	-	+	+
Cost-effectiveness	+/-	+	-	+	-	+/-	N/A	+/-	-	-	+	+

Table 3 Internal appropriateness: implementation according to EU plans, procedures and principles

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10.4   External effectiveness: success in conflict prevention?[284]

In order to assess the extent to which an EU mission/operation was effective overall, observers must also consider whether and how the target conflict and country benefitted (or not) from the intervention. In other words, whether the purpose of operational conflict prevention was achieved. A successful mission/operation must help prevent (further) violent conflict, but only by proportional preventative means. Accordingly, the external perspective on effectiveness first assesses whether a mission/operation contributed in a meaningful way to the prevention of (further) violent conflict, and then examines whether the ways in which it sought to do this were appropriate measures of prevention. To this end, two external effectiveness criteria – external goal attainment and external appropriateness – are described and applied below.

10.4.1. EXTERNAL GOAL ATTAINMENT IN EU MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

Violence is never a given. It is neither a constant nor necessarily a logical linear next stage of conflicts, which may indeed move back and forth between violence and non-violence. If a conflict does become (more) violent, however, there are five different processes by which this may take place: namely, through *initiation, continuation, diffusion, escalation* and/or *intensification of violent conflict.* Initiation is when a conflict turns violent in the first instance. This may be more or less likely, but it is never a sure thing. Continuation is when the violent aspect of a conflict continues over time, which may occur over shorter or longer periods, sometimes with non-violent 'interruptions'. Diffusion is a process by which violent conflict in one geographic area directly or indirectly generates violent conflict in another area. It can take place within or across state borders. Escalation occurs when new actors become involved in an existing conflict. Such actors may be neighbouring states, ethnic kin, diaspora or others who become actively involved in the violent conflict. Intensification refers to a process by which the violence itself increases; and can include both an increase in the number and nature of violent incidents, albeit for our purposes only those directly related to the conflict are included. Although these are five conceptually distinct processes, initiation/continuation, diffusion, escalation and/or intensification of violence may well occur simultaneously.[285]

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[284] See D1.4 for further discussions of 'external effectiveness' and success in conflict prevention.
[285] Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, 2007. Transnational Dimensions of Civil War. *Journal of Peace Research*, 44, pp. 293-309; Lobell, Steven E. and Mauceri, Philip, 2004. Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.1-10; Rodt, Annemarie Peen, 2014. *The European Union and Military Conflict Management: Defining, Evaluating and Achieving Success* (London: Routledge).

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To fulfil the external goal attainment criterion, a mission/operation must have a positive and sustainable impact on the (potentially) violent conflict on the ground.[286] This might seem an obvious criterion for success, but it is all too often bypassed or misinterpreted when missions/operations of this nature are evaluated. Goal attainment from an external conflict prevention perspective is not necessarily achieved by a mission/operation, which merely fulfils its mandate. However, it is also not necessary – nor desirable – that all underlying issues (root causes) related to the conflict are resolved by the mission/operation.[287] EU missions/operations are sometimes undertaken in the hope that they might help bring about the peaceful resolution of a conflict, but this has never been their primary purpose. Conflict prevention must not be confused with conflict resolution. There is a significant difference between successful conflict prevention (particularly of the operational kind) and successful conflict resolution. This distinction is imperative in order not to confuse the responsibilities of EU personnel and decision-makers with that of others involved in the conflict or indeed its resolution. In the end, it is adversaries, not international interveners, who must resolve their conflicts.[288] The primary purpose of operational conflict prevention is *to prevent (further) violent conflict* and in this way help to bring about conditions under which the parties involved can resolve the conflict. The external goal attainment criterion has been developed to help assess whether a given mission/operation is effective in this regard in the specific context in which it engages. The indicators of external goal attainment are, thus, whether if this has not already taken place there is an initiation of violent conflict or if the violent conflict is already underway whether it continues, diffuses, escalates and/or intensifies.

EU missions/operations only rarely seek to prevent (more) violence through their own presence – either directly through containment or indirectly through deterrence. More often, they subscribe to theories of change, which propose that peace and stability will result from gradual changes in the society, security sector, distribution of power, etc., which they seek to bring about through external intervention. Either way, it is important to recognise that change can be negative as well as positive – and at times continuity may be the best possible outcome. Regardless, EU missions/operations must be assessed according to the extent to which they make a *meaningful, positive and sustainable contribution* to preventing (further) violence. EU missions/operations are usually part of wider efforts

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[286] Stedman, S. J. 2001. "Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers", *IPA Policy Paper Series on Peace Implementation*, New York; Reimann, C. (2004): "Assessing the State-of-the-Art in Conflict Transformation" in Austin, A., Fischer M. and Roperts, N. (eds.): *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook*, Springer VS; Bercovitch, J. and Simpson, L. (2010): "International Mediation and the Question of Failed Peace Agreements: Improving Conflict Management and Implementation", *Peace & Change*, 35:1, pp. 68-103.
[287] Johansen, Robert, C., 1994. UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success? *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38(2), pp. 307-310; Reagan, Patrick M., 1996. Conditions of Successful Third Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 40(2), pp. 336-359.
[288] Johansen, Robert, C., 1994. UN Peacekeeping: How Should We Measure Success? *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38(2), pp. 307-310; Wolff, Stefan, 2006. *Ethnic Conflict: A Global Perspective.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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to prevent or even resolve the conflict(s) in question. The external goal attainment criterion must, thus, consider the EU mission/operation in light of these broader efforts – by the Union and other actors involved. Does it make a meaningful contribution to the EU's comprehensive approach towards the conflict country or region? Does it facilitate successful cooperation and coordination with international, regional, national or local actors involved in preventing (further) violent conflict? Does it strengthen peacebuilding, stabilization and/or Security Sector Reform in the country? Whether civilian or military – a EU mission/operation is only effective in terms of its external goal attainment, when it fulfils its potential role within this wider conflict prevention process and contributes meaningfully to it. That is, through a positive and sustainable impact (however small) with regards to preventing (more) violent conflict.

Table 4. brings together the results of the case studies with regard to external goal attainment. It demonstrates how there was no further violent conflict in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The case studies conclude that EULEX and EUFOR Althea have contributed even if they cannot be given full credit for this positive development. On the flip side, the conflicts in South Sudan, Libya, DR Congo and the Palestinian Territories deteriorated into further violence, although this cannot be blamed on the Union's missions/operations deployed in the field at the time, the missions has no succeeded in achieving medium to long term stability. What all twelve cases show and is illustrated in the difference between operational activities and achievements in the Central African Republic, DR. Congo and Afghanistan, respectively, the Union's efforts can make more or less meaningful contributions to prevent further violence in actively violent conflicts. In other words, it matters what type of mission/operation the Union launches and what mandate and means are at its disposal.

	EULEX Kosovo	EUFOR Althea	EUAVSEC South Sudan	EUFOR RCA	EUBAM Libya	EUPOL COPPS	EUBAM Rafah	EUPOL Afghanistan	EUPOL DRC	EUSEC DRC	Ops. Artemis	EUFOR RCD
No initiation/ continuation	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
No diffusion	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	N/A	-	-	-	-
No escalation	+	+	-	N/A	-	-	-	N/A	-	-	+/-	+/-
No intensification	+	+	-	+/-	-	-	-	N/A	-	-	+/-	+/-

Table 4: External goal attainment: contribution to preventing (further) violent conflict

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10.4.2. EXTERNAL APPROPRIATENESS IN EU MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS

The final effectiveness criterion is one, which has been much neglected in the analysis of EU missions/operations; namely, external appropriateness. Appropriateness, in this enquiry, assesses the ways in which a mission/operation seeks to achieve its purpose. Unlike internal appropriateness, which evaluates operational effectiveness according to internal indicators (timeliness, efficiency and cost-effectiveness), external appropriateness evaluates the implementation of a mission/operation according to a set of standards focused on appropriateness in operational conflict prevention, because as Lund points out, 'misapplied preventive efforts, even if timely, may be worse than taking no action at all.'[289]

The external appropriateness criterion takes as its starting point that an intervention must do more good than harm. This is equally important for civilian missions and military operations. [290] *Proportionality* should govern any type of external intervention, including preventive measures and non-coercive as well as coercive policy tools. Foreign interventions, which are inherently intrusive and limits both national sovereignty and local ownership, must always be proportional to the challenge at hand. [291] Therefore, the concept of *necessity,* which condemns unnecessary interventions or measures as illegitimate must be considered in deliberations concerning the external appropriateness of EU missions and operations.[292]

Operational conflict prevention requires that analyses take these principles beyond the battlefield, where they traditionally apply, and assess any impact – intended or not – to the lives and wellbeing of populations in areas where the EU engages as well to its own personnel and any (potential) adversaries or spoilers to its missions/operations. Because if an actor like the EU engages in coercive measures – of any kind – for any purpose – it is important to scrutinize its actions according to widely accepted principles governing the legitimate use of force, whether that force be violent or not. As the focus of this enquiry is on operational conflict prevention by both civilian and military means, it is important that these principles are applied to a wider spectrum of interventions i.e. different types of missions and operations as well as a broader concept of 'coercion', not necessarily

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[289] Lund, M. S. (2009): "Conflict Prevention: Theory in Pursuit of Policy and Practice" in Bercovitch, J., Kremenyuk, V. and Zartman, I. W. (eds.): *The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution*, SAGE, London.
[290] Guthrie, Charles and Quinlan, Michael, 2007. *Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare.* London: Bloomsbury.
[291] Bellamy, Alex, J., 2006. *Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq.* Cambridge: Polity Press, p.199-228; Walzer, Michael, 2006. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic Books, p.127-137.
[292] Guthrie, Charles and Quinlan, Michael, 2007. *Just War: The Just War Tradition: Ethics in Modern Warfare.* London: Bloomsbury, p.1-49, Walzer, Michael, 2006. Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New York: Basic Books, p.144-151.

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physical, violent or lethal. With regard to physical force, which is rare but sometimes mandated in EU operations, this criterion scrutinises the appropriateness of use as well as non-use thereof.

External appropriateness in operational conflict prevention is best understood as 'proportional prevention', which allows one to assess whether more good than harm is done as well as ensuring that what is done is done by proportionate means of power and persuasion to facilitate effective prevention of (more) violent conflict. External appropriateness is closely linked to external goal attainment in the sense that it explores whether the contribution that a mission/operation makes is meaningful (positive and sustainable) enough to justify the measures (necessary and sufficient) taken to make that contribution.

Table 5 compares and contrasts the external appropriateness of the EU missions and operations examined. Only in the Balkans have EULEX and EUFOR Althea contributed in meaningful ways to preventing further violent conflict in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, respectively. In the DR Congo the two short-term military operations managed to in the case of Artemis to prevent further escalation of violence, whilst the EUFOR mission pre-empted violence from erupting. However, the impact of the missions was short-term, something that can also be found in the case of CAR mission. EUAVSEC South Sudan and EUBAM Libya proved too little too late, whilst the rest of the missions/operations have done more good than harm, but also demonstrated serious limitations to their contributions, which all fell short of preventing further violent conflict in their respective countries. As one central placed informant in the DRC said 'we operated from the principle that it is better to do something than nothing'. The question that this comparison raises is whether – and if so when – it becomes inappropriate to do too little – in particular as one response may delay or even exclude another possibly more appropriate one.

	EULEX Kosovo	EUFOR Althea	EUAVSEC South Sudan	EUFOR RCA	EUBAM Libya	EUPOL COPPS	EUPOL Rafah	EUPOL Afghanistan	EUPOL DRC	EUSEC DRC	Ops. Artemis	EUFOR RCD
Proportional prevention (good vs. harm done)	+	+	-	+/-	-	+/-	-	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-	+

Table 5: External appropriateness: proportional prevention effort and effect

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10.5   Conclusion

This 'Chapter on Effectiveness of Missions' compared EU missions and operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya, DR Congo, the Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan. The purpose of this endeavour was to draw more general conclusions across missions and operations as a basis for future policy recommendations to help improve the effectiveness of capabilities in EU conflict prevention.

This chapter built on previous parts of the IECEU project. Deliverable 1.4 developed an analytical approach to better understand factors furthering the effectiveness and impact of EU external action, especially within EU crisis management missions and operations. That deliverable provided the analytical framework for this chapter. As such, an internal EU perspective was integrated with an external conflict preventive perspective and 'effectiveness' was defined as encompassing both what was achieved in an EU mission/operation and the way in which this was sought achieved. Corresponding 'effectiveness criteria' and 'success indicators' focused and structured subsequent case studies in Work Packages two, three and four, which examined EU effectiveness in the Balkans (WP2), Africa (WP3), the Middle East and Asia (WP3).

Based upon individual case studies of EU missions and operations in the three respective regions, this chapter compared and contrasted effectiveness across different (types of) missions/operations as well as various conflicts, countries and regions focused upon by the EU – and therefore the IECEU project. In order to identify more clearly the level and nature of the EU's effectiveness – or lack thereof – this chapter too was structured around the four effectiveness criteria developed in D1.4. These were internal goal attainment, internal appropriateness, external goal attainment and external appropriateness. In this way the chapter focused and structured the comparison of results from individual case studies to test the generalizability of their findings across a larger dataset. The results of this exercise are summarized in tables 6-9.

	EULEX Kosovo	EUFOR Althea	EUAVSEC South Sudan	EUFOR RCA	EUBAM Libya	EUPOL COPPS	EUBAM Rafah	EUPOL Afghanistan
Politico-strategic aims	+	+	-	+	-	+	+/-	+/-
Operational objectives	+/-	+/-	+/-	+	-	+	-	+/-

Table 6: Internal goal attainment: EU achievements according to mandated purpose

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	EULEX Kosovo	EUFOR Althea	EUAVSEC South Sudan	EUFOR RCA	EUBAM Libya	EUPOL COPPS	EUBAM Rafah	EUPOL Afghanistan
Timeliness	+	+	-	-	-	+	+/-	-
Efficiency	+/-	+/-	-	+/-	-	+	+/-	+/-
Cost- effective-ness	-	+	-	+	-	+/-	N/A	+/-

Table 7: Internal appropriateness: implementation according to EU plan, procedures and principles

	EULEX Kosovo	EUFOR Althea	EUAVSEC South Sudan	EUFOR RCA	EUBAM Libya	EUPOL COPPS	EUBAM Rafah	EUPOL Afghanistan
No initiation/ continuation	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-
No diffusion	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	N/A
No escalation	+	+	-	N/A	-	-	-	N/A
No intensification	+	+	-	+/-	-	-	-	N/A

Table 8: External goal attainment: (further) violent conflict prevented

	EULEX Kosovo	EUFOR Althea	EUAVSEC South Sudan	EUFOR RCA	EUBAM Libya	EUPOL COPPS	EUPOL Rafah	EUPOL Afghanistan
Proportional prevention (i.e. more good than harm done) as well as necessary, meaningful and sustainable contribution to conflict prevention	+	+	-	+/-	-	+/-	-	+/-

Table 9: External appropriateness: proportionality in prevention effort and effect

Overall the comparison showed that the EU's venture into operational conflict prevention is neither an unconditional 'success' nor 'failure'. Instead it demonstrates how the Union has had significant achievements as well as difficulties in this regard – sometimes in the same missions/operations. This in turn illustrates why it is important to investigate the Union's effectiveness in conflict prevention and to explore and explain when, why and how the Union's missions/operations are effective or not. Moreover, the comparative analysis reveals that the EU can be effective in achieving its ends and objectives – both operationally and strategically – in a timely, efficient and cost-effective manner.

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Likewise, there is empirical evidence to support that the Union can make necessary, meaningful and sustainable contributions to preventing (further) violent conflict beyond it borders – without using disproportionate means. In other words, the Union has been successful according to each of the four effectiveness criteria introduced above. However, it has not been successful in all four in a single mission/operation examined above. This too illustrates the need to specify what type of 'effectiveness' one is addressing.

Comparatively, the Union has been more successful in making meaningful and sustainable contributions to conflict prevention in the Balkans, where the situation in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo has been relatively safe and secure throughout the EU missions/operations. However, these cases illustrate that even in such scenarios the Union itself may hinder or hamper its own effectiveness. In cases where the Union attempted to 'do something' in deteriorating conflicts like in South Sudan, Libya and the Palestinian territories, it has failed to such an extent that the missions themselves have had to be withdrawn ahead of schedule – in part or in full. This illustrates how although it may be difficult politically to 'do nothing' in a crisis situation, it may be better than doing the wrong thing risking disproportionate costs to the results that are achievable. EU missions/operations are not always the appropriate tool – no matter how hardworking and dedicated their staff might be. That said EUFOR RCA showed how it is possible to achieve significant results despite on-going conflicts, as long as the Union recognizes and respects its limitations and therefore carefully coordinates its efforts with others. To a lesser extent, examples of this were seen in South Sudan, Libya, Afghanistan and the Palestinian territories.

In conclusion, the Union may not be able to halt or transform on-going conflicts alone, but it does choose where, when and how to engage – and if it makes these choices wisely it can make meaningful contributions to preventing further violent conflict in ways that benefit Brussels as well as the people on the ground. Therefore, it is imperative that the Union learns – at least – from its own experiences – in the field as well as in Headquarters.

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11 CONCLUSION

The purpose of this comparative study is to form a basis for the policy recommendations and policy dialogues developed in WP7. It has done so by identifying common lessons from the case studies, which are formulated as policy potentials. The 56 potentials identified here are also listed in Annex A. These potentials represent the identifiable findings, lessons and ideas from the study reports of all 10 missions and operations that IECEU studied. More in depth analysis of the missions and operations case can be found in the study reports of the IECEU.

The identification of lessons is based on a tabulation table where all the results of the case studies were arranged with respect to the capability and issue they raised. Some issues or themes have been clearly more explored in some contexts, and as such the findings are not evenly distributed through-out the missions and operations. This unevenness was expected as the CSDP operations work in very different contexts. Most notably, the cross-cutting themes of human rights is analysed most in-depth with EUPOL COPPS in Palestine, where the human rights issues are also arguably the most relevant. As the purpose of this study is to identify lessons and policy potentials for further development into policy recommendations, some leeway has been taken in incorporating good practices from individual missions and operations, which seem especially relevant for on-going policy discussions.

The unevenness of results extends to the investigation of different capabilities in the case studies, where planning capacity, operational capacity, comprehensiveness and competences were well-represented but technology and especially interoperability were less so. For both, development is clearly on-going but results, and development are unevenly developed. In the current situation, the main lesson identified is that on-going development is needed but this lesson has already been well-understood within the EU and on-going steps are in place. The potential need for deeper analysis of technology and interoperability were already identified in the grant proposal for IECEU, and thus are analysed in more detail in WP6. For policy recommendations in WP7, the deeper understandings of WP6 will be incorporated.

There are five main lessons identified in the study. First, there is wide variability in CSDP missions and operations is large terms of their capabilities and effectiveness. Variability is also large within individual missions and operations between different capabilities. All missions and operations are mixtures of strengths and weaknesses, and as such overly simplistic analysis should be avoided. When variation is as large as it is in these findings, standardisation is typically needed. However, standardisation needs to be balanced both with the need for simplicity in structures and context-specificity. Standardisation in CSDP already exists in a number of areas, but is not comprehensive

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nor necessarily adhered to. Some lack of standardisation can directly affect the security of EUs personnel (e.g. medical standards and knowledge of working in hostile environments), and as such require adhering to regardless of the staff's contract type.

Planning forms the core of CSDP, and especially on-going strategic planning needs strengthening. The on-going changes both within local contexts but also within the operations and mission themselves require on-going, extensive, planning support from Brussels, increased focus on operational planning in the field and better coordination between the two. The changes both in the local contexts but also in the operations and missions themselves are both on-going and often extensive. The flux within missions and operations is especially tied to short rotations, changes in mandate and the number of staff, which can vary greatly.[293] The local contexts of crisis management are also especially prone to change and even extensive change. When there are changes in the security situation, or the premises that the mission or operation is built on, EU is slow or even unable to

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Textbox 11: Main Lessons Identified

1. Variability in CSDP missions and operations is large in terms of their capabilities and effectiveness. Variability is also large within individual missions and operations between different capabilities. All missions and operations are mixtures of strengths and weaknesses, and as such overly simplistic analysis should be avoided.

2. Planning forms the core of CSDP, and especially on-going strategic planning vis-à-vis changes both in the local contexts and in the operations and missions themselves needs strengthening.

3. Strategic planning leads to mandate formation, which was identified as the main challenge in terms of effectiveness. Similar challenge is seen with incorporating lessons learned into planning.

4. EUs strengths in crisis management are its ability to work with multiple partners (comprehensiveness and integrated approach) and the expertise and skills of its personnel, but there are challenges in communication methods, short rotations, hand-over procedures, recruitment, as well as hr processes.

5. Strengthening on-going development of civ-mil and civ-civ interoperability and standardisation as well as CSDP specific technologies and programs is needed.

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[293] EUFOR Althea size varied between 400 and 7000 personnel. See: 4.1 Staffing.

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adapt and adjust. Planning is especially important in differentiating between the strategic and the expedient in changing circumstances.

Mandate creation was found to be especially challenging in terms of effectiveness Mandates are always compromises between different interests, needs and wants and are unlikely to

> *Planning is especially important in differentiating between the strategic and the expedient in changing circumstances.*

gather wide support. However, overly broad mandates created with limited understanding of the local context or situational awareness, or which do not incorporate lessons learned from earlier missions, operations or mandates, are likely to cause further challenges. These challenges are especially evident in the creation of OPLANs and MIPs but also in the creation of a general understanding within the mission/ operation of *why* they have been deployed and *what* they are doing. The clarity of message that the mandate conveys is especially important in multinational and complex environments.

EUs strengths in crisis management are its ability to work with multiple partners (comprehensiveness and integrated approach) and the expertise and skills of its personnel although there are challenges in both. In terms of comprehensiveness; the integrated approach needs strengthening. Strengthening is especially needed in strategic planning for comprehensiveness, as many opportunities for creating comprehensiveness are lost in different planning pipelines, which form separate structures and limit communication and information sharing in the field. Formalizing some coordination relationships would also aid in creating long-term comprehensiveness but are often limited by lack of knowledge of the length of engagements. Formalizing the relationships requires investment, which gives good value in long-term, large engagements but less so in short-term small engagements. The competences of the personnel and their ability to work effectively are complicated by short rotations, lack of adherence to hand-over rotations, uneven use of pre-deployment training, lack of possibilities of mentoring, limited amount of in-mission training. On a more systematic level, recruitment processes vary greatly and if problems are identified, it may be difficult or impossible to remove low performers.

Finally, strengthening on-going development of especially civ-mil and civ-civ interoperability, standardisation, CSDP specific technologies and programs is needed. There are multiple standards and systems in use, often based on national systems but also created by individual missions. The tasks, function and personnel of the different CSDP missions and operations vary greatly, as of course does member state policies. However, there is potential for joint development of many of the supportive functions, which may provide in better systems overall. A clear example, are in-mission

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trainings where joint-trainings could be organised on the local context, some specific skills and cross-cutting themes. Further development of common tools to use in civilian crisis management would be also aid in creating tools for the integrated approach.

The results of this study are unlikely to be surprising to EU personnel working with CSDP missions. The potentials identified here are also likely to be echoed in policy initiatives and guidelines created by EU. Some of these guidelines and practices are publically known and available but much more information is confidential and not incorporated here. The assumption is that many of the shortcomings have already been addressed in some way, potentially even several years ago. Information, guidelines and processes are abundant, but implementation is falling behind or not even considered. Change takes time, and in a multinational complex structure, change takes even longer necessitating a long-term focus on implementation.

11.1   Further considerations

Current conflict prevention mechanisms both within the EU but also more widely require further development and evaluation. Specifically, more understanding is needed on *what* prevents conflict, and whether the conflict prevention mechanisms in use do in fact prevent conflict. Mechanisms required include evaluation, base-line studies, understanding of different conflict dynamics and conflict drivers. Intertwining internal and international security concerns causes further challenges to creating conflict prevention mechanisms EU's Early Warning System offers an interesting possibility for further study and development. With its combination of expertise, research and missions, EU is well-placed to drive the development of conflict prevention further.

The extent of the indirect impact on the operating context by missions and operations was not broadly considered in this study. When engagement is short and limited, the indirect impact is naturally limited. However, by creating employment, being a source of revenue, and enacting change, the direct impact of EUs actions are accompanied by both positive indirect impact to be amplified and negative indirect impact to be mitigated. These indirect impacts are often context-specific and their identification requires mapping and conflict sensitive practices. Both a positive direct and a positive indirect impact can be seen most in terms of gender, where initiatives to strengthen gender parity are strengthened indirectly by the presence of women, especially in operational roles.

The changing role and functions of crisis management continue to be debated after the Lisbon treaty, which may hinder cooperation in the field. Specifically contested are the optimal length and size of engagement as the term "crisis management" implies short-term immediate response whereas the reality of crisis management is often long-term engagement with inclusion of capacity building. Some

components of longer-term engagements are often quite close to other EU instruments including tools for development. The current planning mechanisms are not well-suited for either, being too cumbersome for short-term engagements and too disjointed for long-term engagements.[294] One potential avenue of development is to advance both long-term engagement, especially in Europe's close neighbourhood, but simultaneously develop shorter-term, clearly defined engagements. These short-term engagements could be specifically designed to complement the work done by other international organisations.

This study demonstrates the value of large-scale macro level studies of CSDP missions and operations, which are often studied in isolation or with focus on individual criteria, aspects or operation type. These studies offer limited potential of identifying generalised lessons identified of CSDP missions and operations especially due to the large variation within missions and operations. Further, the commitment of EU staff to CSDP missions and operations is also translated into a drive to do things well. When structural impediments influence the ability of EU personnel to carry out their tasks, frustration and criticism are natural. In the case studies, it became very clear that the most avid criticism of the EU comes from EU actors themselves. Sometimes this criticism is misinterpreted as criticism of crisis management in general or the structures in place. Rather the criticism is based on understanding the unique and valuable possibilities that CSDP missions and operations have to help those in need, and frustration of not being able to do the best possible work. The lessons identified and the potentials listed here should be understood in the same context. Our studies have shown the positive potential and value of CSDP missions and operations, but we also encourage their further development.

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[294] D4.3 Study Report of the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Afghanistan 2016, IECEU, 653371, 53.

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APPENDIXES

Appendix A: All 56 Potentials Identified

1. Increase resources in planning to ensure on-going planning during the mission life span

2. Emphasise the importance of mandate design and resource mandate creation accordingly

3. Consider building mandates around one thematic priority (e.g. policing, judiciary or training) while ensuring there is flexibility for the Mission implementation plan

4. Ensure on-going, long-term planning support and active engagement though-out the mission lifecycle: timely and flexible decision making, improving situational awareness, being present in early discussions where international intervention is discussed

5. Standardise templates, reports and feedback, especially MIP template, wherever possible

6. Set-up early communication on future operational resources to ensure that planned missions have the resources they need

7. Create a timeframe for crisis management with establishment of clear end state and exit strategies already before a mission/operation is launched. Encourage strategic leadership to deal with changes in circumstances

8. One pipeline: create a unified planning mechanism for both missions and operations for joint-missions wherever possible

9. Set-up a start-up kit that has all main components for setting up a mission and operation to expedite getting the mission/operation fully functional

10. Strengthen the role of operational planning to take advantage of local possibilities

11. Aim to increase rotation length where possible

12. Encourage creation of simple templates and easily usable standards where possible

13. Encourage the creation of a joint mission/ operation culture

14. Focus on staffing, and member state contributions

15. Create a channel to the ground, so there are no national bottlenecks in the reporting of misconducts

16. Deincentivise non-reporting

17. Strengthen unified mechanisms of dealing with misconducts

18. Ensure there is an anonymous mechanism for reporting available also to non-EU actors including locals

19. Ensure that personnel can be removed from their posts without negative consequences to the mission, if need be

20. Consider on-going external evaluation processes for missions and operations to encourage learning

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21. Develop common IT technologies for CSDP missions and operations to enhance effectiveness and interoperability

22. Link development of technologies both to CSDP mission/operation needs but also to the needs identified in host country

23. Tailor training to the technology in use or provide new technology in the training (train & equip)

24. Consider creating set standards for local procurement of technology

25. Create mechanisms, including a"start-up kit", to shorten procurement processes in the beginning of missions/operations

26. Provide secure communications from the beginning of deployment

27. Create shared standards/technologies/planning mechanisms for civilian and military missions and operations to enhance interoperability

28. Develop the current warehouse concept to encourage standardisation

29. Recognise that there are limits to interoperability as the local contexts differ greatly

30. Emphasise potentials (especially in training and technology) for interoperability specifically in terms of civ-civ, and civ-mil cooperation

31. Encourage an interoperability positive mind-set

32. Prioritise HR and focus on recruitment processes

33. Include soft skills assessment especially for more strategic roles

34. Ensure that skype video interviews or interviews in person in Brussels for higher roles are possible

35. Emphasise contextual knowledge, intercultural communication, flexibility and respect

36. Standardise requirements for all personnel whenever possible (including e.g. medical and security certification)

37. Make pre-deployment training mandatory with no caveats

38. Develop more task- and context-specific training and ensure that it is available in missions and operations

39. Consider combining training with equipment allocation

40. Create structures and a mind-set that allows the removal of unsuitable personnel quickly and efficiently

41. Prioritise personnel considerations as committed personnel are the EUs core resource in crisis management

42. Double-hatting for EU institutions can effectively aid coordination.

43. Encourage mentoring and communication between missions and operations

44. Emphasise using an agreed working definition of central EU concepts

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45. Create communication plans, engage with media. Hearts and minds matter- public perception of a mission/operation helps or hinders operation

46. Formalizing some relationships for all forms of coordination may enable better longer-term cooperation as ad hoc relationships are often lost

47. Consider reach (representation) results (follow-up), structures (creating invitation lists) renewal (revisiting invitation lists) and reliability (both in terms of regular meetings but also openness of communication in ad hoc local engagement

48. Emphasise speaking with one "EU voice" externally to avoid confusion

49. Some projects for short reconstruction projects may aid mission/operation´s activities and aid in confidence building

50. Avoid prioritising expediency over efficiency and consider the value of coordination to the mission/operation.

51. Double-hatting may lead to higher degrees of acceptance

52. Promote human rights mapping especially when improving the capabilities of local security providers

53. Continue mainstreaming gender and human rights considerations

54. Advocate gender-sensitive media campaigns

55. Including gender-specific consideration when dealing with considerations of what is a safe and secure environment

56. Actively encourage strides towards gender parity within operations/missions

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> **Appendix B: Questionnaire of the Analytical Survey**

D5.1 Analytical Syrvey

Dear Participant,

This questionnaire is aimed at researchers who conducted research for case studies in WP2, WP3, and WP4. Please make sure that it is circulated within your organization.

Please answer the questionnaire no later than on the 31st of January 2017.

The survey consists of 43 questions and should not take you more than 20 minutes to complete. It is a key mechanism of gathering quantitative information for D5.1.

Thank you!

I N S T R U C T I O N S

The survey consists of 20 statements concerning the capabilities of the mission (items 2, 4, 6...). Based on the interviews and other information available to you, please evaluate how well each statement describes the mission or operation under study. Use the scale provided from 0 to 10 where 0 means that the statement describes the mission very poorly and 10 means that the statement describes the mission very well.

After each statement, there will be follow-up question on the significance of the statement formulated "How did this contribute to the success of the mission?" (items 3, 5, 7...). Based on the interviews and other information available to you, evaluate the significance of the previous question in your case study using a scale from −5 to +5. Here −5 means that the factor evaluated in the previous item hindered the success of the mission greatly, 0 means that it had no effect on the success of the mission, and +5 that the previously mentioned matter contributed to the success of the mission greatly and positively.

Together the two evaluate both the capability itself and the significance of the capability on the overall success of the mission.

If the topic has not been investigated in your case study and you have no information to base your answer on, please choose "I don't know".

Please note: the survey is based on the knowledge that you have.

The questionnaire refers to both civil missions and military operations as "missions".

<u>Respondent information</u>

1) Select which one of the following missions you have studied in WP2, WP3, or WP4.

   Please answer to the following questionnaire regarding this particular operation or mission.

   EULEX Kosovo

   EUFOR ALTHEA Bosnia Herzegovina

   EUSEC RD Congo

   EUPOL RD Congo

   EUAVSEC South Sudan

   EUFOR RCA Central African Republic

   EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories

   EUBAM RAFAH Palestinian Territories

   EUBAM Libya

   EUPOL Afghanistan

<u>Capabilities and their influence on the success of the mission</u>

<u>1. Planning capacity</u>

2) Circumstances and the situation in the receiving country were investigated adequately before planning the mission.

0 The statement describes the mission very poorly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 The statement describes the mission very well	I don't know

3) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

   −5   0 No   +5

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Hindered the success of mission greatly	−4	−3	−2	−1	effect on the the success of mission	+1	+2	+3	+4	Contributed to the success of the the mission greatly	I don't know

4) The objectives defined in the mandate(s) of the mission were valid, realistic, and clear.

0 The statement describes the mission very poorly	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 The statement describes the mission very well	I don't know

5) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

−5 Hindered the success of mission greatly	−4	−3	−2	−1	0 No effect on the the success of mission	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5 Contributed to the success of the the mission greatly	I don't know

6) The mandate(s) of the mission left sufficient space for decision making at field-operational level.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

7) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

8) The Operation Plan(s) (OPLAN) as a whole was/were well formulated.

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Options as in questions 2 and 4.

9) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

2. Operational capacities

10) The mission had sufficient financial resources to successfully fulfil its objectives.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

11) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

12) The command and control structure of the mission was clear and adequate.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

13) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

14) The duration of the rotation cycle of staff was suitable for the mission.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

15) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

16) The mission had enough staff in numbers to successfully fulfil its objectives.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

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17) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

18) During the mission communication and the flow of information within the mission was functional.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

19) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

20) During the mission communication and the flow of information between "Brussels" and the mission was functional.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

21) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

22) Lessons learned from earlier missions were well utilised in different phases of the mission.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

23) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

3. Interoperability

24) There was efficient pooling and sharing between contributing countries.

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Options as in questions 2 and 4.

25) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

4. Competences (knowledge and skills)

26) Those recruited to the mission had adequate knowledge and skills (including language skills, education, communication skills, working experience etc.) to successfully carry out their tasks.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

27) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

28) Those recruited for the mission had sufficient and well suited pre-deployment training.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

29) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

30) In-mission training and hand over were sufficient and well suited.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

31) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

5. Comprehensiveness

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32) The mission was well integrated in the EU's comprehensive approach in the receiving country.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

33) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

34) The mission coordinated well with other international actors working in the receiving country.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

35) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

36) The mission coordinated well with local actors.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

37) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

6. Technologies

38) Information and telecommunication technology (including computers, data systems, programs, communication networks etc.) given to the staff of the mission was sufficient and practical.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

39) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

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40) Other technologies (including vehicles, uniforms, housing etc.) given to the staff of the mission were sufficient and practical.

Options as in questions 2 and 4.

41) How did this contribute to the success of the mission?

Options as in questions 3 and 5.

<u>Success of mission</u>

Please evaluate, how successful the mission under study was as a whole. Take into account the interviews and other available information. Use a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means very unsuccessful and 10 means very successful.

42) All things considered, how successful was the mission?

0 Very unsuccessful	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10 Very successful	I don't know

<u>Additional information</u>

43) Additional comments
In case you want to provide some further information regarding your answers or the topics handled in the questionnaire, please use the field below.

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Appendix C: Further details of the Analytical Survey including correlations

The Analytical Survey included two set of questions. In the first set it was asked how well certain capacity-related questions described missions. In the second set it was asked how the availability/unavailability of the capacities mentioned in the statements effected the success of the mission. For details about the questionnaire, see appendix B.

Total number of answers is 13. Respondents of the survey are researchers who have written the study reports and analysed the material from the interviews conducted as part of IECEU. Thus, although the number of respondents is relatively low it is still reasonable to interpret the outcomes of the survey. These 13 answers cover eight out of ten missions/operations which are under scrutiny in the case studies. The two missions in Democratic Republic of Congo (EUPOL RDC and EUSEC RDC) were answered together, in other words they are treated as one mission in the figures. There were no answers from the two missions in Palestine (EUBAM Rafah and EUPOL COPPS). Discounting the missions in Palestine, the number of answers per mission/operation varies between one and four. In figure 6, the averages are weighted so that each of these missions get equal weight despite of the number of answers per mission. This weighting means that the missions with more answers do not get overemphasised in the figures. In some points figure 6 would seem slightly different if unweighted averages would be presented instead of the weighted averages, however, the general picture and the general conclusions from the data remain same whichever averages are observed.

Appendix C presents the statistical relationship between the answers of the first and the second set of questions. The unit of analysis throughout appendix C is one pair of answers, where the first answer answers the question *how well certain statement describes the mission* and the second answer answers the question *how did this contribute to the success of the mission*. For example, one such pair consists of answers of one respondent to items 10 and 11; in item 10 the respondent was asked how well the statement "The mission had sufficient financial resources to successfully fulfil its objectives" describes the mission and item 11 asks how much this (in)sufficiency of financial resources hindered or contributed to the success of the mission. In total there are 260 this kind of pairs (40 (questions) * 13 (respondents) / 2 (each pair consists of two answers) = 260).

In short, the appendix shows that there is clear and positive dependency between availability/unavailability of capacities and their influence in the success of the mission/operation.

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The better the capacities are available (in other words, the better the statements describe the mission, the x-axis in figures B1 – B8) the more likely it is that they have been considered as contributing to the success of the mission (the y-axis of figures B1 – B8). Respectively, the less the statements describe the mission the more likely it is that this has hindered the success of the mission, according to the answers. This positive relationship was expected. The correlation coefficients (Pearson's *r*) in table B1 indeed generally indicate a strong positive correlation, and at the significance level of 0,05 the results are significant in all but one case. In all but three of these cases the results are also significant at the significance level of 0,005. The Spearman's rank correlation coefficient has also been calculated, although not reported here. Taken into account the linear relationship illustrated in figures B1 – B8 of the following pages, it is unsurprising that the results of Spearman's rank correlation were very similar compared to the Pearson correlation reported in table B1.

As said, figures B1 – B8 show that the relationships between "How well statement describes the mission" and "Did this hinder or contribute to the success of the mission" are linear. Figure 1B shows that one unit change in x-axis causes on average 0,78 unit change in y-axis. In other words, when the statement describes the availability of a capacity one grade better (using scale 0 to 10), it is on average estimated to contribute to the success of the mission/operation 0,78 units more – or hinder the success 0,78 units less (using scale −5 to +5). The equations of the regression lines further show that when different capabilities are observed the relationships of the variables under study are very much alike, although some variation emerges. Comparing different capabilities, the coefficient of x varies between 0,67 and 0,93. These differences in the coefficients could be taken as a hint that, for example, one unit change in the availability/unavailability of competences related capacities has greater impact (coefficient of x is 0,93) on the success of the mission/operation than one unit change in the availability/unavailability of organisational capacities (coefficient of x is 0,67). However, as the wordings of the statements differ and as the differences between capabilities are relatively small, too bold conclusions should not be made.

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Table B1. Correlations between how well statements describe missions and how this contributes to the success of the mission (Notes: *p < 0,05, **p < 0,01, ***p < 0,005, two-tailed)

	Pearson's *r*		N
All questions	0,839	***	242
Planning Capacity	0,785	***	49
Organisational Capacities	0,814	***	86
Interoperability	0,856	***	12
Competences	0,883	***	36
Comprehensiveness	0,921	***	37
Technologies	0,771	***	22
2) Circumstances and the situation in the receiving country were investigated adequately before planning the mission.	0,895	***	12
4) The objectives defined in the mandate(s) of the mission were valid, realistic, and clear.	0,868	***	13
6) The mandate(s) of the mission left sufficient space for decision making at field-operational level.	0,491		13
8) The Operation Plan(s) (OPLAN) as a whole was/were well formulated.	0,729	*	11
10) The mission had sufficient financial resources to successfully fulfil its objectives.	0,863	***	12
12) The command and control structure of the mission was clear and adequate.	0,921	***	12
14) The duration of the rotation cycle of staff was suitable for the mission.	0,975	***	12
16) The mission had enough staff in numbers to successfully fulfil its objectives.	0,703	**	13
18) During the mission communication and the flow of information within the mission was functional.	0,904	***	13
20) During the mission communication and the flow of information between "Brussels" and the mission was functional.	0,896	***	12
22) Lessons learned from earlier missions were well utilised in different phases of the mission.	0,824	***	12
24) There was efficient pooling and sharing between contributing countries.	0,856	***	12
26) Those recruited to the mission had adequate knowledge and skills (including language skills, education, communication skills, working experience etc.) to successfully carry out their tasks.	0,843	***	13
28) Those recruited for the mission had sufficient and well suited pre-deployment training.	0,885	***	13
30) In-mission training and hand over were sufficient and well suited.	0,941	***	10
32) The mission was well integrated in the EU's comprehensive approach in the receiving country.	0,906	***	12
34) The mission coordinated well with other international actors working in the receiving country.	0,922	***	13
36) The mission coordinated well with local actors.	0,936	***	12
38) Information and telecommunication technology (including computers, data systems, programs, communication networks etc.) given to the staff of the mission was sufficient and practical.	0,880	***	11
40) Other technologies (including vehicles, uniforms, housing etc.) given to the staff of the mission were sufficient and practical.	0,664	*	11

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CSA project: 653371
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Figure B1. Scatter plot, answers to all capability related questions

Linear regression line in red,

equation of the line: y = −4,14 + 0,78x

Figure B2. Scatter plot, answers to all capability related questions (data points "jittered")*

*As the used scales only include integers (0, 1, 2, …) several data points are "overlapping" in figure B1; thus the exact number of observations in any single point is impossible to detect. In figure B2 the overlapping points are slightly moved using jitter function so that their quantity is easier to see.

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Figure B3. Scatter plot, answers to planning capacity related questions

Linear regression line in red,

equation of the line: y = −4,47 + 0,84x

Figure B4. Scatter plot, answers to organisational capacities related questions

Linear regression line in red,

equation of the line: y = −3,66 + 0,67x

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CSA project: 653371
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Figure B5. Scatter plot, answers to interoperability related questions

Linear regression line in red,

equation of the line: y = −3,95 + 0,78x

Figure B6. Scatter plot, answers to competences related questions

Linear regression line in red,

equation of the line: y = −4,87 + 0,93x

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CSA project: 653371
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Figure B7. Scatter plot, answers to comprehensiveness related questions

Linear regression line in red,

equation of the line: y = −4,67 + 0,90x

Figure B8. Scatter plot, answers to technologies related questions

Linear regression line in red,

equation of the line: y = −4,16 + 0,77x